Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.46

[1] "We must not, therefore, relying on the security of capital punishment, decree the worst against them nor make them desperate, as if there were no place to repent and, as soon as they can, to cancel their offence. For observe:

[2] if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now compound whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the present and our tribute for the time to come. But the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did and endure the siege to the very last if to compound late and soon be all one?

[3] And how can it be but detriment to us to be at charge of long sieges through their obstinacy and, when we have taken a city to find it exhausted and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And this revenue is the only strength we have against our enemies.

[4] We are not then to be exact judges in the punition of offenders but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our confederate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws but by the providence of our own actions.

[5] But we to the contrary, when we recover a city which, having been free and held under our obedience by force hath revolted justly, think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them.

[6] Whereas we ought rather not mightily to punish a free city revolted but mightily to look to it before it revolt and to prevent the intention of it, but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can.

[1] We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error.

[2] Consider a moment! At present, if a city that has already revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. In the other case, what city think you would not prepare better than is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all one whether it surrender late or soon?

[3] And how can it be otherwise than hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege, because surrender is out of the question; and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our real strength against the enemy?

[4] We must not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our dependencies; and we must make up our minds to look for our protection not to legal terrors but to careful administration.

[5] At present we do exactly the opposite. When a free community, held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it severely;

[6] although the right course with freemen is not to chastise them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them before they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the insurrection suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as possible.

„Wir dürfen also nicht im Vertrauen darauf, daß die
Todesstrafe jede Bürgschaft gewähre, einen nachtheiligen Entschluß
fassen, noch auch den Abtrünnigen jede Hoffnung benehmen, daß es eine
Möglichkeit gibt, von ihrem Fehl wieder umzukehren und ihn in
möglichst kurzer Frist wieder vergessen zu machen. Ueberlegt doch, daß bei ¹
solchem Verfahren eine abtrünnige Stadt, wenn sie die Aussicht auf
Erfolg geshcwunden sieht, gewiß zu einem Vergleiche bereit sein wird,
so lange sie noch im Stande ist, die Kriegskosten zu erstatten und
sonst ihre Steuern zu zahlen. Welche Stadt aber, glaubt ihr wohl,
werde sich bei jenem andern Verfahren nicht noch viel stärker rüsten
als sonst und eine Belagerung bis zum Aeußersten aushalten, wenn
es für sie ganz dieselben Folgen hat, ob sie sich vorher oder nachher
ergibt? Wie aber soll für uns kein Schaden daraus erwachsen, wenn
wir die Kosten einer langen Belagerung tragen müssen, weil wir
jede Aussöhnung zurückweisen, und wenn wir im Fall der Einnahme
eine zerstörte Stadt in die Hände bekommen und für die Zukunft ihrer
Steuerzahlungen verlustig sind? Und auf diesen beruht doch unsere
Kraft gegenüber dem Feinde! Wir dürfen also nicht uns selbst den
größern Schaden zufügen, indem wir als Richter über die Verbrecher
die Sache zu genau nehmen, sondern vielmehr darans sehen, daß wir
bei mäßiger Ahndung für die Zukunft in der Lage bleiben, Städte
unter uns zu haben, die zahlen können, und müssen uns selbst nicht
mit der Strenge der Gesetze, sondern durch Sorgfalt unserer
Vorkehrungen Sicherheit zu schaffen suchen. Thun wir aber davon nicht das
Gegentheil, wenn wir einen sonst freien und mit Gewalt bezwungenen
Staat, der einem natürlichen Zuge folgend durch Abfall seine
Unabhängigkeit herzustellen strebt, wieder unterworfen haben und dann
meinen, wir müßten ihn streng bestrafen? Freie Männer muß man nicht,
wenn sie abgefallen sind, scharf züchtigen, sondern bevor sie noch
abfallen , muß man scharfes Augenmerk haben und seine
Vorsichtsmaßregeln ergreisen, daß sie nicht einmal auf den Gedanken kommen; hat
man sie aber wieder einmal durch Waffen zum Gehorsam bringen
müssen, so soll man sie die Schuld so wenig als möglich empfinden
lassen."

XLVI. « Il ne faut donc pas, par trop de confiance dans l’efficacité de la peine de mort, prendre une résolution funeste ; il ne faut pas fermer toute espérance aux villes révoltées, en déclarant qu’il n’y a plus de place pour le repentir, et qu’un prompt retour ne saurait expier leur crime. Songez que, dans l’état actuel, lorsqu’une ville rebelle se reconnaît dans l’impossibilité de vaincre, elle vient à composition lorsqu’elle est encore en état de payer les frais de la guerre et d’acquitter le tribut à l’avenir. Mais, avec une pareille politique, croyez-vous qu’il y ait une seule ville qui ne fasse de plus sérieux préparatifs et qui ne soutienne le siège jusqu’à la dernière extrémité, s’il n’y a aucune différence entre une prompte soumission et une résistance opiniâtre ? N’y aura-t-il pas alors dommage pour nous-mêmes à prolonger nos dépenses devant une place assiégée, tout accord étant désormais impossible ; à ne la prendre que ruinée, si nous nous en emparons, et à nous priver pour l’avenir des tributs que nous devions en attendre, tributs qui sont notre force contre nos ennemis ? Ne compromettons donc pas nos propres intérêts en jugeant les coupables d’après les principes d’une justice rigoureuse ; considérons plutôt comment nous pourrons, en ne punissant qu’avec une prudente modération, laisser aux villes assez de ressources pour nous fournir à l’avenir d’abondants tributs. N’espérons pas les maintenir par la rigueur des lois, mais par une active vigilance. Nous faisons actuellement le contraire : si un peuple libre, qui ne reste sous notre domination que par la force, a tenté, comme cela est naturel, de recouvrer son indépendance, lorsqu’il retombe sous notre joug nous croyons devoir le punir avec rigueur. Le mieux, avec des hommes libres, n’est pas de châtier sévèrement ceux qui se soulèvent, mais de les surveiller sévèrement avant leur défection, de prévenir chez eux même la pensée de la révolte, et, après les avoir subjugués, d’étendre le moins possible l’accusation.

« Il ne faut donc pas, par trop de confiance en l'efficacité de la peine de mort, prendre une résolution fâcheuse, en ôtant aux insurgés toute idée de repentir et d’une prompte réparation de leur faute. Réfléchissez que, dans l’état actuel des choses, lorsqu’une ville révoltée se voit dans l’impossibilité de résister, elle capitule pendant qu’elle est encore à même de rembourser les frais de la guerre et de payer le tribut pour l’avenir ; mais, dans l'autre hypothèse, croyez-vous qu’il y en eût une seule qui ne fit les plus grands préparatifs et ne se défendît jusqu’à la dernière extrémité, s’il ne devait y avoir aucune différence entre une prompte soumission et une résistance désespérée ? Et comment ne serait-ce pas un dommage pour nous de faire à grands frais le siège d’une place déterminée à ne pas se rendre, ou, si nous la prenons, de la trouver ruinée et de perdre pour toujours les subsides qu’elle nous fournissait? Ce sont pourtant ces tributs qui soutiennent notre puissance.

« Gardons-nous donc de nous nuire à nous-mêmes en frappant les coupables avec la dernière sévérité. Cherchons plutôt, par des punitions mitigées, à laisser aux villes des ressources pécuniaires suffisantes. Plaçons notre sûreté, non dans la rigidité de nos lois, mais dans la vigilance'de nos actes. Aujourd'hui nous faisons l’inverse. Si un peuple libre, assujetti à notre empire, essaye — comme c'est naturel — de s’y soustraire, et que nous parvenions à le réduire, nous nous croyons obligés de le punir sévèrement. Ce qu’il faudrait, ce n’est pas de châtier avec rigueur des hommes libres qui se révoltent, mais de les garder avec rigueur avant leur rébellion, afin de leur en ôter jusqu’à la pensée, ou, après les avoir soumis, de n’imputer leur crime qu’au petit nombre.

[1] "We must not, therefore, so pin our faith to the penalty of death as a guarantee against revolt as to make the wrong decision, or lead our rebellious subjects to believe that there will be no chance for them to repent and in the briefest time possible put an end to their error.

[2] Consider now: according to your present policy ¹ if a city has revolted and then realizes that it will fail, it may come to terms while still able to pay the indemnity and to keep up its tribute in the future; but, in the other case, what city, think you, will not prepare itself more thoroughly than now, and hold out in siege to the last extremity, if it makes no difference whether it capitulates quickly or at its leisure?

[3] And as for us, how can we fail to suffer loss, incurring the expense of besieging a city because it will not surrender, and, if—we capture it, recovering one that is ruined, and losing thereafter the revenue from it— the source of our strength against our enemies?

[4] We must not, therefore, be such rigorous judges of the delinquents as to suffer harm ourselves, but we must rather see how for the time to come, by punishing moderately, we may have at our service dependent cities that are strong in material resources; and we must deem it proper to protect ourselves against revolts, not by the terror of our laws, but rather by the vigilance of our administration. At present we do just the opposite:

[5] whenever a free people that is forced into subjection revolts, as it naturally will, in order to recover its independence, we think that, as soon as we have subdued it, we must punish it severely.

[6] We ought, on the contrary, instead of rigorously chastising free peoples when they revolt, to watch them rigorously before they revolt, and thus forestall their even thinking of such a thing; and when we have subdued a revolt, we ought to put the blame on as few as possible. ²

[1] "We must not, then, either take bad counsel through trusting to the punishment of death as a thing to be relied on, or leave to those who have revolted no hope of being allowed to change their minds, and wipe out their offence in as short a time as possible.

[2] For consider that at present, if any city, even after revolting, find that it will not succeed, it would come to terms while it has still means of refunding the expenses, and of paying tribute in future. But in the other case, which of then, think you, would not make better preparations for the attempt than they do now, and hold out against its besiegers to the utmost, if it is all one whether it surrender slowly or quickly?

[3] And how can it fail to be injurious for us to be put to expense by sitting down before it, because it will not surrender; and if we take the city, to recover it in a ruined condition, and be deprived of the revenue from it in future?

[4] For our strength against the enemy lies in this. So then we must not hurt ourselves, by being strict judges of the offenders, but rather see how, by punishing them moderately, we may be able in future to avail ourselves of the cities with unimpaired mean the score of money; and we must resolve to derive our protection not from severity of laws, but from attention to deeds. The very contrary of which we do at present;

[5] and we have subdued any power that was [once] free, and, when harshly governed, naturally revolted for its independence, we fancy that we are bound to avenge ourselves with severity.

[6] But in dealing wit freemen, we must not punish them rigorously when revolt, but watch them rigorously before they revolt and prevent their even coming to the thought of it; and when we have mastery of them, we should attach the guilt to as few as possible.

[1] « Quare non oportet nos neque mortis poena, lan-quam locuplete fidejussore fretos, minus recte de Mytilenaeis statuere, neque omnem spem tollere illis, qui defecerint, fore, ut eorum poenitentiae aliquis locus detur, et tempore quam brevissimo peccatum ipsis, eluere liceat.

[2] Considerate enim, quod sic quidem, si qua civitas, quae defectionem fecerit, intelligat, sibi rem non successuram, veniet ad compositionem, dum adhuc habet, unde impensas restituere et tributum in posterum persolvere possit; at illo modo quam tandem fore putatis, quae non melius, quam nunc illa, se instruat, et diuturnam obsidionem ad extremum usque perlatura sit, si idem valet, sero et cito compositionem facere ?

[3] Et nobis quomodo detrimento non erit, quando propter sublatam compositionis facienda; spem in longam obsidionem sumptus facere cogimur, et, si urbem capiamus, profligatam recipimus, et vectigalibus, quae ex ea percipimus, in posterum privamur? Atqui hac ipsa re adversus hostes valemus.

[4] Quapropter nobis non est committendum, ut eo, quod illorum, qui deliquerunt, judices sumus severi, detrimentum potius capiamus, quam videndum, quonam modo moderata punitione civitatibus validis a pecuniarum quidem vi in posterum uti possimus, neque existimandum legum atrocitate custodiam eorum agendam esse, sed actionum nostrarum accurata sobrietate.

[5] Cujus rei nunccontra-rium facientes, si quem liberum hominem et invitum alterius imperio parentem, qui ideo, ut par est, ad libertatem defecerit, subegerimus, eum atrocibus suppliciis afficiendum censemus.

[6] Atqui liberos homines non quum deficiunt, acriter punire oportet, sed antequam defecerint, eos diligenter custodire, et antevertere, ut ne in cogitationem quidem hujus rei veniant, et, si eos in nostram potestatem redegerimus, delicti culpam quam paucissimis tribuere.

[1] Und nun, da ich als Festredner nach bestem Wissen dem Gesetze genügt, und die Veranstaltungen zur Ehre der Bestatteten theils schon beendigt, theils die alsbaldige Uebemahme der Erziehung ihrer Söhne bis zum Mannesalter vom Staate freigebig beschlossen ist — und solche Aufopferung jetzt und in Zukunft nicht ungelohnt zu lassen, ist er sich schuldig; denn je grösser der Ehrenpreis, der den Tapfern erwartet, desto mehr zuverlässige Männer hat der Staat —

« Non dobbiamo adunque, fidandoci alla pena di morte come a sicuro mallevadore , prendere una cattiva risoluzione ; nè mettere ili disperanza i ribelli, come se non vi sia per esser luogo a pentimento che quasi in sulT istante cancelli il loro fallo. Perocché osservate che, nel caso mio, una città anche ribellata, se conosca di non poter prevalere, verrà a’ patti in istato tuttora da rifarci le spese, e da pagare il tributo all’avvenire : ma nell’altro caso, qual città pensate voi che non volesse rinforzare i suoi presenti apparecchi, e durar sino all’ultimo nell’assedio , ove importi lo stesso il presto o tardi comporsi ? E come non sarebbe egli allora nostro danno (attesa l’impossibilità d’accordarsi ) lo spendere rimanendo all9 assedio, conseguire deserta quella città che espugnassimo , e cosi rimaner privi della rendita che in seguito ci sarebbe pervenuta , e dove consiste il nerbo delle nostre forze contro i nemici ? Cosicché non dobbiamo esser giudici esatti dei delinquenti a danno nostro , più presto che vedere come, castigandoli moderatamente, possiamo in avvenire servirci di quelle città potenti per copia di denaro ; e però brigarci di tenerle guardate non colla severità delle leggi, ma colla soprawegghianza delle loro azioni. Noi però adopriamo tutto il contrario ; avvegnaché , se soggioghiamo un popolo libero e dominato per forza, il quale siasi ribellato per ricuperare (come è naturale) la propria independenza, reputiamo che convenga punirlo atrocemente : mentre vuoisi non severamente punire gente libera quando siasi già ribellata , ma severamente guardarla innanzi che si ribelli, ^prevenirla, in modo che ciò non per le venga in pensiero ; e ridotta ohe l’abbiamo in poter nostro, imputarglielo a colpa il men possibile.