ἀνλεῖσα κτλ.
: ‘slackening the other by soothing address, taming it,’ etc. The three participles are not coordinate, but
παραμυθουμένη explains the action of
ἀνιεῖσα. It is unnecessary to desert the best MSS (as I once did) and read
ἀνιεῖσα, παραμυθουμένη καὶ ἡμεροῦσα with
Ξ
v and the older editors.
προστατήσετον κτλ.
Bekker's emendation—see cr. n.—is now generally accepted.
τούτω means
λογιστικόν and
θυμοειδές: so also in B below. On
ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον etc. see II 379 C note
καλουμένων κτλ.
καλουμένων is said because such pleasures are no true pleasures: cf. I 336 A note and (for the implication itself) IX 583 B ff.,
Phil. 36 C
ff. On
οὐκ αὖ see 426 E note The imagery of this passage suggests that the
ἐπιθυμητικόν is a sort of
θηρίον: cf. IX 588 E ff.
ὧν ‐‐ γένει
: sc.
ἄρχειν. “Dativus causam indicat, cur tertiae parti non conveniat duabus reliquis praeesse et imperare, eamque in ipsius genere et indole positam demonstrat” (Schneider). If this is the meaning, we should expect
φύσει rather than
γένει. Perhaps Plato wrote
γενῶν (so
q Flor. U, Stallbaum etc.): cf.
γένη in 441 C. To
προσῆκον Campbell prefers
προσῆκεν, but the present (
προσῆκον sc.
ἐστίν) is better here.
φυλαττοίτην
. The two higher parts of soul are to be
φύλακες both of the lower part and (in a different sense) ‘also’ (
καί) ‘of external enemies’: cf. III 415 D, E. Dobree's
φυλαττοίσθην fails to give its proper force to
καί before
τοὺς ἔξωθεν. For
φυλάττω used in this way cf. II 367 A
οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μη ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ.
ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου
. In this particular the analogy between the city and the soul is not quite exact, otherwise it would be the rulers in the city who prescribe
τὸ δεινόν τε καὶ μή, whereas it is the legislator (see on
ὁ νομοθέτης 429 C). This point is emphasized, perhaps unduly so, by Krohn (
Pl. St. p. 43). Unless Plato made the Deity the
οἰκιστής of the soul, as the original legislator is of the city, it was impossible for him to avoid placing the
λογιστικόν in a position of even greater authority than the rulers. In Books VI and VII the inequality is redressed by making the power of the Rulers in the city commensurate with that of
λόγος in the soul: see VI 497 C note
ἦρχέν τε κτλ.
: ‘ruled within him and issued these instructions.’ The imperfect is used because the instructions must be given
before they can be obeyed by
θυμοειδές, as described in the last sentence. J. and C. say that
ἦρχε refers to 428 E; but Plato is not there speaking of the individual, only of the State. Although a reference to 439 C or 441 E is barely possible, it is much simpler to regard the imperfect as real, and not ‘philosophic.’ See above on III 406 E. Schneider, to judge from his translation, takes the same view. With
σμικρῷ μέρει cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. X 7. 1177^{b} 34 ff.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι (sc.
τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ)
κτλ.
αὖ κἀκεῖνο κτλ.
αὖ καί has been interpreted (1) as implying that the
θυμοειδές also has a
sort of knowledge: cf. 429 C and 439 E note: (2) as ‘like the rulers in the State’: cf. 428 B ff. The first view is slightly more natural on linguistic grounds, but I think Plato would hardly have attributed
ἐπιστήμη in any shape to the
θυμοειδές. Probably (2) is right, for the analogy between the city and the soul is in Plato's mind all through this section: see 441 C, D, and 442 D.
ᾧ πολλάκις κτλ.
: ‘in virtue of our oft-repeated maxim and in that way’: i.e.
τῷ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. Ficinus seems to have read
καὶ ὡς after
λέγομεν. At first sight
καὶ οὔτως appears to demand the insertion; but Plato is speaking with less formality and precision than in 441 C, D. The reading of Vind. E
καὶ οὗτος (for
καὶ οὔτως), i.e. ‘the individual, as well as the city,’ is attractive, but unnecessary. Hartman proposes
ᾧ <πόλιν> πολλάκις <ἐ> λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ἔσται, a solution which will commend itself to few.
μή πῃ ‐‐ εἶναι
. ‘Do we find Justice growing dimmer in any way? Does it appear something different from what it was discovered to be in the city?’ lit. ‘blunted, so as to appear’ etc. In the language of 434 D (to which Socrates' question refers) Justice has now ‘passed into’ the Individual; and no feature has been blunted, or lost its clearness of outline. We are therefore confirmed in our view of Justice, both civic and individual. Hartman would read
ἀπήμβλυνται, taking
ἡμῖν as ‘by us,’ but the present is more expressive, and (with
ἡμῖν) represents us as in a certain sense spectators of the selfevolution of Justice: cf.
ἐὰν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἕνα ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο κτλ. 434 D.
ἀπαμβλύνεται=‘retunditur’ (Schneider).
τὰ φορτικά
. Plato tests his view of Justice by four criteria taken as it were
de foro and turning on various popular associations of the word: cf. IX 573 B ff. Of these the first three are concerned with honesty and trustworthiness in public and private life; while the last (
μοιχεῖαι—ἀθεραπευσίαι) refers to morality in general, including the service of the gods. Taken together, they sum up the leading features of the perfect character, and shew that Plato's conception of private, as of political, Justice is in reality Righteousness or Moral Perfection, whereof the other virtues are the fruit. Plato's innovation lay in interpreting Righteousness as
τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, or rather in the peculiar meaning which he attached to this phrase: see on 434 C and infra 443 B note
παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου κτλ.
Honesty and truthfulness were generally recognised as characteristic of the
δίκαιος ἀνήρ: see the passages collected by Nägelsbach
Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240—246.
τοῦτο αὐτόν
. See cr. n. “Fortasse Plato
τοῦτον αὐτό scripsit” (Schneider).
