Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 4.443

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[443] For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit¹ of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act 443a than men of a different kind? No one would, he said. And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public? He would. And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements. How could he? Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man. To anyone indeed, 443b he said. And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled? Yes, that and nothing else. Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort? No, by heaven, he said, I do not.
Finished, then, is our dream and perfected —the surmise we spoke of,² that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, 443c we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice. Most assuredly. It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps,³ a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practice carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter⁴ was, as it seems, 443d that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one’s own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one’s self, and the things of one’s self—it means that⁵ a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own,⁶ and having first attained to self-mastery⁷ and beautiful order⁸ within himself,⁹ and having harmonized¹⁰ these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, 443e and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,¹¹ one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming¹² the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science 444a that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance, to be the opinion¹³ that in turn presides¹⁴ over this.

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 4.443 focus

[443]
οἷον εἰ δέοι ἡμᾶς ἀνομολογεῖσθαι περί τε ἐκείνης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνῃ ὁμοίως πεφυκότος τε καὶ τεθραμμένου ἀνδρός, εἰ δοκεῖ ἂν παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου ἢ ἀργυρίου δεξάμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀποστερῆσαι, τίνʼ ἂν οἴει οἰηθῆναι 443a τοῦτον αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι;
οὐδένʼ ἄν, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱεροσυλιῶν καὶ κλοπῶν καὶ προδοσιῶν, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἑταίρων ἢ δημοσίᾳ πόλεων, ἐκτὸς ἂν οὗτος εἴη;
ἐκτός.
καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν γʼ ἂν ἄπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὅρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ὁμολογίας.
πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
μοιχεῖαί γε μὴν καὶ γονέων ἀμέλειαι καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπευσίαι παντὶ ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσήκουσι.
παντὶ μέντοι, ἔφη. 443b
οὐκοῦν τούτων πάντων αἴτιον ὅτι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι;
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
ἔτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἣ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις;
μὰ Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.
τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτετέλεσται, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι ὡς εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ 443c θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι.
παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.
τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα, ὦ Γλαύκων—διʼ ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ—εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτως.
φαίνεται.
τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν 443d ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα 443e συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη, ἐάν τι πράττῃ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πρᾶξιν ἣ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν σῴζῃ τε καὶ συναπεργάζηται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον δὲ 444a πρᾶξιν ἣ ἂν ἀεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ αὖ ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν.

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Cf. on 332 A and Aristotle Rhet. 1383 b 21.

2. ὅ: Cf. on 434 D.

3. The contemplation of the εἴδωλον, image or symbol, leads us to the reality. The reality is always the Platonic Idea. The εἴδωλον, in the case of ordinary things, is the material copy which men mistake for the reality (516 A). In the case of spiritual things and moral ideas, there is no visible image or symbol ( Politicus 286 A), but imperfect analogies, popular definitions, suggestive phrases, as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, well-meant laws and institutions serve as the εἴδωλα in which the philosophic dialectician may find a reflection of the true idea. Cf. on 520 C, Sophist 234 C, Theaetetus 150 B.

4. Cf. Timaeus 86 D, Laws 731 E, Apology 23 A. The reality of justice as distinguished from the εἴδωλον, which in this case is merely the economic division of labor. Adam errs in thinking that the real justice is justice in the soul, and the εἴδωλον is justice in the state. In the state too the division of labor may be taken in the lower or in the higher sense. Cf. on 370 A, Introduction p. xv.

5. μὴ ἐάσαντα . . . δόχαν 444 A: Cf. Gorgias 459 C, 462 C. A series of participles in implied indirect discourse expand the meaning of τὴν ἐντός ( πρᾶξιν), and enumerate the conditions precedent (resumed in οὕτω δή443 E; Cf. Protagoras 325 A) of all action which is to be called just if it tends to preserve this inner harmony of the soul, and the reverse if it tends to dissolve it. The subject of πράττειν is anybody or Everyman. For the general type of sentence and the Stoic principle that nothing imports but virtue cf. 591 E and 618 C.

6. Cf. on 433 E.

7. Cf. Gorgias 491 D where Callicles does not understand.

8. Cf. Gorgias 504.

9. Cf. 621 C and on 352 A.

10. The harmony of the three parts of the soul is compared to that of the three fundamental notes or strings in the octave, including any intervening tones, and so by implication any faculties of the soul overlooked in the preceding classification. Cf. Plutarch, Plat. Quest. 9. Proclus, p. 230 Kroll. ὥσπερ introduces the images, the exact application of which is pointed by ἀτεχνῶς. Cf. on 343 C. The scholiast tries to make two octaves ( δὶς διὰ πασῶν) of it. The technical musical details have at the most an antiquarian interest, and in no way affect the thought, which is that of Shakespeare’s

For government, though high and low and lower,

Put into parts, doth keep one in concent,

Congreeing in a full and natural close

Like music.

( Henry V. I. ii. 179) Cf. Cicero, De rep. ii. 42, and Milton ( Reason of Church Government),

Discipline . . . which with her musical chords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together.

11. Cf. Epin. 992 B. The idea was claimed for the Pythagoreans; cf. Zeller I. i. p. 463, Guyau, Esquisse d’une Morale, p. 109

La moralité n’est autre chose que l’unité de l’être.

The key to effective life is unity of life,

says another modern rationalist.

12. ὀνομάζοντα betrays a consciousness that the ordinary meaning of words is somewhat forced for edification. Cf. Laws 864 A-B and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 9, n. 21. Aristotle ( Eth. Nic. 1138 b 6) would regard all this as mere metaphor.

13. ἐπιστήμην . . . δόχαν: a hint of a fundamental distinction, not explicitly mentioned before in the Republic. Cf. Meno 97 B ff. and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 47-49. It is used here rhetorically to exalt justice and disparage injustice. ἀμαθία is a very strong word, possibly used here already in the special Platonic sense: the ignorance that mistakes itself for knowledge. Cf. Sophist.

14. ἐπιστατοῦσαν: Isocrates would have used a synonym instead of repeating the word.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ἱεροσυλιῶν ‐‐ προδοσιῶν . See Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 293 ff., 298 f.

ἄπιστος ‐‐ κατἁ ὅρκους . εὐορκία was an indispensable element in Greek morality: see Nägelsbach l.c. p. 242, and the interesting monograph of Augustin Der Eid im Gr. Volksglauben u. in d. Pl. Ethik Elbing 1894.

μοιχεῖαι ‐‐ ἀθεραπευσίαι . Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 264 ff., 275 ff., 191 ff. The virtue of εὐσέβεια was commonly regarded as δικαιοσύνη ἡ τερὶ τοὺς θεούς (e.g. Euthyph. 12 E ), and εὐσέβεια is concerned with θεῶν θερατεία. See Euthyph. l.c. and cf. also the Stoic Zeno in D. L. VII 119 εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας, and Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX 123.

τέλεον κτλ. The language is suggested by Homer's οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ’ ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται ( Od. XIX 547). ὅ is a vague internal accusative: see on ἣν ᾠήθημεν in 434 D.

ἔφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 433 A. On οἰκίζειν see III 407 B note For κινδυνεύομεν Hartman suggests ἐκινδυνεύομεν; but presents do not of course become imperfects in indirect.

τὸ δέ γε : ‘yes, but in point of fact.’ For τὸ δέ in this sense cf. I 340 D note τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές below expresses the same meaning more fully and emphatically.

δἰ ὃ ‐‐ οὕτως . The imperfect ὠφέλει (see cr. n.), ‘for which reason also it was of service to us,’ viz. in discovering the real or original justice, seems to me better than the present. See II 368 D ff. Plato is justifying himself for having taken so much trouble about a mere εἴδωλον; it was in order to learn the original through the copy. So also Hartman. The present could only mean ‘benefits the city’ (so Schneider, Rettig and others). Madvig, strangely enough, suspects the whole phrase. Civic Justice is an εἴδωλον of Justice in the soul as being its reflection in outward conduct. See also on 443 B ff. above.

τοιοῦτο takes its meaning from τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικόν etc. ‘Justice was indeed something of this kind’ (i.e. a sort of τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν), but not περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν. The warning conveyed by εἶδος and τρόπον τινά in 433 A (where see note), 433 B and 432 E is now justified: for Justice is said to be περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς πρᾶξιν, and is therefore not, strictly speaking, that which we have called ‘Civic Justice.’

ὡς ἀληθῶς should be construed with περὶ ἑαυτόν. The soul is the true self, as Socrates continually maintained. It is better to regard περί before ἑαυτόν as coordinate with περί in περὶ τὴν ἐντός, than to translate “with internal actions which are in very truth concerned with himself” (J. and C.). ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτόν etc. merely emphasizes and explains περὶ τὴν ἐντός.

ἕκαστον . Ast would read ἕκαστον τῶν; but the meaning is easily caught after τὰ ἑαυτοῦ just before.

τῷ ὄντι κτλ. : ‘having set his house in order in the truest sense.’ So Schneider, rightly. For οἰκεῖα cf. III 405 B note

ξυναρμόσαντα ‐‐ ἡρμοσμένον . Cf. 432 A, where a similar image is employed. The figure here is taken from the Octachord, the λογιστικόν being represented by the ὑπάτη or highest string (which gave out the lowest note), the ἐπιθυμητικόν by the νεάτη (an octave higher in pitch), and the θυμοειδές by the μέση or fourth. See Dict. Ant. II p. 195 or Gleditsch Die Musik d. Gr. p. 860. The single notes of a ἁρμονία could be called ὅροι because they were in reality terms in a proportion and depended on the relative length of the string: cf. Tim. 35 B , C. Hartman's correction of νεάτης, ὑπάτης, μέσης to νεάτην, ὑπάτην, μέσην is very attractive: for the genitives can only be explained as ὅρον νεάτης etc., and the effect is unpleasing, especially with ἁρμονίας coming between. Retaining the Greek nomenclature, we may translate: ‘having harmoniously joined together three different elements, just like three terms in a musical proportion or scale, lowest and highest and intermediate,’ etc. In ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξύ Plato indicates (as J. and C. observe) that his threefold division of soul may not be ‘strictly exhaustive’ (cf. VIII 548 D note). The missing faculties would thus correspond to the notes intervening between the ὑπάτη and μέση, and the μέση and νεάτη. It will be noted that the unity resulting is not that of unison, but that of a scale or mode. Nevertheless it is clear from the language used that the ἁρμονία which Plato describes is, as before, σωφροσύνη: cf. ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ with 431 A, B, φίλον γενόμενον with 442 C; κοσμήσαντα too suggests κοσμιότης, and the word σώφρονα itself is finally employed. Cf. 434 C note A different explanation is given by the Scholiast. Holding that Plato is referring to a system of two octaves ( δὶς διὰ πασῶν) he explains νεάτη, μέση and ὑπάτη as e.g. A', A, and b (not a, which is the προσλαμβανόμενος). His note is as follows: νεάτη ἤγουν νήτη ὑπερβολαίων ἡ ἐσχάτη χορδὴ τοῦ δὶς διὰ πασῶν συστήματος, ὑπάτη δὲ ἡ μετὰ τὸν προλαμβανόμενον (leg. προσλαμβανόμενον) φθόγγον πρώτη χορδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δὶς διὰ πασῶν συστήματος. μέση δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ἤτοι φθόγγος ἢ χορδὴ ἡ τελευταία μὲν τοῦ πρώτου διὰ πασῶν, ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὡς εἶναι τούτων κοινήν, ὡς Πτολεμαῖός τέ φησι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι μουσικοί. But in the δὶς διὰ πασῶν σύστημα, the ὑπάτη is not σύμφωνος with the νήτη ὑπερβολαίων, although the προσλαμβανόμενος of course is (see Gleditsch l.c. p. 861 and Euclid Sect. Can. 10 ed. von Jan): so that according to the Scholiast there is a serious breach of συμφωνία. It seems to me quite clear that in ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς—μέσης Plato is thinking of three ξύμφωνοι φθόγγοι, and in the single octave or διὰ πασῶν, the ὑπάτη, μέση or fourth, and νεάτη were σύμφωνα ἀλλήλοις: see Cleonid. Isag. Harm. 5 ed. von Jan. In 432 A also, Plato contemplates only a single octave: see note ad loc.

ἕνα ‐‐ πολλῶν . Cf. 423 D note and [ Epin.] 992 B ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα. The phrase εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν is a sort of Platonic motto or text (like the φωναί of post-Aristotelian ethics).

οὕτω δὴ ‐‐ ἤδη : emphatic, as Hirzel points out ( Hermes VIII p. 393): for the just man will not take part in practical affairs until he has ordered his own soul aright. Cf. Alc. I 113 B ff., Ap. 36 C , and Xen. Mem. III 7. 9 , IV 3. 1.

ἢ καί . Stallbaum and others add περί (with Ξ) before πολιτικόν, but τι πράττῃ περὶ πολιτικόν τι is very unpleasing. πολιτικόν depends directly on πράττῃ and is equivalent to περὶ πόλιν. The slight variety of expression is easy and elegant after ἢ καί ‘aut etiam.’

ἐπιστήμην ‐‐ δόξαν . This is, as Krohn points out ( Pl. St. p. 68), the first precise and explicit separation of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in the Republic. Each of them, however, is still concerned with conduct, and not, as in the end of V, with the theory of knowledge.

τυγχάνει ‐‐ ὄν =‘really is’: I 337 B note

ἀδικίαν . Now that we have discovered Justice, it is necessary to look for Injustice, in order that we may compare the two and decide the question at issue, viz. πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους (427 D: cf. II 368 E note). The full exposition of Injustice is reserved for Books VIII and IX, where Plato takes the subject in its proper order, considering civic injustice first, and afterwards that of the individual. At present he contents himself with a preliminary or exoteric sketch of Injustice in the soul, representing it as unrighteousness in general, just as Justice, both in the State and in the individual, has been identified with righteousness or moral perfection (434 C, 442 E notes).

ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ‐‐ ὄντι . See cr. n. The reading of Ξ and other inferior MSS, which (in common with all the editors) I have printed above, seems to be an attempt to emend the older and more difficult reading preserved in Α and Π. Stallbaum supposes that A here represents a corruption of Ξ, αὖ δουλεύειν being presumably a correction (of αὐτῳ δουλεύειν) which has crept into the text; but this is unlikely in itself, and also leaves τοῦ δ) before αὖ δουλεύειν unexplained. The text of Ξ is not in itself quite satisfactory, as Richards has pointed out. οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ for ὥστε πρέπειν αὐτῷ seems unexampled, although οἵου δουλεύειν would of course be right. The expression τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, ‘that which is of the ruling class,’ is also curious for the more direct and accurate τῷ ἀρχικῷ γένει. The reading of A and Π yields no tolerable sense, and certainly cannot come from Plato. Madvig (with Vind. E) proposes οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τὸ δ’ αὖ <μὴ> δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, which is intelligible, if weak. I have thought of οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τῷ δ’ αὖ βουλεύειν (or δεσπόζειν, after Schneider) ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, but there are obvious objections. I should not be surprised if the whole clause ἀλλὰ —ὄντι, as it appears in A and Π, is only an attempt by some illiterate scribe to work out the antithesis of προσῆκον: lit. ‘being by nature such as to be proper for it to be a slave, and the slavery again to that which is of the ruling class.’ The clause, even as read in Ξ, adds nothing to the sense, and the references in τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα and τούτων just below are caught more easily without the obnoxious words. See 442 B ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσῆκον αὐτῷ γένει. Cf. III 413 C note

τούτων : sc. τῶν γενῶν.

ταὐτὰ ‐‐ ταῦτα . μὲν οὖν corrects τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα: “immo haec eadem” (Schneider). For ταὐτά some prefer, with one MS of Stobaeus Flor. 9. 64, αὐτά (‘immo haec ipsa’), others τοιαῦτα, but there is not sufficient reason for deserting A.

δίκαια ‐‐ ἐμποιεῖ . Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 59) reminds us of Arist. Eth. Nic. II 1. 1103^{a} 34 ff. τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα κτλ. On the Socratic analogy between body and soul cf. II 380 B note

ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν . Ξ (with a few other MSS) reads ἐμποιεῖν; and Stallbaum and others adopt this reading. ποιεῖν, ‘to produce,’ is however satisfactory: cf. 422 A.

τὸ δὲ νόσον ‐‐ ὑπ) ἄλλου . Here and in Tim. 82 A ff. Plato adopts the Hippocratean theory of the origin of disease: see de nat. hom. VI p. 40 c. 4 Littré ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὁκόταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα (sc. αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴ ξανθή τε καὶ μέλαινα) τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιός τε καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ᾖ. ἀλγέει δὲ ὁκόταν τι τουτέων ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον ᾖ ἢ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκρημένον ᾖ τοῖσι ξύμπασιν (Poschenrieder die pl. dial. in ihr. Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokr. Schr. p. 37). Cf. also Pl. Symp. 186 D with Hug ad loc. On κατὰ φύσιν see 443 B note

κάλλος ‐‐ εὐεξία : with reference perhaps to Thrasymachus' statement in I 348 E f. that Injustice is καλόν and ἰσχυρόν.

τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν κτλ. ‘What remains for us now to enquire is whether,’ etc. For the position of ἡμῖν cf. that of πάντων in 445 B. Herwerden suggests τόδε or τόδε δή, neither of which is necessary.

πότερον αὖ κτλ. See I 354 B, C, and note on 444 A.

Plato Republic 4.443

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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