Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.29

[1] Now when he had dispatched with the assembly and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to sea.

[2] He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion because he heard that he also of himself had a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the isle. For the army, having suffered much by the straitness of the place and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle;

[3] confirmed therein the more for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, they were before [the more] afraid and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come aland. For their errors being in the wood and their preparation could not so well have been discerned, whereas all the faults of their own army should have been in sight, so that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly in what part soever they had pleased, because the onset had been in their own election.

[4] Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedaemonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it, because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another.

[1] After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos , and pushed forward the preparations for his voyage.

[2] His choice fell upon Demosthenes because he heard that he was contemplating a descent on the island; the soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the position, and rather besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the firing of the island had increased the confidence of the general.

[3] He had been at first afraid, because the island having never been inhabited was almost entirely covered with wood and without paths, thinking this to be in the enemy's favour, as he might land with a large force, and yet might suffer loss by an attack from an unseen position. The mistakes and forces of the enemy the wood would in a great measure conceal from him, while every blunder of his own troops would be at once detected, and they would be thus able to fall upon him unexpectedly just where they pleased, the attack being always in their power.

[4] If, on the other hand, he should force them to engage in the thicket, the smaller number who knew the country would, he thought, have the advantage over the larger who were ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off imperceptibly, in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to see where to succor each other.

Als er nun Alles Nöthige in der Volksversammlung
bereinigt und die Athener ihm durch Abstimmung den Seezug
übertragen hatten, gesellte er sich noch einen der Feldherrn bei Pylos,
den Demotshenes, zu und segelte dann schnell ab. Den
Demosthenes hatte er sich aber deßhalb an die Seite genommen, weil er
unterdessen erfahren, daß dieser die Landung aus der Insel schon im
Plan entworfen habe. Seine Soldaten nämlich, in Folge des
Mangels am Platze, und eher selbst belagert, als belagernd, wünschten einen
Handstreich zu wagen. Dazu vermehrte seine Vortheile der Umstand,
daß die Insel in Brand gerieth. Anfangs nämlich, weil die Insel
durchaus bewaldet und als ein von jeher unbewohnter Platz auch
ganz unwegsam war, fürchtete er sich und war der Meinung, daß
diese Umstände eher den Feinden zu Statten kämen; denn diese ^{1 2 3}
könnten einem zahlreichen Landungsheere durch Anfälle aus dem
Hinterhalt großen Schaden thun, weil die Schwächen und die
Rüstung der Feinde deS Waldes wegen ihm selbst nicht so sichtbar seien,
während hingegen alle Fehler seines eigenen Heeres jenen offenkundig
waren, so daß sie dasselbe unvermuthet überfallen könnten, an welchem
Punkte sie nur wollten, denn der Angriff stünde ja bei ihnen. Wenn
er aber hinwieder genöthigt würde, in der dichtverwahcsenen Gegend
handgemein zu werden, so dachte er, sei auch eine Minderzahl,
kundig der Ortsgelegenheit, im Vortheil vor einer unkundigen
Uebermacht, und es könne auch sein eigenes Heer trotz der großen Zahl
aufgerieben werden, ohne daß er es merke, weil keine Umschau
möglich war, an welchen Punkten Hülfe nöthig sei.

XXIX. Cléon prit, dans l’assemblée, toutes ses mesures ; il reçut les suffrages des Athéniens pour cette expédition, se choisit pour collègue Démosthènes, un des généraux qui étaient à Pylos, et pressa son départ. Ce qui l’avait déterminé à s’adjoindre Démosthènes, c’est qu’il avait appris que ce général songeait, de son côté, à faire une descente dans l’île. Car les soldats, fatigués de leur séjour dans un lieu où tout manquait, et plutôt assiégés qu’assiégeants, brûlaient de courir au danger. Un incendie survenu dans l’île avait aussi augmenté la confiance de Démosthènes. Jusque-là il avait hésité parce que l’île, de tout temps inhabitée, était en grande partie boisée et sans chemins frayés ; il croyait cette circonstance favorable aux ennemis. Si une armée nombreuse y descendait, ils pourraient l’attaquer en dérobant leurs mouvements et lui faire beaucoup de mal ; leurs fautes et leurs dispositions seraient bien mieux cachées dans l’épaisseur de la forêt, tandis que, toutes les fautes de l’armée athénienne étant à découvert, l’ennemi, maître de choisir son terrain, pourrait tomber sur elle à l’improviste du côté qu’il voudrait. Il pensait d’ailleurs que, s’il était forcé d’en venir aux mains dans le fourré, des troupes moins nombreuses, mais ayant l’expérience des lieux, auraient l’avantage sur un corps plus cpnsidérable à qui manquerait cette expérience ; que, par suite, son armée pourrait être détruite en grande partie, sans même qu’on s’en aperçût, dans l’impossibilité de découvrir sur quel point on de- vrait mutuellement se porter secours.

Après avoir pris toutes les dispositions dans l’assemblée et reçu à cet effet les suffrages du peuple, Clécn accéléra le départ. De tous les généraux qui étaient à Pylos, il ne s’adjoignit pour collègue que Démosthène. C’est qu’il avait appris que ce général songeait lui même à faire une descente dans l’île. En effet ses soldats, qui souffraient de leur dénûment et qui étaient moins assiégeants qu’assiégés, brûlaient d’en venir à une action décisive. Un incendie survenu dans l’île avait achevé de l’y déterminer. Jusque-là il avait craint de s’engager sur un terrain fourré, désert et sans chemins battus. Cette circonstance lui paraissait favorable aux ennemis, qui pourraient, eu sortaut de leur» retraites obscures, faire beaucoup de mal à une armée descendue à terre. Leurs dispositions et les fautes qu’ils pourraient commettre seraient masquées par l’épaisseur dé la forêt, tandis que celles des Athéniens seraient à découvert. Maître de choisir sou terrain, l’ennemi pourrait, dans un moment donné, tomber sur eux à l’improvisté. Si les Athéniens s’efforçaient d’en venir aux mains dans le fourré, il sentait que des troupes moins nombreuses, mais connaissant les localités, auraient nécessairement l’avantage sur des forces plus considérables, auxquelles cette expérience manquerait; en sorte que sa grande armée courrait le risque de périr en détail, sans que les différents corps pussent se prêter un mutuel appui.

[1] When he had arranged everything in the assembly and the Athenians had voted in favour of his expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and made haste to set sail.

[2] He selected Demosthenes because he had heard that he was planning to make his landing on the island. For his soldiers, who were suffering because of the discomforts of their position, where they were rather besieged than besiegers, were eager to run all risks. And Demosthenes himself had also been emboldened by a conflagration which had swept the island.

[3] For hitherto, since the island was for the most part covered with woods and had no roads, having never been inhabited, he had been afraid to land, thinking that the terrain was rather in the enemy's favour; for they could attack from an unseen position and inflict damage upon a large army after it had landed. To his own troops, indeed, the mistakes and the preparations of the enemy would not be equally clear by reason of the woods, whereas all their own mistakes would be manifest to their opponents, and so they could fall upon them unexpectedly wherever they wished, since the power of attack would rest with them.

[4] If, on the other hand, he should force his way into the thicket and there close with the enemy, the smaller force which was acquainted with the ground would, he thought, be stronger than the larger number who were unacquainted with it; and his own army, though large, would be destroyed piece-meal before he knew it, because there was no possible way of seeing the points at which the detachments should assist one another.

[1] When he had thus arranged every thing in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, having associated with himself one of the generals at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, he prepared to set sail as quickly as possible.

[2] He chose Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he was himself meditating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were eager to run all risks. The firing of the island had moreover given him confidence.

[3] For formerly, in consequence of its being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its having always been uninhabited, he was afraid, and considered this to be rather in favour of the enemy; as when he landed with a large force, they might attack him from an unseen position, and so do him damage. For, owing to the forest, their mistakes and amount of forces would not be so distinctly seen by him, while all the blunders of his troops would be visible to them; so that they might fall on him unexpectedly at whatever point they pleased, it being always in their power to make the attack.

[4] And if, again, he should force them to an engagement in the forest, he thought the smaller number, with knowledge of the country, would have an advantage over the larger without that knowledge; and that their own army, great as it was, might imperceptibly be cut off, while they could not see in which direction to assist each other.

[1] Quum autem res omnes ad expeditionem necessarias in concione peregisset, et Athenienses expeditionem ei decrevissent, ipseque ex ducibus, qui ad Pylum erant» unum Demosthenem sibi collegam adjunxisset, e vestigio discessit.

[2] Demosthenem autem ideo collegam sibi adjunxit, quod audiret eum in animo habere, exscensnm ex navibus in insulam facere. Milites enim loci inopia graviter pressi, et obsessi potius quam obsidentes, ad periclitandam belli fortunam animis erant propensi.

[3] Praeterea ei ipsa insula incendium passa vires addidit Nam quum prius esset magna ex parte silvosa et invia, propter perpetuam solitudinem, eam formidabat, atque hoc pro hostibus magis facere putabat; nam in magnas copias ex navibus m terram egressas illos ex locis abditis irruptionem faciendo multa detrimenta inferre posse. Nam sibi quidem illorum errata et apparatum propter silvam non perinde perspicua fore; suarum vero copiarum omnia peccata hostibus manifesta fore; quamobrem illos ex improviso, quacunque vellent, impressionem in se facturos; penes illos enim hostem invadendi arbitrium futurum.

[4] Rursus si manus in locis densis per vim conserere contenderet,filios, qui essent pauciores, sed locorum periti, longe meliore conditione rem gesturos arbitrabatur, quam illos, qui numero superiores essent, sed locorum imperiti; praeterea suum exercitura , qui numerosus erat, clam profligatum iri, erepta suis facultate prospiciendi, qua parte alii aliis mutuam opem ferre possent.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

Spedito egli il tutto nell’adunanza, ed eletto dagli Ateniesi a quell’ impresa, parti prontamente, dopo avere scelto per suo collega Demostene, uno dei comandanti a Pilo , perchè aveva udito che desso meditava lo sbarco nell’ isola, al vedere che i soldati trovandosi male per la miseria del luogo , e piuttosto assediati che assediatili , anelavano di cimentarsi. Senza di che confermava Demostene in questa sua intenzione l' incendio accaduto nell’isola , la quale essendo quasi tutta boscosa e senza vie , perchè di continuo disabitata , lo metteva in timore , e parevagli che ciò fosse in vantaggio dei nemici ; essendoché se vi sbarcasse con molte genti, assalendolo essi da qualche luogo occulto , lo batterebbero. Infatti gli sbagli e le disposizioni di essi, atteso il bosco , non sarebbero a lui egualmente palesi, laddove gli sbagli del proprio esercito sarebbero tutti visibili j cosicché verrebbe inaspettatamente assalito ove più piacesse al nemico , in mano del quale stava l' assalire. D’altronde s’ ei forzasse il folto del luogo per venire alle prese, stimava che i meno, ma pratichi del posto, vincerebbero i più non pratichi, e che il suo esercito quantunque numeroso andrebbe senza accorgersene rifinito , mancando del prospetto necessario per soccorrersi scambievolmente.