Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 354

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[354]

ΣΩ.

οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, διʼ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ ἄλλων 354 354a ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν;—συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν.—οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μέν ἐστιν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ; φαῖεν ἄν;—συνεδόκει.—πότερον 354b οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.—συνεδόκει.—ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι διʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος 354c λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.— οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.—οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν;—συνεδόκει.—τοῦτʼ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθʼ εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῇ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν 354d αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατʼ ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕξετε.— οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.—ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι 354e ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕξετε.— ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἕνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῇ; Συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδεῖξαι τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις.

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 354 focus

Soc.

Then does it seem to you, my friends, as Protagoras and I assert, that the only reason why these things are evil is that they end at last in pains, and deprive us of other pleasures? Would they admit this?
We both agreed that they would.
Then again, suppose we should ask them the opposite: You, sirs, who tell us on the other hand that good things are painful—do you not give such instances as physical training, military service, and medical treatment conducted by cautery, incision, drugs, or starvation, and say that these are good, but painful? Would they not grant it? 354b
He agreed that they would.
Then do you call them good because they produce extreme pangs and anguish for the moment, or because later on they result in health and good bodily condition, the deliverance of cities, dominion over others, and wealth? They would assent to this, I suppose.
He agreed.
And are these things good for any other reason than that they end at last in pleasures and relief and riddance of pains? Or have you some other end to mention, 354c with respect to which you call them good, apart from pleasures and pains? They could not find one, I fancy.
I too think they could not, said Protagoras.
Then do you pursue pleasure as being a good thing, and shun pain as being a bad one?
He agreed that we do.
So one thing you hold to be bad—pain; and pleasure you hold to be good, since the very act of enjoying you call bad as soon as it deprives us of greater pleasures than it has in itself, or leads to greater pains than the pleasures it contains. 354d For if it is with reference to something else that you call the act of enjoyment bad, and with a view to some other end, you might be able to tell it us but this you will be unable to do.
I too think that they cannot, said Protagoras.
Then is not the same thing repeated in regard to the state of being pained? You call being pained a good thing as soon as it either rids us of greater pains than those it comprises, or leads to greater pleasures than its pains. Now if you have in view some other end 354e than those which I mention when you call being pained good, you can tell it us; but you never can.
Truly spoken, said Protagoras.
Once more then, I proceeded; if you were to ask me, my friends, Now why on earth do you speak at such length on this point, and in so many ways? I should reply, Forgive me: in the first place, it is not easy to conclude what it is that you mean when you say overcome by pleasures; and secondly, on this point hang all our conclusions.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν—ἐροίμεθα . There is no sufficient reason for changing ἄν to αὖ or for omitting ἄν : ἄν points forward to the apodosis in l. 35 φαῖεν ἄν and is just as idiomatic as ἄν in ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ , e.g. in 311B above.

οί=ον τά τε γυμνάσια κτλ. Rep.II. 357C τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι—εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατπεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτπευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χπηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰπ ἐρίρονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν .

τὰς στρατείας . Ar. Eth. Nic. X. 7. 1177 b . 9 οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γιγνοιντο .

καύσεών τε—λιμοκτονιῶν . Gorg. 521E πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἁνήρ(sc. ὁ ἰατρός )— τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ ρνίγων—ρικπότατα ρώματα διδοὺς καὶ ρεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων. λιμοκτονία (‘Hungerkur’, says Stallbaum) is part of the μικρὰ δίαιτα of Rep. III. 406D .

ἄλλων ἀρχαί : ‘dominions over others’—not ἄλλων πόλεων : cf. Gorg. 452D αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἄμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ. Heindorf's conjecture ἄλλαι (i.e. ‘besides’) is not necessary, in view of Gorg. 514A (quoted by Sauppe) ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν .

τέλος . The philosophical sense of this word—as an end of action—is beginning to appear in Plato: cf. Gorg. 499E ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθὸν κτλ. ;

ἀλλ’ ἢ ἡδονάς is Stephanus' emendation for ἀλλ’ ἡδονάς .

ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν : the copula is attracted to the predicate, as regularly: cf. below, 359D τὸ ἥττω εἶvαι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα .

εἴ με ἀνέροισθε : without the φαίην ἄν which we should expect. Socrates apostrophises the ἄνθρωποι as if they stood before him; the φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε of l. 66 is part of what Socrates says to the ἄνθρωποι .

ἐν τούτῳ : see on 310D above. πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις means all the proofs that pleasure is good and pain evil.

ἀναθέσθαι suggests (as often) draughts-playing: a comparison which is worked up into a simile by Plato in Rep. VI. 487B-C.

Plato Protagoras 354

ed. John Burnet

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