Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 1.75

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„Hätten wir mit unserer damaligen Opferwilligkeit und Klug
heit nicht verdient, Lakedämonier, der Herrschaft wegen, die wir
nun mal haben, in Griechenland nicht so scheel angesehen zu
werden? Wir haben sie doch nicht mit Gewalt erworben, sondern
weil ihr nicht mehr mitwolltet, als es galt, den Persern vollends
den Rest zu geben, kamen uns die Bundesgenossen freiwillig
mit der Bitte, den Oberbefehl zu übernehmen. Erst die Verhält
nisse selbst haben uns dann später genötigt, das daraus zu machen,
was inzwischen daraus geworden ist; hauptsächlich war es unsere
eigene Sicherheit, dann unsere Ehre und schließlich auch unser
Vorteil, waS unS dazu nötigte. Die meisten haßten uns, einige
waren schon abgefallen und erst mit Gewalt wieder unterworfen,
und auch eure Freundschaft zu unS war nicht mehr die alte,
sondern durch Mißtrauen und Verstimmung getrübt, so daß es
höchst bedenklich für uns gewesen wäre, locker zu lassen und
dadurch neue Gefahren heraufzubeshcwören; denn sie würden
alle zu euch übergegangen sein. Kann man es doch keinem
verdenken, wenn er angesichts solcher Gefahren auf seine Sicher
heit Bedacht nimmt.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 1.75.1 focus

[1] ‘ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι;

[2] καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι·

[3] ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας.

[4] καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ’ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο.

[5] πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 1.75.1 focus

[1] "Therefore, men of Lacedaemon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians, for our courage at that time and for our prudence and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo.

[2] Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord.

[3] So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is out of the nature of the thing itself, as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit.

[4] For when we had the envy of many and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger. For the revolts from us would all have been made to you.

[5] Now it is no fault for men in danger to order their affairs to the best.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 1.75.1 focus

[1] Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire.

[2] That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command.

[3] And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in.

[4] And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you.

[5] And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 1.75 focus

„Verdienten es also, ihr Lakedämonier, unsere Hingebung
und unsere einsichtigen Anschläge nicht, daß die Herrschaft, welche wir
jetzt besitzen, für die Hellenen kein Gegenstand solchen Neides wäre?
Wir haben sie ja nicht mit Gewalt an uns gerissen, sondern sie nur
übernommen, da ihr, was gegen den Barbaren noch zu thun übrig ¹
blieb, nicht zu Ende führen wolltet, und weil die Bundesgenossen uns
von freien Stücken angingen und baten, die Anführung zu
übernehmen. Weiterhin sind wir aber durch die Umstände selbst gezwungen
worden, diese erst überkommene Macht auf den jetzigen Stand zu
bringen, vornehmlich aus Besorgniß um unsere eigene Sicherheit, dann
auch, um unsere Ehre zu wahren, und endlich, weil es unser Vortheil
erheischte. Denn da wir den Meisten verhaßt, Einige auch schon von
uns abgefallen und mit Gewalt zur Unterwerfung gebracht waren, so
schien es nicht mehr mit unserer Sicherheit verträglich, durch Aufgeben
der Herrschaft über sie uns neue Gefahren zu erwecken '), da auch
ihr gegen uns nicht mehr gleich freundliche Gesinnung trüget, sondern
bereits Mißtrauen und Zwist zwischen uns getreten war; denn es
wären dann Alle euch zugefallen. Es sollte aber gegen Niemanden
Neid erwecken, wenn er im Angesicht der größten Gefahren seinen
Vortheil zu sichern sucht."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 1.75 focus

LXXV. « Nous avons mérité, ô Lacédémoniens, par notre dévouement à cette époque, par la sagesse de nos vues, de ne pas rencontrer chez les Grecs cette violente jalousie contre notre domination actuelle. Car ce n'est point la violence qui nous l’a donnée ; quand vous avez refusé de demeurer avec les alliés pour combattre les restes de l’armée barbare, eux-mêmes sont venus à nous, en nous priant de nous mettre à leur tête. La nature même des choses nous a forcés à porter notre domination au point où elle est parvenue ; nous y étions engagés d’abord par la crainte, ensuite par la gloire, enfin par l’intérêt. Nous ne voyions plus de sécurité, nous voyions un danger réel à nous en départir, alors que la plupart des alliés nous haïssaient, quand plusieurs déjà s’étaient soulevés et avaient du être réduits, quand chez vous-mêmes l’amitié avait fait place au soupçon et à l'hostilité. Car c’est dans vos bras que se seraient jetés les rebelles ; et on ne peut blâmer personne de bien assurer ses intérêts en prévision des plus graves périls.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 1.75 focus

« Après tant de preuves de dévouement et d’intelligence, est-il juste que l’empire que nous possédons excite ace point la jalousie des Grecs? Nous l’avons acquis cet empire, non par violence, mais parce que les alliés, lorsque vous refusâtes d’achever la guerre contre les Barbares, nous déférèrent le commandement. Nous avons été contraints dès l’abord et par la nature des choses de donner à cet empire son extension actuelle ; en cela nous avons écouté la crainte, l’honneur et l'intérêt. En bntte à la haine générale, forcés de réprimer des défections, voyant votre vieille amitié faire place à la suspicion et à la malveillance, nous avons jugé périlleux de nous relâcher sur nos droits et de permettre aux défectionnaires de passer de votre côté. Or nul ne peut trouver materais qu'en présence des plus grands dangers on prenne soin de ses intérêts.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 1.75.1 focus

[1] "Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account of the empire we possess ?

[2] And indeed we did not acquire this empire by force, but only after you had refused to continue to oppose what was left of the barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to assume the leadership.

[3] It was under the compulsion of circumstances that we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well;

[4] and after we had once incurred the hatred of most of our allies, and several of them had already revolted and been reduced to subjection, and when you were no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone over to you.

[5] And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of the gravest dangers.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 1.75.1 focus

[1] "Do we not then deserve, Lacedaemonians, both for our zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie under such excessive odium with the Greeks, at least for the empire we possess?

[2] For this very empire we gained, not by acting with violence, but through your having been unwilling to stand by them to finish the business with the barbarian, and through the allies having come to us, and of their own accord begged us to become their leaders:

[3] and from this very fact we were compelled at first to advance it to its present height, principally from motives of fear, then of honour also, and afterwards of advantage too.

[4] And it no longer appeared to be safe, when we were hated by the generality, and when some who had already revolted had been subdued, and you were no longer friends with us, as you had been, but suspicious of us, and at variance with us, to run the risk of giving it up; for those who revolted would have gone over to you. ¹

[5] And all may without odium secure their own interests with regard to the greatest perils. ²

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 1.75.1 focus

[1] « Dignine igitur sumus, Lacedaemonii, et propter animi alacritatem, quam tunc demonstravimus, et consilii. prudentiam, qui imperii nomine, quod obtinemus, Graecis haud adeo vehementer invisi simus ?

[2] Namque hoc ipsum accepimus non per vim, sed quia et vos ad persequendas reliquias belli contra barbarum gerendi remanere nolueratis, et quia socii ad nos accesserunt et nos ipsi orarunt, ut duces esse vellemus.

[3] Itaque coacti sumus ipsa re imperium in hunc statum primum perducere, praecipue quidem prae metu, deinde vero, honoris etiam causa, postremo etiam utilitatis gratia.

[4] Nec amplius tutum nobis esse videbatur, quum plerisque invisi essemus atque etiam nonnullos, qui defecerant, jam subegissemus, vosque nobis non amplius aeque essetis amici, sed suspiciosi et adversi, imperio deposito periclitari; nam qui a nobis defecissent, vobis se adjunxissent.

[5] Nec ulli mortalium est invide ndum, si in maximis periculis constitutus suis rationibus prospi-ciat, quam optime potest.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 1.75 focus

« È egli dunque cosa giusta , o Lacedemoni, che la prontezza di animo e la saviezza di consiglio allora dimostrata , ci rendano sì smodatamente segno alla invidia dei Greci, anche per l' impero che abbiamo ? Nè già noi l' ottenemmo per forza, ma da che, avendo voi ricusato di rimanere a combattere gli avanzi del barbaro, gli alleati ricorsero a noi, e di per sè stessi ci pregarono ad essere capitani. La natura stessa della cosa poi ci obbligò fino da principio a promuovere questo impero al punto presente, primieramente per timore-, poscia per onore, in ultimo per vantaggio. Ed essendo oramai avuti in odio da molti, avendo sottomessi alcuni che già ci si erano ribellati, e vedendo voi non già come prima amici nostri, ma sospettosi e discordevoli ; non più ci pareva sicuro consiglio rallentare il vigore di quello con nostro pericolo , conciofossechè a voi si accosterebbero quelli che da noi si rifilassero. Or niuno deve biasimare chi cinto da gravissimi pericoli si adopra a ben disporre i propri affari.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.75

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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