[337]
You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive
337a
from clever fellows like you than severity.
And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony 1 of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you. That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, 337b and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, 337c or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him? Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn’t be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then, 337d he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity, 2 said he; but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, 337e said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.
And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony 1 of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you. That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, 337b and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, 337c or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him? Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn’t be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then, 337d he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity, 2 said he; but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, 337e said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.
Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.
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