Plato Republic 1.337

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

χαλεπαίνεσθαι . This strained use of the passive of χαλεπαίνω in order to make the antithesis to ἐλεεῖσθαι formal as well as real is not found elsewhere in Plato. For parallels see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. 1 p. 299.

σαρδάνιον . Plato uses this expression as Homer does, of a sinister smile which bodes pain to others: Od. XX 301 f. μείδησε δὲ θυμῷ | σαρδάνιον μάλα τοῖον (of Odysseus among the suitors). Among later authors it more frequently denotes the forced smile which disguises the sufferer's own pain; and so apparently Simonides used the phrase ( Fr. 202 A Bergk). The explanations volunteered by the ancients apply only to the non-Homeric usage: the Scholiast, however, at the end of his note on this passage correctly remarks, μήποτε οὖν τὸ Ὁμηρικόν, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία ἴσως ἐρρύη, “ μείδησε δὲ κτλ.,” τὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν χειλῶν γέλωτα καὶ μέχρι τοῦ σεσηρέναι γιγνόμενον σημαίνει. The spelling σαρδόνιον came into vogue through the popular etymology from the bitter Sardinian herb, ἧς οἱ γευσάμενοι δοκοῦσι μὲν γελῶντες, σπασμῷ δὲ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν (Schol.). The Scholiast's suggested derivation from σαίρειν ( ringi, as of an angry dog) suits the meaning which the phrase bears in Homer and Plato, and is probably right. Photius' σαρδάζων· μετὰ πικρίας γελῶν preserves the δ .

ποιήσοις is rejected by Cobet and Herwerden. “Post οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ, τί ἄλλο ἤ, πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ verbum omittunt” (says Cobet, quoting Theophr. Char. c. 25). ποιήσοις is not however otiose, but suggests the phrase πάντα ποιεῖν, ‘leave nothing undone,’ as in Euthyph. 8 C πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην: cf. Ap. 39 A .

ἐρωτᾷ . I formerly read ἐρωτῷ (with Goodwin MT. p. 277). A few inferior MSS have ἔροιτο. The optative is certainly the regular periodic construction in clauses of this kind: but the indicative may perhaps be allowed in loose conversational style.

τυγχάνει ὄν . Stallbaum explains ὄν as ‘being true,’ and τι as the subject to τυγχάνει. This view is perhaps less natural than to make ὄν the copula and τι the predicate: for the pronoun ‘it’ i.e. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον (Schneider) can be quite easily understood. For the use of τυγχάνει ὄν (‘really is’) cf. II 379 A, VII 518 E, Euthyph. 4 E with my note ad loc.

ὡς δή . The force of ὡς in this common ironical expression ( quasi vero, cf. Gorg. 468 E , 499 B) is referred by Jebb ( Soph. O. C. 809 ) to an ellipse: ‘(do you mean) forsooth that.’ An objection to this theory is that it will not explain ὡς δή τοι in cases like II 366 C, Phaedr. 242 C , Tim. 26 B . It seems better to explain these usages on the same principle. The view that ὡς is exclamatory will not account for II 366 C, and is not specially appropriate in the other places. Neither is it easy to make ὡς= ἐπεί (‘your illustration is excellent, seeing that the cases are so very similar!’ Tucker). Schneider (on II 366 C) regards ὡς as nearly equivalent to ὥστε (cf. note on II 365 D). Probably ὡς is in reality consequential (like the English ‘so’), the relative retaining its original demonstrative sense. This explanation will, I believe, suit all the passages in question.

περὶ δικαιοσύνης κτλ. περὶ δικαιοσύνης and τούτων are rejected by Herwerden, but the fulness of expression suits the arrogant tone of Thrasymachus.

τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν ; Here and in what follows there is a play on the judicial formula παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, where παθεῖν refers to δεσμός φυγή θάνατος ἀτιμία, and ἀποτεῖσαι to fines. In a δίκη τιμητός, the defendant if found guilty would be asked in the words τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεῖσαι to propose an alternative penalty to that demanded by the accuser; after which it was the duty of the judges finally to assess ( τιμᾶν) the penalty: cf. Ap. 36 B and Laws 933 D. It is partly the paronomasia in the words παθεῖν μαθεῖν (cf. the ancient text πάθος μάθος Aesch. Ag. 176 ) which draws from Thrasymachus the mock compliment ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ (‘you are vastly entertaining’) although (cf. ἆ <*>διστε 348 C) Thrasymachus is also jeering at the simplicity of Socrates.

πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον . Hertz and Herwerden conjecture παθεῖν for μαθεῖν: but this would make Thrasymachus ignore Socrates' identification of παθεῖν with μαθεῖν. In ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον Plato no doubt satirizes (somewhat crudely, it must be allowed) the avarice of Thrasymachus and his class, in contrast with whom Socrates has no money, because his conversations are gratis.

εἰσοίσομεν . The metaphor is from a banquet to which each contributes his share: cf. Symp. 177 C ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ ἅμα μὲν τούτῳ ἔρανὀν εἰσενεγκεῖν κτλ.

ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ . See cr. n. The retention of εἴη after αὐτ ῷ can only be defended by regarding μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων as equivalent to εἰ μὴ εἰδείη μηδὲ φάσκοι and carrying on the εἰ; but this is excessively harsh and no parallel has yet been adduced. Of the two alternatives, to insert an εἰ before ἀπειρημένον or εἴη, and to drop εἴη (with Bremius), I prefer the latter as simpler in itself and accounting more easily for the corruption. The accusative absolute may have been misunderstood and εἴη inserted by a negligent reader owing to εἰ in the previous line. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 137) inserts δ) before αὐτῷ and retains εἴη, regarding εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται and ἀπειρημένον δ’ αὐτῷ εἴη as coordinate clauses under the rule of the same εἰ; but to this there are many objections. Tucker's suggestion εἰ, ὅ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη κτλ. (‘if, in regard to whatever he thinks about them, it were forbidden’ etc.) strikes me as heavy and cumbrous.