Plutarch, De cohibenda ira, ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, 11

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[11]

ΦΟΥΝΔ.

πάντων δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἐθισμοῦ δεομένων, οἷον δαμάζοντος καὶ καταθλοῦντος ἀσκήσει τὸ ἄλογον καὶ δυσπειθές, οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἐγγυμνάσασθαι 20 τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ πρὸς τὸν θυμόν. οὔτε γὰρ φθόνος οὔτε φόβος οὔτε φιλοτιμία τις ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς αὐτούς· ὀργαὶ δὲ συνεχεῖς πολλὰ ποιοῦσαι προσκρούματα καὶ σφάλματα διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ὀλισθηρῷ χωρίῳ, μηδενὸς ἐνισταμένου μηδὲ κωλύοντος, 25 459c ὑποφέρουσιν.¹ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀναμάρτητον ἐν πάθει τὸ ἀνυπεύθυνον κατασχεῖν, μὴ πολλῇ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐμπεριλαβόντα πραότητι μηδὲ πολλὰς ὑπομείναντα φωνὰς γυναικὸς καὶ φίλων ἐγκαλούντων ἀτονίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν. οἷς μάλιστα παρωξυνόμην 5 καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὡς τῷ μὴ κολάζεσθαι διαφθειρομένους. ὀψὲ μέντοι συνεῖδον, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνους ἀνεξικακίᾳ χείρονας ποιεῖν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ πικρίᾳ καὶ θυμῷ διαστρέφειν ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἑτέρων ἐπανόρθωσιν ἔπειτα πολλοὺς ὁρῶν αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ 10 κολάζεσθαι πολλάκις αἰδουμένους κακοὺς εἶναι καὶ μεταβολῆς ἀρχὴν τὴν συγγνώμην μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν τιμωρίαν λαμβάνοντας, καὶ νὴ Δία δουλεύοντας ἑτέροις 459d ἀπὸ νεύματος καὶ σιωπῇ καὶ προθυμότερον ἢ μετὰ πληγῶν καὶ στιγμάτων ἑτέροις, ἐπειθόμην ἡγεμονικώτερον 15 εἶναι τοῦ θυμοῦ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς εἶπεν

ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς·

² ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον αἰδουμένοις ὁ σωφρονίζων ἐγγίγνεται φόβος. ἡ δὲ συνεχὴς πληγὴ καὶ ἀπαραίτητος 20 οὐ μετάνοιαν ἐμποιεῖ τοῦ κακουργεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῦ λανθάνειν πρόνοιαν μᾶλλον. τρίτον ἀεὶ μνημονεύων καὶ διανοούμενος πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ὡς οὔθʼ ὁ τοξεύειν ἡμᾶς διδάξας ἐκώλυσε³ βάλλειν ἀλλὰ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, οὔτε τῷ κολάζειν ἐμποδὼν ἔσται τὸ διδάσκειν 25 459e εὐκαίρως τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ μετρίως καὶ ὠφελίμως καὶ πρεπόντως πειρῶμαι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφαιρεῖν⁴ μάλιστα τῷ μὴ παραιρεῖσθαι τῶν κολαζομένων τὴν δικαιολογίαν ἀλλʼ ἀκούειν. ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος ἐμποιεῖ τῷ πάθει διατριβὴν καὶ μέλλησιν ἐκλύουσαν ἥ τε κρίσις εὑρίσκει καὶ τρόπον πρέποντα καὶ μέγεθος 5 ἁρμόττον κολάσεως· ἔτι δʼ οὐχ ὑπολείπεται πρόφασις τῷ διδόντι δίκην ἀντιτείνειν πρὸς τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν, ἂν μὴ κατʼ ὀργὴν ἀλλʼ ἐξελεγχθεὶς κολάζηται τὸ τʼ αἴσχιστον οὐ πρόσεστι, φαίνεσθαι δικαιότερα τοῦ δεσπότου λέγοντα τὸν οἰκέτην. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ 10 459f Φωκίων μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν οὐκ ἐῶν προεξανίστασθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐδὲ ταχὺ πιστεύειν, εἰ σήμερον εἶπεν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τέθνηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκώς οὕτως οἶμαι δεῖν ὑποβάλλειν ἑαυτῷ τὸν σπεύδοντα διʼ ὀργὴν 15 ἐπὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν, εἰ σήμερον οὗτος ἠδίκηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην ἠδικηκώς· καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἰ δώσει δίκην βράδιον, ἀλλʼ εἰ ταχὺ παθὼν ἀεὶ φανεῖται⁵ μὴ ἀδικῶν· ὅπερ ἤδη συμβέβηκε πολλάκις. τίς. γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτω δεινός ἐστιν, ὥστε 20 460a μαστιγοῦν καὶ κολάζειν δοῦλον, ὅτι πέμπτην ἢ δεκάτην ἡμέραν προσέκαυσε τοὖψον ἢ κατέβαλε τὴν τράπεζαν ἢ βράδιον ὑπήκουσε; καὶ μὴν ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἐφʼ οἷς εὐθὺς γενομένοις καὶ προσφάτοις οὖσι ταραττόμεθα καὶ πικρῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἔχομεν. ὡς γὰρ 25 διʼ ὁμίχλης τὰ σώματα, καὶ διʼ ὀργῆς τὰ πράγματα μείζονα φαίνεται. διὸ δεῖ ταχὺ συμμνημονεύειν τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἔξωθεν ὄντας⁶ἀνυπόπτως, ἂν καθαρῷ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ καθεστῶτι φαίνηται μοχθηρόν, 460b ἐπιστραφῆναι, καὶ μὴ προέσθαι τότε μηδʼ ἀφεῖναι τὴν κόλασιν ὥσπερ σιτίον ἀνορέκτους γεγονότας. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ παρούσης 5 ὀργῆς κολάζειν, ὡς τὸ παυσαμένης μὴ κολάζειν ἀλλʼ ἐκλελύσθαι, καὶ ταὐτὸ πεπονθέναι τοῖς ἀργοῖς κωπηλάταις, οἳ γαλήνης ὁρμοῦσιν εἶτα κινδυνεύουσιν ἀνέμῳ πλέοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ λογισμοῦ κατεγνωκότες ἀτονίαν καὶ μαλακίαν ἐν τῷ κολάζειν, 10 σπεύδομεν παρόντι τῷ θυμῷ καθάπερ πνεύματι παραβόλως. τροφῇ μὲν γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν κατὰ φύσιν χρῆται τιμωρίᾳ δʼ ὁ μὴ πεινῶν μηδὲ διψῶν αὐτῆς, μηδʼ ὥσπερ ὄψου πρὸς τὸ κολάσαι τοῦ θυμοῦ δεόμενος, 460c ἀλλʼ ὅταν πορρωτάτω τοῦ ὀρέγεσθαι γένηται 15 προσάγων τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναγκαίως. οὐ γάρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης⁷ ἱστορεῖ κατʼ αὐτὸν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ μαστιγοῦσθαι τοὺς οἰκέτας πρὸς αὐλόν, οὕτω πρὸς ἡδονὴν δεῖ καθάπερ ἀπολαύσματος ὀρέξει τῆς τιμωρίας ἐμφορεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν κολάζοντας εἶτα μετανοεῖν· 20 ὧν τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες τὸ δὲ γυναικῶδες· ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς χωρὶς ἐν τῷ τοῦ λογισμοῦ χρόνῳ τὴν δίκην κομίζεσθαι⁸ μὴ ὑπολείποντας⁹ τῷ θυμῷ πρόφασιν.

De cohibenda ira. Plutarch. ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs. Leipzig. 1891.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Περὶ ἀοπγησίας (Greek) (Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol III. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.)

Translations (2)

On the Control of Anger Perseus (Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VI. Helmbold, William Clark, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1936 (printing).) — 11 focus

[11]

FUNDANUS.

But however true it is that all the passions have need of a process of habituation, which tames as it were and subdues by rigorous training the irrational and obstinate element of the soul, there is no passion that we can better learn to control by practising on servants than temper. For no envy or fear or rivalry enters into our relations with them, but frequent fits of anger bring about many conflicts and errors, and because of the absolute power we possess, there being no one to oppose or prevent us, these cause us to slide and fall, since we are, as it were, on slippery ground. For it is impossible that irresponsible power under the influence of passion should be free from error, unless he who wields this power shall encompass it with a bulwark of gentleness, and shall hold out against many pleas of wife and friends, all charging him with laxity and easy-going ways. By such charges I myself used to be very greatly exasperated against my slaves, in the conviction that they were being ruined by not being punished. At long last, however, though late it was, I came to perceive that, in the first place, it is better to make them worse by forbearance than by harshness and anger to pervert my own self for the correction of the others. In the second place, when I observed that many, just because they were not being punished, were often ashamed to be bad, and made pardon, rather than correction, the starting-point of reformation, and, I swear, performed their duties more zealously for the kind of master who gave orders silently with a nod than for the others who used blows and branding-irons, I began to be convinced that reason is more fit than anger to govern. For it is not as the Poet¹ has said,

Where fear is, there is also reverence;

but, on the contrary, in those who revere there is engendered the kind of fear that corrects behaviour, whereas continual and unmerciful beating produces, not repentance for wrongdoing, but rather the farsighted cunning to do wrong without detection. In the third place, I always keep in mind and reflect in privacy that he who taught us the use of the bow did not forbid us to shoot, but only to miss the mark,² and that the infliction of punishment will not be hindered by our teaching how to inflict it at the right time,³ with moderation, and in a useful and suitable manner; and, remembering these things, I try to get rid of my anger, if possible, by not depriving those who are to be punished of the right to speak in their defence, but by listening to their plea. For both the passage of time gives a pause to passion and a delay which dissolves it, and also the judgement discovers a suitable manner of punishment and an adequate amount; furthermore, the man who suffers punishment has no pretext left for opposing the correction if punishment is inflicted, not in anger, but after the accused has been proved guilty; and finally, the most shameful thing is avoided-that the slave should seem to be making a juster plea than his master.

FUNDANUS.

And so, just as Phocion⁴ after Alexander’s death, trying to keep the Athenians from revolting prematurely or believing the report too quickly, said to them, If, men of Athens, he is dead to-day, he will be dead to-morrow also, and the day after; in like manner, I think, the man who, urged on by anger, is in a hurry for vengeance, should suggest to himself, If this person is guilty of wronging you to-day, he will still be guilty to-morrow also, and the day after; no harm will be done if he shall be punished somewhat late, but if he is punished in haste he will always be thought to have suffered without offending; and this has happened many times in the past. For which of us is so harsh that he scourges and chastises a slave because five or ten days ago he overroasted the meat or upset the table or carne too slowly at our bidding? And yet these are the very things which cause us to be excited and in a cruel and implacable mood at the moment they happen and are still fresh in our memory. For as the shapes of persons seen through a fog, so things seen through a mist of rage appear greater than they are.

FUNDANUS.

These are the reasons why we should immediately call to mind such instances and precepts; and when we are free from all suspicion of passion, if the offence still appears evil to the clear and settled judgement, we should attend to it then and not dismiss or abandon the punishment, as we leave food when we have lost our appetite. And nothing is so much the cause of our punishing in a rage as that, when our anger is over, we do not punish, but leave things alone. We are very much like lazy oarsmen, who during calm weather lie in port, and later, at the risk of their lives, avail themselves of a wind to go sailing. And so do we condemn reason for remissness and softness in punishment and hasten on to the deed rashly and to our peril when anger, like a gale, is upon us. For while a hungry man indulges in food as nature dictates, yet punishment is indulged in by one who is not hungry or thirsty for it, nor does he need anger as a relish to stimulate him to punish; on the contrary, when he finds himself very far removed from the desire to punish, he brings up reason to reinforce him and punishes under compulsion. Aristotle⁵ relates that in Etruria in his day slaves were scourged to the music of pipes. But one should not, in that spirit, through a craving for the punishment as for a kind of enjoyment, gorge oneself with it, and rejoice while inflicting chastisement and after inflicting it repent⁶ - of these the first is bestial, the second womanish - but without either sorrow or pleasure one should mete out punishment in reason’s own good time, leaving anger no excuse.

Concerning the cure of anger: a dialogue Perseus (Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. I. Goodwin, William W., editor; Dillgham, William, translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.) — 11 focus

[11]

FUNDANUS.

Now, whereas all passions do stand in need of discipline, which by exercise tames and subdues their unreasonableness and stubbornness, there is none about which we have more need to be exercised in reference to servants than that of anger. For neither do we envy nor fear them, nor have we any competition for honor with them; but we have frequent fits of anger with them, which case many offences and errors, by reason of the very power possessed by us as masters, and which bring us easily to the ground, as if we stood in a slippery place with no one standing by to save us. For it is impossible to keep an irresponsible power from offending in the excitement of passion, unless we gird up that great power with gentleness, and can slight the frequent speeches of wife and friends accusing us of remissness. And indeed I myself have by nothing more than by such speeches been incensed against my servants, as if they were spoiled for want of beating. And truly it was late before I came to understand, that it was better that servants should be something the worse by indulgence, than that one should distort himself through wrath and bitterness for the amendment of others. And secondly, observing that many by this very impunity have been brought to be ashamed to be wicked, and have begun their change to virtue more from being pardoned than from being punished, and that they have obeyed some upon their nod only, peaceably, and more willingly than they have done others with all their beating and scourging, I became persuaded of this, that reason was fitter to govern with than anger. For it is not as the poet said,—

Wherever fear is, there is modesty;

but, on the contrary, it is in the modest that that fear is bred which produces moderation, whereas continual and unmerciful beating doth not make men repent of doing evil, but only devise plans for doing it without being detected. And in the third place I always remember and consider with myself, that as he who taught us the art of shooting did not forbid us to shoot, but only to shoot amiss, so no more can it be any hindrance from punishing to teach us how we may do it seasonably and moderately, with benefit and decency. I therefore strive to put away anger, especially by not denying the punished a liberty to plead for themselves, but granting them an hearing. For time gives a breathing-space unto passion, and a delay which mitigates and dissolves it; and a man’s judgment in the mean while finds out both a becoming manner and a proportionable measure of punishing. And moreover hereby, he that is punished hath not any pretence left him to object against the correction given him, if he is punished not out of anger, but being first himself convinced of his fault. And finally we are here saved from the greatest disgrace of all, for by this means the servant will not seem to speak more just things than his master.

As therefore Phocion after the death of Alexander, to hinder the Athenians from rising too soon or believing it too hastily, said: O Athenians, if he is dead to-day, he will be so to-morrow, and on the next day after that; in like manner do I judge one ought to suggest to himself, who through anger is making haste to punish: If it is true to-day that he hath thus wronged thee, it will be true to-morrow, and on the next day, also. Nor will there any inconvenience follow upon the deferring of his punishment for a while; but if he be punished all in haste, he will ever after seem to have been innocent, as it hath oftentimes fallen out heretofore. For which of us all is so cruel as to torment or scourge a servant because, five or ten days before, he burnt the meat, or overturned the table, or did not soon enough what he was bidden? And yet it is for just such things as these, while they are fresh and newly done, that we are so disordered, and become cruel and implacable. For as bodies through a mist, so actions through anger seem greater than they are. Wherefore we ought speedily to recall such considerations as these are to our mind; and when we are unquestionably out of passion, if then to a pure and composed reason the deed do appear to be wicked, we ought to animadvert, and no longer neglect or abstain from punishment, as if we had lost our appetite for it. For there is nothing to which we can more justly impute men’s punishing others in their anger, than to a habit of not punishing them when their anger is over, but growing remiss, and doing like lazy mariners, who in fair weather keep loitering within the haven, and then put themselves in danger by setting sail when the wind blows strong. So we likewise, condemning the remissness and over-calmness of our reason in punishing, make haste to do it while our anger is up, pushing us forward like a dangerous wind.

He that useth food doth it to gratify his hunger, which is natural; but he that inflicts punishment should do it without either hungering or thirsting after it, not needing anger, like sauce, to whet him on to punish; but when he is farthest off from desiring it, then he should do it as a deed of necessity under the guidance of reason. And though Aristotle reports, that in his time servants in Etruria were wont to be scourged while the music played, yet they who punish others ought not to be carried on with a desire of punishing, as of a thing they delight in, nor to rejoice when they punish, and then repent of it when they have done,—whereof the first is savage, the last womanish; but, without either sorrow or pleasure, they should inflict just punishment when reason is free to judge, leaving no pretence for anger to intermeddle.

Notes on the current edition

Περὶ ἀοπγησίας

1. ὑποφέρουσιν R: ὑποφέρουσαι

2. cf. Lorenz. Epich. fr. 58

3. ἐκώλυσε] ἐκέλευσε?

4. πρεπόντως πειρῶμαι, τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφαιρῶν Madvigius

5. ἀεὶ φανεῖται] ἀναφανεῖται Madvigius. εἶτα φανεῖται?

6. ὄντας Benselerus: ὄντα

7. Ἀριστοτέλης] Fragm. 608

8. κομίζεσθαι R: κολάζεσθαι

9. ὑπολείποντας *: ὑπολείποντα

Plutarch De cohibenda ira 11

ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs

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ΦΟΥΝΔ.

Current edition Perseus

FUNDANUS.

FUNDANUS.

FUNDANUS.

FUNDANUS.

Notes on the current edition

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