Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.96

[1] When the news of that which had happened in Euboea was brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest astonishment that ever they had been in before. For neither did their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other at any time so much affright them as this.

[2] For now when the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more galleys nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition amongst themselves and in continual expectation of falling together by the ears, then in the neck of all arrived this great calamity, wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst of all, Euboea, by which they [had] received more commodity than by Attica.

[3] How then could they choose but be dejected? But most of all they were troubled, and that for the nearness, with a fear lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage and come immediately into Peiraeus, now empty of shipping, of which they thought nothing wanting, but that they were not there already.

[4] And had they been anything adventurous, they might easily have done it; and then, had they stayed there and besieged them, they had not only increased the sedition but also compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though enemies to the oligarchy, and in the meantime gotten the Hellespont, Ionia, the Islands, and all places even to Euboea, and, as one may say, the whole Athenian empire into their power.

[5] But the Lacedaemonians, not only in this but in many other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. For being of most different humours, the one swift, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous; the Lacedaemonians gave them great advantage, especially when their greatness was by sea. This was evident in the Syracusians, who, being in condition like unto them, warred best against them.

[1] When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens a panic ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in Sicily , great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much alarmed them.

[2] The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and might at any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of all Euboea , which was of more value to them than Attica , could not occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency.

[3] Meanwhile their greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the enemy, emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and sail against Piraeus , which they had no longer ships to defend; and every moment they expected him to arrive.

[4] This, with a little more courage, he might easily have done, in which case he would either have increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or if he had stayed to besiege it have compelled the fleet from Ionia , although the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of the Hellespont , Ionia , the islands, and of everything as far as Euboea , or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire.

[5] But here, as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens . Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in combating them.

Der Athener aber, als die Nachricht von diesen Ereignissen
bei Euböa in die Stadt kam, bemächtigte sich die allergrößte
Bestürzung, so wie sie früher nie dagewesen. Denn weder das Unglück auf
Sicilien, obgleich es damals hoch genug angeschlagen wurde, noch
sonst irgend ein anderer Unfall hatte sie so in Furcht und Schrecken
gesetzt. Das Heer auf Samos war von ihnen abgefallen, andere
Schiffe waren nicht mehr da, noch auch Leute zur Bemannung; sie
selbst waren unter sich zwiespältig, und keinen Augenblick war man
sicher, ob es nicht unter ihnen selbst zum Losschlagen käme; und nun
war noch ein solches Unglück dazugekommen, durch welches sie ihre
Schiffe und, was das Wichtigste war, Euböa verloren, woher sie
mehr Nutzen gehabt hatten, als aus Attika; — wie hatten sie da ¹
also nicht den Muth verlieren sollen? Am allermeisten beunruhigte
sie aber die in nächster Nahe drohende Gefahr, wenn die siegreichen
Feinde es wagen würden, sogleich gegen den Piräeus loszusegeln, der
von Schiffen ganz entblößt war, und jeden Augenblick glaubte man,
sie müßt«-« erscheinen. Und in der That hätten die Feinde dieß leicht
durchgesetzt, wenn sie nur etwas kühner gewesen wären; und entweder
hätten sie, wenn sie die Stadt blokirten, das Zerwürsniß in derselben
noch erweitert, oder wenn sie sich festsetzten und dieselbe belagerten,
die athenischen Schiffe von Jonien, trotz deren Feindschaft gegen die
Oliga-rchie, herbeizukommen gezwungen, um den eigenen Angehörigen
und dem Gesammtstaat Hülfe zu leisten; und in diesem Falle wäre
der Hellespont und Jonien und die Inseln und alles Land bis Euböa
hin, und sozusagen die ganze Herrschaft der Athener ihnen in die
Hände gefallen. Aber nicht nur bei dieser Gelegenheit allein zeigten
sich die Lakedämonier den Athenern als Feinde, deren Kriegführung
den Vortheil auf ihrer Seite ließ, sondern auch in vielen anderen.
Schon im Charakter beider Theile lag der größte Gegensatz; sie selbst
waren rasch, jene langsam, — sie unternehmend, jene bedenklich;
und hierin lag besonders für die Erhaltung ihrer Seeherrschaft der
größte Nutzen. DaS haben besonders die Syrakusaner gezeigt, die
dem Charakter nach den Athenern am nächsten standen und sie auch
mit dem besten Glück zu bekämpfen wußten.

XCVI. Quand on apprit à Athènes les événements d’Eubée, ce fut une consternation jusque-là sans exemple : ni le désastre de Sicile, quelque immense qu’il eût semblé alors, ni aucun autre malheur n’avait causé encore une telle stupeur. L’armée de Samos insurgée contre eux; ni vaisseaux de rechange, ni équipages pour les monter; la sédition dans la ville, sans qu’on sût quand on en viendrait aux mains; pour comble de misères, un désastre qui leur enlevait et leur flotte, et, ce qui était le pire, l'Eubée, plus utile pour eux que l’Attique même! Comment n’eussenl-ils point été découragés? Le danger le plus pressant, ce qu’on redoutait par-dessus tout, c’était que l’ennemi vainqueur n’osât se présenter au Pirée, alors dégarni de vaisseaux. D’un moment à l’autre on s’attendait à le voir paraître. Et, en effet, avec plus d’audace c’était chose facile : il suffisait de mouiller devant la ville pour y augmenter les dissensions; ou, si l’on s’arrêtait à en former le siége, on obligeait les soldats de Samos, quoique ennemis de l’oligarchie, à ramener la flotte au secours de leurs parents et de la république entière. Dès lors, on était maître de l’Hellespont, de l’Ionie, des îles, de tout le pays jusqu’à l’Eubée, et, pour ainsi dire, de la domination athénienne tout entière. Mais ce n’est pas la seule circonstance où ce fut un bonheur pour les Athéniens d’avoir à combattre les Lacédémoniens de préférence à tout autre peuple; il en fut de même dans bien d’autres occasions. La profonde opposition des caractères, la vivacité et l’esprit entreprenant des uns opposés à la lenteur et à la timidité des autres, donnèrent un immense avantage aux Athéniens, surtout pour conquérir l’empire des mers. Les Syracusains l’ont bien fait voir; personne ne ressemblait plus aux Athéniens; aussi n’eurent-ils pas d’ennemis plus redoutables.

Quand on connut à Athènes les événements de l’Eubée, on fut dans la dernière consternation. Ni le désastre de Sicile, tout affreux qu’il parut dans le temps, ni aucun autre revers n'avait encore causé une pareille épouvante. L'armée de Samos était en pleine révolte ; plus de vaisseaux, plus d’équipages ; dans la ville, la désunion ; la guerre civile près d’éclater ; enfin, pour comble de disgrâce, on venait de perdre une flotte et, ce qui était encore pis, l’Eubée, l’Eubée plus précieuse à elle seule que l’Attique elle-même. Comment ne pas éprouver un profond découragement ? Ce qui augmentait encore les alarmes, c’était la crainte que les ennemis, enhardis par leur victoire, ne cinglassent directement contre le Pirée dépourvu de vaisseaux ; à chaque instant on s’attendait à les voir arriver. S’ils eussent été plus audacieux, ce leur eût été chose aisée ; leur présence eût accru la division entre les citoyens ; le blocus eût forcé les soldats de Samos, quoique hostiles à l’oligarchie, de venir au secours de leurs parents et de la république entière; dès lors l’Hellespont était aux ennemis, de même que l’Ionie, les îles, tous les pays jusqu’à l’Eubée, en un mot la totalité de l’empire des Athéniens. Mais ce ne fut pas la seule occasion où les Lacédémoniens se montrèrent pour les Athéniens les plus commodes adversaires. L’extrême différence de caractère de ces deux peuples, l’un vif et audacieux, l’autre circonspect et timide, procura un immense avantage aux Athéniens, surtout dans une lutte maritime. C’est ce que firent bien voir les Syracusains ; ce peuple qui avait avec les Athéniens plus de ressemblance que tout autre, fut aussi celui qui leur fit la plus rude guerre.

[1] When the report of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, there was greater consternation than ever before. For neither the disaster in Sicily, great though it seemed at the time, nor any other event had ever yet so frightened them.

[2] At a time when their army at Samos was in revolt, when there were no more ships to be had nor men to man them, when they were in a state of sedition at home and there was no telling when a conflict might break out among themselves, when, to crown all, a disaster had now come upon them of this magnitude, in which they had lost both their fleet and, worst of all, Euboea, from which they derived more benefit than from Attica—had they not every reason to be despondent?

[3] But what alarmed them most and touched them most nearly was the possibility that the enemy, now victorious, might dare to make straight for Athens and attack the Peiraeus, which was now without ships to defend it; and they believed that they were all but there already.

[4] And indeed, if they had been more bold, the enemy could readily have done this very thing, and they would either, by setting up a blockade, have caused the city to be still more torn by factions, or else, if they had remained and laid siege to it, would have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though hostile to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and of the city as a whole; and thereby the Hellespont would have been theirs, and Ionia, and the islands, and everything as far as Euboea— indeed almost the whole empire of the Athenians.

[5] But it was not on this occasion only that the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to make war upon, but on many others also. For being widely different in character—the one people being quick, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous—it was especially in the case of a naval power that they were most helpful. And the Syracusans proved this; for it was because they were most similar in character to the Athenians ¹ that they made war upon them most successfully.

[1] When the news of what had happened at Euboea reached the Athenians, a greater consternation was felt by them than had ever been before. For neither had the disaster in Sicily, though it appeared a great one at the time, nor any other event, ever yet alarmed them so much.

[2] For when, after their army at Samos had revolted from them, and they had no more ships nor men to go on board them, while they were in a state of sedition, and did not know when they might break out into conflict with one another; [when, I say, under such circumstances] so great a calamity had befallen them—one in which they had lost their fleet, and, what was most of all, Euboea, from which they derived more advantages than from Attica—how could their dejection be unnatural?

[3] But what especially and most immediately alarmed them, was the thought that the enemy would venture, on the strength of their victory, to sail straightway to the attack of their port Piraeus, while it had no ships for its protection;

[4] and they supposed that they were already all but there. And indeed, if they had been more bold, they might easily have done that, and so have either divided the city still more than ever, by lying near it, or if they had remained and blockaded it, have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though opposed to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and the whole city; and in the mean time the Hellespont would have been theirs, with Ionia, the islands, every thing as far as Euboea, in a word, the whole empire of Athens.

[5] But it was not on this occasion, but on many others also, that the Lacedaemonians proved themselves most convenient people for the Athenians to be at war with. For by being very widely different in character—the one people being quick, and the other slow; the one enterprising, and the other unadventurous—they presented very many advantages, especially in the case of a naval empire. A proof of this was given by the Syracusans; for they, through being of a congenial disposition, were also most successful in carrying on war with them.

[1] Atheniensibus autem quum res ad Euboeam gest* nuntiatae essent, pavor omnium ad illum usque diem maximus incessit Nam nec in Sicilia accepta clades, quamvis tunc ingens visa esset, nec aliud quicquam eos unquam adeo terruerat.

[2] Quippe quum eo tempore, quo et exercitus Samius defecerat, et aliae naves non supererant, nec homines, qui eas conscenderent, et ipsi seditione laborabant, et incertum erat, quando inter se ipsi concursuri essent, tanta illa calamitas accessisset, qua et classem, et quod maximum erat, Euboeam amiserant, ex qua plus utilitatis, quam ex Attica, percipiebant, qui non merito tum animis erant consternati?

[3] Sed maxime eos et in proximo hoc perturbabat, si hostes ausuri essent, victoria potiti , confestim in ipsorum Piraeeum navibus vacuum tendere ; et tantum non jam adesse eos putabant.

[4] Id quod illi, si audaciores fuissent, facile fecissent, et aut dissidium longe majus in urbe excitassent, prope eam in ancoris stantes , aut si remanentes eam obsedissent, et classem ab Ionia licet dominatui paucorum infestam coegissentpropinquis suis et universae civitati succurrere, et interea et Hellespontus, et Ionia, et insulae, et omnia loca ad Boeotiam usque pertinentia , et paene dixerim omne Atheniensium imperium in eorum potestatem venisset.

[5] Verum non in ea tantum re Lacedaemonii Atheniensibus omnium maxime commodi hostes in bello gerendo fuerunt, sed etiam in aliis multis; quum enim moribus maxime differrent, alteri acres, alteri tardi, et alteri conando prompti, alteri timidi, idque praecipue in imperio maritimo, plurimum Atheniensibus proderant. Documento fuerunt Syracusani; qui quum moribus maxime similes illis extitissent, optime etiam bellum adversus illos administrarunt.

Pervenuta agli Ateniesi la nuova dei fatti dell’Eubea vi sorse sbigottimento grandissimo oltre ogni altro di prima ; nè la disfatta di Sicilia, tuttoché allora paruta grande, nè verun altro caso finora gli atterrì mai cotanto. Imperciocché essendo accaduta sì grave sciagura nella quale avean perduto le navi, e (che grandissima cosa era) l’Eubea, da cui traevano vantaggi maggiori che dall9Attica, mentre era già ribellato l’esercitò di Samo, e non avean più navi nè genti da empirle , e mentre bollivano le fazioni nè vedevasi quando si sarebber potute mai riconciliare; come non era ragionevole il loro scoraggiamento? Sopra tutto poi li turbava l’imminentissimo pericolo che i nemici usando della vittoria osassero spinger subito la flotta contro il Pireo sguarnito di navi, e già li credean poco meno che presenti. Lo che sarebbe loro agevolmente riuscito se fossero stati più ardimentosi, ed assediando Atene l’avrebber divisa maggiormente, ed astrette le navi della Ionia, sebbene nemiche del governo de’pochi, a correre in soccorso de’ propri parenti e di tutta quanta la città ; ed in questo l' Ellesponto, la Ionia, le isole e quanto v’è di spazio fino all’Eubea, insomma tutto l’imperio ateniese sarebbe venuto nelle loro mani. Nè già in questa sola occasione, ma in altre molte ancora, i Lacedemoni f uron per gli Ateniesi quelli, contro a’quali guerreggiarono più comodamente. Imperciocché essendo diversissimi d’indole , gli uni pronti, gli altri tardi, questi intraprendi tori quelli dubitosi, specialmente nel governo delle flotte, procuravano agli Ateniesi vantaggi grandissimi. E la cosa è stata comprovata dai Siracusani, che essendo di maniere consimili agli Ateniesi li combatterono bravissimamente.