Plato Republic 5.471

οὐδὲ ὀνομάσσυσιν : much less consider it so.

σωφρονιοῦσιν . The word σωφρονίζω (‘make σώφρων,’ i.e. ‘chastise’) implies the remedial view of punishment: see on II 380 B.

οὐ πολέμιοι . A few inferior MSS read ὡς οὐ πολέμιοι, and ὡς appears also in the margin of A. Campbell suggests <καὶ> οὐ πολέμιοι, Förster <ὡς> σωφρονισταί; but neither suggestion is nearly so expressive and good as the reading of the best MSS.

αὑτοῖς . The ambiguity in αὑτοῖς can mislead nobody, and αὐτοῖς (Hartman, with A etc.) would be very unpleasing. In such cases the authority of Plato's MSS is nought. The behaviour of Athens in connexion with the Mitylenean revolt is a conspicuous example of the inhumanity which Plato here condemns: see Thuc. III 36 ff.

ἀλγούντων . “Significatur necessitas innocentibus quoque damnum inferendi, quo nocentes punire et ad pacem adigere cogantur” Schneider.

τοὺς ἐναντίους . “Graecos adversarios vocat, non hostes” Stallbaum. q has Ἕλληνας for ἐναντίους—an obvious ‘interpretamentum.’

πρὸς δὲ ‐‐ ἀλλήλους . A bitter commentary on the foreign policy of Greek cities. The ‘natural’ relations between Greece and Barbary had been reversed: not only did Greeks treat Greeks as enemies, but they had begun to treat barbarians as friends. Christ ( Pl. Stud. pp. 37—39) supposes that Plato wrote this passage in 374, when Plataea was destroyed by Thebes, and the surviving inhabitants fled to Athens ( Xen. Hell. VI 3. 1 , Isocr. Plat. 1 ff.). The same view is held by Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 662. Plato's rebuke would have been equally or even more telling in 386, when Greece was exhausted by the Corinthian war, and friendship with the ‘natural enemy’ had forced the peace of Antalcidas upon the Greeks, to the bitter grief and shame of patriots: cf. Isocr. Paneg. 120, 121. In any case νῦν should no doubt be referred to the time when Plato wrote these words, and not to the date of action of the dialogue. See also Introd. § 4.

ὡς δυνατή . In a certain sense, this has already been proved, for the city is κατὰ φύσιν: cf. 456 C, 466 D. We have, however, still to shew that the harmony with nature can be attained, and this is what Plato proceeds to do.

ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε κτλ. We should expect ὁμολογῶ after ᾗ γένοιτο, but anacolutha after ὅτι are so frequent that something of the sort may be mentally supplied: cf. I 352 B, V 465 A notes Richards would insert ὁμολογῶ in the text. I formerly proposed καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω, <καὶ> ἃ σὺ παραλείπεις ὅτι κτλ., ‘I too assert’ (sc. no less than you), ‘and also what you omit, that’ etc., but now acquiesce in the anacoluthon.

φόβων ‐‐ ἐχθροῖς . Cf. Laws 806 B.

στραγγευομένῳ . See cr. n. στρατευομένῳ could only be understood (with Stallbaum, who retains it, and Huber zu den Plat. Gleichnissen p. 10) as half-jocular for ‘de re militari disputanti.’ Such a usage is possible in itself (see on ἀποτίνουσι II 363 C); but ὤκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη and μὴ διάτριβε (in B) are strongly in favour of στραγγευομένῳ. The same corruption—due to confusion of γ and τ, combined with lipography—occurs in the MSS of Ar. Ach. 126 , as well as in Hesychius ( στρατεύομαι· διατρίβω) and elsewhere: see Blaydes on Ar. l.c.

τὼ δύο κύματε . See 457 B, C. The first was ὡς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τούς τε φύλακας καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας; the second community of wives and children.

λέγειν λόγον τε . J. and C. read λόγον λέγειν τε with Ξ and Μ; but the other reading has far more authority, and is perhaps exquisitius. Cf. 452 A.

ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο ; See cr. n. γε after τοῦτο is certainly wrong. It has no MS authority except that of A^{2}, and (as Stallbaum shews) ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο is the regular form of this phrase in Plato: cf. Gorg. 497 E , Charm. 164 A . In both these cases the reply is Οὐδέν, followed by ἀλλά, as here.

παραδείγματος κτλ. παράδειγμα is not here an ‘illustration,’ but a ‘model’ or ‘standard’ (“Musterbild” Schneider) exactly as in IX 592 B and Theaet. 176 E .

αὐτό ‐‐ δικαιοσύνην : ‘justice by itself’: see II 363 A note Here however the expression means ‘abstract justice’ rather than merely ‘justice apart from its consequences.’ It is not yet a metaphysical ‘Idea’ in the sense of VI and VII: see on III 402 C, and cf. Pfleiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 19 with Susemihl Gen. Entw. II pp. 176 f.

καὶ ἄνδρα κτλ. : ‘and the man who is perfectly just if he should come into existence, and what his character would be if he did.’ εἰ γένοιτο must be understood as a kind of protasis to τὸν τελέως δίκαιον (i.q. τὸν τελέως ὄντα or ἂν ὄντα δίκαιον). Schneider's explanation is less simple: “virum perfecte iustum quaesituri ea conditione rem susceperant, si fieri et existere talis posset.” We must beware of translating ‘num existeret’ (Stallbaum): for it is just in order to shew the irrelevancy of the question, ‘Can such a man exist?’ that Plato wrote this sentence. Madvig omits καί before οἷος. In that case εἰ γένοιτο goes with the following clause (cf. IV 419 A note), and the meaning is: ‘if he should come into existence, what his character would be when he did.’ By this means we obtain an exact parallel between δικαιοσύνην οἷόν <*>στι and ἄνδρα—οἷος ἂν εἴη. It must be admitted, I think, that the emendation is an improvement: but the MS reading may stand. Campbell needlessly questions εἰ γένοιτο, thinking it a gloss on γενόμενος. The pleonasm is characteristic: cf. 471 C εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ’ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὰ ᾗ γένοιτο.

καὶ ἀδικίαν αὖ κτλ. See IV 420 C note

ἵνα ‐‐ ἕξειν . Cf. VIII 544 A.

ἐκείνοις . See cr. n. ἐκείνης, which Schneider alone retains, can hardly be defended. For the error see Introd. § 5.

τοῦτο μέν . On μέν without δέ see 475 E note

οἴει ‐‐ ἄνδρα . For οἴει <*>ν Richards reads οἴει δή: but δή is unpleasing here. See also on 450 C. After ἂν—εἶναι we might expect δς ἂν—μὴ ἔχοι, ‘who would not be able,’ and so Ξ, q and several other MSS actually read. The irregularity is however no more than ‘cannot’ for ‘would not be able to’ in English. I have restored οἷος (which used to be read before Bekker) for οἷον (see cr. n.). The corruption is easy, and in such cases the relative regularly agrees with its subject: see Phil. 29 E with Stallbaum's note. It is also wrong in point of sense to refer the relative to παράδειγμα here. Art is credited with higher possibilities in this passage than in Book X, unless we suppose that the painter's κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος is only an artificial combination of individual features imitated from human beings. But in that case the illustration is less apposite; for Plato's perfect city is more than imitation of the actual. See also on X 598 A, and cf. Xen. Mem. III 10. 2 and Arist. Pol. γ. 11. 1281^{b} 10—15.

παράδειγμα κτλ. Cf. Laws 713 B and 739 C—E.

δυνατώτατα κτλ. “Superlativus facultatem, quam relativam dicunt, indicat” Schneider. It is important to observe that Plato does not expect a perfect realisation even when philosophers become kings: cf. 473 E. Why he does not, is explained in 473 A. πάλιν refers to 472 C.