Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.62

[1] "And thus much for the profit that will be found by advising wisely concerning the Athenians.

[2] But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think, perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both; or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety.

[3] Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope, knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they have had, to take away another's right, have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own.

[4] For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things to come, which, though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence.

[1] So far as regards the Athenians such are the great advantages proved inherent in a wise policy.

[2] Independently of this, in the face of the universal consent that peace is the first of blessings, how can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be better preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less numerous miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own safety.

[3] If there be any here who feels certain either by right or might to effect his object, let not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment. Let him remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to lose what they had.

[4] Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider before attacking each other.

„So groß ist der Vortheil, der uns aus emem
vernunftigen Entschlüsse den Athenern gegenüber erwächst; warum sollten
wir nun nicht aber auch das, was von Allen für das Vvrt heil hafte st e
gehalten wird, den Frieden nämlich, unter uns selbst herstellen? Oder
glaubt ihr etwa, wenn jetzt noch Manches besteht, was dem Einen ¹
zwar vortheilhast, dem Andern aber das Gegentheil davon ist, daß<
nicht viel eher der Friede als der Krieg das Nachtheilige Beiden aus
dem Wege räumen, das Vortheilhafte aber für Beide in gleicher
Weise erhalten werde? Oder daß der Friede uns nicht Ruhm und
Glanz und was sonst Alles, wovon ich jetzt nicht viele Worte machen
will, mit geringerer Gefahr gewähren werde? Das bedenket wohl
und überseht nicht, was ich vorbringe, erwartet vielmehr von seiner
Befolgung eure Rettung! Wenn aber Einer, mag er sich nun auf
sein Recht, oder auf die Gewalt steifen, des Erfolges ganz sicher zu
fein glaubt, so sehe er doch zu, daß er nicht bitter enttäuscht werde,
und bedenke, daß schon gar Viele, die aus Rachegefühl ihren
Beleidigern zu Leibe gingen, und Andere, die in ihrer Uebermacht
Bürgschaft des Gewinns sahen, — die Einen nicht nur keine Rache
fanden, sondern sogar selbst zu Grunde gingen, die Andern aber, anstatt
zu gewinnen, ihr Hab und Gut verloren. Denn wer Rache sucht,
hat nicht dem Rechte gemäß Erfolg, deßhalb, weil ihm Unrecht
geschehen ist; noch auch ist Macht deßhalb zuverläßig, weil sie die
Hoffnung des Erfolgs hat, sondern der unberechenbare Wille der Zukunft
entscheidet das Meiste, und obgleich dieser von allen Dingen das
Betrüglichste ist, so bringt er doch auch sehr großen Nutzen mit sich; denn
weil wir Alle in gleicher Furcht schweben müssen, so gehen wir mit
um so größerer Vorsicht in den Kampf."

LXII. « Tels sont, à l’endroit des Athéniens, les avantages que nous trouverons dans une sage résolution. Quant à vos démêlés intérieurs, pourquoi, quand chacun s’accorde à proclamer la paix le premier des biens, n’y pas mettre un terme ? Si les uns prospèrent, si les autres souffrent, ne croyez-vous pas que la tranquillité, mieux que la guerre, peut procurer à ceuxci le terme de leurs maux, à ceux-là la conservation de leurs avantages ? La paix rend moins périlleux les hon- neurs et les dignités, et tant d’autres biens qui seraient aussi longs à énumérer que les maux de la guerre ! Envisagez tout cela, et que mes paroles, loin d’inspirer le dédain, vous aident à prévoir les moyens de vous sauver.

« Si quelqu’un s’imagine que le droit ou la force sont des gages assurés du succès, qu’il craigne d’être cruel- lement déçu par quelque coup inattendu. Qu’il songe que les exemples abondent d’hommes qui, en poursuivant la réparation d’une injustice, ont non-seulement échoué dans leur vengeance, mais trouvé la ruine, que bien des ambitieux, pour avoir voulu s’agrandir par la force, ont, au lieu d’ajouter à leur puissance, perdu ce qu’ils avaient ; car on ne peut pas compter sur une juste revanche, par cela seul qu’on est victime d’une injustice ; et la force, pour être confiante, n’est pas non plus une garantie. C’est l’avenir avec son inconstance qui décide souverainement, et cette incertitude même de l’avenir, quelque trompeuse qu’elle soit, a pourtant de grands avantages : par la crainte qu’elle nous inspire à tous également, nous apportons, chacun de notre côté, plus de réserve dans nos attaques.

« Tel est, à l’égard des Athéniens, l’immense avantage que nous nous assurons en prenant une sage résolution. Quant à la paix entre nous, à cette paix que chacun s’accorde à regarder comme le premier des biens, pourquoi ne pas la conclure? Si les uns prospèrent, si les autres souffrent, ne croyez-vous pas que la tranquillité convienne mieux que la guerre pour procurer à ceux-ci la cessation de leurs maux , à ceux-là le maintien de leur bien-être? N’est-ce pas la paix qui garantit les honneurs et les distinctions? N’est-ce pas elle qui produit mille autres avantages, aussi longs à énumérer que les maui de la guerre? Pesez donc mûrement mes paroles ; et, loin d'en tenir peu de compte, profitez-en pour votre salut.

« Si quelqu’un de vous s’imagine triompher à coup sûr, parce qu’il a pour lui le droit ou la force, je crains une amère déception. Que de fois n’a-t-on pas vu des hommes qui poursuivaient une juste vengeance, non seulement ne pas l’atteindre, mais encore compromettre leur propre sécurité? tandis que d’autres qui espéraient s’agrandir par la force , bien loin de faire des conquêtes, n’ont réussi qu’à perdre ce qu’ils possédaient. En effet, la vengeance n’aboutit pas toujours par cela seul qu’elle est légitime; de même que la force, pour être pleine d’espérance, n’est pas toujours un sûr appui. C’est la fortune qui décide de l’avenir. Malgré ses incertitudes, elle ne laisse pas d’avoir son bon côté ; car une crainte réciproque fait qu’on y regarde à deux fois avant d'en venir à des actes hostiles.

[1] "So far, then, as the Athenians are concerned, this is the great advantage we win if we are well advised;

[2] but as to the question of peace, which all men agree is a most desirable thing, why should we not make it here among ourselves? Or, think you, if one person now enjoys a blessing and another labours under adversity, it is not tranquillity far more than war that will put an end to the latter and perpetuate the former? And has not peace its honours and less hazardous splendours, and all the other advantages on which one might dilate as easily as on the horrors of war? Considering these things, you should not overlook my advice, but should rather look forward each to his own salvation thereby. And if any of you cherishes the confident belief that he can gain anything either by insisting on his rights or by an appeal to force, let him not, through the baffling of his hopes, suffer a grievous disappointment;

[3] for he knows that many men ere now, whether pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, or in other cases, hoping to gain some advantage by the exercise of power, have, on the one hand, not only not avenged themselves but have not even come out whole, and, on the other hand, instead of gaining more, have sacrificed what was their own.

[4] For revenge has no right to expect success just because a wrong has been done; nor is strength sure just because it is confident. But as regards the future, it is uncertainty that for the most part prevails, ¹ and this uncertainty, utterly treacherous as it is, proves nevertheless to be also most salutary; for since both sides alike fear it, we proceed with a greater caution in attacking one another.

[1] "With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice.

[2] And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it amongst ourselves? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, any one has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the latter, and help to preserve the former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honours and splendours? with all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it.

[3] And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had.

[4] For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future prevails to the greatest possible degree; and though the most. deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful: for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another.

[1] « Atque commodum quidem, quod ad Athenienses attinet, tantum esse «omperitur, si rebus nostris recte consulamus ;

[2] pacem vero, quam omnium confessione summum bonum esse constat, cur etiam inter nos ipsos facere non oporteat? An existimatis, si quid boni alicui adest, aut si cui contraria, non potiorem esse pacem quam bellum, tum ad liberandum alterutrum his malis, tum etiam ad illud bonum conservandum, et pacem habere honores et dignitates a periculo remotiores, atque alia, quae quis oratione longa persequi posset, quemadmodum de bello?Quibus rebus consideratis non oportet contemnere mea verba, sed potius unumquemque his admonitum suae saluti prospicere.

[3] Et si quis vel suae causae aequitate vel sua potentia fretus certam de rei alicujus successu spem concepit, is caveat, ne praeter spem graviter labatur, illud intelligens, plures jam ultionibus persequentes illos, a quibus injurias acceperant , alios etiam sperantes se suas facultates aliqua potentia amplificaturos, hanc sortem habuisse, ut illi quidem non solum suas injurias ulti non sint, sed ne salutem quidem suam retinere potuerint; hi vero pro amplificaUooe etiam jacturam suarum rerum fecerint.

[4] Ultio non ut jus erat, feliciter succedit propterea quod quis iqjuriam ab altero patitur; neque etiam potentia ideo est certa, quod homines bona spe compleat. Sed incertus futuri eventus plerumque plus valet, qui quum sit res omnium maxime lubrica, tamen utilissima videtur; utrique enim pariter timentes circumspectius alii alios invadimus.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

« Ecco quanto bene rispetto agli Ateniesi ritroviamo saggiamente deliberando. Quanto poi alla pace, che a confessione di tutti è l’olUmo dei beni, come non deve farsi anche fra noi stessi ? Se uno si trovi in prosperità, un altro in avversità , non credete voi che la pace meglio che la guerra possa in quest’ultimo cessare, e nel primo conservare il suo stato ; e che ella offra onori e chiarezza permanente e tutto ciò che potrebbe dar materia a lunga orazione non meno che la guerra ? Lo che considerando dovete non spregiar mie parole, ina anzi per queste provveder ciascuno alla vostra salvezza. E se alcun tien per fermo di ben riuscire in qualche cosa o per il dritto o per la forza , badi che la sua speranza non vada fallita , ove egli sappia che dei molti i quali volevano perseguire colla vendetta gli ingiuriatori, e degli altri i quali speravano di vantaggiarsi per via della forza, quelli non che vendicarsi , non ne uscirono a bene ; a questi invece di acquistare, avvenne di perdere del proprio. Imperciocché la vendetta non riesce meritamente a buon fine perchè è provocata dall9 ingiuria, nè la fortezza è stabile perchè ha buone speranze; ma d’ordinario la vince l’incertezza del futuro, che sebben fallacissima pure si mostra anche utilissima, avvegnaché temendo del pari usiamo maggior previdenza nell’assalirci l'un l’altro.