[1] When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon and Demosthenes that they spent their labour there in vain and that if they would deliver unto him a part of the archers and light-armed soldiers to get up by such a way as he himself should find out and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced.

[2] And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedaemonians that he might not be discovered making his approach under the cliffs of the island where they were continual in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch, and with much labour and hardly unseen, came behind them, and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected.

[3] And the Lacedaemonians, being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with great) that they were in at Thermopylae. For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path; and these now, being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer, but fighting few against many and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground; and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.

[1] The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were losing their labour: but that if they would give him some archers and light troops to go round on the enemy's rear by a way he would undertake to find, he thought he could force the approach.

[2] Upon receiving what he asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order not to be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the island permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly appeared on the high grounding their rear, to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the still greater joy of his expectant friends.

[3] The Lacedaemonians thus placed between two fires, and in the same dilemma, to compare small things with great, as at Thermopylae , where the defenders were cut off through the Persians getting round by the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began to give way, and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from want of food, retreated.
  The Athenians were already masters of the approaches

[1] But when the business seemed interminable, the general ¹ of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes and said that their side was wasting its pains; but if they were willing to give him a portion of their bowmen and light-armed troops, so that he could get round in the enemy's rear by some path or other which he might himself discover, he thought that he could force the approach.

[2] Obtaining what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, so as not to be observed by them, and advanced along the precipitous shore of the island, wherever it offered a foothold, to a point where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the position, maintained no guard. Thus with great difficulty he barely succeeded in getting round unobserved and suddenly appeared on the high ground in the enemy's rear, striking them with consternation by this unexpected move, but far more encouraging his friends, who now saw what they were expecting.

[3] The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and—to compare a small affair with a great one—were in the same evil case as they had been at Thermopylae; for there they had perished when the Persians got in their rear by the path, ² and here they were caught in the same way. Since, then, they were now assailed on both sides they no longer held out, but, fighting few against many and withal weak in body from lack of food, they began to give way. And the Athenians by this time were in possession of the approaches.

[1] When the business was still undecided, the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were labouring in vain; but if they would give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round in their rear by a way that he should himself discover, he thought he could force the approach.

[2] Having received what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever the precipitous side of the island allowed a passage, and where the Lacedaemonians, relying on the strength of the ground, kept no guard, with great labour and difficulty he got round unobserved, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight of what they were looking for.

[3] And now the Lacedaemonians were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the same result (to compare a small case with a great one) as that which happened at Thermopylae; for those troops were cut off through the Persians' getting round by the path; and these, being more assailed on all sides, no longer held their ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, and from weakness of body through want of provisions, they began to retreat; and so the Athenians now commanded the approaches.

[1] Sed quum res nullum haberet exitum, Messeniorum dux ad Cleonem et Demosthenem accedens, eos frustra laborare dixit; sed si sagittariorum,et levis armaturae aliquam partem sibi dare vebnt, ad illos a tergo circumveniendos via, quamcunque ipse invenisset, putare aditum per vim aperiri posse.

[2] Quum autem accepisset, quae petierat, ex occulto iter ingressus, ne ab illis conspiceretur, procedens qua in quoque loco praerupta insulae natura pedem figere permitteret, et ad eam partem, quam Lacedaemonii loci situ freti non custodiebant, difficulter et aegre illis insciis munitionem circumiit, atque repente in loco superiore a tergo hostium conspectus illos quidem ob inopinatum casum metu consternavit; hos vero, qui cernebant, quod exspectabant, multo magis confirmavit.

[3] Quare Lacedaemonii, quum utrinque telis jam peterentur, et in eadem fortuna constituti essent, ut parva magnis conftram, quae erat Suorum ad Thermopylas, nam et illi semita a Persis circumventi perierant, et hi jam undique telis expositi diutius resistere non poterant, sed pauci cum multis dimicantes, et ob inediam corpore languentes, cedere cceperont, et Athenienses omni accessu jam potiebantur.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴