496a
496b
496c
496d
496e
Soc.
Take, for instance, any part of the body you like by itself, and consider it. A man, I suppose, may have a disease of the eyes, called ophthalmia?
Call.
Certainly.
Soc.
Then I presume he is not sound also at that time in those same eyes?
Call.
By no conceivable means.
Soc.
And what say you, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia? Does he at that time get rid too of the health of his eyes, and so at last is rid of both things together?
Call.
Far from it.
Soc.
Because, I imagine, this would be an astonishing and irrational result, would it not?
Call.
Very much so.
Soc.
Whereas, I take it, he gets and loses either turn?
Call.
I agree.
Soc.
And so with strength and weakness in just the same way?
Call.
Yes.
Soc.
And speed and slowness?
Call.
Certainly.
Soc.
And so too with good things and happiness and their opposites—bad things and wretchedness—does one take on each of these in turn, and in turn put it off?
Call.
Absolutely, I presume.
Soc.
Then if we find any things that a man puts off and retains at one and the same moment, clearly these cannot be the good and the bad. Do we admit this? Now consider very carefully before you answer.
Call.
Oh, I admit it down to the ground.
Soc.
So now for our former admissions: did you say that being hungry was pleasant or painful? I mean, hunger itself.
Call.
Painful, I said; though eating when one is hungry I call pleasant.
Soc.
I see: but at all events hunger itself is painful, is it not?
Call.
I agree.
Soc.
And so too with thirst?
Call.
Quite so.
Soc.
Then am I to ask you any further questions, or do you admit that all want and desire is painful?
Call.
I admit it; no, do not question me further.
Soc.
Very good: but drinking when one is thirsty you surely say is pleasant?
Call.
I do.
Soc.
Now, in this phrase of yours the words
when one is thirsty, I take it, stand for
when one is in pain?
Call.
Yes.
Soc.
But drinking is a satisfaction of the want, and a pleasure?
Call.
Yes.
Soc.
So in the act of drinking, you say, one has enjoyment?
Call.
Quite so.
Soc.
When one is thirsty?
Call.
I agree.
Soc.
That is, in pain?
Call.
Yes.
Soc.
Then do you perceive the conclusion,—that you say one enjoys oneself, though in pain at the same moment, when you say one drinks when one is thirsty? Or does this not occur at once, at the same place and time—in either soul or body, as you please? For I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so or not?
Call.
It is.
Soc.
But further, you say it is impossible to be badly off, or to fare ill, at the same time as one is faring well.
Gorgias. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1925.
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