Soc.
Then does it seem to you, my friends, as Protagoras and I assert, that the only reason why these things are evil is that they end at last in pains, and deprive us of other pleasures? Would they admit this?
We both agreed that they would.
Then again, suppose we should ask them the opposite: You, sirs, who tell us on the other hand that good things are painful—do you not give such instances as physical training, military service, and medical treatment conducted by cautery, incision, drugs, or starvation, and say that these are good, but painful? Would they not grant it? 354b
He agreed that they would.
Then do you call them good because they produce extreme pangs and anguish for the moment, or because later on they result in health and good bodily condition, the deliverance of cities, dominion over others, and wealth? They would assent to this, I suppose.
He agreed.
And are these things good for any other reason than that they end at last in pleasures and relief and riddance of pains? Or have you some other end to mention, 354c with respect to which you call them good, apart from pleasures and pains? They could not find one, I fancy.
I too think they could not, said Protagoras.
Then do you pursue pleasure as being a good thing, and shun pain as being a bad one?
He agreed that we do.
So one thing you hold to be bad—pain; and pleasure you hold to be good, since the very act of enjoying you call bad as soon as it deprives us of greater pleasures than it has in itself, or leads to greater pains than the pleasures it contains. 354d For if it is with reference to something else that you call the act of enjoyment bad, and with a view to some other end, you might be able to tell it us but this you will be unable to do.
I too think that they cannot, said Protagoras.
Then is not the same thing repeated in regard to the state of being pained? You call being pained a good thing as soon as it either rids us of greater pains than those it comprises, or leads to greater pleasures than its pains. Now if you have in view some other end 354e than those which I mention when you call being pained good, you can tell it us; but you never can.
Truly spoken, said Protagoras.
Once more then, I proceeded; if you were to ask me, my friends, Now why on earth do you speak at such length on this point, and in so many ways? I should reply, Forgive me: in the first place, it is not easy to conclude what it is that you mean when you say overcome by pleasures; and secondly, on this point hang all our conclusions.
Protagoras. Plato. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1924.
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