Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.49

[1] Nicias, when he spake this, assured them of it, as knowing the state of Syracuse precisely and their want of money, and that there were some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians and sent him word not to go. Withal he had now confidence in the fleet, which, as being before overcome, he had not.

[2] As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no means hear of it. But if the army might not be carried away without order from the Athenians but must needs stay in Sicily, then, he said, they might go to Thapsus or Catana, from whence by their landmen they might invade and turn much of the country to them and wasting the fields of the enemies, weaken the Syracusians; and be to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a narrow (which is the advantage of the enemy), but in a wide place, where the benefit of skill should be theirs, and where they should not be forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits.

[3] In sum, he said, he by no means liked to stay where they were, but with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel.

[4] Nevertheless, upon the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth and procrastination in the business, and a suspicion withal that the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he knew above the rest. And thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence and stayed upon the place.

[1] Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the financial distress at Syracuse , and also because of the strength of the Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success.

[2] Demosthenes, however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from Athens , and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus or Catana ; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy's favour, a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where they could retreat or advance without being confined or circumscribed either when they put out or put in.

[3] In any case he was altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed.

[4] Nicias however still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation came over them, with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further information to make him so positive.

Bei dieser Meinung blieb Nikias feststehen, da er von den
Verhältnissen in Syrakus und dem dortigen Geldmangel genau
unterrichtet war, auch eine Partei daselbst den Athenern daS Regiment
in die Hände spielen wollte, die ihn durch Botschaften aufsordem,
er möge nicht abziehen, und weil er außerdem, obgleich beisegt/mehr
als früher auf seine Schiffe vertraute. Demosthenes aber war'-mit
dem längeren Verbleiben vor der Stadt in keiner Weise
einverstanden; wenn man schon ohne einen Volksbeschluß der Athener das
Heer-nicht zurückführen dürfe, sondern bleiben müsse, so solle man
wenigstens nach Thapsos oder Katana abziehen, von wo auS-sie mit
der Landmacht auf weite Strecken hin daS Gebiet der Feinde
plündern .und",sich selber Unterhalt verschaffen und dem Gegner Schaden
thun könnten; und mit der Flotte könnten sie dann auf offenem Meer
Gefechte liefern, also nicht auf beschränktem Raum, wo der Vortheil
mehr auf Seiten des Feindes sei, sondern in offener See, wo ihre
eigene größere Erfahrung ihnen erst von Nutzen wäre, und sie zurück-
weichen und. angreisen könnten, ohne in Angriff oder Landung nur
auf einen kleinen und von allen Seiten beengten'Raum angewiesen
zu sein.Kurz, in gar keiner Hinsicht, sagte er, gefalle eS ihm, noch
länger da zu bleiben, sondern so rasch als möglich und'ohne alles
Zaudern solle man aufbrechen. Ganz ebenso redete auch Eurymedon;
da aber Nikias im Widerspruch beharrte, so kam eine gewisse
Unsicherheit und Zögerung in die Sache, zumal man auch vermuthete,
Nikias müsse mehr-wissen, daß er so fest auf seiner Meinung beharre.
Auf diese Weise also zögerten die Athener, und blieben in ihrer
Stellung. ^ - ' - r g "

XLIX. Ce qui fortifiait Nicias dans le sentiment qu’il énonçait, c’est qu’il connaissait exactement l’état intérieur de Syracuse, l’épuisement des finances et l’existence d’un parti qui, décidé à livrer le gouvernement aux Athéniens, l’encourageait par des messages à ne pas lever le siége. II était d’ailleurs confirmé dans ce dessein par la confiance que lui avait jusque-là inspirée la flotte.

Démosthènes, au contraire, repoussait absolument l’idée de continuer le siége. Suivant lui, s’il fallait attendre un décret des Athéniens pour emmener l’armée et temporiser jusque-là, on devait à cet effet se transporter à Thapsos ou à Catane, et de là faire des incursions dans tous les sens avec l’infanterie, vivre sur le pays ennemi, le ravager et lui faire le plus de mal possible. En même temps la flotte, au lieu de combattre à l’étroit, ce qui était surtout favorable à l’ennemi, attaquerait au large, dans une mer ouverte, où leur expérience trouverait à s’utiliser, où ils auraient de l’espace pour les manoeuvres en avant et en arrière, sans être circonscrits et gênés dans toutes les évolutions par la proximité du rivage. En un mot, il se déclara absolument opposé à un séjour plus longtemps prolongé sur le même point, et ouvrit l’avis de partir immédiatement et sans délai. Eurymédon se rangea à cette opinion. Mais l’opposition de Nicias amena de l’hésitation et des retards; on supposait d’ailleurs que sa persistance tenait à quelques données particulières; et, par suite, les Athéniens continuèrent à temporiser et à rester dans leur immobilité.

Ce qui engageait Nicias à tenir ce langage avec tant d’assurance, c’est qu’il, connaissait à fond l’état intérieur de Syracuse, les embarras financiers, l’existence d’un parti disposé à livrer la ville aux Athéniens et qui les pressait de ne point lever le siège ; c’est enfin qu’il avait dans la flotte plus de confiance qu’auparavant. Démosthène au contraire ne voulait pas entendre parler d’un plus long séjour. « S’il faut, iisait-il, pour lever le siège attendre que le décret en soit venu d’Athènes, le mieux est d’aller s’établir à Thapsos ou à Catane, d’où l’armée de terre pourra étendre ses dévastations sur le pays ennemi et vivre de pillage, tandis que la flotte ne sera plus obligée de lutter à l’étroit, circonstance favorable aux adversaires, mais agira dans une mer ouverte, où elle pourra tirer parti de son expérience en manœuvrant à son gré, sans avoir à circonscrire ses mouvements d’attaque et de retraite. » Il ajouta qu’à aucun prix il ne consentirait à rester davantage, mais qu’il fallait partir immédiatement.

Eurymédon se réunit à l’avis de Démosthène ; mais l’opposition de Nicias amena de l’irrésolution et des lenteurs. On le croyait mieux renseigné que les autres. Il s’ensuivit que les Athéniens ajournèrent leur départ, et ne firent aucun mouvement.

[1] To such effect Nicias spoke with confidence, because he had accurate knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, both of their lack of money and that a party existed there that wished the government to come under the control of the Athenians and was constantly making overtures to him to keep him from withdrawing; and at the same time, though beaten in the field, he had as much confidence as ever in the fleet at any rate.

[2] Demosthenes, however, would not consent on any consideration whatever to continue the siege; if they could not lead the army home without a vote of the Athenians, but must stay on in Sicily, he said that they should do this only after removing to Thapsus or to Catana. From this new base they could overrun with their army large tracts of the country and support themselves by ravaging the enemy's property, and at the same time do him damage; and as for the fleet, they would thenceforth do their fighting, not in a narrow space, which was more in the enemy's favour, but in the open sea, where there was plenty of room and the advantages of skill would be on their side, and they would not have to make their retreats and advances setting out from and falling back into a scant and circumscribed base.

[3] To sum up his position in a word, he said that he did not at all approve of remaining any longer in the same place, but urged that they should now as quickly as possible move to another place and make no delay.

[4] And Eurymedon concurred with him in these views. But since Nicias objected, some hesitation and delay ensued; and at the same time there was a suspicion that it was because of some superior knowledge that he insisted. And so in this way the Athenians delayed to the end and continued to remain where they were.

[1] Such were the views which Nicias was positive in stating, from having gained an accurate acquaintance with the state of affairs in Syracuse, and their want of money; and because there were some who were desirous that the state should fall into the hands of the Athenians, and were sending messages to him not to abandon the siege; and at the same time, ¹ because he was influenced by confidence in his fleet, at any rate more than before.

[2] Demosthenes, however, would not at all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege; but if it were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, he said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or to Catana, where they could overrun with their troops a large part of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their enemies' property, and so might injure them; while at the same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in favour of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, where their skill would be of service to them, and they would have an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and circumscribed space, both on putting out and coming to land.

[3] In a word, he did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in their present position, but of removing immediately without delay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view.

[4] But as Nicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might be so positive from knowing something more than he expressed. The Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained where they were.

[1] Nicias quidem haec cum asseveratione dicebat, quia rerum Svracusanarum slatuni plane compertum habe- bat, et pecuniarum inopiam, et esse illic quosdam, qui rei in Atheniensium potestatem venire cuperent, et qui nuntios ad se mitterent, ne discederet; simul etiam quia naves certe eum jam magis quam antea fiducia commovebant.

[2] Demosthenes vero de remanendo in obsidione nullo modo assentiebatur; si autem sine Atheniensium decreto non liceret exercitum abducere, sed ibi perstandum esset, dicebat id aut Thapsum translatis castris faciendum esse, aut Catanam, unde et peditatu plerasque agri circumjecti partes invadentes et res hostium diripientes victum sibi paraturi iliisque damnum illatori essent, et navibus in alto, nec in angustiis, quae pro hostibus magis facerent, proelia commissuri essent, sed in amplo spatio, ubi ex sua peritia fructum perciperent, et se recipiendi et hostem invadendi liberam facultatem haberent, non ex brevi circumscriptoque spatio provehentes et revertentes.

[3] In summa nullo modo sibi placere dicebat, in eodem loco diutius manere, sed quam celerrime jam et sine ulla cunctatione castris motis abir£. Et Eurymedon ejus orationem comprobabat.

[4] Sed contradicente Nicia segnities quaedam et cunctatio incedebat, et simul etiam suspicio, ne Nicias, quod aliquid amplius nosset, haec affirmaret. Hunc in modum Athenienses quidem cunctati sunt et in loco permanserunt.

Stava jNicia fermo nella sua proposta perchè era esattamente informato dello stato di Siracusa e della mancanza del denaro, e perchè ivi erano persone desiderose che il governo venisse in mano degli Ateniesi, le quali gli facevano intendere che non si levasse dall’assedio. Oltre di che si era lasciato vincere dalla fiducia che avea concepita maggiore di prima almeno quanto alle navi. Demostene però non approvava per verun conto il rimanere all’ assedio ; e se non si voleva ritirare l’esercito senza il decreto degli Ateniesi, ma trattenersi in Sicilia, diceva che bisognava far ciò col passare a Tapso ovvero a Catana, donde colla fanteria potrebbero voltarsi a correre gran parte della campagna, e danneggiare i nemici devastando le cose loro ; che colla flotta combatterebbero in alto mare ed all’aperto invece che in luogo angusto ( lo che era più vantaggioso al nemico ) ; che allora potrebbero giovarsi della propria perizia ; e che non dovendo fare impeto o vogare a terra in breve e circoscritto spazio , sarebbero padroni di ritirarsi e di assalire. Insomma protestava non piacerli in niun modo il rimanervi più a lungo, e voleva che fin d’allora presti ssi inamente si ritirasse l’esercito senza indugiare ; ed Eurimedonte era in ciò d’accordo con lui. Ma contradicendo Nicia , si sparse pel campo una certa indolenza ed irresolutezza, ed insieme l’opinione che egli stesse alla dura perchè ne sapesse più degli altri. In tal guisa gli Ateniesi temporeggiavano senza muoversi da quel luogo.