Plato Protagoras 351

ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ. Protagoras says in effect: δύναμις and ἰσχύς are of the body, θάρσος and ἀνδρεία of the soul. δύναμις may come from knowledge (as when one has learnt how to wrestle: above 350E , or from madness or rage (as in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for vengeance; such men have no real physical strength or ἰσχύς as it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of δύναμις ). ἰσχύς comes from natural constitution ( φύσις ) and proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense). Similarly θάρσος may result from art ( τέχνη is substituted for ἐπιστήμη in view of the illustrations in 350A , from rage or madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna); ἀνδρεία comes from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf. Rep. III. 410D τὸ θυμοειδὲς—τῆς φύσεως—ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδπεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ’ ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληπόν τε καὶ χαλερὸν γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός).

εὖ ζῆν εἰ ἀνιώμενος—ζῴη . There is the usual ambiguity in εὖ ζῆν : see on 344E above.

οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ . The MSS. have δοκοῖ , which all the editors (except Heindorf) retain. The meaning required is: ‘would he not, think you, have lived well?’ (to which Protagoras replies ἔμοιγε sc. δοκεῖ ), not ‘would you not think he has lived well?’ and δοκεῖ is as necessary here as in ἆρ’ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν εἰ—ζῴη above. The idiom is attested by abundant examples, e.g. Ar. Plut. 380 καὶ μὴν φίλως γ’ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀναλώσας λογίσασθαι δώδεκα , Wasps, 1404-5 εἰ νὴ Δί’ ἀντὶ τῆς κακῆς γλώττης ποθὲν πυροὺς πρίαιο σωφρονεῖν ἄν μοι δοκεῖς : in Plato it is extremely frequent, e.g. Rep. 1. 335B πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι , Alc. I, 105C εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι—οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν , Gorg. 514E, cf. Euthyd. 294B , 306B Gorg. 522A , and below 357A The corruption is natural: it occurs also in the MSS. of Ar. Wasps, loc. cit.

ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω : i.e. ‘I mean’ not ‘I say’: cf. below, l. 23 in E. Socrates puts his question in a different form inviting an affirmative answer. After the ἡδέα following Heindorf would insert τὰ ἡδέα , but the subject is easily supplied.

μὴ εἴ τι—ἄλλο . So B and the first hand in T. The clause εἴ τι—ἄλλο defines negatively the meaning of κατὰ τοῦτο , as καθ’ ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν defined it positively. μή deprecates or forbids the possible misunderstanding: its use in the idiomatic μὴ ὅτι is the same in kind: see above on 319D To read εἰ μή τι (with the second hand in T) would be to beg the whole question— that step is not reached till 353D

ἔστι μὲν ἃ κτλ. See on ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα in 334A

ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον κτλ. πρὸς λόγονdoes not (except per accidens ) mean ‘relevant’ but is equivalent to εὔλογον : compare the phrases μετὰ λόγου, κατὰ λόγον ; and, for the use of πρός, πρὸς ὀργήν, πρὸς βίαν and the like. So in 343D 344A Here the meaning is further explained by the clause καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ— ἀγαθόν. τὸ σκέμμα is quite different from σκέψις : it is not the inquiry itself, but the proposition to be inquired into, viz. that Pleasure is good: if this proposition is reasonable, says Protagoras, we shall accept it, if not, we shall dispute it. The sentiment does not deserve the scorn which Heindorf pours upon it, if only we catch the force of πρὸς λόγον, σκέμμα and ἀμφισβητήσομεν .

δίκαιος—σύ . Plato very frequently omits the copula ἐστίν; εἶ and ἐσμέν more rarely, εἶναι often, ἦν rarely, parts of the conjunctive and optative very rarely. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, 31-5.

κατάρχεις : a lofty word (here used with a touch of irony) with religious associations: the middle is used of beginning a sacrifice. Cf. Symp. 177E ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἀγαθῆ? καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἔρωταand ibid. 176A.