Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.30

[1] These things came into his head especially from the loss he received in Aetolia; which in part also happened by occasion of the woods.

[2] But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware.

[3] By this accident, Demosthenes, the better discerning that the Lacedaemonians were more than he had imagined, having before, by victual sent unto them, thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise as a matter deserving the Athenians' utmost care and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had, and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near and put in readiness every other needful thing.

[4] And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also, with those forces which he had required, unto Pylus. When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main war.

[1] The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had not a little to do with these reflections.

[2] Meanwhile, one of the soldiers who were compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning to do so; and as it came on to blow soon afterwards, almost the whole was consumed before they were aware of it. Demosthenes was now able for the first time to see how numerous the

[3] Lacedaemonians really were, having up to this moment been under the impression that they took in provisions for a smaller number; he also saw that the Athenians thought success important and were anxious about it, and that it was now easier to land on the island, and accordingly got ready for the attempt, sent for troops from the allies in the neighborhood, and pushed forward his other preparations.

[4] At this moment Cleon arrived at Pylos with the troops which he had asked for, having sent on word to say that he was coming. The first step taken by the two generals after their meeting was to send a herald to the camp on the mainland, to ask if they were disposed to avoid all risk and to order the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, to be kept in gentle custody until some general convention should be concluded.

Sein Unglück in Aetolien welches zum Theil der
waldigen Gegend zugeschrieben werden konnte, war nicht die geringste
Ursache, daß ihm solche Ueberlegungen kamen. Da nun also seine
Soldaten aus Mangel an Raum genöthigt waren, an den äußersten
Vorsprüngen der Insel zu landen, um sich dort bei ausgestellten
Wachposten die Mahlzeit zu bereiten, zündete Einer ohne Absicht
eine kleine Strecke des Gehölzes an, und als darauf noch ein Wind
dazu kam, so brannte unversehens der größte Theil des Waldes
nieder. Als er nun leicht sah, daß der Lakedämonier eine größere
Zahl dort war, während er früher der Meinung gewesen, daß für eine
geringere Anzahl daselbst Lebensmittel zugeführt würden, so dachte
er jetzt, daß es sich schon der Mühe lohne, wenn die Athener größeren
Eifer zuwendeten, und rüstete sich zum Handstreich auf die Insel, —
die überdieß auch leichter zugänglich geworden war, — indem er
von den Bundesgenossen in der Nähe Truppen an sich zog und sonst
Alles in Bereitschaft setzte.

Kleon, der durch einen vorausgesendeten Boten schon hatte
anzeigen lassen, daß er mit den von ihm geforderten Truppen kommen
werde, langte nun auch in Pylos an. Sogleich nachdem sie sich
vereinigt, schickten sie zuerst einen Herold in das feindliche Lager vom
Festland mit der Aufforderung, ob sie nicht ihrer Mannschaft auf der
Insel befehlen wollten, ihre Waffen und sich selbst ohne weiteren ¹
Kampf zu übergeben; wogegen diese in anständigem Gewahrsam ²
gehalten werden sollten, bis des Weiteren Uebereinkunft getros-g
fen sei.

XXX. Ces réflexions lui étaient surtout suggérées par son désastre d’Étolie, qui avait tenu en partie à une forêt.

Comme on était fort à l’étroit, les soldats athéniens étaient obligés d’aborder aux extrémités de l’île, et de placer des sentinelles pour prendre leurs repas. L’un d’eux mit le feu, par mégarde, à une petite portion de bois ; le vent s’éleva, et l’incendie gagna, avant qu’on s’en fût aperçu, la plus grande partie de la forêt. Démosthènes put mieux distinguer alors les Lacédémoniens, et reconnut qu’ils étaient plus nombreux qu’on ne le supposait ; car, jusque-là, il avait pensé qu’on introduisait des vivres pour moins de monde. Il jugea donc que les Αthéniens devaient s’occuper plus sérieusement d’une affaire de cette importance et, du moment où il vit que l’attaque de l’ile présentait moins de difficultés, il se prépara à y descendre. Il demanda des troupes aux alliés du voisinage, et fit toutes ses dispositions. Cependant Cléon lui avait mandé, par un courrier, qu’il allait venir et lui amener les troupes qu’il avait demandées ; lui-même arriva à Pylos. Une fois réunis, ils envoyèrent d’abord un héraut au camp sur le continent, pour inviter les Péloponnésiens à donner aux guerriers de l’ile le conseil de livrer, sans combat, leurs personnes et leurs armes ; ils promettaient d’ailleurs de traiter les prisonniers avec égards, jusqu’à conclusion d’un arrangement définitif.

Ces craintes lui étaient suggérées par le souvenir de son désastre d’Étolie, occasionné en partie par une forêt. Mais le hasard voulut que, les Athéniens ayant été contraints, par le manque d’espace, d’aborder sur la lisière de l'île pour y pré-parer leur repas sous la garde d’un avant-poste, un soldat, par inadvertance, mît le feu à dee broussailles; l'incendie, attisé par le vent, gagna de proche en proche, et la plus grande partie de la forêt fut consumée. Cet accident permit à Démo-sthène de mieux juger du nombre des ennemis. Il le trouva plus considérable qu’il ne l’avait cru d’après la quantité de vivres qu’on leur faisait passer. Dès lors il pensa que les Athéniens redoubleraient de zèle pour une entreprise qui ne manquait pas de grandeur; enfin il s’assura que l’abord de l'île était moins difficile qu’il ne se l’était figuré; il se disposa donc k effectuer la descente. Il demanda des renforts aux alliés du voisinage et fit tous les autres préparatifs.

Sur ces entrefaites Cléon, après l’avoir averti qu’il approchait avec les troupes demandées, arrive à Pylos. Aussitôt réunis, iis enrôlent un héraut à l’armée du continent pour demander aux Lacédémoniens s’ils veulent ordonner aux guerriers de l’île de se rendre sans combat, eux et leurs armes, à condition que le» Athéniens les tiendront dans une captivité modérée jusqu’à la conclusion d’un armistice définitif.

[1] It was especially owing to his experience in Aetolia, ¹ when his reverse was in some measure due to the forest, that these thoughts occurred to Demosthenes.

[2] But the soldiers were so cramped in their quarters that they were obliged to land on the edge of the island and take their meals under cover of a picket, and one of their number accidentally set fire to a small portion of the forest, and from this, when a breeze had sprung up, most of the forest was burned before they knew it.

[3] Thus it happened that Demosthenes, who could now get a better view of the Lacedaemonians, found that they were more numerous than he had thought; for he had previously suspected that the number for which they were sending provisions was smaller than they stated. ² He also found that the island was less difficult to make a landing upon than he had supposed.

[4] He now, therefore, believing that the object in view was well worth a more serious effort on the part of the Athenians, began preparations for the attempt, summoning troops from the allies in the neighbourhood and getting everything else ready.
  Cleon, meanwhile, having first sent word to Demosthenes that he would soon be there, arrived at Pylos, bringing the army for which he had asked. As soon as they had joined forces, they sent a herald to the enemy's camp on the mainland, giving them the option, if they wished to avoid a conflict, of ordering the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, on condition that they should be held in mild custody until some agreement should be reached about the main question. ³

[1] It was, above all, from his disaster in Aetolia, which in a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these thoughts struck him.

[2] The soldiers, however, having been compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island, and take their dinners, with a guard posted in advance; and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part of the wood, and a wind having afterwards risen, the greater part of it was consumed before they were aware of it.

[3] In this way then observing, on a clearer view, that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous than he had expected—for before this, he imagined that they took in provisions for a smaller number—and now perceiving that the Athenians were more in earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention, and that the island was more easy to land on, he was preparing for the adventure, by sending for troops from the neighbouring allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when Cleon, after previously sending him word that he was coming, arrived at Pylus with the forces he had asked for.

[4] After their meeting, they sent, in the first place, a herald to the camp on the continent, wishing to know whether, without running any risk, they would desire the men in the island to surrender to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being kept in mild custody, till some general agreement were concluded.

[1] Haec autem potissimum ob cladem iEtolicam, quam ex parte propter silvam acceperat, in mentem ei veniebant.

[2] Quum autem milites propter insulae angustias ad extremas ejus oras prandii causa adhibita custodia accedere coacti essent, et quidam silvam paulatim incendisset invitus, posteaque ventus excitatus esset, magna ejus pars hostibus insciis est cremata.

[3] Sic igitur facilius conspicatus Lacedaemonios, et plures esse animadvertens, quum suspicaretur se prius commeatum ad pauciores illuc transmisisse , tone ut ad rem dignam, cui Athenienses majorem diligentiam adhiberent, et in insulam faciliore aditu patefactam , expeditionem parabat, sociales copias ex locis vicinis accersens, et cetera praeparans.

[4] Cleo igitur nuntio ad illum praemisso, per quem illi significaret se venturum, cum copiis, quas petierat, Pylum pervenit. Et quum in unum locum convenissent, ante omnia caduceatorem ad hostium castra in continente posita miserunt, ut illos provocarent, si vellent citra periculum imperare suis militibus in insula interceptis, ut et arma et se ipsos sibi traderent, ea conditione, ut custodia tolerabili servarentur, donec aliquid de rerum summa transactum esset.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

E tali pensieri gli correvano nell’animo a cagione principalmente della sconfitta etolica cagionata in gran parte dalla selva. Ora però , attesa la strettezza dell’ isola, essendo i soldati nemici costretti a pranzare per precauzione quasi sulle coste di essa , ed avendo un tale appiccato il fuoco involontariamente a piccola porzione della selva, era poi sopravvenuto il vento onde gran parte di quella andò inavvertitamente bruciata ; e per questo potè Demostene meglio osservare che i Lacedemoni erano in maggior numero che non credeva ; quando prima sospettava clic per miuor gente s’ introducessero i viveri. Allora convinto che gli Ateniesi vorrebbero usare maggior premura contro un nemico non dispregevole , e vedendo che l' isola offriva più facile sbarco di prima , preparava l’assalto , richiedeva di truppe i vicini alleati, ed apprestava tutte le altre cose. Intanto Cleone che aveva spedito innanzi ad avvisarlo eh’ ei giungerebbe colla soldatesca da lui domandata , arriva a Pilo : e trovatisi amendue insieme spediscono innanzi tratto un araldo al campo nemico in terraferma, confortando a voler ordinare a quei dell’isola , a scanso d’ogni pericolo, di render Tarmi e le persone, a condizione che sarebbero tenuti sotto discreta guardia, finche non si fosse convenuto della somma delle cose.