Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Henry Stuart Jones, 7.75

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[1] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῷ Δημοσθένει ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐγίγνετο.

[2] δεινὸν οὖν ἦν οὐ καθ’ ἓν μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅτι τάς τε ναῦς ἀπολωλεκότες πάσας ἀπεχώρουν καὶ ἀντὶ μεγάλης ἐλπίδος καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολείψει τοῦ στρατοπέδου ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι.

[3] τῶν τε γὰρ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων ὄντων, ὁπότε τις ἴδοι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον, ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο, καὶ οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι τραυματίαι τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖς πολὺ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς ζῶσι λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι.

[4] πρὸς γὰρ ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν τραπόμενοι ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν, ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐς ὅσον δύναιντο, εἴ τῳ δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ὑπολειπόμενοι, ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν.

[5] κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ· μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἅμα ἐπορεύοντο. καὶ τούτων οἵ τε ἄλλοι πάντες ἔφερον ὅτι τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος χρήσιμον, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, οἱ μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ· ἀπηυτομολήκεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα. ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά· σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ.

[6] καὶ μὴν ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν, ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κούφισιν, οὐδ’ ὣς ῥᾳδία ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῖκτο.

[7] μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ’ εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ’ ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι,πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ. ὅμως δὲ ὑπὸ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπικρεμαμένου ἔτι κινδύνου πάντα ταῦτα αὐτοῖς οἰστὰ ἐφαίνετο.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. ed. Henry Stuart Jones. Oxford. 1910.

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Ἱστορίαι (Greek) (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).)

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.75 focus

[1] After this, when everything seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now the third day from their fight by sea.

[2] It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that instead of their great hopes they had endangered both themselves and the state, but also for the dolorous objects which were presented both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular in the leaving of their camp.

[3] For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief. But the living that were sick or wounded both grieved them more than the dead, and were more miserable.

[4] For with entreaties and lamentations they put them to a stand, pleading to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades, and following as far as they were able; and when the strength of their bodies failed, that they could go no further, with ah-mes! and imprecations were there left. Insomuch as the whole army, filled with tears and irresolute, could hardly get away, though the place were hostile and they had suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future, more than with tears could be expressed; but hung down their heads and generally blamed themselves. For they seemed nothing else but even the people of some great city expugned by siege and making their escape.

[5] For the whole number that marched were no less one with another than forty thousand men. Of which not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought he should have occasion to use, but also the men of arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under their arms, partly for want and partly for distrust of their servants, who from time to time ran over to the enemy; but at this time went the greatest number. And yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn, for not a jot more provision was left remaining in the camp.

[6] Neither were the sufferings of others and that equal division of misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it in that we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. And the rather because they considered from what splendour and glory which they enjoyed before into how low an estate they were now fallen. For never Grecian army so differed from itself.

[7] For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns with which they put to sea, they went back again with the contrary maledictions; and whereas they came out seamen, they departed landmen, and relied not upon their naval forces but upon their men of arms. Nevertheless, in respect of the great danger yet hanging over them, these miseries seemed all [but] tolerable.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.75 focus

[1] After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place upon the second day after the sea-fight.

[2] It was a lamentable scene, not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to contemplate.

[3] The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who had perished.

[4] These fell to entreating and bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of departure, and following as far as they could, and when their bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not easy to go, even from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared to suffer more.

[5] Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march being not less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers, contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals, in some cases for want of servants, in others through not trusting them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in greater numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there was no longer food in the camp.

[6] Moreover their disgrace generally, and the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent alleviated by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the splendor and glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended.

[7] For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.75 focus

Danach, als dem Nikias und Demosthenes Alles
hinreichend vorbereitet schien, erfolgte endlich der Aufbruch des Heeres am
dritten Tag nach der Seeschlacht. Es war aber ein jammervoller
Auftritt aus mehr als einer Ursache. Nicht nur zogen sie jetzt ab,
nachdem sie alle ihre Schiffe verloren hatten, und anstatt der
Erfüllung ihrer großartigen Hoffnungen schwebten jetzt sie selber und ihr
ganzer Staat in größter Gefahr, sondern es bot sich auch beim
Verlassen des Lagers dem Auge eines Jeden Schmerzliches und den Sinn
Verwundendes. Denn die Todten lagen unbegraben, und wenn
Einer einen Angehörigen daliegen sah, so ergriffen ihn Schmerz und
Furcht zugleich, und die, welche lebend zurückgelassen wurden,
verwundet oder krank, waren den Ueberlebenden ein noch schmerzlicherer
Anblick, als die Todten, und weitunglükclicher, als die Gefallenen. Denn
sie streckten flehend die Hände aus und wehklagten und brachten sie
zur Verzweiflung, indem sie baten, man möge sie doch mitnehmen.
Und wenn Einer wo einen Freund oder Angehörigen sah, so riefen
sie Jeden beim Namen an, und wenn ihre Zeltgenossen sich in Marsch
setzten, so klammerten sie sich fest an sie und folgten ihnen, so weit sie
konnten, und wenn Einen dann die Kraft verließ und die Glieder
ihnen versagten, so blieben sie unter Beshcwörungen und Wehgeheul
liegen, so daß das ganze Heer in Thränen unter diesem Widerstreit
der Gefühle nur schwer abzog, obgleich sie Feindes Land verließen
und sie selber schon Unheil erlitten hatten, das mehr als
beweinenswerth war, und von der ungewissen Zukunft solches noch befürchten
mußten. Dazu herrschte unter ihnen auch Beschämung und Selbst- ¹
anklage, denn ihr Zug glich ganz und gar der flüchtigen Bevölkerung
einer eroberten Stadt, und zwar einer nicht kleinen, denn nicht
weniger als vierzig tausend Mann war die gesammte Masse stark, die sich
in Marsch setzte. Und von diesen trugen nicht nur die Andern, was
Jeder Brauchbares mitnehmen konnte, sondern sogar auchdie
Schwerbewaffneten und die Reiter trugen zu ihren Waffen auch ihre
Lebensmittel, theils aus Mangel an Waffenknechten ^), theils auch aus
Mißtrauen; denn die Meisten derselben waren schon früher oder eben
jetzt zu den Feinden übergelaufen. Gleichwohl hatten sie auch so nicht
das Genügende zum Mitnehmen, da kein Brod mehr im Lager war.
Das übrige Elend und die gleiche Betheiligung Aller an dem
Unglück, die doch sonst bei einer großen Zahl von Mittragenden
Erleichterung gewährt, wurde in der gegenwärtigen Lage deßhalb doch
um nichts leichter genommen, zumal man von solchem Glanz und so
großartigen Versprechungen des Beginnens zu solchem Ende und
solcher Erniedrigung herabgekommen war. Denn eS war dieß der größte
Glücksumschlag, den je ein Hellenisches Heer erlitten. Gekommen,
um Andern Knechtschaft zu bringen, mußten sie nun abziehen in der
Furcht, daß ihnen selber dieß Schicksal bevorstehe; anstatt
glückverheißender Wünsche und Kriegsgesänge, in deren Geleit sie von , der
Heimath abgesegelt waren, brachen sie jetzt unter den entgegengesetzten
Zurufungen auf; aus Seeleuten waren sie Landsoldaten geworden,
und anstatt Schiffsdienst zu thun, marshcirten sie jetzt als
Schwerbewaffnete. Und doch schien ihnen selbst dieß Alles noch erträglich gegen
die Gefahr, die noch drohend über ihren Häuptern schwebte.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.75 focus

Darauf, als Nikias und Demosthenes glaubten, daß alles
so weit sei, erfolgte dann endlich am dritten Tage nach der
Schlacht der Aufbruch des Heeres. Es war entsetzlich, nicht
nur der ganze Vorgang an sich, wie sie so nach Verlust ihrer
sämtlichen Schiffe abzogen und die glänzenden Hoffnungen für
sich und ihre Stadt zunichte geworden waren, sondern auch was
jeder einzelne beim Abzüge aus dem Lager an herzzerreißenden
Auftritten mit ansehen mußte. Denn die Toten waren noch
nicht begraben, und jeden, der einen seiner Angehörigen so da
liegen sah, überkam Schmerz und Grauen. Die Verwundeten
aber und die Kranken, die man liegen ließ, waren in den
Augen der Überlebenden noch beklagenswerter als die Toten
und in der Tat schlimmer dran als die schon Umgekommenen.
Vor ihrem Flehen und Wehklagen wußte man sich nicht zu
lassen. Wenn einer von ihnen einen seiner Freunde oder An
gehörigen erblickte, so rief er ihn an und bat, ihn doch mitzu
nehmen, klammerte sich an die abziehenden Zeltgenossen und
schleppte sich ihnen nach, so weit er konnte, bis ihm dann die
Kräfte ausgingen und er nach allem Jammer und Beschwören
schließlich liegen blieb. So kam das Heer vor lauter Tränen
und Schwierigkeiten kaum von der Stelle, obwohl es auS
Feindesland abzog, wo es bisher schon schwere Leiden bis zum
Übermaß ausgestanden und auch in Zukunft gewiß noch weiter
zu befürchten hatte. Niedergeschlagen und verdrossen, wie sie
waren, überhäuften sich die Leute selbst mit Vorwürfen. Es
sah aus wie die Flucht der Einwohner aus einer eroberten
Stadt, und keiner kleinen Stadt, denn die ganze sich fort
wälzende Masse betrug mindestens vierzigtausend. Dabei schleppte
jeder möglichst alles mit sich, was er brauchen konnte, und
auch die Hopliten und die Reiter mußten, was sie sonst nicht
gewohnt waren, neben ihren Waffen ihre Lebensmittel selbst
tragen, weil sie entweder keine Diener mehr hatten oder ihnen
nicht trauten; denn die waren ihnen meist schon längst oder eben
jetzt entlaufen. Aber auch was sie an Lebensmitteln bei sich
hatten, reichte nicht aus, da die Vorräte im Lager alle ge
worden waren. Und wenn es sonst ein gewisser Trost im
Unglück ist, daß man es nicht allein trägt, sondern mit vielen
Leidensgefährten teilt, so wurde es darum doch in diesem
Augenblick nicht minder schwer empfunden, zumal wenn man
bedachte, wie diese anfangs so stolze und glänzende Unter
nehmung so kläglich endete. Denn in der Tat war dies der
größte Glückswechsel, den ein griechisches Heer jemals erlebt
hatte. War man gekommen, um andere zu unterjochen, so
mußte man jetzt, um nicht selbst zugrunde zu gehen, das Weite
suchen, statt freudiger Gebete und Schlachtgesänge, mit denen
man in See gegangen, nur Unkenrufe hören, statt zu Schiff
zu Lande abziehen, statt des Matrosen jetzt den Hopliten spielen.
Gleichwohl erschien das alles noch erträglich gegenüber der
Größe der noch weiter drohenden Gefahren.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.75 focus

LXXV. Enfin, quand Nicias et Démosthènes jugèrent les préparatifs suffisants, le départ de l’armée eut lieu, le surlendemain du combat naval. La situation des Athéniens était affreuse à bien des égards : ils partaient après avoir perdu tous leurs vaisseaux; au lieu de vastes espérances, il n’y avait plus que périls pour eux et pour la république. Même l’abandon du camp était pour la vue, pour l’âme de chacun, un spectacle navrant : les morts restaient sans sépulture; celui qui découvrait un des siens gisant à terre était saisi de douleur et d’effroi. Ceux qu’on délaissait vivants encore, les blessés et les malades, inspiraient à ceux qui partaient plus de compassion encore que les morts, et étaient en effet plus à plaindre. Leurs supplications, leurs gémissements jetaient l’armée dans une affreuse perplexité; ils adjuraient de les emmener; ils appelaient à grands cris tous ceux de leurs amis, de leurs parents qu’ils apercevaient; ile se suspendaient à leurs compagnons de tente au moment du départ et les suivaient aussi loin qu’ils pouvaient; puis, quand la force et l’énergie les trahissaient, ils restaient abandonnés, non sans faire entendre des cris d’imprécation et de désespoir. Aussi l’armée entière, plongée dans les larmes et la consternation, avait peine à s’éloigner; et pourtant c’était une terre ennemie; les maux qu’elle y avait déjà soufferts, ceux qu’elle redoutait encore dans un avenir inconnu étaient de ceux qu’aucunes larmes ne sauraient égaler. A un immense découragement se mêlait la honte de leur profonde humiliation. On eût cru voir une place prise d’assaut, une ville considérable fuyant tout entière; car la multitude qui marchait là réunie ne formait pas moins de quarante mille hommes, et tous s’en allaient chargés d’objets divers, chacun ayant pris ce qu’il avais pu trouver d’utile. Les hoplites mêmes et les cavaliers portaient sous les armes leurs vivres, contrairement à l’usage; les uns parce qu’ils n’avaient plus de valett, les autres parce qu’ils s’en déliaient. —Et, en effet, la désertion, qui avait commencé depuis longtemps, devint alors générale. — Les provisions qu’ils emportaient n’étaient même pas suffisantes; car il n’y avait plus de vivres au camp. Quoique la vue des maux d’autrui, la parité des souffrances, le grand nombre des compagnons de malheur apporte un certain soulagement, leur situation ne leur en semblait pas moins intolérable, eu égard surtout à l’éclat et à l’orgueil des débuts, comparés à l’humiliation du dénoûment. Jamais, en effet, armée grecque n’avait passé par d’aussi extrêmes vicissitudes : venus pour asservir les autres, ils s’en allaient redoutant pour eux-mêmes l’esclavage; aux invocations et aux péans du départ avaient succédé les sinistres lamentations du retour·; partis sur leurs vaisseaux, ils revenaient à pied, plus confiants dans leurs hoplites que dans leur marine¹. Et cependant tout cela leur semblait tolérable, comparé à l’immensité du péril encore suspendu sur eux.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.75 focus

Quand Nicias et Démosthène jugèrent les apprêts suffisants, le départ de l’armée s’effectua; c’était le surlendemain du combat naval. La situation des Athéniens était affreuse. Non-seulement ils avaient perdu leurs vaisseaux et voyaient leurs belles espérances faire place aux plus noirs pressentiments pour eux et pour leur patrie, mais encore l’évacuation du camp ^ présentait le plus douloureux spectacle à la vue et à l’esprit de chacun. Les morts étaient sans sépulture ; le soldat, qui voyait un des siens étendu sans vie, était glacé de tristesse et d’effroi. Ceux qu’on abandonnait vivants, les blessés et les malades, inspiraient encore plus de compassion et de sympathie; leurs supplications et leurs gémissements étaient à fendre le cœur. Ils conjuraient qu’on les emmenât, appelaient à grands cris tous ceux qu’ils apercevaient de leurs compagnons ou de leurs proches, se cramponnaient à leu ris camarades de tente déjà en marche, les suivaient aussi loin qu’ils pouvaient; puis, à bout de forces, ils s’arrêtaient en proférant des obsécrations et des sanglots ; en sorte que l'armée entière fondait en pleurs et avait la mort dans l’âme. Elle avait peine à s’éloigner de cette terre ennemie, où elle avait souffert des maux qu’elle ne pouvait assez déplorer ; mais ceux qu'on entrevoyait dans une vague perspective étaient plus cruels encore. Les soldats étaient mornes et profondément humiliés. On eût dit une ville prise d’assaut, d’où s’enfuit une population sans nombre ; en effet, il n'y avait pas moins de quarante mille hommes dans cette foule cheminant à la fois. Chacun s’était chargé du bagage le plus indispensable ; les hoplites et même les cavaliers, contrairement à l’usage, portaient leurs aliments sous leurs boucliers, soit faute de serviteurs, soit défiance : en effet, la désertion des esclaves, commencée depuis longtemps, était devenue générale. Les provisions qu’on emportait n’étaient pas même suffisantes, car il n’y avait plus de vivres dans le camp. Cette espèce d’allégement qu’on éprouve à partager ses souffrances avec beaucoup de compagnons n’adoucissait aucunement la situation présente, surtout lorsqu'on songeait à quel triste dénotaient venait aboutir tant d’ostentation et d’orgueil déployés au début. En effet, jamais armée grecque ne subit un plus cruel mécompte : ils étaient venus pour asservir les autres, et üs s’en allaient avec la crainte d’être eux-mêmes asservis ; aux vœux et aux péans du départ, succédaient des cris du plus funeste augure ; partis sur des vaisseaux, ils s’en retournaient à pied, et aux fonctions de marins s’étaient substituées celles d’hoplites. Toutefois ces maux leur paraissaient encore supportables, en comparaison des périls qui les menaçaient.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.75 focus

[1] After this, when it seemed to Nicias and Demosthenes that adequate preparations had been made, the departure of the army at last took place —on the third day following the sea-fight.

[2] And it was terrible, not in one aspect only of their fortunes, in that they were going away after losing all their ships, and, in place of high hopes, with danger threatening both themselves and their State, but also in that, on the abandonment of their camp, it fell to the lot of each man to see things that were painful both to sight and mind.

[3] The corpses were still unburied, and whenever a man saw one of his own friends lying dead, he was plunged into grief commingled with fear; and the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, far more than the dead seemed piteous to the living, and were more wretched than those that had perished.

[4] For turning to entreaty and lamentation, they drove the men to distraction; begging to be taken along and calling aloud upon each one if they saw anywhere a comrade or a kinsman, clinging to their tent-mates now going away and following after them as long as they were able, and then, when the bodily strength of one or another failed, falling behind, though not without faint¹ appeals to the gods and lamentations; so that the whole army, being filled with grief and in such perplexity, found it hard to depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had endured already sufferings too great for tears and feared for the future what they might still have to suffer.

[5] There was also a general feeling of dejection and much self-condemnation. For indeed they looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city; for in the entire throng no fewer than four myriads were on the march together. And of these, the rest all bore whatever each could that was useful, while the hoplites and the horsemen, contrary to their wont, carried their own food, some for want of attendants, others through distrust of them; for there had been desertions all along and in greatest numbers immediately on their defeat. But even so they did not carry enough, for there was no longer food in the camp.

[6] Furthermore, the rest of their misery and the equal sharing of their ills—although there was in this very sharing with many some alleviation—did not even so seem easy at the moment, especially when one considered from what splendour and boastfulness at first to what a humiliating end they had now come. For this was indeed the very greatest reversal that had ever happened to an Hellenic armament;

[7] for it so fell out that in place of having come to enslave others, they were now going away in fear lest they might rather themselves suffer this, and instead of prayers and paeans, with which they had sailed forth, were now departing for home with imprecations quite the reverse of these; going too as foot-soldiers instead of seamen, and relying upon hoplites rather than a fleet. And yet, by reason of the magnitude of the danger still impending, all these things seemed to them tolerable.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.75 focus

[1] After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought they were sufficiently prepared, the removal of the army took place, on the third day after the sea-fight.

[2] It was a wretched scene then, not on account of the single circumstance alone, that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, and while both themselves and their country were in danger, instead of being in high hope; but also because, on leaving their camp, every one had grievous things both to behold with his eyes and to feel in his heart.

[3] For as the dead lay unburied, and any one saw a friend on the ground, he was struck at once with grief and fear. And the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, were to the living a much more sorrowful spectacle than the dead, and more piteous than those who had perished.

[4] For having recourse to entreaties and wailings, they reduced them to utter perplexity, begging to be taken away, and appealing to each individual friend or relative that any of them might any where see; ZZZ hanging on their comrades, as they were now going away; or following as far as they could, and when in any case the strength of their body failed, not being left behind without ¹ many appeals to heaven and many lamentations. So that the whole army, being filled with tears and distress of this kind, did not easily get away, although from an enemy's country, and although they had both suffered already miseries too great for tears to express, and were still afraid for the future, lest they might suffer more.

[5] There was also amongst them much dejection and depreciation of their own strength. For they resembled nothing but a city starved out and attempting to escape; and no small one too, for of their whole multitude there were not less than forty thousand on the march. Of these, all the rest took whatever each one could that was useful, and the heavy-armed and cavalry themselves, contrary to custom, carried their own food under their arms, some for want of servants, others through distrusting them; for they had for a long time been deserting, and did so in greatest numbers at that moment. And even what they carried was not sufficient; for there was no longer any food in the camp.

[6] Nor, again, was their other misery, and their equal participation in sufferings, (though it affords some alleviation to endure with others,) considered even on that account easy to bear at the present time; especially, when they reflected from what splendour and boasting at first they had been reduced to such an abject termination. For this was the greatest reverse that ever befell a Grecian army;

[7] since, in contrast to their having come to enslave others, they had to depart in fear of undergoing that themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns, with which they sailed from home, they had to start on their return with omens the very contrary of these; going by land, instead of by sea, and relying on a military rather than a naval force. But nevertheless, in consequence of the greatness of the danger still impending, all these things seemed endurable to them.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.75 focus

[1] Postea vero, ubi Niciae et Demostheni res satis praeparatae esse visae sunt, jam etiam discedere exercitus tertio a navali pugna die coepit.

[2] Acerba igitur tos eiat non tantum, si in unum contracta calamitatum summa specietur, quod et amissa classe universa discedebant, idque pro magna spe et ipsi et universa civitas in salutis discrimen adducti, sed etiam in castris deserendis unicuique ingerebantur et oculis et menti, quae doloris plena essent.

[3] Nam quum et mortui essent insepulti, quoties quis aliquem necessariorum jacentem conspexisset, mcerore simul et metu afficiebatur, et qui vivi relinquebantur, vulnerati et aegroti, mullo innjorem mterorem, quam mortui, vivis al ferebant, et mullo miseriores erant, quam interfecti.

[4] Nam ad preces et lamentationes conversi ceteros ad consilii inopiam adigebant, quum postularent, ut se abducerent, et uniuscujusque fidem implorarent, sicubi quis aliquem aut sodalium aut familiarium animadvertisset, et ex contubernalium jam abeuntium cervicibus penderent, et, quousque possent, insequerentur, si quem autem corporis vires defecissent, non sine mullis obtestationibus ac ploratibus remanerent, adeo ut omnis exercitus lacrymis repletus et hujusmodi consilii inopia non facile discedere posset, quamvis et ex hostico discederent et jam vel majora quam qua» lacrymis defleri possent, aut passi essent, aut ne paterentur in posterum , pro futurae sortis obscuritate metuerent.

[5] £t animis simul dejecti erant et sibi ipsis irati vehementer. Nihil enim aliud, quam expugnatae civitati profugienti ti-miles erant, eique non parvae; universa enim multitudo simul proficiscentium non erat infra numerum quadraginta millium. Atque horum quum ceteri omnes, quod quisque poterat utile sibi, lum etiam gravis armaturae milites et equites praeter consuetudinem ipsi sua cibaria sub armis ferebant, alii propter servorum inopiam, alii propter diffidentiam ; transfugerant enim et jampridem et plerique tunc ipsum. Atque ne haec quidem, quae ferebant, sufficere poterant; nullus enim commeatus in castris amplius erat.

[6] Et vero reliqua ignominia, et aequalis malorum portio, quamquam aliquod levamentum habebat ex eo, quod multorum communis esset, tamen ne sic quidem in prasenii facilis videbatur, praesertim cogitantibus, quanto ex splendore et gloriae dignitate, qua initio praediti fuissent, in quem exitum et in quam humilitatem devenissent.

[7] Maxima enim haec rerum commutatio illi Graecorum exercitui contigit; qui enim venerant, ut alios in servitutem redigerent, iis accidit, ut ipsi hoc potius metuentes abscederent, et pro votis laetisque carminibus, cum quibus domo profecti erant, rursus cum ominis mali vocibus, quae his erant contraria»,* discederent, idque ita, ut pedestres facti ex nauticis iter fc-cerent, animumque potius ad gravem armaturam, quam ad classem appellerent. Nihilominus tamen propter periculi adhuc impendentis magnitudinem haec omnia iis tolerabilia videbantur.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.75 focus

Dopo queste cose, poiché a Nicia ed a Demostene parve che tutto fosse sufficientemente apparecchiato , movevasi finalmente il campo tre giorni dopo la battaglia navale. Nè solamente facea pietà il complesso di tanti iafortunii, cioè il partire colla perdita di tutta la flotta, e col pericolo proprio e della patria , invece delle grandi speranze prima concepute, ma ancora nell’abbandonare gli alloggiamenti interveniva ad ognuno di vedere e sentire cose dolorose. Imperciocché qualora tra gl’insepolti cadaveri ciascun vedesse giacere qualche suo amico, era preso da tristezza e timore ; ed i vivi abbandonati, feriti o malati, arrecavano ai vivi maggior afflizione dei morti, ed erano più infelici di questi ; essendo che rivoltisi alle preghiere ed ai pianti facean cascare il cuore , con alte grida scongiurando a condurli via ogni compagno o parente che scorgessero, e si avvinghiavano ai camerati che partivano, e finché aveano forza li seguitavano. E se ad alcuni falliva la lena del corpo restavano derelitti mandando imprecazioni e gemiti ; talché tutto l'esercito pieno di lagrime e straziato da diversi affetti, non sapeva di leggeri indursi a partire da quella terra benché nemica, dove avea sofferto sciagure maggiori d’ogni pianto , e dove altre temea di soffrirne nascoste ora nell’ incertezza. Da per tutto era una cupa malinconia, da per tutto udivansi scambievoli rimproveri, poiché non altro assembravano che un popolo scappato da una città espugnata , e questa non piccola; non essendo minore di quaranta migliaia tutta la moltitudine che marciava insieme. Fra tutti questi ognuno portava addosso quel che poteva di ciò che fosse necessario, ed i soldati gravi ed i cavalieri sebbene carichi dell’armi portavano fuor dell’usato da sé i viveri, parte per mancanza , parte per diffidenza dei galuppi, molti dei quali erano innanzi disertati, e moltissimi allora disertavano ; e con tutto ciò quel che portavano non bastava , perchè nel campo era venuta meno la vettovaglia. Oltre di che l’avvili mento in tutto il reato, e quella ugual porzione di mali che pure ha in sè qualche sollievo quando siam molti a soffrire, non riusciva al presente leggera, specialmente al riflettere da quale splendore e da qual fasto primiero eran venuti a sì oscuro termine ed a cotanta bassezza. E certo grandissimo fu questo rovescio per l’esercito dei Greci, a’quali andati a soggettare gli altri, accadde invece di partire colla paura di trovarsi essi a quel caso ; invece di salpare in mezzo ai voti ed ai canti militari , svignare tra clamori aflatto contrari ; e invece di salir sulle navi, marciare a piedi, e attendere all’armi, innanzi che alla flotta. Nondimeno per la grandezza del pericolo che ancor sovrastava , tutte queste cose parevan loro tollerabili.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.75

ed. Henry Stuart Jones

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