Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Henry Stuart Jones, 7.74

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[1] οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄγγελμα ἐπέσχον τὴν νύκτα, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀπάτην εἶναι. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὣς οὐκ εὐθὺς ὥρμησαν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν περιμεῖναι, ὅπως ξυσκευάσαιντο ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν οἱ στρατιῶται ὅτι χρησιμώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα καταλιπεῖν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὰ ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς δίαιταν ὑπῆρχεν ἐπιτήδεια ἀφορμᾶσθαι.

[2] Συρακόσιοι δὲ καὶ Γύλιππος τῷ μὲν πεζῷ προεξελθόντες τάς τε ὁδοὺς τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ᾗ εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰέναι, ἀπεφάργνυσαν καὶ τῶν ῥείθρων καὶ [τῶν] ποταμῶν τὰς διαβάσεις ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ στρατεύματος ὡς κωλύσοντες ᾗ ἐδόκει ἐτάσσοντο· ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἀφεῖλκον (ἐνέπρησαν δέ τινας ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), τὰς δ’ ἄλλας καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν ἀναδησάμενοι ἐκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. ed. Henry Stuart Jones. Oxford. 1910.

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Ἱστορίαι (Greek) (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).)

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.74 focus

[1] Upon this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had been without fraud. And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to stay there that day also, to the end that the soldiers might pack up their necessaries as commodiously as they could, and begone, leaving all things else behind them save what was necessary for their bodies.

[2] But Gylippus and the Syracusians, with their land forces, went out before them, and not only stopped up the ways in the country about by which the Athenians were likely to pass and kept a guard at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to receive and stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. And with their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the Athenians and towed their galleys away from the shore. Some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves meant to have done, but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into the city.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.74 focus

[1] who put off going for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its sincerity.
Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for their personal subsistence.

[2] Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of the stream and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and stop the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and conveyed to the town.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.74 focus

Da es aber auch so nicht so rasch zum Abzug kam, so
beschlossen sie auch noch den nächsten Tag zu bleiben, damit die
Soldaten das Nöthigste so gut wie möglich zusammenpacken und alles ¹
Andere zurücklassen könnten, indem sie nur mitnähmen, was für die
leiblichen Bedürfnisse das Ersprießlichste sei, um dann aufzubrechen.
Die Syrakusaner aber und Gylippos kamen ihnen mit dem Landheere
zuvor und versperrten die Wege im Lande, welche die Athener
nothwendig passtren mußten, besetzten die Furten der Bäche und Flüsse,
und stellten sich, wo es ihnen passend schien, auf, um das Heer der
Feinde zu empfangen und am Weitermarsch zu hindern. Ihre Schiffe
aber fuhren heran und zogen die Fahrzeuge der Athener vom User
herab; einige wenige hatten die Athener ihrem Vorhaben gemäß
verbrannt, die übrigen nahmen sie in aller Ruhe, ohne daß Jemand sie
hinderte, wo grade jedes an's Land getrieben war, in's Schlepptau
und brachten sie nach der Stadt.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.74 focus

Infolge dieser Meldung ließen diese die Nacht verstreichen,
weil ihnen gar nicht einfiel, es könne sich dabei um eine
Täuschung handeln. Und da sie bei alledem nicht gleich auf
brachen, beschlossen sie, auch noch den folgenden Tag zu warten,
damit die Soldaten Zeit hätten, womöglich wenigstens das
Notwendigste zusammenzupacken, dann aber alles übrige im
Stich zu lassen und sich nur mit dem für die Leibesnotdurft
Unentbehrlichen auf den Weg zu machen. Inzwischen waren
Gylippos und die Syrakuser mit dem Landheere ausgerückt,
hatten die Wege, welche die Athener vermutlich einschlagen
mußten, durch Verhaue gesperrt, die Übergänge der Flüsse und
Bäche besetzt und die ihrer Meinung nach geeigneten Stellungen
eingenommen, um das athenische Heer zu empfangen und ihm
den Weg zu verlegen. Mit ihren Schiffen aber fuhren sie an
die Schiffe der Athener heran und holten sie vom Strande;
denn die Athener hatten nur wenige ihrem Plane gemäß selbst
schon in Brand gesteckt; die übrigen nahmen sie, sowie sie flott
geworden, in Schlepptau und brachten sie, ohne auf Widerstand
zu stoßen, in aller Ruhe an die Stadt.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.74 focus

LXXIV. Ceux-ci, sur ce Rapport, se tinrent en repos la nuit, sans soupçonner un stratagème. Puis, du moment où ils n’étaient pas partis sur-le-champ, ils crurent devoir attendre encore le jour suivant, afin de lais- ser aux soldats le temps de faire autant que possible les dispositions les plus indispensables, et de prendre avec eux en partant tout ce qui était strictement nécessaire pour vivre; car ils abandonnaient tout le reste. Gylippe, de son côté, sortit de la ville avec l’armée de terre dés Syracusains, prit les devants, et intercepta les routes dans la direction quedevaient suivre vraisemblablement les Athéniens; il occupa les gués des rivières et des ruisseaux, et choisit ses positions pour attendre l’ennemi et lui barrer le passage. En même temps la flotte se rapprocha du rivage et se mit à remorquer les vaisseaux athéniens. L’intention des Athéniens était de les incendier tous; mais ils n’avaient pu en brûler qu’un petit nombre. Les autres, abandonnés au hasard sur la côte, furent remorqués à loisir et sans aucune opposition vers la ville. '

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.74 focus

Ceux-ci, d’après cet avertissement, suspendirent pour cette nuit le départ, sans soupçonner la ruse; et, comme on n’était pas pàrti sur-le-champ, on résolut de laisser passer encore le lendemain, afin de procurer aux soldats le temps de faire les préparatifs les plus urgents. Ordre fut donné de se tenir prêts à partir en n’emportant que les objets de première nécessité, les vivres strictement indispensables, et d’abandonner tout le reste. Dans l’intervalle, les Syracusains et Gylippe prirent les devants avec l’armée de terre, barricadèrent les routes par où il était à croire que les Athéniens se dirigeraient, occupèrent tous les cours d’eau, enfin se disposèrent de leur mieux à recevoir les ennemis et à les repousser. En même temps, la flotte s’approchait du rivage et saisissait les vaisseaux athéniens ; quelques-uns avaient été brûlés par les Athéniens eux-mêmes, ainsi qu’il avait été décidé ; tous les autres, qui se trouvaient épars sur la plage, furent remorqués à loisir et emmenés sans opposition vers la ville.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.74 focus

[1] So the Athenians, in view of the announcement, in which they saw no trickery, stayed on for that night. And since, even as things were,¹ they had not set out immediately, it seemed to them best to wait during the following day also, in order that the soldiers might pack up what was most useful, as well as they could in the circumstances, and then be off, leaving everything else behind and taking along only such of the supplies on hand as would serve for the sustenance of the body.

[2] But the Syracusans and Gylippus went out ahead of them with their infantry and blocked up the roads in the country by which it was likely that the Athenians would travel, set guards at the fords across the streams and rivers, and posted themselves, at such points as seemed favourable, for the reception of the Athenian army, with the intention of opposing its progress. They also sailed up with their ships and began to haul down the Athenian ships from the beach and tow them away; the Athenians themselves had already, it is true, burned some few of their ships, as had been their purpose with the whole fleet,² but all the rest the Syracusans, at their leisure and without opposition, taking them one at a time according as they happened to have run aground, lashed to their own ships and brought to the city.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.74 focus

[1] They, in accordance with the information, stopped for the night, considering it to be no false statement. And since they had not, as it was, set out immediately, they determined to remain over the next day also, that the soldiers might pack up, as well as they could, the most useful articles; and though they left every thing else behind, to take with them, when they started, just what was necessary for their personal support.

[2] But the Syracusans and Gylippus had marched out before with their troops, and were blocking up the roads through the country where it was likely the Athenians would advance, as well as guarding the passages of the streams and rivers, and posting themselves for the reception of the army, in order to stop it where they thought best; while with their ships they sailed to those of the Athenians, and towed them off from the beach. Some few indeed the Athenians themselves had burnt, as they had intended; but the rest they lashed to their own at their leisure, as each had been thrown up on any part of the beach, and, without any one trying to stop them, conveyed them to the city.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.74 focus

[1] hi vero ob istum nuntium ea nocte restiterunt, nullam subesse fraudem rali. Et quando ne sic quidem statim discessissent, placuit iis insequentem quoque diem remanere, ut milites pro praesenti facultate convasarent quam commodissime possent, et cetera quidem omnia relinquere , solis vero assumptis rebus, quotquot ad corporis victum ac vestitum essent necessariae, abire.

[2] Syracusani vero et Gylippus cum peditatu quidem prius egressi et vias per suam regionem, qua verisimile erat Athenienses iter facturos, obstruxerunt, et rivorum et fluviorum transitus custodiebant, et in locis ad excipiendum exercitum opportunis, ut eum iis prohiberent, qua videbatur, acie instructa stabant; navibus autem advecti Atheniensium naves a littore abstrahebant; paucas aliquot vero concremarunt, quod vel ipsi Athenienses facere in animo habuerant, ceteras autem trahebant per otium, nullo prohibento, ut quaeque forte aliquo delata erat, religatas in urbem.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.74 focus

I quali a tale annunzio, non pensando che vi fosse sotto alcuna frode soprastettero quella notte. E giacché non si erano mossi pensarono di soprassedere anche il giorno seguente, per dare ai soldati il maggior comodo possibile di far fagotto ; e prendendo seco le sole cose necessarie al mantenimento della persona, lasciar tutte le altre, e partire. Ma i Siracusani e Gilippo prima della loro partita usciti fuori con la fanteria, serrarono le strade del paese, per dove conghietturavano che gli Ateniesi passerebbero, tenevan guardati i guadi de1 torrenti e de’fiumi, e si schierarono nei siti opportuni per far fronte all’esercito nemico, risoluti di contrastargli il passaggio. Inoltre si appressarono colle navi a quelle degli Ateniesi per ritirarle dalla spiaggia , ne abbruciarono alcune poche , come avean pensato di fare gli Ateniesi medesimi ; e le altre, dovunque ciascuna si trovasse sbalzata , comodamente e senza veruno impedimento, col rimurchio le tiravano .alla città.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.74

ed. Henry Stuart Jones

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