Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 7.518

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[518] “But a sensible man,” 518a I said, “would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,¹ and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh² unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or 518b whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.³ And so⁴ he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.” “That is a very fair statement,” he said.
“Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions.⁵ 518c What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting⁶ vision into blind eyes.” “They do indeed,” he said. “But our present argument indicates,” said I, “that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periact⁷ in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. 518d And this, we say, is the good,⁸ do we not?” Yes. “Of this very thing, then,” I said, “there might be an art,⁹ an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.” “Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “Then the other so-called virtues¹⁰ of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. 518e For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit¹¹ and practice. But the excellence of thought,¹² it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, 519a or, again, useless and harmful.

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 7.518 focus

[518] 518a
ἀλλʼ εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μεμνῇτʼ ἂν ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ φανοτέρου βίου ἥκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότωται, ἢ ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς 518b ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπʼ αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, ἧττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ.
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.
δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτʼ ἀληθῆ· τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ 518c ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες.
φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ σὺν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη· τοῦτο δʼ εἶναί φαμεν 518d τἀγαθόν. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι.
ἔοικεν γάρ, ἔφη.
αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος—τῷ ὄντι γὰρ 518e οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν—ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον 519a καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται.

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Aristotle, De an. 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is ἀόρατον but otherwise than the dark.

2. Cf. Theaet. 175 D-E.

3. Lit. or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light.

4. i.e. only after that. For οὕτω δή in this sense cf. 484 D, 429 D, 443 E, Charm. 171 E.

5. ἐπαγγελλόμενοι connotes the boastfulness of their claims. Cf. Protag. 319 A, Gorg. 447 c, Laches 186 C, Euthyd. 273 E, Isoc. Soph. 1, 5, 9, 10, Antid. 193, Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 1, i. 2. 8, Aristot. Rhet. 1402 a 25.

6. Cf. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum compares Eurip. Hippol. 917 f. Similarly Anon. Theaet. Comm. (Berlin, 1905), p. 32, 48. 4

καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνήσεως

. Cf. also St. Augustine:

Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae;

and Emerson’s

strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul.

7. περιακτέον is probably a reference to the περίακτοι or triangular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, as a number of classical plays seem to have required something of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio s. v. Machine, p. 1469.

8. Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysticism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. Some teachers will concur.

9. Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 E p. 22, note b. Adam is mistaken in taking it Education ( ἡ παιδεία) would be an art, etc.

10. This then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the Protagoras and Meno. The intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle’s term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by the grace of God. In a reformed state it could be systematically inculcated and taught. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 51-512 on Meno 70 A. but we need not infer that Plato did not believe in mental discipline. cf. Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, p. 164

The conception of mental discipline is a least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the seventh book of the Republic . . .

11. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 a 14-17

ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους

. Plato does not explicitly name ethical and intellectual virtues. Cf. Fox, op. cit. p. 104

Plato correctly believed . . .

12. Plato uses such synonyms as φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια, etc., as suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristotelian meticulousness.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

φανότερον (‘greater brightness,’ ‘more light’) and λαμπροτέρου are neuter. The omission of articles elevates the style. Richards would delete ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου, but the words balance ὑπὸ ἀηθείας exactly as ἐσκότωται balances μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται (‘has been dazzled’). Any stronger antithesis than ὑπὸ ἀηθείας would give a false meaning, for the blindness is not caused by σκότος, but only by ἀήθεια: ξυνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ κτλ. (520 C).

εἰ γελᾶν κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 175 B , D. There is more of pity than of malice in Plato's philosophic smile.

αὐτῶν : ‘the subject before us’: cf. VI 511 C, and αὐτό in I 339 E note

ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κτλ. ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι of sophistic ‘professions’ is almost technical: cf. e.g. Prot. 319 A , Gorg. 447 C and Isocr. Soph. 1. τινές from its position is emphatic, and makes us halfsuspect some allusion to a particular Sophist: cf. Aristotle's use of τινές (Bonitz Ind. Arist. p. 598). Similar sophistic ἐπαγγέλματα are ridiculed, though on different grounds, by Isocrates Soph. 2 ff.: see also Prot. 318 E ff. and Euthyd. 273 D ff. ( ἀρετήν, ἔφη sc. ὁ Εὐθύδημος,— οἰόμεθα οἵω τ’ εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα), and cf. Newman Politics of Aristotle I p. 387. It should be mentioned that the double εἶναι has been suspected by Richards, who would omit the first; but Plato himself is not averse to such repetitions: cf. μετέχειν— μετέχειν in VI 511 E and X 621 B note

ἐντιθέναι . Cf. Theognis 429—438 ( εἰ δ’ ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νοήμα 435). The grossly material and mechanical view of education which Plato here attacks has some affinity with what is sometimes called ‘cram.’ ἐντιθέναι was used of a nurse feeding children (I 345 B note); but such an allusion, though not in itself inappropriate, is scarcely intended here. Cf. also Symp. 175 D , E.

ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος κτλ. Sophists profess to put ἐπιστήμη into the soul; but Plato's argument indicates that the power or faculty of ἐπιστήμη ( ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν), and its organ νοῦς are already present in the soul of each individual, just as ὄψις and ὄμμα are already possessed by the prisoners in the cave. νοῦς is in fact the θεῖόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν, according to Plato, through whose indwelling man is most truly man by being like to God (VI 501 B, IX 589 D notes). The doctrine that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις implies what is fundamentally the same view: see Meno 81 A ff. and Phaed. 72 E —76 D, especially 73 A ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσειν. We may even go further and say that Plato's conception of the divine element in man is the ultimate basis of all his proofs of Immortality. In its deeper bearings, therefore, the view of education here presented is incomparably grander and more profound than the usual connotation of the word either in ancient or in modern times. We educate our pupils not only for time, but for eternity, and therefore πείρας οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωμεν λόγοις (VI 498 D). See also X 618 C ff. and Phaed. 107 D f. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Αἵδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς κτλ. Michael Angelo used to say that every block of marble contained a statue, and that the sculptor brings it to light by cutting away the encumbrances by which the ‘human face divine’ is concealed. In like manner, according to Plato, it is the business of the teacher to prune the soul of his pupil of those unnatural excrescences and incrustations which hide its true nature (519 A, B note), until the human soul divine (VI 501 B note) stands out in all its pristine grace and purity. It should carefully be noted that in Plato's theory of education the entire soul is involved ( ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ). The Platonic περιαγωγή, although, or rather, perhaps, because, it applies primarily and immediately to the intellect, effects a moral no less than an intellectual revolution. The moral discipline of Books II—IV, so far from being overthrown, is strengthened and consolidated by being intellectualised. Cf. also 519 A B note

ἑκάστου . ἑκάστῳ was read by Iamblichus ( Protrept. 16) for ἑκάστου: but cf. 527 D note

ξύν . See on IV 424 D. Here, as in Gorg. 513 A and Laws 678 C, it implies an intimate, almost organic, connexion (‘in conjunction with’). Lina ( de praepos. usu Plat. p. 33) is mistaken in holding that ξύν introduces a mere “Anhängsel” in this passage.

τούτου τοίνυν κτλ. “Construe: ( ἡ παιδεία) εἴη ἂν τέχνη τῆς περιαγωγῆς (i.q. τοῦ περιάγειν, quod praecedit) τούτου αὐτοῦ ( τοῦ ὀργάνου τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος)— οὐ ( τέχνη ) τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν—ἀλλὰ ( τοῦ) μηχανήσασθαι τοῦτο ( ὥστε βλέπειν οἷ ἔδει)” Ast. This interpretation is, I believe, correct. Plato began by asserting that Education is not what certain Sophists declare it to be—the putting of sight, as it were, into blind eyes. For there is already in every man's soul an eye or ὄργανον, which sees or learns already; what is required is to turn this ὄργανον round. Hence he concludes ( τοίνυν) Education is not (as the Sophists say) an art of putting sight into the soul's eye ( τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν refers to τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες), but an art of turning round just this very eye or ὄργανον which is present in every soul from the first. The prevailing view since Schneider regards τούτου αὐτοῦ as anticipating and explained by, not as depending on, τῆς περιαγωγῆς. This yields a tolerable sense, but makes it difficult to supply the subject of μεταστραφήσεται, and αὐτῷ is also awkward. On Ast's view τίνα— μεταστραφήσεται explains τούτου αὐτοῦ τῆς περιαγωγῆς, and the subject of μεταστραφήσεται as well as the antecedent of αὐτῷ is at once seen to be τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, for it is identical with the antecedent of τούτου αὐτοῦ.

τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι κτλ. The genitive has been wrongly taken as one of the rare examples in good Greek of an independent final infinitive (Weiske quoted in A. J. Ph. IV p. 418), a construction for which see Jannaris Historical Greek Grammar pp. 483, 578. It depends on τέχνη: see last note. For διαμηχανήσασθαι Ast (with some inferior MSS) reads δὴ μηχανήσασθαι: but cf. (with Schneider) Laws 746 C τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται.

αἱ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ. ἄλλαι is anticipative )( ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι below. καλούμεναι (as Bosanquet points out) should be taken with ψυχῆς (lit. ‘which are called soul's’ i.e. ‘which are commonly said to belong to the soul’). Plato does not mean to deny that they are virtues, but they do not belong to soul essentially and from the first. Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 185 ff.), who, with the editors generally, takes καλούμεναι as ‘sogenannten,’ affirms that Plato here discards the virtues of Book IV; but he is merely contrasting these and other virtues or excellencies with νόησις.

ἐγγύς τι εἶναι . Campbell conjectures ἐγγύς τι τείνειν. I once thought of ἐγγύς τι τεῖναι, taking the aorist as an explicit reference to the ethical virtues already discussed; but the text is doubtless sound: cf. V 472 C and VIII 544 D ( μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν).

ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν . Aristotle Nic. Eth. II 1 is in effect a commentary on this text: note in particular ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ ( ἀρετὴ) ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται (1103^{a} 17)— οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται (ibid. 19)— τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον (1103^{a} 31).

ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι κτλ. The ἀρετή of φρονῆσαι (= νόησις or the exercise of νοῦς) is not merely καλουμένη ψυχῆς, but does in reality belong to (for τυγχάνει οὖσα cf. I 337 B note)—is an essential attribute of—something more divine (than that to which the other virtues belong), viz. νοῦς. The meaning of φρόνησις has changed since IV 433 B (see on IV 428 B) in conformity with the intellectualism of Books VI and VII.

παντὸς μᾶλλον has been suspected, and Madvig proposes ὑφάσματος or πλάσματος μᾶλλον, Richards ὀργάνου μᾶλλον: but the text is indubitably sound. The phrase, like πάντων μάλιστα, means ‘most assuredly,’ and has nothing to do with the comparative θειοτέρου, but emphasises the whole assertion exactly as in Crit. 49 B and Prot. 344 B .

τὴν μὲν δύναμιν κτλ. Plato means that νοῦς can never lose its power or function, which is νόησις. οὐδέποτε should not be limited to this life. The Peripatetic doctrine of “das unsterbliche Attribut der denkenden Function” is here foreshadowed, as Krohn observes ( Pl. St. p. 160). See also on 518 C.

ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς is equivalent to ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς τε καὶ μή (‘according as it is or is not turned round’). See on VI 498 A.

δριμὺ μὲν κτλ. δριμύ is ‘shrewdly.’ ‘astutely,’ like a quick-sighted lawyer: cf. (with J. and C.) Theaet. 175 D τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν. For ταῦτα Cobet needlessly proposes τά: cf. 519 B note Instead of ὥστε (which three MSS omit) Ast conjectured καί, and E. S. Thompson ( Camb. Phil. Soc. Proceed. XXI p. 13) ὥς τε: but the clause ὅσῳ—ἐργαζόμενον is a logical inference from οὐ φαύλην—ὑπηρετεῖν and should not therefore be introduced by καί, still less by ὥς τε. I formerly printed ἐργάζεται ( Ξ and the three MSS already referred to reading ἐργάσεται), but the finite verb is not likely to have been corrupted into a participle, and exactly the same ungrammatical assimilation appears with ὥστε in Andoc. 4. 20, Isaeus 9. 16 and Isocr. Paneg. 64, 65 (quoted by Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1015 note 3). The instances cited by Schneider ( Addit. p. 52) viz. Tim. 56 B , [ Eryx.] 404 A and Thuc. I 25 are not strictly parallel to this.

τὰς τῆς γενέσεως κτλ. : ‘as it were the leaden weights, which are of the family of Becoming, and which, through indulgences in eating and through pleasures and gluttonous desires connected with such like indulgences, adhere to it’ (i.e. to such a nature, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως) ‘and turn the soul's vision round below.’ The eye of the soul ought to be turned round ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου (518 C): and it is our duty to shake the soul clear of τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς μολυβδίδας. For γενέσεως see on VI 485 B, and cf. μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ’ ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν infra 525 C and 525 B, 526 E, 534 A al. With ξυγγενεῖς cf. VIII 554 D where τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίας = τὰς κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας. The μολυβδίδες are the accumulated products of sensual indulgence and desire: see X 611 C ff., especially ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ, ἅτε γῆν ἑστιωμένῃ, γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἑστιάσεων 611 E—612 A, and Phaed. 81 C together with Ep. VII 326 B. Cf. also Clement Strom. IV 4 p. 1228 C Migne ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας. These μολυβδίδες are akin to the world of γένεσις because they are σωματοειδῆ, γεώδη, γεηρά (Plato ll. cc.), of the earth earthy. They become incorporate with the soul ( προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι, cf. προσπεφυκέναι X 611 D), making it, as Plato does not hesitate to say, σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἅπερ ἃν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ ( Phaed. 83 D , cf. ib. 82 E, 83 C). Milton is platonizing when he tells how the soul “grows clotted by con tagion, Imbodies and imbrutes, till she quite lose The divine property of her first being” ( Comus 464 ff.). Through the weight of these encumbrances the eye of the soul is turned down (cf. IX 586 A κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας κτλ.), nor can the soul look upwards until they are knocked away ( περιεκόπη: cf. περικρουσθεῖσα in X 611 E). We may again compare the lines of Milton “Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell From Heaven; for e'en in Heaven his looks and thoughts Were always downward bent” ( Par. Lost I 679 ff.). For περικάτω cf. Photius περικάτω τραπήσεται· ἀντὶ τοῦ περιτραπήσεται κάτω. The περι‐ balances περι‐ in περιεστρέφετο just below. Instead of ἐδωδαῖς, Jackson suggests ἐδωδῆς, comparing III 389 E τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν. The proposal is attractive and may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient reason for departing from the MSS. See also on περικάτω and the whole of this difficult and highly important sentence, App. V.

ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν κτλ. For the anacoluthon cf. Laws 810 D, E (Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 37). Cobet gratuitously adds τά before ἐφ’ ἅ. Cf. 519 A note With the sentiment cf. VI 491 C, D notes, 494 C ff. notes Plato may well be thinking of Alcibiades again. The present passage is a conspicuous proof of the almost boundless influence which Plato ascribed to education, when applied to gifted natures.

σκοπὸν ‐‐ ἕνα κτλ. The εἷς σκοπός of Plato's guardians is the Idea of Good, which is therefore clearly not only a metaphysical but also an ethical concept—the goal of conduct as well as the ultimate cause of knowledge and existence. Cf. 540 A and App. III.

ἑκόντες εἶναι . I 336 E note

τῶν οἰκιστῶν =‘the founders’ is in explanatory apposition with ἡμέτερον .

ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν . VI 505 A.

ἰδεῖν τε κτλ. depends on ἀναγκάσαι and explains ἀφικέσθαι—μέγιστον (J. and C.). τε balances καί before ἀναβῆναι. This explanation is better than to regard τε as ‘and’ (with Schneider and D. and V.).

ἔπειτα and ε<*>τα are used like our ‘what!’ in indignant or quasi-indignant questions. Cf. Gorg. 466 C , Ap. 28 B and elsewhere, with Blaydes on Ar. Av. 911 .

ἐπελάθου κτλ. πάλιν does not mean that Glauco has forgotten twice, but only that he remembered before. The emphasis falls on ἐπελάθου rather than on πάλιν. Plato is thinking of V 466 A, where Glauco says μέμνημαι when challenged on this point. To this explanation, which he gives as an alternative, Schneider inclines to prefer the view which sees in πάλιν a reference directly to IV 419 A ff. But the interlocutor there is Adimantus, not Glauco, and even Adimantus in IV could not strictly be said to forget what Socrates for the first time expressly asserts (IV 420 B οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο—ἡ πόλις) in reply to Adimantus' difficulties.

νόμῳ is the reading of all the best MSS, and was restored by Schneider for νομοθέτῃ. Law is personified throughout the whole sentence: cf. (with Schneider) Tim. 24 B . νομοθέτῃ gives a good sense, but is weaker than νόμῳ: Law, we feel, is free from selfishness and partiality, but a legislator need not be.

Plato Republic 7.518

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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