Plato Republic 10.597

εἰ καὶ τοῦτο κτλ. : sc. as well as the κλίνη made by the painter.

ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τούτων κτλ. For ἐπί see on V 475 A. τοῦτον in τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον (“hunc, quem quaerimus” Schneider) was found by Dübner to be the reading of A as well as the rest of Bekker's MSS, and Schneider restores it in his Addit. p. 77.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. For γίγνονται see on VIII 562 A. With ἐν τῇ φύσει cf. infra 597 C, 598 A, Phaed. 103 B and Parm. 132 D τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει. Each of these passages brings ἡ φύσις into connexion with the Ideas: cf. also V 476 B, VI 501 B, Crat. 389 B ff. and infra 597 D, E. In the phrase ἐν τῇ φύσει, the expression ἡ φύσις means ‘Nature’ i.e. rerum natura (cf. R. G. Bury in Cl. Rev. VIII p. 299), but for Plato rerum natura, strictly interpreted, is the Ideal World. Plato's nomenclature is in harmony with the traditional usage of Greek philosophy, for “in Greek philosophical language, φύσις always means that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative, and transient” (Burnet Early Greek Phil. p. 11). Now in Platonism the primary, fundamental, persistent, is the εἶδος: and hence the φύσις or ‘nature’ of anything means its Idea (e.g. Phaedr. 254 B ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἠνέχθη), and the φύσις or nature of all things ( rerum natura) becomes an expression for the World of Ideas (“regio idearum, ὁ νοητὸς τόπος” Schneider). Bosanquet would like to render φύσις by ‘evolution,’ “without understanding any definite theory of origins.” Such a translation would be, in my judgment, not only gravely misleading, but linguistically wrong; for ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα cannot mean ‘which evolution has produced’: the force of ἐν must be local—figuratively so, of course— exactly as in ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει referred to above. So also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. X p. 121. To Krohn, φύσις appears to be “die allgemeine Gesetzlichkeit des Universums, die dem δημιουργός die Musterbilder liefert” ( Pl. St. p. 249). This is nearer the truth, but we must not surrender the self-existence of the Ideas. See also on 597 D.

ἣν—θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι . “Occurrit, ut videtur, quasi ex improviso Platoni, Deum Idearum auctorem appellare” says Pansch ( de deo Platonis p. 45), truly enough, in the restricted sense that we ought to lay no stress on this passage by itself as evidence for the origin of the Ideas. But, if God and the Idea of Good are the same (see on VI 505 A ff.), Plato is merely saying in theological language what he formerly said in philosophical, when he derived the οὐσία of all other Ideas from the Idea of Good (VI 509 B). See Krohn Pl. St. p. 242, where the same explanation is given, and Zeller^{4} II p. 666. It is not, I think, quite correct to dismiss θεός as merely “eine mythische Ausdrucksweise” (Hirmer Entstehung u. Komp. etc. p. 647), and Susemihl ( Einleitung p. 262) is certainly wrong when he takes it to mean ‘ a god.’ The sentence has been much discussed in connexion with the theory that Plato's Ideas are ‘thoughts of God’: see for example Hermann de loco Plat. de rep. VI 505 sq. p. 5 with Bonitz's reply Disput. Pl. duae p. 33 and Hermann's rejoinder Vindic. disp. de idea boni pp. 39 ff., and cf. Zeller l. c. pp. 664— 670. I have already said in App. III to Book VII that Plato himself says nothing to shew that he viewed his Ideas in this light; and it is only by reading into his words much more than they are naturally fitted to convey, that the present passage can be made to support the identification.

εἰ δύο κτλ. : not of course ‘if God had made’ etc. (D. and V.), but ‘if he should make’ etc., referring to the future, in harmony with οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν. The words δύο μόνας mean ‘no more than two,’ “auch nur zwei” (Schneider). Even two (not to speak of more) would involve a fresh ἰδέα. Cf. Tim. 31 A τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῷα, μεθ’ ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἄν ποτ’ εἴη· πάλιν γὰρ ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ περὶ ἐκείνω δέοι ζῷον, οὗ μέρος ἂν εἴτην ἐκείνω, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐκείνοιν ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ τῷ περιέχοντι τόδ’ ἂν ἀφωμοιωμένον λέγοιτο ὀρθότερον. The τρίτος ἄνθρωπος argument against the theory of Ideas rests on the same basis: see Parm. 132 E ff. with Arist. Met. A 9. 990^{b} 17 and Bonitz ad loc.

μίαν φύσει κτλ. : ‘created it, in its essential nature, one. So it appears. Shall we then call him the Nature- maker of bed, or something of the sort? It would at all events be fair to do so, since he has made both this and all besides in their essential nature.’ Connected with the notion ‘bed’ (observe the neuter τούτου), there are two makers: (1) its φυτουργός, who makes ἡ φύσει κλίνη, (2) its δημι‐ουργός, who makes κλίνη τις, a particular material bed. The first is God— the φυτουργός not only of ‘bed’ but of all else: the second a carpenter. φυτουργός is used by Plato in the peculiar sense of ὁ φύσει‐τι ποιῶν, the maker of e.g. the bed-by-nature, the table-by-nature, etc.; and the peculiar form of Glauco's answer ( δίκαιον γοῦν κτλ.) shews that he was sensible of the linguistic experiment. Plato's meaning would have been easier for us to catch if (using substantives instead of pronouns), he had said μίαν φύσει κλίνην ἔφυσεν (created one bed-by-nature, cf. VI 501 B τὸ φύσει δίκαιον) and ἐπειδήπερ καὶ φυσει‐κλίνην καὶ φύσει‐τἄλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν, but what he does write is much more elegant. It seems to me certain <*> φύσις in this passage refers to the essen<*> nature (i.e. the Idea) of the thing in q<*> tion. Schleiermacher, Schneider, <*> Müller, to judge from their translatio<*> held the same view. The English tra<*> lators render the second φύσει ‘by crea<*> (D. and V.) or ‘by the natural proce<*> creation’ (Jowett), but apart from o<*> objections, φύσει surely cannot bea<*> sense so very different from that whi<*> has at the beginning of the argument: <*> 597 B note, where reference is made als<*> Bosanquet's ingenious, but, as I belie<*> wholly mistaken view.

τί αὐτὸν κλίνης κτλ. ; For the <*> tive cf. IX 582 C, 585 D, infra 597 E <*> (with J. and C.) Symp. 204 D τί τῶν κα<*> ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως;

τὸν τοῦ τρίτου κτλ. The gen<*> is like τί αὐτὸν κλίνης κτλ. above. <*> not think we ought (with J. and C. <*> supply δημιουργόν.

τοῦτ) ἄρα ‐‐ μιμηταί . Since <*> tragic poet is an imitator, he too wil<*> τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεω<*> in other words, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως <*> Baiter's text is misleading because <*> prints no comma after μιμητής ἐστι. That Tragedy is a branch of μίμησις, was universally allowed: see above on 595 C. Plato's procedure in reasoning from Painting to Poetry (cf. infra 598 C, 601 A, 603 B and 605 A) may be illustrated by Simonides' remark that ‘Poetry is vocal Painting,’ as ‘Painting is silent Poetry’ ( ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζῳγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζῳγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν Plut. de gloria Ath. 346 F)—a saying which Lessing appropriately cites in the preface to his Laocoon.

τρίτος τις κτλ. : ‘as it were third from King and Truth.’ The metaphor is a genealogical one (cf. III 391 C Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός), and the King corresponds of course to the φυτουργός or God. On the one hand we have (1) God, (2) the τέκτων, (3) the μιμητής: on the other (1) the αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, (2) a material κλίνη, (3) a picture of a material κλίνη: and just as the picture is τὸ τρίτον γέννημα ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, so the imitator is ‘third in descent’ ( τρίτος — πεφυκώς) and consequently two degrees removed from ὁ θεός. The propriety of the term βασιλέως will be seen if we translate Plato's theological phraseology into its philosophical equivalent. When he tells us that God constructs the Idea of Bed, he means that the Idea of Good is the source of that Idea (597 B note), and the Idea of Good is King of the Ideal World: see VI 509 D. This is the application of the phrase: but it is possible enough that the expression itself was half-proverbial in Plato's time, and referred originally to the person who stood next but one in order of succession to the Persian throne. See App. I. The general sense is well illustrated by J. and C. from Dante In- ferno 11. 105 Si che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote, i.e. Art is Nature's daughter, as Nature is God's: ‘so that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.’ It should be noticed that the drift of Plato's meaning can be expressed in terms of the simile of the line. The αὐτὸ δ ἔστι κλίνη, for example, belongs to EB (see Fig. 1 on p. 65), the material κλίνη to DC, and the picture of a Bed to the realm of εἰκόνες, that is to say AD. Similarly we may suppose that the state of mind of the carpenter is πίστις, and that of the Painter εἰκασία. See below on 601 E and cf. App. I to Book VII. Other views of the phrase τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως are discussed in App. I.