πότερα ἐκεῖνο ‐‐ ἔφη
. In holding that the Art of Painting imitates only
τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα. Plato degrades it to the level of photography, and the painter himself to a mere mechanical copyist, whose intelligence does not rise above
εἰκασία (in the sense of VI 511 E: see note ad loc. and App. I to Book VII). Yet the highest art has in every age claimed to portray, not the so-called actual, but the Ideal: see for example Arist.
Poet. 25. 6 and 17: “It may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. ‘Yes,’ we say, ‘but
the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality’” (Butcher's translation), and the recent development of this idea by W. J. Courthope,
Life in Poetry and Law in Taste pp. 152, 165, 196 ff. and passim. In the present passage, Plato bases his unfavourable verdict on what must be admitted to be a narrow and scholastic interpretation of his own ontology, but in view of Books II and III as well as 605 C— 607 A below, we can hardly doubt that his attitude was determined in the first instance by educational rather than by metaphysical considerations, and that throughout the whole of Book X he was thinking less of the inherent possibilities of Art, than of actual Greek Art and Poetry considered as the exponents of a moral and religious creed which Plato himself emphatically disowns. See also on 607 A. In any case, the objections which he here urges do not touch the real essence of any form of Art except pure and unadulterated realism. Elsewhere throughout the Platonic writings there are not wanting indications of a juster estimate of the artistic faculty and its possibilities (see for example III 401 B—403 C, and especially V 472 D, and cf. Walter
Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum pp. 441 ff., 459 ff. and Stählin
Stellung d. Poesie in d. Plat. Phil. pp. 56—65), and the sympathetic student of Plato will find it easy to construct a nobler and more generous theory of Aesthetic Art out of the doctrine of Ideas together with its corollaries of
ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence. It is also a historical fact that Plato's own conception of a transcendent self-existing Beauty,
ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ’ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δ’ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν (
Symp. 211 A
), has proved an inexhaustible fountain of inspiration to some of the greatest artists, notably, for instance, in connexion with the Platonic Academy at Florence in the days of Michel Angelo: see Symonds,
Renaissance in Italy II pp. 205, 207, 247, 323 ff. Those who have caught the spirit of Plato's teaching will agree with me when I say that the famous lines of Wordsworth on King's College Chapel
ἆρα οἷα ἔστιν κτλ.
The painter, as Bosanquet reminds us, operates in two dimensions, and so cannot copy the material bed “in its solid completeness, but only his partial view of it” i.e. the bed as it
appears to him from one point of view, a particular
φάντασμα of bed. His work, in fact, is
σκιαγραφία (II 365 C note). It will follow that Painting is a stage lower than ‘third from truth,’ but Plato does not press the point, and in 599 A and D Poetry—the sister art to Painting—remains as before only
τρίτον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας. See also on
μιμητική in B below.
πεποίηται
is passive, not middle, as J. and C. strangely imagine. Cf. 605 A
ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς—οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν.
τὸ ὄν
: not of course in the metaphysical sense, but in the sense in which e.g. the material bed ‘is’ as opposed to its
φάντασμα, which only
φαίνεται, and which is all that the painter copies. An apologist of Art might fairly reply to Plato that in another and profounder sense it is just because Art does ‘imitate’ the
φάντασμα and not the material reality that her creations frequently possess a measure of ideality and truth beyond and above what Plato assigns to them here. Cf. Butcher,
Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. pp. 127 ff., 157—162. For the construction see on III 407 B.
ἡ μιμητική
. In this particular instance the inference from Painting to the whole of imitative art is hardly to be justified: for Sculpture, which is certainly, in the Greek way of thinking, a branch of
μιμητική, cannot be said to copy only a
φάντασμα of the material object to the same extent that Painting does. See however
Soph. 235 E
, 236 A.
διὰ τοῦτο ‐‐ εἴδωλον
: ‘what enables it to manufacture all things is that it lays hold of but a little part of each, and even that is unsubstantial.’
πάντα ἀπεργάζεται recalls 596 C—E, while preparing us at the same time for
πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας κτλ. below in C. In
σμικρόν τι ἑκάστου ἐφάπτεται the construction is like
μεταλαμβάνουσι—τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο (
Prot. 329 E
). For
εἴδωλον Herwerden conjectures
εἰδώλου: but the word refers to
φαντάσματος above and must therefore be in apposition to the part and not the whole. The particular ‘appearance’ of a bed which a painter copies is properly regarded as only a little ‘part’ of it.
περὶ οὐδενὸς ‐‐ τῶν τεχνῶν
: ‘although he does not understand about the arts of any one of them.’ According to this explanation, which is that of Prantl,
περί governs
τῶν τεχνῶν and
τούτων has for its antecedent
σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα κτλ. The plural
τῶν τεχνῶν is a trifling irregularity, due to the introduction of
τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, in the absence of which Plato would doubtless have written
περὶ οὐδετέρου τούτων ἐπαΐων τῆς τέχνης. For the distance between
περί and its noun cf. VIII 551 C
περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὁτουοῦν ἀρχῆς,
Prot. 319 D
περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως (if Sauppe is right in construing
περί with
διοικήσεως),
Laws 859 A
οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν γραφῆς γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν ,
Tim. 40 D
τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν εἰρημένα φύσεως ἐχέτω τέλος, and other examples in Lina
de praepos. usu Plat. pp. 17 f. It is certainly wrong to translate the text by ‘without knowing anything
about these arts,’ and we have no right to resort to such emendations as
οὐδὲν τούτων ἐπαΐων τῶν
τεχνῶν (Ast) or
οὐδὲν περὶ τούτων (or
τούτων πέρι οὐδὲν )
ἐπαΐων τῶν τεχνῶν (Richards). I now believe that Prantl's view, with which Stallbaum also agrees, is correct, and therefore withdraw my former conjecture
τεχνιτῶν. That
τεχνῶν is sound appears also from
αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ σκυτοτομίας in 601 A.
γράψας ‐‐ τέκτονα εἶναι
. The same idea recurs in
Soph. 234 B
. The subject of
δοκεῖν (
opinari) is
παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους (Schneider). This is better than to make
δοκεῖν=
videri and supply
τὸ ἐζωγραφημένον (with J. and C.).
ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ
: ‘we must reply to’—(or ‘retort upon’) ‘such a person’: cf. (with J. B. Mayor in
Cl. Rev. X p. 110)
Prot. 320 C
πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον κτλ. The antecedent of
τῷ τοιούτῳ is
τις. The words have been strangely misinterpreted by Schneider(“bei dem muss man annehmen” etc.), J. and C. (“we must understand by such a statement”) and others, forgetful of the parallel expression in the
Protagoras. Vermehren actually goes so far as to conjecture
ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ (
Plat. Stud. p. 119).
γόητί τινι
. Cf.
Soph. 234 C
.
διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς κτλ.
In agreement with Dümmler (
Antisth. pp. 23 ff.), Stählin (
Stellung d. Poesie etc. p. 26) takes this as a specific reference to Antisthenes. Antisthenes, in the first place, denied the Ideal theory and held that there could be no knowledge except of particulars: so that Plato might well insinuate that he was incapable of distinguishing knowledge from ignorance: cf. V 476 D note In the second place, Antisthenes was a champion of Homer, and discovered a sort of moral philosophy in his works (see
Frag. 24—28 in Winckelmann
Antisth. Frag. and Zeller^{4} II pp. 330 ff.). On the strength of these two facts Stählin has evolved the ingenious theory that Plato's motive throughout this part of the discussion is a purely polemical one, and that he did not seriously consider Poetry only ‘third from Royalty and Truth.’ Plato, thinks Stählin, says in effect: ‘Antisthenes holds that poets have knowledge of and copy particulars; but there is no knowledge of particulars, and particulars are copies of Ideas, so that on Antisthenes's own shewing Poets are ignorant, and Poetry is thrice removed from Truth: whereas Antisthenes thinks Homer was omniscient.’ The dagger is only lath: for Antisthenes was not an Idealist. Yet it is tolerably clear that Plato is refuting a view of poetry which found enthusiastic advocates in his own time, and Antisthenes may have been one of these, though the evidence falls far short of proof (see next note): but the purpose of this investigation is certainly not polemical and nothing more, and in spite of other passages in which Plato takes a more generous view of Poetry (see on 598 E), there is no good reason to suppose that his hostility is otherwise than serious here. See also on line 28.
τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον κτλ.
See 595 C note In
τινων Dümmler and Stälhlin (ll. cc.) again recognise Antisthenes, but although Antisthenes seems to have believed in Homer, there is no evidence that he was a champion of Tragedy (note
ὅτι οὗτοι κτλ.); and he was certainly not the only person in whose eyes Homer was regarded as at once a universal genius and the educator of the whole of Greece. It is not necessary to suppose that Plato has any individual person in his mind: there must have been many such apologists of Homer and dramatic poetry in Plato's day, and Plato as usual individualizes the type. See for instance the
Ion of Plato and
Ar.
Frogs 1008
ff. It will, no doubt, help us to appreciate Plato's attitude towards Poetry if we remember that she was the
de facto rival of Philosophy, and that (as Munk observes,
die nat. Ordnung d. Plat. Schr. pp. 313 ff.) the
Republic is in a certain sense a demand that Philosophy shall take the place which Poetry had hitherto filled in educational theory and practice: see especially the address to poets in
Laws 817 A ff.
ὦ ἄριστοι—τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὂ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος κτλ. Cf. also infra 600 A note But it is surely absurd to suppose that Plato was actuated by any feeling of personal jealousy towards Homer, and aspired to supplant him in the admiration of his countrvmen: ‘there is no envy in the choir divine’ (
Phaedr. 247 A
). There is something almost pathetic in Dionysius' inability to understand and appreciate Plato when he assures us with monotonous and feeble iteration that ‘there was, there really was in Plato's nature, with all its excellences, something of vainglory. He shewed this particularly in his jealousy of Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth after crowning him with a garland and anointing him with myrrh’ (
Letter to Pompeius § 756, translated by Roberts).
ἀνάγκη ‐‐ ποιεῖν
. The saying is attributed by Wilamowitz (
Phil. Unters. IV p. 285) to Sophocles himself, on what authority he does not say. Is he thinking of Athen. I 22 B
μεθύων δὲ ἐποίει τὰς τραγῳδίας Αἰσχύλος, ὥς φησι Χαμαιλέων. Σοφοκλῆς γοῦν ὠνείδιζεν αὐτῷ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰδώς γε? In any case the reference ought not to be thus limited, nor ought we to suppose (with Dümmler and Stählin, ll. cc.) that Antisthenes alone is intended, for Plato seems to be alluding to a tolerably widespread view and one which was freely represented in Apologies of Poetry. Understood in its full significance, the theory of Poetry which Plato is here combating requires us to believe that a poet who can represent a general, a pilot etc., knows the art of generalship, pilotage etc. (cf. 599 C ff.), and we are told that Sophocles was actually made
στρατηγός because of his
Antigone (see the Argument ascribed to Aristophanes the grammarian). If we realise the part which Poetry, and especially the poetry of Homer, played in Greek education, and remember that Aristophanes makes Homer the teacher of
τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν, it is by no means extra vagant to suppose that such views were actually maintained in Plato's time, though Pericles for example had a different criterion of strategic ability when he told Sophocles that he ‘knew how to write poetry, but not how to command an army’ (
Περικλέης ποιέειν με ἔφη, στρατηγέειν δ’ οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι Athen. XIII 604 D). Cf.
Ion 540 B—542 B and Stählin
Stellung d. Poesie etc. p. 23 note 3. ‘The public,’ remarks Stählin, ‘whose views Plato here combats, allowed the authority of the poets to extend even to the domain of the particular arts. It was Plato who broke through this magic circle which surrounded Poetry.’ Aristotle followed in the same path, refusing to allow that a mistake in respect of some particular art is necessarily a flaw in the poetry: see
Poet. 25. 1460^{b} 20 ff., 33 ff. Plato himself, of course, holds that poets are destitute of scientific knowledge, and compose their poems
οὐ σοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες
Ap. 22 C
: cf. also
Phaedr. 245 A
,
Ion 533 D ff.,
Laws 719 C and
Men. 99 C
. The true Poet, according to Plato, is a seer: knowledge he has none, but instead of it intuition, enthusiasm and inspiration: he is in short
ἔνθεος, because
ἐπίπνους ὢν καὶ κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (
Men. l.c.). This view of Poetry is of course earlier than Plato: we meet with something like it in a striking fragment of Democritus ap. Dio Chrys. LIII 274 (quoted by Stählin l.c. p. 12)
Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων, and Pindar likes to represent himself as the inspired mouthpiece of the Muses and Apollo. We cannot attain to a correct conception of Plato's aesthetic unless we are careful to remember that, although he refused to allow that the poet has knowledge, he did not deny him genius and inspiration. See also on 598 A supra.
πότερον μιμηταῖς κτλ.
: ‘whether these men whom they have met are imitators, by whom they have been deceived’ etc.
μιμηταῖς is of course predicative, and that is why
τούτοις has no article. We certainly ought not (with Richards) to change
τούτοις into
τοιούτοις. Cf. IV 436 D note
