Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 350

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[350]

ΣΩ.

οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ 350 350a φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως;— ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί.—πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;— ὅτι ἐπίστανται.—τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι;— οἱ ἱππικοί.—τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή;— οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν 350b ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.—ἤδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων;— ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας.—οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν;— αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν.—πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι;— καὶ νῦν γʼ, ἔφη.— 350c οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη;
οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην—εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι 350d οὐ πάντες—τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔροιό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ 350e δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς.

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 350 focus

Soc.

Now do you know who 350a dive boldly into wells?
I do; divers.
Is this because they have knowledge, or for some other reason?
Because they have knowledge.
And who are bold in going to war on horseback—those who are practised horsemen, or those who are not?
Practised horsemen.
And who with bucklers—buckler-men, or those who are not?
Buckler-men: and so with all other cases, he went on, if that is your point; those who have knowledge are bolder than those who lack it, and individually they are bolder when they have learnt 350b than before learning.
But you must have seen at times, I said, persons who are without knowledge of any of these affairs, yet behaving boldly in each of them.
I have, he said, and very boldly too.
Then are these bold ones courageous also?
Nay, that would make courage a base thing, he replied; for those you speak of are out of their senses.
What then, I asked, do you mean by courageous men? Surely the same as bold men? 350c
Yes, I do still, he said.
Then these men, I went on, who are so brave, are found to be not courageous but mad? And in those former cases our wisest men are boldest too, and being boldest are most courageous? And on this reasoning, wisdom will be courage?
You do not rightly recall, Socrates, what I stated in replying to you. When you asked me whether courageous men are bold, I admitted it: I was not asked whether bold men are courageous. Had you asked me this before, I should have said— 350d Not all. And as to proving that courageous men are not bold, you have nowhere pointed out that I was wrong in my admission that they are. Next you show that such persons individually are bolder when they have knowledge, and bolder than others who lack it, and therewith you take courage and wisdom to be the same: proceeding in this manner you might even take strength to be wisdom. On this method you might begin by asking me whether the strong are powerful, and I should say Yes; 350e and then, whether those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not know how to wrestle, and whether individually they are more powerful when they have learnt than before learning, and I should say Yes. And on my admitting these points it would be open to you to say, by the same token, that according to my admission wisdom is strength.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

αολυμβῶσιν . This and the next example are given also in Lach. 193 B ff. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving (an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV. 26. 8) may have been to clean the wells and the like.

τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες . See Introduction, p. xxxii.

αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν—ἤ . The notion ‘than’ is expressed twice: see note on Crito, 44C καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν κτλ., and cf. below, 350E and (with Sauppe) Hdt. VIII. 86 ἐγένοντο—μακρῷ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν ἢ πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ .

αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν—ἀνδρεία : and if αἰσχρόν , not ἀρετή (which it is), since all ἀρετή is καλόν ( 349E . Cf. Lach. 182C ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναιand with the general sentiment Meno, 88B οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ’ οἶον θάππος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαππῇ ἄνθπωρος, βλάρτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται ;

λέγεις : the present is idiomatically used in referring to an earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on ὅπερ λέγω in Apol. 21A . With λέγεις followed by an accusative in this sense compare Symp. 199E πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν· ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός ;

οὐχὶτοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι . This Protagoras did not say, but only that οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι : see 349E For this reason Sauppe and others reject τούς before θαρραλέους , and in favour of this urge the reply of Protagoras ( καὶ νῦν γε ): but inasmuch as (1) οὐκοῦν οὗτοι—μαινόμενοι φαίνονται seems to be intended to be incompatible with τοὺς ἀνδρείους οὐχὶ—εἷναι , (2) θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι in l. 35 clearly implies that θαρραλέοι are conceived of as ἀνδρεῖοι (no less than ἀνδρεῖοι as θαρραλέοι ), we must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS. reading. Protagoras' καὶ νῦν γε is an unwary admission: he does not at first catch the difference between οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι and οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι θαρραλέοι , and Socrates avails himself of his opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this misrepresentation could only be expressed as ἀνδρεῖοι are σοφοί ( = ἐπιστήμονες ), not σοφοί are ἀνδρεῖοι : see on 349E and 350D

ἐκεῖ , i.e. in the case of θάρρος based on σοφία , illustrated in 350A Sauppe (after Schöne) reads οἳ σοφώτατοι, οὗτοι κτλ. : but οἱ σοφώτατοι need not go closely with οὗτοι (which is resumptive) any more than οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες with the preceding οὗτοι . There is a kind of chiasmus in the order οὗτοι— οἱ—θαρραλέοι ) ( οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι .

οὐ καλῶς—μνημονεύεις κτλ . Protagoras sees now that ‘All brave are bold’ is not equivalent to ‘All bold are brave’, and rectifies his καὶ νῦν γε by pointing out that he originally said only ‘All brave are bold’ but he confines his attention to this point, without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates' argument from 349E to 350B

ὡμολόγησα : in 349E

τότε ἤρου . So B and T. In τότε there is perhaps a latent contrast to καὶ νῦν γε of l. 31. Protagoras is correcting his recent slip—had you asked me then (viz. at 349E , I should have answered rightly. τοῦτο has inferior MSS. authority.

τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν . The οὐ after ὡς is due to a confusion between (1) τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας and (2) οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ κτλ. The insertion of οὐ is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is refuted, whence ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ, ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐ etc.

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει κτλ. Protagoras ignores Socrates' third proposition in 350B (25-30), where it is shown that θάρρος without ἐπιστήμη is not ἀνδρεία ; see next note.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ. , i.e. you might as well argue (1) οἱ ἰσχυροί are δυνατοί , (2) οἱ ἐπιστήμονες are δυνατοί , therefore οἱ ἐπιστήμονες are ἰσχυροί . This would only be correct if for (1) we substituted οἱ δυνατοί are ἰσχυροί . To make Protagoras' picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add (3) none who are δυνατοί without ἐπιστήμη are ἰσχυροί —but this is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates' reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras' objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in 350C (33-6), and that is why Socrates makes no reply.

Plato Protagoras 350

ed. John Burnet

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