Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 3.43

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„Wir machen es umgekehrt, ja noch schlimmer. Auch
wenn wir überzeugt sind, daß einer recht hat, aber den Ver
dacht hegen, daß er bestochen sei, so lassen wir ihn zum offen
baren Schaden der Stadt im Stich, weil wir ihm den dann
doch bloß vermuteten Gewinn nicht gönnen. Es ist nun einmal
bei uns nicht anders; das Gute, gradeheraus gesagt, ist der
Verdächtigung nicht minder ausgesetzt als das Schlechte, und
wie der ärgste Bösewicht die Leute durch falsche Vorspiege
lungen ködern muß, so ist auch der ehrliche Mann genötigt,
ihnen Wind vorzumachen, wenn sie ihm glauben sollen. Nur
hier in Athen bei unserer Überklugheit ist es unmöglich, dem
Staate offen und ehrlich zu dienen. Denn wer offen etwas
für ihn tut, wird gleich verdächtigt, im geheimen sein Schäfchen
dabei geschoren zu haben. Bei alledem müßt ihr anerkennen,
daß wir Redner, wo es sich um die wichtigsten Dinge handelt,
doch weiter sehen als ihr in eurer Kurzsichtigkeit, zumal wir
für unsere Anträge vor Gericht verantwortlich sind, ihr aber
als Zuhörer unverantwortlich seid. Wäre die Sache für den,
der den Antrag annimmt, ebenso gefährlich wie für den Redner,
der ihn stellt, so würdet ihr nicht so in den Tag hinein be
schließen. Jetzt aber laßt ihr in irgendeinem augenblicklichen
Ärger allein den Antragsteller dafür büßen, wenn ihr euch
verhauen habt, während alle anderen frei ausgehen, so viele
ihrer auch mitgesündigt haben.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 3.43.1 focus

[1] ‘ὧν ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, καὶ προσέτι ἤν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὐ βεβαίου δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερὰν ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα.

[2] καθέστηκε δὲ τἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τόν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι.

[3] μόνην τε πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοίας εὖ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μὴ ἐξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον· ὁ γὰρ διδοὺς φανερῶς τι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποπτεύεται ἀφανῶς πῃ πλέον ἕξειν.

[4] χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι’ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν.

[5] εἰ γὰρ ὅ τε πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπισπόμενος ὁμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο, σωφρονέστερον ἂν ἐκρίνετε· νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἥντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιοῦτε καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον.

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 3.43.1 focus

[1] "But we do here the contrary; and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth.

[2] And our custom is to hold good counsel given suddenly no less suspect then bad, by which means as he that gives the most dangerous counsel must get the same received by fraud, so also he that gives the most sound advice is forced by lying to get himself believed.

[3] So that the commonwealth is it alone which, by reason of these suspicious imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain and open way without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular.

[4] We, therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst these jealousies do give our advice have need to foresee further than you that look not far, and the rather because we stand accountable for our counsel, and you are to render no account of your hearing it.

[5] For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges. But now, according to the passion that takes you when at any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in fault as well as his.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 3.43.1 focus

[1] This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit.

[2] Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed.

[3] The city and the city only, owing to these refinements, can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in return.

[4] Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little further than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so.

[5] For if those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have led you, upon the single person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 3.43 focus

„Von dem aber thun wir das Gegentheil; ja sogar noch
mehr: wenn Einer im Verdacht steht, durch Geld bestochen gleichwohl
das Beste zu rathen, so lassen wir aus Neid wegen dieses Geldgewinns,
von dem doch nur eine unsichere Vermuthung besteht, den offenbaren
Vortheil des Staates dahinsahren. Es ist nun einmal so: das Gute
ohne Umschweife gerade heraus gesagt wird nicht weniger verdächtigt,
als das Schlechte; die Folge davon ist: wie der schlimmste Rathgeber
die Menge durch Betrügereien gewinnen muß, ebenso muß der,
welcher zum Besseren räth, sich erst durch Flunkern Vertrauen gewinnen.
Und so ist es denn bei uns, in Folge der Ueberklugheit, unmöglich,
dem Staate durch grades Vorgehen und ohne Schliche einen Nutzen
zu erweisen. Denn wer offenkundig dem Staate Gutes thut, dem
wird mit dem Verdachte gelohnt, daß er im Geheimen irgendwie
einen noch größeren Gewinn dabei in Aussicht habe. Gleichwohl
müssen wir, trotz diesen Zuständen, wo es sich um die höchsten Dinge
handelt, in dem, was wir reden, weiter sehen, als ihr Kurzsichtigen,
zumal wir für unsere Vorschläge verantwortlich sind, ihr aber als
Zuhörer unverantwortlich. Wenn der Ueberredende und der Zustim- ¹²
mende gleicher Gefahr ausgesetzt wären, so möchtet ihr in eurem
Urtheil wohl bedächtiger sein. So aber straft ihr in eurer Hitze beim
ersten besten Mißlingen einzig und allein die eine Abstimmung dessen,
der euch überredet hat, und nicht eure eigenen, wenn sie auch in großer
Zahl mitgesündigt haben."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 3.43 focus

XLIII. « Nous faisons ici tout le contraire : bien plus, sur le simple soupçon qu’un orateur est guidé par quelque intérêt, fussions-nous d’ailleurs persuadés qu’il donne les meilleurs conseils, jaloux des profits problématiques que nous supposons qu’il peut faire, nous frustrons par cela seul l’État d’avantages incontestables. Les choses en sont à ce point que les bons conseils, présentés sans détours, ne sont pas moins suspects que les mauvais ; si bien que si, d’un côté, celui qui veut faire adopter les mesures les plus funestes doit se concilier le peuple en le trompant, de l’autre, celui qui ouvre un avis utile est également obligé à mentir pour trouver créance. Grâce à tous ces raffinements, notre république est la seule qu’on ne puisse servir ouvertement et sans’la tromper. Si l’on donne franchement un conseil utile, on est soupçonné d’en attendre quelque profit secret. Aussi, en présence de pareilles dispositions, sommes-nous obligés, quand nous portons la parole dans les questions les plus graves, de voir plus loin que vous, qui ne savez guère réfléchir mûrement ; d’autant mieux que nous sommes responsables des conseils que nous vous donnons, et que nous nous adressons à des auditeurs irresponsables. Si, du moins, celui qui ouvre un avis et celui qui s’y range avaient le même danger à courir, vos jugements seraient plus réfléchis. Mais, loin de là, s’il vous survient quelque échec, cédant au premier mouvement de colère, vous faites payer au conseiller seul la peine d’une opinion que vous avez partagée, d’une faute qui a été celle de la majorité.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 3.43 focus

« Nous faisons précisément le contraire. Ce n’est pas tout : pour peu qu’un orateur soit soupçonné de vues intéressées, quelle que soit l’excellence de ses conseils, nous nous méfions de sa vénalité prétendue et nous privons ainsi l’État d’avantages réels. Les choses en sont venues au point que les meilleures idées, émises sans détour, ne sont pas moins suspectes que les pires. D’où il résulte que, non-seulement l’auteur de la plus dangereuse proposition est obligé de recourir à l’artifice pour convaincre la multitude, mais l’avis le plus utile a besoin du mensonge pour se faire accepter. Avec cette humeur ombrageuse, notre ville est la seule qu’on ne puisse servir ouvertement et sans la tromper. Faites franchement une offre profitable, et aussitôt l’on vous supçonne de rechercher secrètement quelque bénéfice personnel et plus grand.

« En présence de telles dispositions et lorsqu’il y va de nos intérêts les plus graves, il nous importe à nous autres orateurs de voir un peu plus loin que vous, qui ne donnez qu’un court espace de temps à l’examen des affaires ; car nous sommes responsables de nos avis et vous ne l’êtes pas de vos votes ¹. Si du moins l’auteur d’un projet et celui qui l’adopte avaient les mêmes risques à courir, vos jugements seraient plus équitables; mais non: si l’affaire tourne mal, vous sévissez contre celui qui vous a persuadés et qui n’avait que sa propre opinion, et vous n’avez garde de vous en prendre à vous-mêmes, bien que votre faute ait été celle du grand nombre.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 3.43.1 focus

[1] But we pursue the opposite course, and, moreover, if a man be even suspected of corruption, albeit he give the best counsel, we conceive a grudge against him because of the dubious surmise that he is corrupt and thus deprive the state of an indubitable advantage.

[2] And it has come to such a pass that good advice frankly given is regarded with just as much suspicion as the bad, and that, in consequence, a speaker who wants to carry the most dangerous measures must resort to deceit in order to win the people to his views, precisely as the man whose proposals are good must lie in order to be believed.

[3] And because of this excessive cleverness Athens is the only state where a man cannot do a good service to his country openly and without deceiving it; for whenever he openly offers you something good you requite him by suspecting that in some way he will secretly profit by it.

[4] Yet even so, in view of the very great interests at stake, and in so grave a matter, we who advise must regard it as our duty to look somewhat further ahead than you who give matters only a brief consideration, especially since we are responsible advisers,¹ while you are irresponsible listeners.

[5] Indeed, if not only those who gave advice but also those who followed it had to suffer alike, you would show greater prudence in your decisions; but as it is, whenever you meet with a reverse you give way to your first impulse and punish your adviser for his single error of judgment instead of yourselves, the multitude who shared in the error.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 3.43.1 focus

[1] "But we do the contrary of this; and moreover, if any one be suspected of speaking with a view to his own advantage, though at the same time what is best, through grudging him the gain of which we have but an uncertain idea, we deprive the state of its certain benefit.

[2] And thus good advice, given in a straightforward manner, has come to be no less suspected than bad; so that it is equally necessary for one who wishes to carry the most dreadful measures to win over the multitude by trickery, and for one who speaks on the better side to gain credit by falsehood.

[3] And the state alone it is impossible, owing to these over-wise notions, to serve in an open manner and without deceiving it; for he who openly confers any good upon it is suspected of getting secretly, in some way or other, an advantage in return.

[4] Now on subjects of the greatest importance, and with such an estimate of our conduct, we [orators] ought to speak with more extensive forethought than you who take but an off-hand view of measures; especially as we ¹ are responsible for the advice we give, whereas you are irresponsible for listening to it.

[5] For if he who offered counsel, and he who followed it, suffered alike, you would judge more prudently. But as it is, through whatever passion you may at any time have met with disasters, you punish the single judgment of the man who persuaded you, and not your own, for having so numerously joined in the blunder.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 3.43.1 focus

[1] « Quorum nos contraria facimus, et praeterea, si quis in suspicionem venerit, eum lucri quidem causa, sed tamen optime dicere, invidentes ei propter incertam lucri suspicionem, manifestam utilitatem reipublicae eripimus.

[2] Solet autem usu venire, ut bonae sententiae, quae recto animo dicuntur, non minus sint suspectae, quam malae, adeo ut oporteat pariter tam illum, qui reipublicae pessimum consilium est daturus, fraude multitudinem capere, quam illum, qui optima suadet, mendacio suam causam probare.

[3] Et solam rempublicam propter hujusmodi suspiciones nemo aperte nulla fraude adhibita beneficiis allicere potest; qui enim aperte beneficium dat, eum suspicio est occulte majus lucrum capturum.

[4] Oportet autem, ubi commoda maxima aguntur, et in tali re hoc nos a nobis exigere, ut aliquanto longius prospicientes verba faciamus, quam vos, quibus breve tantum spatium ad cogitandum datur, prae* sertim quum nobis suasionis nostrae ratio reddenda sit, non autem vobis auditionis vestrae.

[5] Nam si et ille, qui aliquid persuasit, et ille, qui ei obsecutus est, aeque mul-ctarentur, profecto prudentius judicaretis; nunc vero ad quemlibet animi motum, quo repente fueritis abrepti, si quando forte in rebus judicandis lapsi estis, illius, qui, persuaserit, unam sententiam, nec vestras ipsorum plectitis , quamvis multae sint, quae simul peccarint.

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 2.43.1 focus

[1] So sind sie würdig des Vaterlandes als Helden gefallen. Uns aber lasset, ob wir auch um einen unblutigeren Ausgang flehen, doch von derselben mannhaften Gesinnung vor dem Feind erfunden werden und nicht nur müssig reden hören von ihrer Nützlichkeit, von der ihr ohne viel Worte und ohne Aufzählung aller Vortheile einer nachdrücklichen Verteidigung schon selbst überzeugt seid, sondern unverdrossen handeln lasst uns für das Vaterland, um seine Grösse zu begreifen und für sie zu erwarmen. Und wenn ihr Bewunderung für sie fühlt, vergesset nicht, dass Männer von Muth, Umsicht und kriegerischem Ehrgefühl es waren, die sie begründet, die wenn ihnen auch zuweilen ein Unternehmen mislang, sich geschämt, desshalb dem Vaterlande ihre Dienste zu entziehen, sondern mit Freuden ihm das beneidenswertheste Opfer dargebracht haben.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 3.43 focus

« Ma noi adoperiamo tutto all’opposto : anzi, di più, se v’è alcuno che, quantunque avuto in sospetto di venale, dia ottimi consigli alla Repubblica, noi non pertanto per quel mal fondato sospetto lo prendiamo in avversione , e defraudiamo la Repubblica dei più evidenti vantaggi. E però s'é ridotto in usanza che i buoni consigli non artatamente proposti sono avuti a sospetto non meno dei perniciosi : di che è costretto ad adoprar la frode chi voglia per cattivarsi il popolo persuadere le più funeste stranezze # non meno che di ricorrere all’ artifizio , per acquistar credenza , chi fa le più utili proposizioni. Frattanto con tali circonspezioui questa è la sola città ove sia impossibile far del bene alla scoperta, senza premettere T iuganno. Se vi lia chi oifra palesemente uu bene, ne e ricambiato col sospetto, quasi che egli abbia qualche segreto vantaggio. Nonostante però tale opinione che si ha di noi oratori, trattandosi di altari del più gran rilievo , conviene che noi ve ne parliamo , prevedendo più lontano di voi che a breve distanza risguardate ; tanto più che i nostri consigli vanno soggetti a rendimento di conti, mentre voi non temete sindacato del modo onde ci ascoltate. Che se il consigliatore e quello che gli va dietro fossero sottoposti alla medesima pena -, voi andreste più ritenuti nei vostri giudizi : laddove ora, se per capriccioso talento vi venga fatto di commettere qualche sbaglio, dannate sola la mente di chi vi consigliò, non le vostre, sebbene in gran numero concorse nell’errore.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 3 (Thucydides, Book III. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

καὶ ὑποπτεύηται —‘if a mere suspicion that a man is speaking for gain, and is offering the best advice in spite of it.’ We cannot render ‘ though he offers the best advice, he does so for gain,’ as is commonly done, for the μέν-clause must be our though (cf. Jebb on Soph. OC. 1536 ). But there is no need to supply δοκῇ from ὑποπτεύηται to suit the δέ-clause if we notice that μὲν . . δέ is inserted merely for the sake of a verbal antithesis, and that the sense is simply κέρδους ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν.

φθονήσαντες . . κερδῶν —‘feeling jealous of the uncertain impression of his gains,’ i.e. jealous of his supposed gains. That his advice is helpful is ex hypothesi certain.

τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα —the same constr. c. 58, 1.

καθέστηκε δέ —‘it has come to this, that.’

ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος is opposed to ἀπάτῃ below.

τὰ δεινότατα . . πεῖσαι —‘to get the most atrocious proposals adopted.’

μόνην τε πόλιν —‘so we are the only state which it is impossible to benefit openly, without recourse to deception.’ It is disputed whether μόνην πόλιν means (1) ‘a state alone,’ as distinct from the individual citizens, or (2) ‘(ours) is the only state which,’ as pred. to ἡμᾶς supplied. The latter is surely right, for (1) Athens is contrasted with ἡ σώφρων πόλις in c. 42, 5, and this contrast is kept up through c. 43, 1, and (2) there is no suggestion in the context that the state is more suspicious than the individual.

διὰ τὰς περινοίας —‘excessive shrewdness,’ by which it thinks it detects self-interest in the honest speaker. The word only here.

ἀνθ‐υποπτεύεται —‘is in return suspected.’

χρὴ δὲ . . σκοπούντων —‘but in dealing with the most important interests and in such a case as this it ought to be assumed that we speakers take a somewhat wider forecast than you whose view is circumscribed,’ i.e. whose judgment is formed in a short debate

τι with περαιτέρω, as in μᾶλλόν τι. ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε : its possible meanings are ‘at such a time,’ and ‘in such a case.’

ὑπεύθυνον —a speaker was liable to the γραφὴ παρανόμων.

πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον . . ἀκρόασιν —‘as opposed to your attention to it, which is irresponsible.’

σωφρονέστερον ἂν ἐκρίνετε —‘you would be more circumspect (cf. c. 42, 5) in your decisions’ ( II. 40, 2).

πρὸς ὀργὴν ἥντιν’ ἂν τύχητε —‘in the anger of the moment.’ Grammatieally ζημιοῦντες is supplied to τύχητε, and πρός, according to a common idiom, is repeated to ἥντινα; but no doubt the speaker would not be conscious of such ellipse. ἥντινα without ἄν is according to epic idiom; but it is very probable that ἥντιν’ ἂν is the true reading. (No other emendation is to be thought of: ἤν τι ἀτυχῆτε is impossible, if only because ἀτυχεῖν in this context means ‘to fail in a request’ Nor must σφαλέντες be supplied to τύχητε: for this would mean that punishment is inflieted in the same mood as that in which the error was committed. But that is not the point.)

εἰ = ὅτι .

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.43

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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