Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 6.21

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„Gegen eine solche Macht ist eS nicht genug an der
Flotte und einer Handvoll Seesoldaten, sondern eS gehört
auch ein starkes Landheer dazu, wollen wir dort etwas aus
richten und nicht Gefahr laufen, durch die zahlreiche Reiterei
an der Landung verhindert zu werden, zumal wenn die Städte
auS Furcht vor unS zusammenhalten sollten und wir außer
den Egestern dort nicht noch andere Bundesgenossen fänden,
die unS mit Reiterei auShelfen könnten. ES wäre schimpflich,
wenn wir gezwungen wären, wieder abzuziehen oder, weit wir
unS nicht von vornherein gehörig vorgesehen, Verstärkungen
nachkommen zu lassen. Wir müssen unS also gleich hier mit
allem reichlich versehen und berücksichtigen, daß eS sich um
einen Zug in ein fernes Land handelt, ein ander Ding, wie
wenn ihr hier inmitten eurer Untertanen mit euren Bundes
genossen gegen einen Feind zu Felde zieht, wobei die nötigen
Zufuhren aus Freundestand leicht zu haben sind. Dort aber
seid ihr auf ein völlig fremdes, feindliches Land angewiesen,
von wo zur Winterzeit nicht einmal ein Bote in vier Monaten
so leicht würde herüberkommen können.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.21.1 focus

[1] ‘πρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναμιν οὐ ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεζὸν πολὺν ξυμπλεῖν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας δρᾶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἴργεσθαι τῆς γῆς, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαράσχωσιν ἡμῖν φίλοι τινὲς γενόμενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀμυνούμεθα ἱππικόν

[2] (αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους)· αὐτόθεν δὲ παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι πολύ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν μέλλομεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ στρατευσόμενοι καὶ ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις ξύμμαχοι ἤλθετε ἐπί τινα, ὅθεν ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κομιδαὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ὧν προσέδει, ἀλλ’ ἐς ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσοντες, ἐξ ἧς μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν χειμερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.21.1 focus

[1] "Against such a power we shall therefore need not a fleet only, and with it a small army, but there must great forces go along of land soldiers, if we mean to do anything worthy of our design and not to be kept by their many horsemen from landing; especially if the cities there, terrified by us, should now hold all together, and none but the Egestaeans prove our friends and furnish us with a cavalry to resist them.

[2] And it would be a shame either to come back with a repulse or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our enterprise at first. Therefore we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that we go far from home and are to make war in a place of disadvantage, and not as when we went as confederates to aid some of our subjects here at home, where we had easy bringing in of necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends. But we go far off, and into a country of none but strangers, and from whence in winter there can hardly come a messenger unto us in so little as four months.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.21.1 focus

[1] Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend ourselves with.

[2] It would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may have undertaken in the quality of allies, among your subject states here in Hellas , where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger to get to Athens .

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.21 focus

„Gegenüber einer solchen Macht aber bedarf es nicht nur
einer Flotte mit mittelmäßiger Bemannung ^), sondern es muß auch
ein zahlreiches Landheer mitschiffen, wenn wir etwas ausrichten wollen,
was unserem Vorhaben entspricht, und nicht durch ihre zahlreiche
Reiterei uns an der Ausbreitung auf dem Lande wollen hindern
lassen, besonders wenn die einzelnen Staaten aus Furcht vor uns
sich mit einander vereinigen, und außer den Egestanern nicht noch
einige andere sich mit uns befreunden und uns Reiterei stellen sollten,
mit welcher wir uns jener erwehren könnten. Denn schimpflich wäre
es, wenn wir zum Rückzug gezwungen würden oder hinterdrein
Unterstützung müßten nachkommen lassen, weil wir bei der ersten Berathung ¹²³
ohne Bedacht vorgegangen sind. Gleich jetzt von hier weg müssen ⁴
wir mit entsprechender Rüstung ausziehen und bedenken, daß wir>
weit von der Heimath über See gehen wollen, und daß dieß kein
solcher Feldzug werden wird, als wenn ihr hier im Lande (als
Bundesgenossen eurer Unterthanen) Einen angreisen wolltet, wo das,
was man etwa später noch bedarf, aus Freundesland leicht
nachgeschafft werden kann; sondern ihr laßt die Heimath weit hinter euch
und zieht in ein ganz fremdes Land, von wo zur Winterszeit sogar
nicht einmal in vier Monaten ein Bote leicht zu euch gelangen
kann."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.21 focus

XXI. Contre une telle puissance, ce n’est pas une expédition navale et de peu d’importance qui peut suffire; il faut de plus embarquer avec nous beaucoup d’infanterie, si nous voulons faire quelque chose qui réponde à nos desseins, et ne pas voir une nombreuse cavalerie nous fermer le pays; surtout si les villes effrayées se liguent, si nous ne trouvons pas quelques alliés, autres que les Égestains, pour nous fournir de la cavalerie à leur opposer. Il serait honteux d’être contraints par la force à nous retirer, ou réduits à demander plus tard des renforts, pour n’avoir pas tout d’abord pris de sages mesures. Il faut donc partir d’ici ¹ avec des préparatifs qui répondent à tous les besoins, et songer que nous allons naviguer très-loin de notre pays, et que nous ne ferons point la guerre dans les mêmes conditions que nos adversaires : il ne s’agit plus de ces expéditions que vous faisiez à titre d’alliés, chez des peuples soumis à votre domination, là où il était facile de tirer d’un pays ami les secours nécessaires; vous allez être isolés sur une terre absolument étrangère, d’où, pendant quatre mois d’hiver, il est difficile même de faire arriver un courrier.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.21 focus

« Contre une telle puissance, une armée navale et médiocre ne suffit pas. Il faut emmener àes troupes de terre en grand nombre, si nous voulons obtenir un résultat significatif, et ne pas nous voir fermer la campagne par la cavalerie ennemie ;. car il est à craindre que les villes épouvantées ne se coalisent contre nous, et que les Ëgestains seuls nous fournissent des cavaliers auxiliaires. Or il serait honteux pour nous d’ôtre forcés a la retraite, ou réduits à demander des renforts pour n’avoir pas pris tout d’abord nos mesures.

« Il nous faut donc partir avec un armement complet. N’oublions pas que notas allons porter la guerre dans une contrée lointaine; qu’il ne s’agit pas ici d’une de ces expéditions entreprises par nous en qualité d'alliés, chez nos sujets, dans une terre amie, d’où il est aisé de se procurer tout ce dont on a besoin. Vous allez opérer à une distance énorme, dans un pays tout à fait étranger, d’où, pendant les quatre mois d’hiver, il n’est pas facile de recevoir un simple message.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.21.1 focus

[1] "To cope with such a power we need not only a naval armament of such insignificant size, but also that a large force for use on land should accompany the expedition, if we would accomplish anything worthy of our design and not be shut out from the land by their numerous cavalry; especially if the cities become terrified and stand together, and some of the others, besides Egesta, do not become our friends and supply us cavalry with which to defend ourselves against that of the enemy.

[2] And it would be shameful to be forced to return home, or later to send for fresh supplies, because we had made our plans at first without due consideration. So we must start from home with an adequate armament, realizing that we are about to sail, not only far from our own land, but also on a campaign that will be carried on under no such conditions as if you had gone against an enemy as allies of your subject-states over here, where it would be easy to get whatever further supplies you needed from the friendly territory; nay, you will have removed into an utterly alien land, from which during the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come even in four months.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.21.1 focus

[1] "Against such a power then we require, not only ¹ a marine and inefficient armament, but that a large land force also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitable to our design, and are not to be shut out from the land by numerous cavalry; especially should the cities league together in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves.

[2] But it were disgraceful to return by compulsion, or to send for fresh supplies afterwards, through having inconsiderately formed our plans at first. On the contrary, we must go against them with sufficient forces, knowing that we are about to sail far from our own country, and not on an expedition of the same kind as when you have gone at different times, in the character of allies, against any of your subjects in these parts, where supplies of additional necessaries were easily obtained from the friendly territory; but departing to a land altogether alien to you, from which for ² as many as four months in the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come here.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.21.1 focus

[1] « Adversus igitur talem potentiam non solum navalibus et infirmis copiis est opus, sed etiam multum terrestrem exercitum nobiscum navigare oportet, si modo aliquid cogitatis dignum agere volumus, nec a magno equitatu terra prohiberi, praesertim si civitates nostri metu conspirent, nec ulli alii, quam Egestaei, amici nobis facti, equitatum, quo hostibus resistamus, vicissim suppeditent.

[2] Turpe autem est, nos vi repulsos discedere, aut postea novas copias arcessere, quod primo consilium prudens non inierimus; sed ex hoc ipso loco oportet nos cum firmissimo apparatu bellum illis inferre, reputato, et procul a finibus nostris nos esse navigaturos, neque bellum gesturos eodem modo, quo in regionibus hic nobis parentibus socii aliquem bello petivistis, ubi facilis subvectio eorum, quibus opus erat, ut ex agro sociali, sed in terram digressos totam alienam, unde quatuor hibernorum mensium spatio ne nuntius quidem huc facile venire possit.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.21 focus

« Contro tante forze adunque non basta solo un navale e debole esercito, ma ci vogliono eziandio sulle itevi molti soldati da sbarco, se vogliamo eseguire alcun chè dégno del nostro concetto, e non essere impediti di pigliar terra da grossa cavalleria , specialmente nel caso che le città impaurite si colleghino insieme, o che noi non troviamo altri amici ( dagli Egestei in fuori ) thè ci somministrino cavalli da opporre al nemico. Sarebbe certo vergogna l’essere astretti a tornarcene, o chiedere dipoi nuove truppe per aver deliberato inconsideratamente da primo: ond’è che Conviene partir di qua con sufficienté apparecchio, sapendo che dobbiamo navigare molto dilungi dal paese nostro. Voi non uscite ora alla guerrà siccome quando portate le armi Contro alcuno fra genti a voi soggette t e però cavate facilmente i viveri da paesé amico: ma andate a gettarvi lontani ih terra straniera, donde non è facile aver qua nuove neppure in quattro mesi d' inverno.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

ὑπολάβῃ δὲ κτλ —‘let no one suppose that care for you is not our concern.’

γνούς —‘when he reflects.’

σῳζομένων —the partic. is parallel to διὰ τὸ . . ἀντέχειν .

μὴ ἀσθενεῖς ὄντας —‘with a strong resistance,’ circumstantial partic. to ἀντέχειν .

ἧσσον ἂν κτλ —‘we should be less likely to suffer by their sending a force to aid the Pel.’; ἧσσον ἄν belong both to πεμψάντων and to βλαπτοίμεθα. The argument is that it is the interest of Athens to support the independence of Camarina as a rival power to Syracuse. But, as Freeman asks, what would happen if Athens reduced Syr. to subjection? Would it then be to her interest to maintain the independence of her friends in Sicily?

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ . . ἤδη —‘and it is just in this that we are closely concerned in your affairs.’

διόπερ καί —‘this is the reason too why it is logical that we should restore the L., not as subjects.’

τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς —attracted to the case of ὑπηκόους. τοῖσδε = the Syracusans.

τὰ μὲν γάρ —‘in Greece’)( τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε below.

καὶ αὐτοί —‘even without aid.’

δν κτλ — i.e. δν δουλώσασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἐλευθεροῦν ἄλογον εἶναί φησι.

ξύμφορος — i.e. to maintain the dominion of Athens, it was needful that the Euboean Chalcis should be unarmed and tributary (Freeman), and should not contribute ships.

καὶ Λεοντῖνοι —sc. ξύμφοροί εἰσιν.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.21

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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