Soc.
What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves,
495a
with whatever kind of enjoyment, are happy, and draws no distinction between the good and bad sorts of pleasure? But come, try again now and tell me whether you say that pleasant and good are the same thing, or that there is some pleasure which is not good.
Call.
Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistent through my saying they are different, I say they are the same.
Soc.
You are spoiling your first statements,
1
Callicles, and you can no longer be a fit partner with me in probing the truth, if you are going to speak against your own convictions.
Call.
Why, you do the same, Socrates.
Soc.
Then I am just as much in the wrong if I do, as you are. But look here, my gifted friend, perhaps the good is not mere unconditional enjoyment: for if it is, we have to face not only that string of shameful consequences I have just shadowed forth, but many more besides.
Call.
In your opinion, that is, Socrates.
Soc.
And do you, Callicles, really maintain that it is?
Call.
I do.
Soc.
Then are we to set about discussing it as your serious view?
Call.
Oh yes, to be sure.
Soc.
Come then, since that is your opinion, resolve me this: there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge?
Call.
Yes.
Soc.
And were you not saying just now that knowledge can have a certain courage coupled with it?
Call.
Yes, I was.
Soc.
And you surely meant that they were two things, courage being distinct from knowledge?
Call.
Quite so.
Soc.
Well now, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different?
Call.
Different, I presume, O sage of sages.
Soc.
And courage too, is that different from pleasure?
Call.
Of course it is.
Soc.
Come now, let us be sure to remember this, that Callicles the Acharnian said pleasant and good were the same, but knowledge and courage were different both from each other and from the good.
Call.
And Socrates of Alopece refuses to grant us this; or does he grant it?
Soc.
He does not; nor, I believe, will Callicles either, when he has rightly considered himself. For tell me, do you not regard people who are well off as being in the opposite condition to those who are badly off?
Call.
I do.
Soc.
Then if these conditions are opposite to each other, must not the same hold of them as of health and disease? For, you know, a man is never well and ill at the same time, nor gets rid of health and disease together.
Call.
How do you mean?
Gorgias. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1925.
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