ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου κτλ.
As in V 476 A (see note ad loc.), so here, Plato does not try to prove the Ideal Theory, but treats Glauco as already a loyal Platonist. The account which Plato here gives of his Ideas has been widely canvassed from many different points of view. Bosanquet (
Companion pp. 381 ff.) appears to me to err by interpreting it throughout only in terms of modern life and thought. Others refuse to regard it as serious, in view of the inherent difficulties, and because of Aristotle's remark
διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει
Met.
Λ 4. 1070^{a} 18: cf. also A 991^{b} 3 ff. with Bonitz's note. Others, again, like Krohn (
Pl. St. pp. 242 ff.), hold that the Ideal Theory in Bk X is inconsistent with the theory expounded in V—VII, where we do not hear of Ideas corresponding to concrete and artificial objects, but only of Ideas of qualities (such as Justice) and the like. In reply to the last school of critics, we may point out that Plato is not bound to give an exhaustive account of the Ideal theory whenever he has occasion to make use of it. On the previous occasion he confined himself to Ideas of the virtues etc., because they only were relevant to his immediate purpose (see on V 476 A and cf. Grimmelt
de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 81 ff., Hirmer l.c. pp. 646 ff. and Dümmler
zur Comp. d. Pl. St. p. 14), and it is exactly the same reason which makes him cite Ideas of concrete and artificial objects in Book X. The view that Plato should not be taken seriously is as old as Proclus, who (
in Tim. 104 F) observes
οὐ γὰρ κατά· τινας ἰδέας ὁ τεχνίτης ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα παραδείγματος εἴρηται χάριν καὶ οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, but, apart from other considerations, the recurrence of the same form of the theory in other dialogues (see on 596 B, C) justifies us in taking Plato here also at his word. The history of the controversy is ably reviewed by Dr Beckmann (
Num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit, Bonn 1889), with whom and with Zeller^{4} II pp. 666, 701 al. I agree in believing this passage to be an authoritative exposition of the Ideal theory on one of its many sides.
εἶδος γάρ που κτλ.
: ‘for we are, as you know, in the habit of assuming a certain idea—always
one idea—in connexion with each group of particulars to which we apply the same name’: lit. ‘an Idea, one each’ i.e. each being one. There cannot be two or more Ideas of Bed for example: cf. 597 C. Unnecessary trouble has been raised about the translation of this sentence by Krohn (
Pl. St. p. 240), whose version “in Bezug auf jedes der vielen Dinge nehmen wir je. eine Einheit als
εἶδός τι an” is both strained and inaccurate. For the statement itself cf. V 476 A, 479 A, B, E, 480 A, VI 493 E and VII 507 B note Plato
might have written any of the foregoing passages without believing in Ideas of anything beyond qualities and attributes: but that he
did believe in other Ideas also is evident not only from Book X, but also from
Phil. 15 A
, 16 C, D and many other places quoted by Zeller^{4} II p. 701 note 1.
πολλαί πού εἰσι κλῖναι κτλ.
Why does Plato select examples of artificial objects, when the Painter can equally well paint the features of Nature, as is virtually allowed in C? One reason is that otherwise he could not have constructed the descending scale
θεός, κλινοποιός, ζῳγράφος 597 B ff. Had he selected e.g. mountains, it would be difficult to specify the middle term. Moreover in
Soph. 266 B
ff. we have a distinction drawn between
θεία and
ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιική, the first producing likenesses of natural objects by natural agencies, the second likenesses of artificial objects by artificial means, and Painting is there also classed under the second head:
τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆῤ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τιν) ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην; (266 C). Inasmuch as
σκευαστά are elsewhere credited with less reality than
φυτευτά (see on VII 532 B, C notes), the choice of these examples is also specially appropriate to Plato's main object, that is to say, the depreciation of imitative art.
ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι κτλ.
For ideas of
σκευαστά cf. especially
Crat. 389 A
—390 A, a passage which forms an admirable commentary on this. The anecdote about Plato and Diogenes in D. L. VI 53 (
Πλάτωνος περὶ ἰδεῶν διαλεγομένου, καὶ ὀνομάζοντος τραπεζότητα καὶ κυαθότητα κτλ.) is pointless unless Plato believed in
εἴδη τῶν σκευαστῶν .
οὐκοῦν ‐‐ κατὰ ταὐτά
. Cf.
Crat. 389 A
ff.
ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρ οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ πέφυκε κερκίζειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει; Πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατ) ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. The Idea is conceived as a
παράδειγμα: cf. VI 500 E—501 C and see on V 476 D. Borrowing the ontology of the
Philebus, we might say that the carpenter has an
ἄπειρον of wood, into which he introduces
πέρας after the model of the Idea of Bed or
αἰτία, thereby manufacturing a
μικτόν or material bed (Schmitt
die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil. p. 25 note 68). We are not entitled (in view of 597 B and the phraseology of the present passage) to take
ἰδέαν merely as the plan or form of bed in the mind of the carpenter: the Ideas of
σκευαστά must be credited with the same attributes—transcendence, self-existence, etc.—as appertain to those of abstract qualities and
φυτευτά (see on V 476 A), although the difficulties which such a view involves are undeniably greater in the one case than in the other. If we put ourselves in Plato's position—and Socrates is here speaking as one Platonist to another (
εἰώθαμεν λέγειν)—it becomes correct to say that the carpenter is looking at the Idea rather than at his own
νόημα, for the
νόημα is nought apart from its object, the
νοητόν (cf. V 476 E note), i.e. the selfexistent Idea of Bed, without which all the
νοήματα in the world would be powerless to generate a bed because it is the
αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, and no mere
νόημα, which is the true and essential cause of all material
κλῖναι. See also on 597 B.
καὶ τόνδε ‐‐ δημιουργόν
: i.e.
καὶ τόνδε τὸν δημιουργὸν τίνα καλεῖς, sc. as well as the
δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους. Baiter ought not to have printed Vermehren's pointless conjecture
καὶ τόνδε τινὰ καλεῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν (
Pl. Stud. p. 118): for Plato is leading up to 597 B
ζῳγράφος δή, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν, and he again calls the painter a
δημιουργός in D and E: so also
χειροτέχνης just below.
ὃς ‐‐ χειροτεχνῶν
. Cf.
Soph. 233 E
— 234 C, where the same conception is worked out in almost exactly the same way.
τάχα
here means ‘soon,’ and not ‘perhaps’: cf. with Schneider
Crat. 410 E
.
καὶ ἑαυτόν
presents no difficulty: cf.
ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν in E below. It is difficult to imagine why Liebhold proposed
τὰ κατ’ ἐνιαυτόν (
Philolog. for 1880 p. 168). Perhaps he thought the
δημιουργός was
ὁ θεός, an extraordinary error, which Peipers and others (see Zeller^{4} II p. 711 note 4) perpetrated, making God his own creator, and drawing some profound and far-reaching metaphysical lessons from their mistake.
καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτλ.
Soph. l.c.
καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης [
καὶ γῆς]
καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμπάντων. The words in brackets occur only in
Ξ, and were possibly introduced from this passage.
πάντα
has two (not, as Baiter asserts, five) dots over it in A, but is in all the MSS and should not (with Baiter) be bracketed. It is important, in view of 598 C ff., to insist that there is
nothing which the Painter and Poet cannot ‘make’: hence the emphasis.
ἐν Ἅιδου
should also of course be kept, though cancelled by Herwerden. Polygnotus' famous picture of
τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου at Delphi may serve as an illustration (Paus. X 28—31).
σοφιστήν
: used as in
Symp. 203 D
δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής. Plato may also mean to hint that the Painter and Sophist are birds of a feather: for in
Soph. 233 E
ff. a definition of the Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term is evolved out of just such an account of painting as we find here.
ποιητής
. The Greek idea of the Poet as a ‘maker’ lends additional flavour to
ποιεῖν and
ποιητής throughout this argument.
δημιουργούμενος
is suggested of course by
δημιουργός just before: cf. III 395 B. The combination of this verb with
τρόπος has a playful mock-heroic air.
κάτοπτρον κτλ.
On the view of Painting here involved see 598 A note It is usual to compare Shakespeare's “hold the mirror up to nature,” but (as Bosanquet points out) there is more in Shakespeare's saying than in Plato's.
τῶν τοιούτων ‐‐ ζῳγράφος ἐστίν
. The Painter will copy with less accuracy than a mirror, so that according to Plato's way of reasoning in this passage Photography is superior in point of truth to Painting (Reber
Plato u. die Poesie p. 23). See however on 598 A.
οὐ—μέντοι
. I 339 B note
ἄρτι refers to 596 B.
