Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.61

[1] "Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours than for the impairing of what we already have; and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself.

[2] In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man and city with city, to return again into amity; and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians' enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians.

[3] For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessaries which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved themselves in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans.

[4] For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league they were bound unto.

[5] Indeed, the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject; for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way and to be shy of such as assail.

[6] We are to blame that know this and do not provide accordingly and make it our first care of all to take good order against the common fear.

[7] Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in); and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without trouble; and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.

[1] And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily , if we, its inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy.

[2] These considerations should reconcile individual with individual, and city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the whole of Sicily . Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only are enemies of Athens , while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood;

[3] the attack in question is not inspired by hatred of one of two nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in Sicily , the common property of us all.

[4] This is proved by the Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation: an ally who has never given them any assistance whatever, at once receives from them almost more than the treaty entitles him to.

[5] That the Athenians should cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very excusable; and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are over ready to serve. It is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them; one is not less invariable than the other.

[6] Meanwhile all who see these dangers and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come here without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite to get rid of the common peril, are mistaken.

[7] The quickest way to be rid of it is to make peace with each other; since the Athenians menace us not from their own country, but from that of those who invited them here. In this way instead of war issuing in war, peace quietly ends our quarrels; and the guests who come hither under fair pretences for bad ends, will have good reason for going away without having attained them.

„Und wir sollten doch eigentlich, wenn wir klug sind, lieber
solche Bundesgenossen herbeiführen, welche uns neuen Besitz erwerben,
als solche, die uns am eigenen Besitz schädigen. Denn mit Solchen
nehmen wir ja selbst die Gefahr in's eigene Haus. Wir müssen uns
überzeugen, daß Bürgerkrieg die einzelnen Staaten sowohl, wie unsere
ganze Insel am sichersten zu Grunde richte. Stellen wir Einwohner ¹
Siciliens doch Alle einander nach und sind nach den einzelnen Städten
feindlich geschieden! Das sollten wir doch einmal einsehen und uns
Bürger mit Bürger und Stadt mit Stadt aussöhnen und so ganz
Sicilien zu retten suchen! Und Keiner soll sich einbilden, daß, wenn die
Dorischer Herkunft unter uns von den Athenern bekriegt werden, die
chalkidischer Abstammung der Ionischen Blutsverwandtschaft wegen in
Sicherheit seien. Denn nicht gegen die Völkerschaften, weil sie der
Abstammung nach gespalten sind, führen die Athener aus Haß gegen
den einen Theil Krieg, sondern weil sie nach den Gütern Siciliens
begehren, deren wir uns gemeinsam erfreuen. Das haben sie deutlich
gezeigt, als sie Seitens des chalkidischen Stammes angerufen wurden;
denn Leuten, die ihnen niemals der Bundesgenossenschaft gemäß
Zuzug geleistet hatten, haben sie ihrerseits die Bundespflicht über
Erheischen des Vertrags hinaus bereitwilligst geleistet. Daß nun die
Athener in solcher Art nach Vergrößerung streben und ihre Netze ausstellen,
das verzeihe ich ihnen ohne Weiteres, und ich tadle überhaupt nicht
die, welche Herrschaft wollen, sondern die, welche allzu bereitwillig
sind, das Joch des Gehorchens auf sich zu nehmen. Denn die
Menschen sind nun einmal durchweg so geartet, daß sie sich den
unterwerfen, der nachgibt, aber auch, daß sie sich gegen den Angriff schützen.
Wir Alle nun, die dieß wissen und uns doch nicht nach Pflicht
vorsehen, und Jeder, der hieher gekommen ist, ohne die Hauptsache darin
zu sehen, daß Alle insgesammt die gemeinsame Gefahr zum glücklichen
Ausgang zu wenden haben, der fehlt groß. Dem wäre aber schnell
abgeholfen, wenn wir uns nur unter einander aussöhnen wollten;
denn die Athener können den Krieg nicht von ihrem eigenen Gebiet
aus führen, sondern nur vom Gebiete Solcher, die sie in's Land
rufen. Und so würde nicht Krieg durch Krieg, sondern Zwiespalt durch
Frieden ohne Mühe zu Ende gebracht, und die herbeigerufenen
Fremden, die zwar inter wohlklingendem Vorwand, aber mit ungerechter
Absicht gekommen sind, können mit Fug und Recht unverrichteter Dinge
heimgeschickt werden."

LXI. « Cependant, à moins d’être privés de sens, c’est en vue d’acquérir ce que l’on n’a pas, et non pour compromettre ce qu’on possède, qu’on doit appeler à soi des alliés et s’exposer aux périls. Ce sont les dissensions, songez-y bien, qui perdent les États, et en particulier la Sicile ; car, pendant que nous sommes divisés, ville contre ville, on conspire contre nous tous ensemble. Convaincus de cette vérité, réconcilions-nous donc, villes et particuliers, et travaillons en commun à sauver la Sicile entière. N’allez pas vous imaginer que les Athéniens ne haïssent chez nous que les Doriens ¹ , et que la race chalcidique ² n’a rien à craindre d’eux, grâce à sa parenté ionique. Ils ne s’inquiètent pas des différences de race, pour réserver leur haine à l’une d’entre elles exclusivement : ils convoitent les richesses de la Sicile, que nous possédons en commun. Ils l’ont bien prouvé dernièrement, quand ils ont été appelés par les peuples d’origine chalcidique : ils n’en avaient jamais reçu aucun secours, en vertu de conventions réciproques ; et ce sont eux, tout au contraire, qui se sont empressés de satisfaire les premiers aux obligations de l’alliance. Que les Athéniens aient cette ambition et qu’ils prennent de loin leurs mesures, je le leur pardonne aisément : je ne blâme pas ceux qui aspirent à la domination, mais bien ceux qui sont trop disposés à s’y soumettre ; car il est dans la nature de l’homme d’opprimer toujours qui lui cède, et de se tenir sur la réserve avec qui lui résiste. Si, sachant cela, nous ne prenons pas de justes précautions, si quelqu’un arrive ici sans être convaincu que la chose la plus urgente est de mettre ordre tous ensemble au danger commun, c’est là un tort grave. Le péril serait bientôt écarté, si nous marchions tous d’accord, car les Athéniens ont leur base d’opérations, non pas chez eux ³ , mais bien chez ceux qui les ont appelés. Dès lors il n’est pas besoin de guerre pour mettre fin à la guerre ; la paix terminera sans secousse nos différends ; et ces hôtes, venus à notre appel, avec des intentions hostiles, sous des apparences honnêtes, auront un prétexte non moins honnête pour s’en aller sans avoir rien fait.

« C’est en vue d’acquérir ce qu’on n’a pas, et non d’exposer ce qu’on possède, qu’il faudrait, si l’on était sage, appeler des auxiliaires et courir les chances des combats. Ne sait-on pas que rien n’est plus mortel que la désunion pour les États en général, et spécialement pour la Sicile, dont toutes lès villes sont divisées, quoique menacées en commun?

« Convaincus de. ces vérités , réconcilions-nous, États comme particuliers, et réunissons nos efforts pour le salut de la Sicile entière. Ne vous figurez pas que les Athéniens n’en veulent chez nous qu’aux Doriens, et que les Chalcidéens. seront protégés par leur affinité avec la branche ionienne ¹ . Ce n’est point par inimitié nationale ni par antipathie de races qu’ils viennent nous attaquer; c’est parce qu’ils convoitent les richesses de la Sicile, notre commun patrimoine. Ils l’ont bien prouvé en dernier lieu, à l’appel de la race chalcidique. Jamais ils n’en avaient reçu le moindre secours en vertu d’un traité ; ce sont eux qui ont saisi avec empressement le prétexte d’une alliance.

« Que les Athéniens aient ces vues ambitieuses, je le conçois sans peine. Je ne blâme pas ceux qui aspirent à la domination, mais bien plutôt ceux qui se résignent à la jsubir. Il est dans la nature de l’homme de fouler ce qui lui cède et de se garer de ce qui le menace. Mais, de notre côté, nous serions impardonnables, si nous ne prenions pas d’utiles précautions, ou si nous ne regardions pas comme notre premier devoir de conjurer le danger qui est suspendu sur nos têtes.

« Il serait bientôt nul ce danger, si nous voulions faire une transaction générale ; car le point d’appui des Athéniens n’est pas chez eux, mais chez les peuples qui les appellent. Dès lors ce n’est pas une guerre qui mettra fin à une autre guerre : mais c’est la paix qui terminera à l’amiable nos différends; et ces perfides auxiliaires, qui se couvrent d’un masque spécieux, s’en retournerout comme ils sont venus, sans avoir rien gagné.

[1] "And yet, if we are prudent, we ought, each of us in behalf of his own state, to call in allies and incur dangers only when we are seeking to win what does not belong to us and not when we imperil what is already ours; and we should remember that faction is the chief cause of ruin to states and indeed to Sicily, seeing that we her inhabitants, although we are all being plotted against, are disunited, each city by itself.

[2] Recognizing these facts, we must be reconciled with each other, citizen with citizen and state with state, and join in a common effort to save all Sicily. And let no one imagine that only the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, because of their kinship with the lonians, are safe.

[3] For it is not through hatred of one of the two races into which we are divided that they will attack us, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we possess in common. They have just made this clear by their response to the appeal which the people of Chalcidic stock made to them; ¹

[4] for to those who have never given them aid according to the terms of their alliance they of their own accord have fulfilled an ally's obligations with a zeal exceeding their compact. That the Athenians entertain these designs of aggrandisement is quite pardonable;

[5] and I have no word of blame for those who wish to rule, but only for those who are too ready to submit; for it is an instinct of man's nature always to rule those who yield, but to guard against those who are ready to attack.

[6] If any of us, knowing how matters really stand, fails to take proper precautions, or if anyone has come here not accounting it of paramount importance that we must all together deal wisely with the common peril, we are making a mistake. The speediest relief from this peril would be gained by our entering into an understanding with one another;

[7] for the base from which the Athenians propose to move is not their own territory, but that of the people who asked them to intervene. And if we follow this course, war will not end in another war, but without trouble quarrels will end quietly in peace, and those who have been invited to intervene, having come with a fair pretext for injustice, will depart home with a fair plea for failure.

[1] "And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city.

[2] Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily: and the thought should be entertained by no one, that though the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connexion.

[3] For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race:

[4] for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact. And very excusable is it that the Athenians should practise this covetousness and forecasting;

[5] and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are too ready to be subject. For human nature is always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not forecast as we ought, and if any one has come here without regarding it as his first care, that all should make a good arrangement for what is a general cause of alarm;

[6] we are mistaken in our views. Most speedily then should we be rid of that alarm by making peace with each other:

[7] for it is not from their own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is not terminated by war, but our quarrels are ended without trouble by peace; and those who have been called in, having come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want of success.

[1] « Atqui, ei sapiuius, oportet unumquemque nostrum potius, ut suis rebus aliena adjungat, quam ut jam paratas laedat, socios accersere et pericula insuper subire, et existimare seditionem maxime perniciosam esse quura singulis civitatibus, tum etiam universae Sicilis, cujus nos in-cois universi insidiis appetimur, et tamen pro singularum civitatum dissensionibus divisi sumus.

[2] Quibus rebus intellectis oportet et privatum cum privato et civitatem cum civitate in gratiam redire, et operam dare, ut omnes simat universam Siciliam servemus, nec in mentem venire cuipiam , eos quidem, qui de nobis sunt Dorienses, Atheniensium hostes esse; Chalcidenses vero, propter cognationem Ionicam, a periculis tutos esse.

[3] Neque enim gentibus propterea, quod ab origine sint divisae, alterius odio moti bellum inierunt, sed cupiditate bonorum Siciliae, quae communiter possidemus.

[4] Hoc autem nunc declararunt in ista Chalcidensium evocatione; illis enim, qui ex foederis societate nullum auxilium iis unquam tulerunt, ipsi potius foederis jus libenter praestiterunt.

[5] Atque Atheniensibus quidem haec affectantibus, et provide perficere conan-tibus multam veniam dandam esse censeo, nec eoe, qur imperium affectant, vitupero, sed eos, qui ad imperata feriendum sunt propensiores; ita enim nati sunt homines, ut semper illos imperio premant, qui cedunt, ab illis vero sibi caveant, qui arma ipsis inferunt.

[6] Nos vero peccamus, quotquot, quum haec habeamus perspecta, non recte prospicimus , neque singuli hoc antiquissimum esse judicamns, ut commune periculum universi recte administremus»

[7] Hoc autem celerrime liberabimur, si compositionem ia ter nos faciamus; Athenienses enim non ex sui agri finibus pro^ fecti nos invadunt, sed ex illorum agro, qui eos accersive-runt

[8] Atque ita non bellum bello, sed pace discordiae nullo negotio sedantur; et qui evocati sunt, et qui specioso, praetextu injusti huc venerunt, jure optimo re infecta abi» buut.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

« Ma se non abbiamo offuscati gli occhi dell’intelletto, dobbiamo invitare alleati ed abbracciar nuovi pericoli , piuttosto per acquistare al nostro stato quel d’altrui che danneggiare il proprio : dobbiamo persuaderci che le sette sono la peste principalissima si delle particolari repubbliche che della Sicilia intera , della quale noi abitatori quantunque tutti insidiati, andiamo città per città parteggiando. Queste considerazioni devono condurre i privati a rappacificarsi coi privati, e le città colle città, a fine di tentar concordemente di salvare tutta quanta la Sicilia. Nessuno si immagini che i soli Dorici tra noi sieno nemici agli Ateniesi, e che i Calcidesi in grazia della consanguinìtà ionica stieno al sicuro : imperciocché non per odio alla diversità del sangue costoro invadono i popoli, ma per bramosia dei beni di Sicilia, che possediamo in co' miiue. E ciò hanno appalesalo all’ invito fatto loro da quei di stirpe calcidica , ai quali, con prontezza maggiore di quel che richiedesse una convenzione, hanno pagato un debito di giustizia come consanguinei, senza esserne stati mai soccorsi secondo l’alleanza. Pur queste soverchierie e premeditazioni degli Ateniesi sono bene da scusarsi ; nè io biasimo quelli che voglion comandare, ma quelli che sono troppo pronti ad obbedire ; avvegnaché sia propio degli uomini comandar sempre a chi cede e guardarsi da chi t’assale. E vanno errati quelli tra noi che convinti di ciò, non antiveggono drittamente , e si presentano all’assemblea senza credere della massima importanza il ben provvedere al timore comune, da cui tostissimamente saremmo liberi solo che ci accordassimo insieme ; perchè gli Ateniesi non si muovono contro noi dal loro paese } ma dal paese di chi gli ha chiamati. Allora non la guerra colla guerra, ma le dissensioni colla pace tranquillamente queteremo : e quanto fu ingiusta , sebben palliata la venuta degli Ateniesi qua invitati, altrettanto sarà ragionevole la loro partenza a man vuote.