Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.42

[1] "I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the Mytilenaeans to be again debated nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, haste and anger, whereof the one is ever accompanied with madness and the other with want of judgment.

[2] And whosoever maintaineth that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is not wise or doth it upon some private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that future and not apparent things may be demonstrated otherwise than by words; interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calumniation. But they of all others are most intolerable that when men give public advice will accuse them also of bribery.

[3] For if they charged a man with no more but ignorance when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place, he is still suspected; and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool but also void of honesty.

[4] The commonwealth gets no good by such courses for through fear hereof it will want counsellors. And the state would do their business for the most part well if this kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking, for they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors.

[5] For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him but rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of speech. And a wise state ought not either to add unto, or, on the other side, to derogate from, the honour of him that giveth good advice, nor yet punish, nay, nor disgrace, the man whose counsel they receive not.

[6] And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice deliver anything against his own conscience, out of ambition of further honour and to please the auditory, nor he that doth not, covet thereupon by gratifying the people some way or other that he also may endear them.

[1] ‘I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind.

[2] As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent of action, the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested: senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain future through any other medium; interested if wishing to carry a disgraceful measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny.

[3] What is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue.

[4] The city is no gainer by such a system, since fear deprives it of its advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to make such assertions, it would be better for the country if they could not speak at all, as we should then make fewer blunders.

[5] The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and far from punishing an unlucky counsellor will not even regard him as disgraced.

[6] In this way successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions for popularity, in the hope of still higher honors, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the multitude.

„Gegen die, welche die Sache der Mytilenäer zu einer
zweiten Abstimmung gebracht haben, kann ich ebensowenig einen
Tadel finden, wie Lob für die, welche es rügen, daß über so
außerordentlich wichtige Dinge mehrmals berathschlagt werde. Vielmehr muß
ich glauben, daß Eile und leidenshcaftliche Stimmung die größten
Feinde eines klugen Beschlusses seien; denn die eine pflegt aus
Unverstand, die andere aus Ungezogenheit und Kurzsichtigkeit zu
entstehen. Und wer gar dafür einsteht, daß die Rede nicht die Lehrerin
des Handelns sei, der besitzt entweder keine Vernunft, oder er hat
irgend einen eigennützigen Hintergedanken. Unvernünftig ist er, wenn
er sich einbildet, auf irgend eine andere Weise über das belehren zu
können, was noch in der Zukunft und im Dunkel liegt. Seinem
Eigennutz aber dient er, wenn er im Bewußtsein der Absicht, zu
Schmählichem überreden zu wollen, sich nicht zutraut, über Unschönes
schön reden zu können, und dafür nun durch dick aufgetragene
Verleumdung die Gegner auf der Rednerbühne und die Zuhörer zu
verwirren sucht. Die Gefährlichsten aber nun sind die, welche auch
noch die Beschuldigung hinzufügen, als ob die Andern durch Geld
bestochen schöne Reden hielten. Denn wenn sie nur die Anklage des
Unverstandes erheben möchten, so würde Einer, wenn er mit seiner
Ansicht nicht durchdringt, zwar den Ruf der Unverständigkeit, aber
doch nicht den der Ungerechtigkeit davontragen. Wird ihm aber Un- ^{1 2}
ehrlichkeit vorgeworfen, so wird er auch, wenn er seine Ansicht durch­ ³
setzt, verdächtig, nnd setzt er sie nicht durch, so scheint er unverständig'
und unehrlich zugleich. Mit dergleichen wird aber dem Staat schlecht
gedient, denn die Furcht beraubt ihn seiner Rathgeber. Aber sehr
wohl würde er sich befinden, wenn er solche Bürger von der
Rednerbühne ausschließen möchte, denn dann wäre die mindeste Gefahr
vorhanden, sich zu Schlechtem verleiten zu lassen. Der gute Bürger muß
sich nicht durch Abschrecken seiner Gegner als den besseren Redner
zeigen wollen, sondern dadurch, daß er sie sich selbst gleichstellt. Auch
soll ein Staat, in dem es vernünftig hergeht, demjenigen, der die
meisten guten Rathschläge gibt, deßhalb zwar nichts an Ehre zulegen, ihm
jedoch auch nicht die Ehre kürzen, und den, der mit seiner Meinung
nicht durchdringt, soll er nicht nur nicht strafen, sondern nicht einmal
seine Ehre antasten. Dann würde, wer Erfolg hat, gewiß nicht, um
größerer Auszeichnung gewürdigt zu werden, manches auch gegen
bessere Einsicht und nach Gunst reden, und wer durchgefallen ist, würde
ebenso wenig, um derselben Ehre theilhaftig zu werden, die Menge zu
gewinnen streben."

XLII. « Je ne saurais ni blâmer ceux qui ont proposé une nouvelle délibération au sujet des Mytiléniens, ni approuver ceux qui trouvent mauvais qu’on revienne plusieurs fois sur les affaires les plus importantes. Loin de là, je crois que les deux choses les plus contraires à une saine délibération sont la précipitation et la co- lère ¹ , l’une provient, en général, du manque de sens, l’autre de l’ignorance et de l’irréflexion. Celui qui soutient que les discours n’éclairent pas les faits est ou dépourvu de raison, ou guidé par quelque intérêt personnel : dépourvu de raison s’il se figure qu’il est quelque autre moyen de répandre la lumière sur l’a- venir et les questions obscures, guidé par l’intérêt, si, voulant conseiller quelque mesure honteuse et sentant son impuissance à bien dire sur ce qui n’est pas bien, il espère, par d’habiles calomnies, effrayer ses adversaires et ses auditeurs. Mais ceux-là sont les pires de tous qui se font de l’imputation de vénalité un argument contre l’opinion émise par un autre. S’ils se contentaient de l’accuser d’ignorance, l’orateur qui aurait eu le dessous pourrait emporter la réputation d’un homme sans talent ; sa probité, du moins, ne serait pas en cause ; mais, quand on ajoute l’accusation d’improbité, il devient suspect, même s’il gagne sa cause ; et, s’il la perd, il passe tout à la fois pour malhabile et malhonnête.

« La république n’a rien à gagner à ces manoeuvres ; car la crainte éloigne d’elle les conseillers honnêtes. Tout n’en irait que mieux si de telles gens ne savaient manier la parole ; car ils entraîneraient l’état à bien moins de fautes. Un bon citoyen doit, au lieu d’effrayer son adversaire, combattre loyalement, à armes égales, et ne se montrer supérieur à lui que par l’éloquence. Dans une sage république, sans combler de nouveaux honneurs celui qui donne le plus de conseils utiles, on doit du moins ne rien retrancher de ceux dont il jouit ; et, loin qu’aucune peine y soit infligée à l’orateur malheureux, sa considération même doit être à l’abri de toute atteinte. De cette manière, celui qui a déjà réussi ne parlera pas contre son sentiment et ne flattera pas le peuple en vue de nouveaux succès ; celui qui a échoué ne songera pas non plus à recourir aux mêmes moyens de flatterie pour se concilier la multitude.

« Ce n’est pas moi qui me plaindrai de ce qu’on a remis en discussion l’affaire des Mytiléniens, ou qui désapprouverai jamais qu’on délibère plus d’une fois sur des causes majeures. Deux défauts me paraissent surtout contraires à la sagesse des délibérations, savoir la précipitation et la colère. L’une provient de légèreté, l’autre d’entêtement et d’ignorance.

« Quant à celui qui soutient que le langage n’est pas l’interprète des faits, il faut qu’il soit ou aveugle ou intéressé: aveugle, s’il croit qu’il existe un autre moyen de jeter du jour sur les questions obscures; intéressé, si voulant proposer quelque turpitude et désespérant d’appuyer par de bonnes raisons une mauvaise cause, il cherche par d’adroites calomnies à intimider ses adversaires et ses auditeurs. Mais la pire espèce est celle des gens qui accusent leurs antagonistes de trafiquer de l’art de la parole. S’ils se bornaient à les taxer d'ineptie, la défaite ferait perdre la réputation d’habileté, non celle de probité; mais, devant le reproche de corruption, l’on a beau triompher, le soupçon reste ; et, si l’on succombe, on paraît à la fois dénué de talent et de vertu.

« Tout cela ne fait pas le compte de la république ; car la crainte la prive de ses conseillers. Les choses iraient bien mieux pour elle, si de tels citoyens étaient de moins habiles orateurs; ils ne l’entraîneraient pas dans tant de fautes. Le bon citoyen n’use pas d’intimidation envers ses adversaires; il lutte contre eux à armes égales et ne doit son triomphe qu’à la supériorité de ses avis. De son côté, une sage république, sans refuser au meilleur conseiller les honneurs qu’il mérite, ne devrait pas les exagérer. Loin d’infliger une peine à l’orateur qui succombe, elle devrait ne lui témoigner aucune défaveur. De cette façon, le vainqueur se laisserait moins aller, parle désir de nouvelles distinctions, à parler contre son sentiment et pour plaire à la multitude, comme aussi le vaincu n’aurait pas recours à la flatterie pour regagner la popularité.

[1] "I have no fault to find with those who have proposed a reconsideration of the question of the Mytilenaeans, nor do I commend those who object to repeated deliberation on matters of the greatest moment; on the contrary, I believe the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion, of which the one is wont to keep company with folly, the other with an undisciplined and shallow mind.

[2] As for words, whoever contends ¹ that they are not to be guides of our actions is either dull of wit or has some private interest at stake—dull, if he thinks it possible by any other means to throw light on that which still belongs to the dim and distant future; self-interested, if, wishing to put through a discreditable measure, he realizes that while he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he can at least slander well and thus intimidate both his opponents and his hearers. Most dangerous of all, however, are precisely those who ² charge a speaker beforehand with being bribed to make a display of rhetoric.

[3] For if they merely imputed ignorance, the speaker who failed to carry his audience might go his way with the repute of being dull but not dishonest; when, however, the charge is dishonesty, the speaker who succeeds becomes an object of suspicion, whereas if he fails he is regarded as not only dull but dishonest as well.

[4] And all this is a detriment to the state, which is thus robbed of its counsellors through fear. Indeed it would prosper most if its citizens of this stamp had no eloquence at all, for then the people would be least likely to blunder through their influence.

[5] But the good citizen ought to show himself a better speaker, not by trying to browbeat those who will oppose him, but by fair argument; and while the wise city should not indeed confer fresh honours upon the man whose advice is most often salutary, it certainly should not detract from those which he already has, and as for him whose suggestion does not meet with approval, so far from punishing him, it should not even treat him with disrespect.

[6] For then it would be least likely that a successful speaker, with a view to being counted worthy of still greater honours, would speak insincerely and for the purpose of winning favour and that the unsuccessful speaker would employ the same means, by courting favour in his turn in an effort to win the multitude to himself.

[1] "I neither blame those who have a second time proposed the discussion of the case of the Mytilenaeans, nor commend those who object to repeated deliberation on the most important subjects; but I think that the two things most opposed to good counsel are hasten and passion one of which is generally the companion of folly, and the other of coarseness and narrowness of mind.

[2] And whoever contends that words are not to be the exponents of measures, is either wanting in understanding, or self-interested: wanting in understanding if he thinks it possible to express himself many other way on what is future and not certain; self-interested, if, when wishing to persuade to something base, he thinks that he could not speak to his credit on a discreditable subject, but that by clever calumniation he might confound both his opponents and audience. But most cruel of all are those who charge us besides with a display [of rhetoric] for pecuniary motives.

[3] For if the only imputed ignorance, he who failed in carrying his point would retire with a character for want of understanding, rather than of honesty: but when a charge of dishonesty is brought against him, if successful, he is suspected; and if unsuccessful, together with his inability, le is also thought dishonest.

[4] And the state is not benefited by such a system; for through fear it is deprived of its counsellors. Most prosperous indeed would it be, if such of its citizens were incapable of speaking; for then they would be less often persuaded to do wrong.

[5] But the good citizen ought to show himself the better speaker not by terrifying his opponent, but by meeting him on equal terms; and the state that acts wisely should not, indeed, confer honour on the man who most frequently gives good advice, but neither should it detract from what he enjoys already; and so far from punishing him who is wrong in his judgment, it should not even degrade him.

[6] For so the successful counsellor would be least tempted to speak any thing contrary to his real opinion, in order to gratify his nearers; and the unsuccessful one would be least anxious by the same means of gratification to bring over the multitude to his side also.

[1] « Neque illos, qui de Mytilenaeis iterum ad consilium retulerunt, reprehendo, neque illos, qui maximis de rebus saepius consultari vetant, laudo, sed credo Irae duo bonae consultationi maxime contraria esse, celeritatem et iram, quorum alterum quidem cum amentia conjunctum esse solet, alterum vero cum imperitia et consilii tenuitate.

[2] Et qui orationem rerum agendarum magistram esse contentiose negat, aut amens est, aut privatim aliquid ipsius interest; amens quidem, si olla alia ratione res futuras et non manifestas declarari posse putat; interest vero ipsius, si cupiens aliquid turpe persuadere, pulchre quidem dicere posse de eo, quod est turpe, non putet, posse vero pulchre calumniatum perterrefacere ot eos, qui contra dicturi, et eos qui audituri sunt.

[3] Illi vero sunt molestissimi, qui ultro etiam ob pecuniam criminantur aliquam ostentandi ingenii orationem exhiberi. Si enim imperitiam objicerent, is, qui rem persuadere non potuisset, imperitus potius quam injustus habitus discederet; sed si injustitia objiciatur, et si causam obtinuit, est suspectus, et si id non perfecit, non solum imperitus, sed etiam injustus existimatur.

[4] Et respublica ex hqjusmodi re nullum sane emolumentum capit; consultoribus enim propter metum destituitur. Atque praeclare cum ea ageretur, si tales cives privatos dicendi facultate haberet; minime enim ad peccandum reliqui impellerentur.

[5] Atqui oportet bonum civem non eum se praebere, qui terreat adversarios contra ipsum dicturos, sed qui aequo certamine melius di-eat, sapientem vero civitatem oportet et ei, qui in rebus plurimis bene consulit, non quidem addere novum honorem, sed nec eum, quem jam habet, imminuere, et eum, qui opinione falsus est, non solum nulla pcena, sed ne ignominia quidem afficere.

[6] Ita enim et is, qui in dicendis sententiis praestat, minime adducatur majorum etiam honorum causa praeter sententiam aliquid et ad gratiam dicere, et qui rectum consilium dare non potuit, eadem opera minime studeat eo ut et ipse aliquid gratificetur, multitudinem sjbi conciliare.

[1] Darum eben habe ich auch bei dem Preise des Vaterlandes verweilt, um den Beweis zu führen, dass es ein höheres Gut ist, wofür wir kämpfen, als die, welche keinen dieser Vorzüge in gleichem Grade besitzen, und damit das Verdienst der Männer, denen ich hier die Grabrede halte, durch Thatsachen ins Licht zu setzen.

« Non io qua vengo per accusar quelli che hanno proposto di nuovamente deliberare intorno ai Mitilenei, nè per lodar quelli i quali biasimano che più volte si discuta intorno ad oggetti rilevantissimi : ma stimo che due cose sieno contrarissime ad un retto giudizio, la prestezza e la collera. Quella suol andar di pari colla stoltezza ; questa con immoderata loquacità e pochezza di riflessione : e chiunque contende non essere i discorsi gli insegnatori degli affari, o delira o vi ha qualche suo privato interesse. Delira, se crede esser possibile in altro modo che colle parole diciferare l’avvenire e ciò che è oscuro : vi ha interesse , se volendo persuadere qualche cosa di turpe , crede di non poter parlare bellamente su ciò che onesto non è, ma bensì di atterrire con bei rabbuffi chi sia per contrariarlo , e l’udienza intera. Coloro poi che per ostentare la propria eloquenza accusano anche di vii guadagno chi monta la ringhiera, sono i più perniciosi ed i più tristi i essendoché, se accusassero solo di incapacità, l’accusato, non prevalendo, partirebbe notato di poca accortezza, piuttosto che di malignità : ma aggiungendòvisi la taccia di nequitoso, se riesce a persuadere, resta sempre sospetto; se non riesce, se ne va colla nota di dappocaggine e di malvagità. La Repubblica intanto nulla profitta in mezzo ai maneggi di costoro, per timore dei quali resta elisi priva di utili consiglieri \ dove se avesse tali cittadini sforniti di eloquenza, dirizzerebbe a buon fine la maggior parte degli affari, avvegnaché il popolo ben di rado sarebbe indotto in errore. Or siccome deve un buon cittadino, non coll’ intimorire chi sia per contradirlo, ma col tenersi entro ai termini della perfetta egualità, mostrare la miglioranza de’suoi ragionamenti ; cosi è richiesto ad una saggia repubblica non aggiugnere nuovi onori a chi generalmente la consigli bene, ma neanche diminuirglieli : e non che punire l’oratore la cui sentenza non prevalga , non deve pure abbassarne la reputazione. Cosi l'oratore che vince non parlerà, per verun modo, cose che egli stesso non approva , col fine di crescere il suo stato e cattar benevolenza ; e colui che non ottiene il vanto, non si studierà di conciliarsi anch’ esso l’animo della moltitudine, col compiacerla di qualche cosa.