Plato, Protagoras, ed. John Burnet, 349

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[349]

ΣΩ.

σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τʼ εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων 349 349a σύ γʼ ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅπως οὔ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, 349b ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἑνὶ πράγματί ἐστιν, ἢ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὂν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ 349c ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πῃ ἄλλῃ νῦν φήσῃς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός 349d μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ γνώσῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. 349e
ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι;— καὶ ἴτας γε, ἔφη, ἐφʼ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι.—φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις;— κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε.—πότερον οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν;— ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.—

Protagoras. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1903.

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Current edition Perseus

Πρωταγόρας (Greek) (Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.)

Translations (1)

Protagoras Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 2. Lamb, W.R.M., translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1924 (printing).) — 349 focus

Soc.

but you are both good yourself and have the gift of making others good. And you are so confident of yourself that, while others make a secret of this art, you have had yourself 349a publicly proclaimed to all the Greeks with the title of sophist, and have appointed yourself preceptor of culture and virtue, and are the first who has ever demanded a regular fee for such work. What then could I do but call upon you to deal with our problem both by question and communication? I had no other course. So now with regard to those points which I have raised on the subject in my opening questions, I desire to be reminded of some 349b by you and to have your help in investigating others. The question, I believe, was this:¹ Are the five names of wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness attached to one thing, or underlying each of these names is there a distinct existence or thing that has its own particular function, each thing being different from the others? And your answer was that they are not names attached to one thing, 349c but that each of these names applies to a distinct thing, and that all these are parts of virtue; not like the parts of gold, which are similar to each other and to the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of the face, dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts and to each other, and each having a distinct function. If you still hold the same opinion of them, say so; if you have a new one, define what it is, for I make no objection to your replying now on other lines. Indeed I should not be surprised 349d if you were merely experimenting upon me when you spoke before.
Well, Socrates, he replied, I say that all these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them are fairly on a par with each other, courage is something vastly different from all the rest. You may perceive the truth of what I say from this: you will find many people extremely unjust, unholy, dissolute, and ignorant, and yet pre-eminently courageous. 349e
Stop now, I said: we must duly examine what you say. Do you call courageous men bold, or something else?
Yes, and impetuous also, he replied, where most men fear to tread.
Well now, do you say that virtue is a good thing, and of this good thing offer yourself as teacher?
Nay, it is the best of things, he said, unless I am out of my senses.
Then is one part of it base and another good, or is the whole good?
Surely the whole is good in the highest possible degree.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Protagoras (Plato. Platonis Protagoras. Adam, James; Adam, Adela Marion, editors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.) focus

ὑποκηρυξάμενος ‘having had yourself heralded as a sophist’: compare Aeschin. in Ctes. 41 ἄλλοι δέ τινες ὑποκηρυξάμενοι τοὺς αὑτῶν οἰκέτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρους . The force of ὑπο‐ is probably the same as in ὑπεῖπον : see note on 343E Notice the effect of the double σεαυτόν (both of them after a natural pause): σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος—σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας : the ‐αυτόν is brought out so strongly as to suggest that Protagoras is the only true Αὐτός or Master.

μισθὸν—ἄρνυσθαι : 328B where however it is not said that Protagoras was the first to take a fee. The Homeric word ἄρνυσθαι is occasionally used by prose writers in the phrase μισθὸν ἄρνυσθαι : whence μισθαρνεῖν .

ἐκεῖνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ : see above on 330A

ἦν δὲ—τόδε : 329C ff.

ἕκαστα attracted for ἔκαστον : so Rep. VIII. 546C δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, i.e. ‘lacking—each of them—one’.

οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι. ὑπόλογον τίθεμαιlike ὑπόλογον ποιοῦμαι ( Lach. 189B ) and ὑπολογίζομαι ( Apol. 28B ) is ‘to set down against’, ‘per contra’, whence ‘object’ as here.

μόρια μέν . The antithesis to μέν was already expressed in ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι 349B

ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates' arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet been discussed: see on 333C and D and Introduction, p. xiii.

ἀκολαστοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ : like Otho (Tac. Hist. II. 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:

ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως . The extreme difference (cf. πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον in l. 4) between courage and the other virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’: below in 359B the διαφερόντως is omitted as unnecessary in a recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23C ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὖσα πόλις ἀρίστη πρός τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως: cf. also Gorg. 487B αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.

ἔχε δή . ‘Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460A, aut revocatur, qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349D rsquo; (Wohlrab on Theaet. 186B ).

πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ. Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι ; (2) ἐπιστήμονες are θαρραλέοι ( 349E l. 16 to 350B l. 25); (3) none who are θαρραλέοι without ἐπιστήμη are ἀνδρεῖοι ( 350B ll. 25-30). From this he infers that σοφοί (i.e. ἐπιστήμονες ) are ἀνδρεῖοι , i.e. that σοφία is ἀνδρεία . The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to assume (it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλέοι contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλέοι with knowledge and θαρραλέοι without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in ch. XIX ff.) every one who is not ἐπιστήμων is ἀνεπιστήμων . Now as ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι and no ἀνεπιστήμονες (in the class θαρραλέοι ) are ἀνδρεῖοι , it follows that ἀνδρεῖοι are ἐπιστήμονες , but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted— that ἐπιστήμονες are ἀνδρεῖοι , since ἀνδρεῖοι may be only a part of ἐπιστήμονες . Socrates —consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when about to draw his conclusion in 350B , ll. 31 and 34, where see note.

καὶ ἴτας γ’, ἔφη : i.e. they not only have θάρρος (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In ἰέναι Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of ἴτης : Sauppe refers to the scholiast on Ar. Clouds , 444 ἴτης. ἰταμός, ἀναιδής, καὶ δῑ αὐτῶν χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρεῖοςis coupled with ἴτης in Symp. 203D and with θρασύς in Ar. Clouds, loc. cit.

φέρε δή κτλ. This section (from φέρε δή to ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα in l. 16) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on l. 9) in 350B see note on l. 29, and cf. Laches, 192C, where the proof that ἄφρων καρτέρησις is not ἀνδρεία is introduced in much the same way: σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι .

εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε : ‘as I'm a sane man’. This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283E , Rep. X. 608D ( εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε ), Gorg. 511B οἶδα—εἰ μὴ κωφός γ’ εἰμι.

τὸ μέν τι—τὸ δέ τι . See on Euthyphr. 12A . Kroschel quotes Phileb. 13C τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας—κακάς .

Plato Protagoras 349

ed. John Burnet

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