[1] The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera and expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory to guard it wheresoever there was need; and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in the state, as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable war.

[2] In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen, and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not attempted.

[3] Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them.

[4] And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle, and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing.

[1] The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera , and expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country, consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the occupation of Pylos and Cythera , and the apparition on every side of a war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of internal revolution,

[2] and now took the unusual step of raising four hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than ever in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime struggle, which their organisation had never contemplated, and that against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked upon as a success sacrificed.

[3] Besides this, their late numerous reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason, had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a second disaster like that on the island,

[4] and thus scarcely dared to take the field, but fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for being new to the experience of adversity they had lost all confidence in themselves.

[1] The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians in possession of Cythera and expected them to make such descents upon their own territory, nowhere massed their forces to oppose them, but sent garrisons here and there throughout the country, determining the number of hoplites by the strength needed at each point, and otherwise were very watchful, fearing lest some revolution should take place which would affect their constitution; for the calamity which had befallen them at the island of Sphacteria had been great and unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on all sides they were encompassed by a war which moved with a swiftness which defied precaution.

[2] Consequently they organized, contrary to their custom, a force of four hundred cavalry and bowmen, and in military matters they now became more timid than at any time before they were involved in a naval struggle which was outside their own existing scheme of military organisation, and that too against Athenians, with whom an attempt foregone was always so much lost of what they had reckoned on accomplishing. ¹

[3] Besides, the reverses of fortune, which had befallen them unexpectedly in such numbers and in so short a time, caused very great consternation, and they were afraid that some time a calamity might again come upon them like that which had happened on the island;

[4] and on this account they showed less spirit in their fighting, and whatever move they might make they thought would be a failure, because they had lost all self-confidence in consequence of having been hitherto unused to adversity.

[1] The Lacedaemonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of this kind on their territory, no where opposed them with their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through the country, consisting of such numbers of heavy-armed as were required at the different places. And in other respects they were very cautious, fearing lest some innovation should be made in their constitution, in consequence of the unexpected and severe blow which had befallen them in the island, and of the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being surrounded on all sides by a war that was rapid and defied all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised four hundred horse and some bowmen;

[2] and now, if ever, they were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters, being engaged in a conflict opposed to the usual character of their forces, to be maintained at sea, and that against Athenians, by whom whatever they did not attempt was always regarded as a failure in their estimate of the success they should have.

[3] At the same time the events of fortune, many of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to their expectation, caused them the greatest dismay; and they were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might again, some time or other, happen to them.

[4] And for this reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that whatever movement they made they should do wrong; because their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their former inexperience in misfortune.

[1] Lacedaemonii vero, quum Cythera ab Atheniensibus teneri viderent, et exspectarent illos in suum etiam agrum exscensiones hujusmodi facturos, cum frequen- tibus quidem copiis nusquam acie instructa obviam iis iverunt, sed militum gravis armaturae magnam manum in varias agri sui partes, prout unusquisque locus postulabat, praesidii causa miserunt, et ceteris in rebus sibi diligenter cavebant, metuentes, ne quid in rerum suarum statu novaretur, propter insperatam et ingentem cladem in insula recens acceptam, et propter Pylum et Cythera occupata, et propter repentinum improvisumque bellum, quod eos undique circumstabat;

[2] quare praeter suam consuetudinem quadringentos equites constituerunt et sagittarios, et ad res bellicas, si unquam ante, tunc potissimum tardiores extilerunl, qui praeter usitatam sibi formam apparatus cum nauticis copiis certare cogerentur, idque contra Athenienses, qui, quicquid intentatum relinquebant, id semper deesse putabant spei de futuro rerum successu conceptae.

[3] Praeterea varii casus qui multi et intra breve tempus praeter omnem exspectationem iis acciderant, maximum metum iis incutiebant, et verebantur, ne forte rursus aliqua calamitas sibi contingeret, qualis erat ea, quam in insula acceperant.

[4] Et propterea ad pugnandam erant timidiores, et quicquid aggressi essent, id infelicem exitum putabant habiturum, propter animi diffidentiam, quod prius adversa fortuna premi non consuevissent.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴