Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.48

[1] Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to have their weakness discovered, and, by decreeing of their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the enemy; for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be less able to do it secretly.

[2] Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege, especially being already masters of the sea, far and near, with their present fleet. There was moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse that desired to betray the state into their hands, and that sent messengers unto him and suffered him not to rise and be gone.

[3] All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion to be of, and did yet consider, nevertheless openly in his speech he was against the withdrawing of the army, and said that he was sure the people of Athens would take it ill if he went thence without their order; for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence upon their own sight of things done rather than upon the report of calumniators, but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse them of. That many, nay most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their misery, will there cry out on the contrary, and say the generals have betrayed the state and come away for a bribe.

[4] That he would not, therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put to death unjustly and charged with a dishonourable crime by the Athenians rather than, if he must needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by his own adventure. And yet, he said, the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to their own.

[5] For paying much money to strangers and laying out much more on forts [without and about the city], having also had a great navy a year already in pay, they must needs want money at last, and all these things fail them. For they have spent already two thousand talents, and are much in debt besides. And whensoever they shall give over this course and make pay no longer, their strength is gone, as being auxiliary and not constrained to follow the war as the Athenians are.

[6] Therefore it was fit, he said, to stay close to the city and not to go away as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much superior.

[1] This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council were openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery.

[2] Moreover, his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more extensive command of the sea now given them by their present navy. Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the city to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him not to raise the siege.

[3] Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting because he hesitated between the two courses and wished to see his way more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion he refused to lead off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never approve of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like themselves and not from what they might hear from hostile critics, would simply be guided by the calumnies of the first clever speaker;

[4] while many, indeed most, of the soldiers on the spot, who now so loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they reached Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish under a dishonorable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of the Athenians, he would rather take his chance and die, if die he must, a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy.

[5] Besides, after all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for a full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it, without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own.

[6] He therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much superior.

Das war die Ansicht des Demosthenes, Nikias aber
glaubte zwar auch, daß es schlecht um sie stünde, jedoch wollte er
nicht in offener Rede ihre'Lage als gefährlich hinstellen und durch
öffentlichen Beschluß des, Abzugs die Feinde selbst davon in Kenntniß
setzen; denn in diesem Falle würde die Ausführung des Beschlusses,
wenn sie ihn schon fassen wollten, viel schwerer geheim gehalten
werden. Dann waren ihm auch gewisse Dinge über die Lage der Feinde
bekannt, die er mehr als die Andern durchschaute, aus welchen er
die Hoffnung ableitete, daß es mit den Syrakusanern noch schlimmer ^{1 2 3}
aussehen werde, als mit ihnen selbst, wenn sie nur die Belagerung
beharrlich fortsetzten; sie selbst würden jene durch Geldmangel ganz
aufreiben, zumal sie mit den jetzt zu Gebote stehenden Schiffen das
Meer aus größere Ausdehnung hin beherrschten, als früher. Auch
war unter den Syrakufanern selbst eine Partei, welche den Athenern
daS Ruder in die Hände geben wollte und geheime Botschaft an
Nikias sandte, die vom Abzug abrieth. Bei dieser Kenntniß war er
in der That schwankend und verhielt sich abwartend, öffentlich und
laut aber erklärte er damals, er werde für den Abzug des Heeres
nicht stimmen, denn er wisse gar wohl, daß die Athener eS von ihnen
nicht so.hinnehmen würden, daß sie ohne Volksbeschluß ihrerseits
abgezogen-seien. Denn zu Athen seien es nicht sie selbst, die über
sich selbst abstimmen würden, und nicht solche, welche die Sachen
ansähen wie sie selbst, würden dort, ohne auf die Vorwürfe Anderer
zu hören, über sie entscheiden, sondern solche, die sich leiten lassen
von,dem ersten Besten, der seine Anklagen in schöne Worte zu fassen
wisse. Selbst von den hier anwesenden Soldaten würden viele, oder
sogar die meisten, welche jetzt ein Geschrei erhüben über ihre
gefährliche Lage, wenn sie erst in Athen angekommen wären, dort das
entgegengesetzte Geschrei anstimmen, als ob die Feldherren, durch
Geld bestochen, abgezogen wären. Er kenne die Art der Athener zu
gut und wolle für seine Person lieber fechtend von der Hand der
Feinde sterben, wenn es schon sein müsse, als wegen einer
schimpflichen Anklage ungerechter Weise durch die Athener zu Grunde gehei.
Die Lage der Syrakusier, sagte er, sei immer noch schlimmer als
ihre eigene. Denn jene hätten aus ihrem Säcke! fremde
Miethssoldaten zu ernähren und den Aufwand für die Festungen zu
bestreiten und müßten jetzt schon ein ganzes Jahr lang die große Flotte
erhalten, und so seien sie jetzt schon in Verlegenheit und würden sich
bald nicht mehr zu rathen und zu helfen wissen. Denn zwei tausend
Talente hätten sie schon ausgegeben und dazu .noh cviele Schulden
gemacht. Wenn sie aber, um an den Atzungskosten zu sparen, ihre
Macht auch nur um ein Geringes verminderten, so würden sie sich
dadurch der Vernichtung preisgeben, da ihre Macht mehr auf
HülfSvolk beruhe, als aus Zwangspflichtigen, wie bei den Athenern. Man
müsse also die Belagerung noch fortsetzen und sich, bei ihrer thatsäch­ ⁴
lichen großen Ueberlegenheit, nicht durch die Furcht vor den Geld­ ⁵
ausgaben zum Abzug bestimmen lassen. , : E

XLVIII. Nicias regardait, lui aussi, la situation comme critique; mais il ne voulait pas en divulguer la faiblesse, ni dénoncer lui-même à l’ennemi ces pro- ^{1 2 3} jets de départ, en les discutant ostensiblement dans un nombreux conseil; car de cette manière le secret serait bien plus difficile lorsqu’on en viendrait à l’exécution. D’ailleurs, ce qu’il savait des affaires de l’ennemi, qu’il connaissait mieux que les autres, lui donnait quelque espoir qu’elles deviendraient plus mauvaises encore que celles des Athéniens, si on persistait dans le siége. On épuiserait leurs ressources et on les réduirait à l’extrémité, d’autant mieux que la flotte actuelle garantissait désormais une plus grande supériorité sur mer. Enfin il y avait dans Syracuse même un parti qui voulait livrer le gouvernement aux Athéniens et qui lui envoyait des émissaires pour le détourner de renoncer à l’entreprise. Ces diverses considérations le faisaient en réalité balancer entre les deux partis; il observait et ajournait toute décision; mais ostensiblement il n’en déclara pas moins qu’il n’emmènerait pas l’armée. Il était sûr, disait-il, que les Athéniens n’approuveraient pas qu’ils eussent d’eux-mêmes ramené l’armée sans un décret du peuple; car ceux qui seraient appelés à prononcer sur leur compte n’auraient pas, comme eux, vu personnellement l’état des choses; ils n’en connaîtraient rien que par les accusations répétées autour d’eux; il suffirait de calomnies habilement présentées pour entraîner leur assentiment; quant aux soldats qui étaient sur les lieux, beaucoup d’entre eux, la plupart même, tout en se plaignant bien fort maintenant de leurs maux, crieraient le contraire une fois de retour et accuseraient les généraux d’avoir trahi et vendu leur départ. Il ne voulait donc pas, pour sa part, connaissant le caractère des Athéniens, s’exposer à tomber victime d’une accu- sation infamante et injuste; il aimait mieux périr, s’il le fallait, en s’exposant personnellement aux coups de l’ennemi. Π ajouta que la situation des Syracusains était encore plus critique que la leur; que la solde des troupes étrangères, les dépenses des garnisons disséminées sur le territoire, jointes à l’entretien, depuis une année déjà, d’une flotte nombreuse, avaient épuisé leurs ressources et que leurs embarras ne feraient que s’accroître; qu’ils avaient dépensé déjà deux mille talents et avaient en outre un arriéré considérable; que s’ils faisaient quelques réductions à leurs dépenses actuelles, en supprimant la solde, ils ruinaient leurs affaires, puisque leur armée se composait surtout d’auxiliaires et non d’hommes astreints au service, comme chez les Athéniens; qu’il fallait donc atermoyer, s’opiniâtrer au siége et ne pas se retirer vaincu par le défaut de ressources quand on en avait de bien supérieures à celles de l’ennemi.

Nicias tenait aussi la position pour fâcheuse; mais il ne voulait pas en convenir ouvertement, ni que les généraux, délibérant sur le départ dans un conseil nombreux, révélassent ainsi eux-mêmes ces projets à l’ennemi, au risque d’en rendre l’exécution plus difficile. D’ailleurs il savait pertinemment que les affaires des Syracusains n’étaient guère plus brillantes, et qu’elles empireraient si l’on continuait le siège. Par là on les écraserait de dépenses toujours croissantes, à présent surtout que la flotte augmentée promettait aux Athéniens la supériorité sur mer. Enfin il y avait à Syracuse un parti qui désirait le triomphe des assiégeants, et qui envoyait à Nicias message sur message pour lui déconseiller de lever le siège. Ces considérations le faisaient hésiter, et l’engageaient à s’opposer manifestement au départ. Il savait bien, dit-il, que les Athéniens n’approuveraient pas une retraite qu’ils n’auraient pas décrétée. Ceux qui prononceraient sur le sort des généraux n’auraient pas vu de leurs yeux l’état des choses; ils ne le connaîtraient que par les critiques répétées autour d’eux, et jugeraient d’après les assertions des beaux parleurs. Ce n’est pas tout : un grand nombre de soldats, la majorité peut-être, qui maintenant se plaignaient le plus haut de leurs souffrances, une fois à Athènes seraient les premiers à déblatérer contre les généraux et à les représenter comme des traîtres vendus à l’ennemi. Connaissant donc le caractère des Athéniens, il ne voulait pas être victime d’une accusation injuste et ignominieuse, et préférait, s’il était nécessaire, périr les armes à la main. Il ajoutait que la situation des Syracusains était encore plus difficile que la leur, la solde des troupes étrangères, les garnisons des forts, l’entretien d’une grosse flotte depuis plus d’une année, leur causant des embarras qui ne feraient que s’accroître; car ils avaient déjà dépensé deux mille talents, sans parler d’une dette énorme ; et, pour peu qu’ils voulussent réduire leur effectif en supprimant la solde, ils seraient perdus, puisque leur armée se composait principalement d’auxiliaires, et non pas de troupes réglées, comme celle des Athéniens. Nicias concluait donc qu’il fallait patienter et poursuivre le siège, sans reculer devant des dépenses qu’Athènes, au bout du compte, était bien en mesure de supporter.

[1] Such was the judgment of Demosthenes. Nicias, however, although he also thought that their situation was bad, did not wish expressly to reveal their weakness, or that they should be reported to the enemy as openly voting in full council for the retreat; for, he urged, they would be far less likely, when they should wish to retreat, to do this unobserved.

[2] Besides, the affairs of the enemy, from such information as he had beyond the rest, still afforded some hope that they would turn out to be worse than their own, if they persisted in the siege; for they would wear the enemy out by cutting off his supplies, especially since now with their present fleet they were to a greater extent than before the masters of the sea. And, in fact, there was a party in Syracuse that favoured submitting to the Athenians, and it was secretly sending proposals to him and urging him not to withdraw. Having knowledge of these things, although in reality he still wavered between the two alternatives and kept pondering them, yet in the speech which he openly made at that time he refused to lead the army away.

[3] For he knew well, he said, that the Athenians would not approve of the generals withdrawing without any vote of their own to that effect. For ¹ those who would vote on their case would not be men who would form their judgments from seeing the facts with their own eyes, as they themselves had seen them, and not from listening to the harsh criticisms of others; on the contrary, whatever calumnies any clever speaker might utter, by these the Athenians would be persuaded.

[4] And of the soldiers now present in Sicily, many, he said—aye, the majority—who were now crying out that they were in a desperate plight, as soon as they arrived in Athens would cry out just the reverse, that their generals had been bribed to betray them and withdraw. Accordingly, he at any rate did not wish, knowing as he did the character of the Athenians, to be put to death on a shameful charge and unjustly at the hands of the Athenians, but rather to fight and die, if so he must, his own death at the hands of the foe. And bad as their own situation was, that of the Syracusans, he said, was still worse;

[5] for in point of money, since they were supporting a mercenary force and at the same time bearing the expense of patrol guard-posts, and had now for a year been maintaining a large fleet besides, they were already embarrassed, and hereafter would be quite without resources; ² indeed, they had spent two thousand talents already and were in debt for many talents more, and if they should lose any portion whatsoever of their present force by not being able to pay for its maintenance, their cause would be ruined, since it depended upon mercenary troops and had not, like their own, the backing of necessity. ³

[6] They ought, therefore, he concluded, to stay on and continue the siege, and not go back home beaten by money, in which they had by far the greater resources.

[1] Nicias, however, though he too considered their circumstances to be bad, yet did not wish to display their weak. ness by words, nor that they should become a laughing-stock to their enemies by voting for the retreat openly, and in ¹ conjunction with many; for so they would far less elude their observation in executing it, whenever they might wish.

[2] To a certain extent also the affairs of the enemy, judging from what he, more than others, knew of them, still afforded some hope that they would be worse than their own, should they persist in carrying on the siege; for so they would exhaust them by want of funds; especially, too, as they had now, with their present fleet, a more extensive command of the sea. A party in Syracuse also, which wished to surrender the city to the Athenians, was sending messengers to him, and urging him not to raise the siege. Knowing these things, then, he was in fact waiting because he was still inclined both ways, and wished to see his course more clearly;

[3] but in the speech openly made by him on that occasion he said,

[4]

[5]

[6]

[1] Nicias vero credebat quidem et ipse, res suas afflictas esse, verbis tamen earum infirmitatem declarare non volebat, neque etiam se ipsos, dum palam cum mullis sententias ferrent de reditu, rem hostibus prodere; nam si hoc facerent, mullo minus, quotiescumque voluissent, clam discedere posse.

[2] Praeterea vero etiam hostium res, pro eo quod earum majorem quam ceteri notitiam habebat, nonnihil spei adhuc ei praebebant, fore, ut deteriore conditione essent, quam suae, si in obsidione perseverarent; illos enim pecuniarum inopia a se exhaustum iri, praesertim quod ipsi jam latius praesentibus navibus maris imperium obtinerent. Atque etiam, quoniam et Syracusis erant nonnulli, qui res Atheniensibus dedere volebant, hi nuntios ad ipsum mittebant, nec discedere sinebant.

[3] Quae quum sciret, re quidem ipsa in utramque partem adhuc nutans et ancipitem cogitationem habens haerebat, verbis vero, quibus tunc palam utebatur, se copias abducturum negabat. Se enim probe scire, haec ab Atheniensibus minime probatum iri, si sine ipsorum decreto discederent. Non enim, eosdem fore, et qui de sc [ipsis] sententias ferant et qui res gestas, ut ipsi, suis oculis videndo et non ex aliorum conviciis audiendo cognoscant, sed potius prout quis pulchre diceos invidiam faceret, ita eos fidem habituros.

[4] et mullos atque adeo plerosque praesentium militum, qui nunc vociferarentur, se iu gravibus malis versari, illuc reversos contraria vociferaturos, duces pecunia ad proditionem adductos discessisse. Non igitur se quidem, qui nosset Atheniensium iiigenia, velle ob turpem causam et injuste ab Atheniensibus potius morte mulctari, quam ab bostibus, si necesse esset, hoc ipsum non sine certaminis periculo pati privatim.

[5] Et res Syracusanorum dicebat tamen nunc quoque deteriore conditione esse, quam Suas; illos enim, quod sua pecunia mercenarios milites alerent, simul etiam, quod alios sumptus facerent in alenda praesidia in castellis circum urbem sitis disposita, praeterea, quod magnam etiam classem jam per annum alerent, partim quidem rei pecuniariae inopia jam premi, partim vero postea in angustiis fore; doo enim talentorum millia jam consumpsisse, et praeterea multa etiam debere, et, si vel minimum de praesenti apparaln detraherent eo quod stipendium dare cessarent, res eorum perituras,quippe quae copiis auxiliaribus potius continerentur, quam uecessilate, ut res suas, constare.

[6] Quamobrem dicebat oportere se in obsidione perseverare, neque, quasi illi pecunia longe superiores essent, victos abire.

Nicia poi con tutto che egli stimasse giunte a mal termine le proprie cose , pure uon voleva allargarsi a parlare della debolezza di quelle; nè col decretare manifestamente la ritirata tra molti, darne sentore ai nemici ; avvegnaché così facendo, quando vi si risolvessero avrebbero maggior difficoltà a tenersi celati. E gli porgeva ancora qualche speranza il sapere ( per i ragguagli che avea più de’suoi colleghi) come lo stato de’ nemici diverrebbe peggiore del suo o\e si persistesse neirassedio, perchè dovrebbero rifinirsi per mancanza di denaro; tanto più che gli Ateniesi, colle navi che ora avevano, signoreggiavano più ampiamente sul mare. Oltre di che vi erano in Siracusa alcuni che volevano voltare il governo in mano d’Atene, e a lui mandavano avvisi e lo confortavano a non partire. Le quali cose non ignorando Nicia stava in fatto tuttor con l’animo intra due, e differiva a decidersi, ma colle parole mostrava chiaro che non avrebbe levato il campo. Saper lui bene, diceva, che gli Ateniesi non approverebbero questa partita senza avterla essi da per sé decretata , poiché su i capitani sentenzeranno non quelli che com’ essi avessero avuto sott' occhio lo stato delle cose , o che non dessero retta alle altrui imputazioni, ma tali che si lasceranno persuadere dalle belle parole di chi voglia metter loro in discredito ; gridare ora molti, pròseguiva, anzi i più de’soldati, che si trovano in gravi mali, ma tornati in patria grideranno al contrario che i generali son partiti corrotti dal denaro. Però non voler lui che conosceva la natura degli Ateniesi morire per mano di loro con turpe accusa ed ingiustamente, più presto che per le mani de’nemici, ove bisogni correr questo rischio , lungi dai clamori d’nn giudizio. Aggiugneva che i Siracusani erano anche in peggior condizione di loro, poiché tra le paghe che avevano i soldati forestieri, tra le altre spese per i presidii delle circonvicine cittadelle, e tra il mantenimento di flotta considerabile che già durava da un anno, trovavansi in parte fin d’allora alle strette, in parte non avrebbero poi saputo come trarsi d'impaccio ; poiché avevano già speso duemila talenti, e molti più ne avevano in debito. Che se venissero a diminuirsi un nonnulla gli apparecchi col non pagare i soldi, le cose loro, consistenti in truppe ausiliarie più presto che stabili come le ateniesi, erano andate. Laonde egli diceva che doveasi continovare l’assedio, e non levarsene vinti dal pensiero che i nemici fossero di gran lunga superiori in denaro.