Plato Republic 1.339

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον . Herwerden would expunge ταὐτόν, but ταὐτὸν is not more otiose here than τὸ αὐτὸ below.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι . There is here a hint of the main purpose of the Republic, which is to prove that δίκαιον is ξυμφέρον in the truest sense for the individual and the state.

οὐ ‐‐ μέντοι . “In interrogationibus haec particula” ( μέντοι) “ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem” (Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 34). μέντοι is simply ‘of course,’ ‘surely’: ‘surely you regard it as just to obey the rulers, do you not?’ The idiom is frequent in Plato. The other examples of it (cited by Stallbaum) in the Republic are infra 346 A, VII 521 D, IX 581 A, 584 A, X 596 E.

πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι κτλ. The reasoning echoes that of 334 C above.

τιθέναι ‐‐ τίθεσθαι : we should expect τιθέναι in both cases, as the ἄρχοντες according to the theory we are discussing are κρείττονες and supreme as legislators: but the middle of personal interest is naturally used in combination with τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς: cf. infra 341 A.

τί λέγεις σύ ; a favourite eristic formula: see Ar. Clouds 1174 τοῦτο τοὐπιχώριον | ἀτεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τί λέγεις σύ;

τοίνυν : not ‘therefore,’ but ‘also,’ a frequent use in Plato. In the Republic it occurs 29 times, according to Kugler de particulae τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 34.

ὅταν οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τοῖς δέ (i.e. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις). These two clauses depend, not on ὡμολογῆσθαι, but on ποιεῖν: it is just to do τὰ ἀξύμφορα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν as often as the rulers unwillingly prescribe what is evil for themselves and so long as Thrasymachus says it is just for subjects to do what the rulers have prescribed. Desire for brevity and balance leads Plato to put both clauses under the government of ὅταν, although ‘since’ rather than ‘whenever’ is the more appropriate conjunction for introducing the second: for Thrasymachus does not sometimes but always assert that it is just to obey the rulers. The suggested reading φῄς for φῇς would require us to take τοῖς δέ κτλ. as an independent sentence, and leave μὲν in οἱ μέν without a corresponding δέ.

αὐτό is ‘the matter,’ ‘the case before us’: cf. IV 428 A ( αὐτῷ), VII 518 B ( αὐτῶν), 524 E ( αὐτῷ ), Theaet. 172 E al. The text has been needlessly suspected by Madvig and other critics.

οὑτωσί : not ‘in that case’ (Campbell), but (with Jowett) simply ‘thus,’ as explained in δίκαιον—λέγεις: cf. Ap. 26 E οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;

ναὶ μὰ Δία κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark that the first stage has been reached in the refutation of Thrasymachus.

ἐὰν σύ γε is of course ironical. The disciples of the rival disputants now enter the fray.

τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα κτλ. If this, and no more, had been Thrasymachus' definition, it would remain unrefuted; commands would be commands, whether expedient for the rulers or not.

δ ἡγοῖτο ‐‐ ξυμφέρειν . This explanation is involved in Clitophon's earlier statement τὸ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων: that which the rulers κελεύουσι is what they believe to be in their interests. Clitophon's defence finds no justification in the terms of Thrasymachus' definition; but it was the most obvious way of attempting to reconcile that definition with the admission that rulers are capable of erring.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον κτλ. Bonitz ( Zeitschr. f. öst. Gymn. 1865 p. 648), followed by Wohlrab, proposes to add the words τὸ ξυμφέρον after ξυμφέρον, “parum venuste,” as Hartman thinks. Neither is it well (with Hartman) to omit τοῦ κρείττονος. The apparent harshness of the construction (‘that which seems to be the stronger's interest to the stronger’) is justified by its brevity and precision, and by the desire to introduce the exact words of the original definition into its amended form.

συκοφάντης . Cf. (with Tucker) Arist. Soph. El. 15. 174^{b} 9 σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων and Rhet. II 24. 1402^{a} 14 ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν.

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως . Bekker (with whom Shilleto on Dem. F. L. § 91 agrees) would insert μέν after λέγομεν: but (as Schneider remarks) the emphasis on τῷ ῥήματι does duty instead of the particle, and even otherwise, μέν is not essential: cf. III 398 A (where Shilleto would also add μέν), infra 343 C, II 363 E, X 605 C al.

τὸ δέ =‘whereas in point of fact’ is a favourite Platonic idiom: cf. IV 443 C, VII 527 A, 527 D al.

ἐπιλιπούσης . See cr. n. The present, which Stallbaum and others adopt, may be right, but the older reading is at least as good. The failure in knowledge must precede the actual error. For the mistake see Introd. § 5.

ἀποκρίνεσθαι . The imperfect infinitive, as Schneider remarks ( Addit. p. 6).