ἱεροσυλιῶν ‐‐ προδοσιῶν
. See Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 293 ff., 298 f.
ἄπιστος ‐‐ κατἁ ὅρκους
. εὐορκία was an indispensable element in Greek morality: see Nägelsbach l.c. p. 242, and the interesting monograph of Augustin
Der Eid im Gr. Volksglauben u. in d. Pl. Ethik Elbing 1894.
μοιχεῖαι ‐‐ ἀθεραπευσίαι
. Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 264 ff., 275 ff., 191 ff. The virtue of
εὐσέβεια was commonly regarded as
δικαιοσύνη ἡ τερὶ τοὺς θεούς (e.g.
Euthyph. 12 E
), and
εὐσέβεια is concerned with
θεῶν θερατεία. See
Euthyph. l.c. and cf. also the Stoic Zeno in D. L. VII 119
εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας, and Sext. Emp.
adv. Math. IX 123.
τέλεον κτλ.
The language is suggested by Homer's
οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ’ ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται (
Od. XIX 547).
ὅ is a vague internal accusative: see on
ἣν ᾠήθημεν in 434 D.
ἔφαμεν κτλ.
The reference is to 433 A. On
οἰκίζειν see III 407 B note For
κινδυνεύομεν Hartman suggests
ἐκινδυνεύομεν; but presents do not of course become imperfects in indirect.
τὸ δέ γε
: ‘yes, but in point of fact.’ For
τὸ δέ in this sense cf. I 340 D note
τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές below expresses the same meaning more fully and emphatically.
δἰ ὃ ‐‐ οὕτως
. The imperfect
ὠφέλει (see cr. n.), ‘for which reason also it was of service to us,’ viz. in discovering the real or original justice, seems to me better than the present. See II 368 D ff. Plato is justifying himself for having taken so much trouble about a mere
εἴδωλον; it was in order to learn the original through the copy. So also Hartman. The present could only mean ‘benefits the city’ (so Schneider, Rettig and others). Madvig, strangely enough, suspects the whole phrase. Civic Justice is an
εἴδωλον of Justice in the soul as being its reflection in outward conduct. See also on 443 B ff. above.
τοιοῦτο
takes its meaning from
τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικόν etc. ‘Justice was indeed something of this kind’ (i.e. a sort of
τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν), but
not
περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν. The warning conveyed by
εἶδος and
τρόπον τινά in 433 A (where see note), 433 B and 432 E is now justified: for Justice is said to be
περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς πρᾶξιν, and is therefore not, strictly speaking, that which we have called ‘Civic Justice.’
ὡς ἀληθῶς
should be construed with
περὶ ἑαυτόν. The soul is the true self, as Socrates continually maintained. It is better to regard
περί before
ἑαυτόν as coordinate with
περί in
περὶ τὴν ἐντός, than to translate “with internal actions which are in very truth concerned with himself” (J. and C.).
ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτόν etc. merely emphasizes and explains
περὶ τὴν ἐντός.
ἕκαστον
. Ast would read
ἕκαστον τῶν; but the meaning is easily caught after
τὰ ἑαυτοῦ just before.
τῷ ὄντι κτλ.
: ‘having set his house in order in the truest sense.’ So Schneider, rightly. For
οἰκεῖα cf. III 405 B note
ξυναρμόσαντα ‐‐ ἡρμοσμένον
. Cf. 432 A, where a similar image is employed. The figure here is taken from the Octachord, the
λογιστικόν being represented by the
ὑπάτη or highest string (which gave out the lowest note), the
ἐπιθυμητικόν by the
νεάτη (an octave higher in pitch), and the
θυμοειδές by the
μέση or fourth. See
Dict. Ant. II p. 195 or Gleditsch
Die Musik d. Gr. p. 860. The single notes of a
ἁρμονία could be called
ὅροι because they were in reality terms in a proportion and depended on the relative length of the string: cf.
Tim. 35 B
, C. Hartman's correction of
νεάτης, ὑπάτης, μέσης to
νεάτην, ὑπάτην, μέσην is very attractive: for the genitives can only be explained as
ὅρον νεάτης etc., and the effect is unpleasing, especially with
ἁρμονίας coming between. Retaining the Greek nomenclature, we may translate: ‘having harmoniously joined together three different elements, just like three terms in a musical proportion or scale, lowest and highest and intermediate,’ etc. In
ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξύ Plato indicates (as J. and C. observe) that his threefold division of soul may not be ‘strictly exhaustive’ (cf. VIII 548 D note). The missing faculties would thus correspond to the notes intervening between the
ὑπάτη and
μέση, and the
μέση and
νεάτη. It will be noted that the unity resulting is not that of unison, but that of a scale or mode. Nevertheless it is clear from the language used that the
ἁρμονία which Plato describes is, as before,
σωφροσύνη: cf.
ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ with 431 A, B,
φίλον γενόμενον with 442 C;
κοσμήσαντα too suggests
κοσμιότης, and the word
σώφρονα itself is finally employed. Cf. 434 C note A different explanation is given by the Scholiast. Holding that Plato is referring to a system of two octaves (
δὶς διὰ πασῶν) he explains
νεάτη, μέση and
ὑπάτη as e.g. A', A, and
b (not
a, which is the
προσλαμβανόμενος). His note is as follows:
νεάτη ἤγουν νήτη ὑπερβολαίων ἡ ἐσχάτη χορδὴ τοῦ δὶς διὰ πασῶν συστήματος, ὑπάτη δὲ ἡ μετὰ τὸν προλαμβανόμενον (leg.
προσλαμβανόμενον)
φθόγγον πρώτη χορδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δὶς διὰ πασῶν συστήματος. μέση δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ἤτοι φθόγγος ἢ χορδὴ ἡ τελευταία μὲν τοῦ πρώτου διὰ πασῶν, ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὡς εἶναι τούτων κοινήν, ὡς Πτολεμαῖός τέ φησι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι μουσικοί. But in the
δὶς διὰ πασῶν σύστημα, the
ὑπάτη is not
σύμφωνος with the
νήτη ὑπερβολαίων, although the
προσλαμβανόμενος of course is (see Gleditsch l.c. p. 861 and Euclid
Sect. Can. 10 ed. von Jan): so that according to the Scholiast there is a serious breach of
συμφωνία. It seems to me quite clear that in
ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς—μέσης Plato is thinking of three
ξύμφωνοι φθόγγοι, and in the
single octave or
διὰ πασῶν, the
ὑπάτη, μέση or fourth, and
νεάτη were
σύμφωνα ἀλλήλοις: see Cleonid.
Isag. Harm. 5 ed. von Jan. In 432 A also, Plato contemplates only a single octave: see note ad loc.
ἕνα ‐‐ πολλῶν
. Cf. 423 D note and [
Epin.] 992 B
ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα. The phrase
εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν is a sort of Platonic motto or text (like the
φωναί of post-Aristotelian ethics).
οὕτω δὴ ‐‐ ἤδη
: emphatic, as Hirzel points out (
Hermes VIII p. 393): for the just man will not take part in practical affairs until he has ordered his own soul aright. Cf.
Alc. I 113 B ff.,
Ap. 36 C
, and
Xen.
Mem. III 7. 9
, IV 3. 1.
ἢ καί
. Stallbaum and others add
περί (with
Ξ) before
πολιτικόν, but
τι πράττῃ περὶ πολιτικόν τι is very unpleasing.
πολιτικόν depends directly on
πράττῃ and is equivalent to
περὶ πόλιν. The slight variety of expression is easy and elegant after
ἢ καί ‘aut etiam.’
ἐπιστήμην ‐‐ δόξαν
. This is, as Krohn points out (
Pl. St. p. 68), the first precise and explicit separation of
ἐπιστήμη and
δόξα in the
Republic. Each of them, however, is still concerned with conduct, and not, as in the end of V, with the theory of knowledge.
τυγχάνει ‐‐ ὄν
=‘really is’: I 337 B note
ἀδικίαν
. Now that we have discovered Justice, it is necessary to look for Injustice, in order that we may compare the two and decide the question at issue, viz.
πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους (427 D: cf. II 368 E note). The full exposition of Injustice is reserved for Books VIII and IX, where Plato takes the subject in its proper order, considering civic injustice first, and afterwards that of the individual. At present he contents himself with a preliminary or exoteric sketch of Injustice in the soul, representing it as unrighteousness in general, just as Justice, both in the State and in the individual, has been identified with righteousness or moral perfection (434 C, 442 E notes).
ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ‐‐ ὄντι
. See cr. n. The reading of
Ξ and other inferior MSS, which (in common with all the editors) I have printed above, seems to be an attempt to emend the older and more difficult reading preserved in
Α and
Π. Stallbaum supposes that A here represents a corruption of
Ξ, αὖ δουλεύειν being presumably a correction (of
αὐτῳ δουλεύειν) which has crept into the text; but this is unlikely in itself, and also leaves
τοῦ δ) before
αὖ δουλεύειν unexplained. The text of
Ξ is not in itself quite satisfactory, as Richards has pointed out.
οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ for
ὥστε πρέπειν αὐτῷ seems unexampled, although
οἵου δουλεύειν would of course be right. The expression
τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, ‘that which is of the ruling class,’ is also curious for the more direct and accurate
τῷ ἀρχικῷ γένει. The reading of A and
Π yields no tolerable sense, and certainly cannot come from Plato. Madvig (with Vind. E) proposes
οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τὸ δ’ αὖ <μὴ> δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, which is intelligible, if weak. I have thought of
οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τῷ δ’ αὖ βουλεύειν (or
δεσπόζειν, after Schneider)
ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, but there are obvious objections. I should not be surprised if the whole clause
ἀλλὰ —ὄντι, as it appears in A and
Π, is only an attempt by some illiterate scribe to work out the antithesis of
προσῆκον: lit. ‘being by nature such as to be proper for it to be a slave, and the slavery again to that which is of the ruling class.’ The clause, even as read in
Ξ, adds nothing to the sense, and the references in
τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα and
τούτων just below are caught more easily without the obnoxious words. See 442 B
ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσῆκον αὐτῷ γένει. Cf. III 413 C note
τούτων
: sc.
τῶν γενῶν.
ταὐτὰ ‐‐ ταῦτα
. μὲν οὖν corrects
τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα: “immo haec eadem” (Schneider). For
ταὐτά some prefer, with one MS of Stobaeus
Flor. 9. 64,
αὐτά (‘immo haec ipsa’), others
τοιαῦτα, but there is not sufficient reason for deserting A.
δίκαια ‐‐ ἐμποιεῖ
. Krohn (
Pl. St. p. 59) reminds us of Arist.
Eth. Nic. II 1. 1103^{a} 34 ff.
τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα κτλ. On the Socratic analogy between body and soul cf. II 380 B note
ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν
. Ξ (with a few other MSS) reads
ἐμποιεῖν; and Stallbaum and others adopt this reading.
ποιεῖν, ‘to produce,’ is however satisfactory: cf. 422 A.
τὸ δὲ νόσον ‐‐ ὑπ) ἄλλου
. Here and in
Tim. 82 A
ff. Plato adopts the Hippocratean theory of the origin of disease: see
de nat. hom. VI p. 40 c. 4 Littré
ὑγιαίνει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὁκόταν μετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα (sc.
αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴ ξανθή τε καὶ μέλαινα)
τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιός τε καὶ δυνάμιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιγμένα ᾖ. ἀλγέει δὲ ὁκόταν τι τουτέων ἔλασσον ἢ πλέον ᾖ ἢ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκρημένον ᾖ τοῖσι ξύμπασιν (Poschenrieder
die pl. dial. in ihr. Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokr. Schr. p. 37). Cf. also Pl.
Symp. 186 D
with Hug ad loc. On
κατὰ φύσιν see 443 B note
κάλλος ‐‐ εὐεξία
: with reference perhaps to Thrasymachus' statement in I 348 E f. that Injustice is
καλόν and
ἰσχυρόν.
τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν κτλ.
‘What remains for us now to enquire is whether,’ etc. For the position of
ἡμῖν cf. that of
πάντων in 445 B. Herwerden suggests
τόδε or
τόδε δή, neither of which is necessary.
πότερον αὖ κτλ.
See I 354 B, C, and note on 444 A.