Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.74

[1] "Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things of most advantage, namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two-thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait whereby he clearly saved the whole business and whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you.

[2] And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods, and even in that estate not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them, and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner.

[3] So that we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited and to the end you might still keep them so, and when you were afraid not of our danger but your own. Whereas we, coming from a city no more being, and putting ourselves into danger for a city hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in part and ourselves.

[4] But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted, or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.

[1] Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz. the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of your receiving him with honors such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor.

[2] While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us.

[3] We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours.

[4] But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably attained.

„Dieser Verlauf der Ereignisse zeigt aber deutlich, daß die
Rettung für Hellas in der Flotte lag, und dabei sind wir selbst mit
den drei wichtigsten Dingen eingestanden: mit der größten Zahl der
Schiffe, dem einsichtigsten Feldherrn und mit der entschlossensten
Hingebung. Denn von den vierhundert Schiffen ' haben wir nicht ^{1 2}
viel weniger als zwei Drittel gestellt, und den ThemistokleS als
Anführer, der am meisten daraufdrang, daß die Seeschlacht in der
Meerenge ^bei Salamis^ geliefert werde, was eben den glücklichen
AuSgang herbeigeführt hat. Auch habt ja ihr selbst von allen Fremden,
die je zu euch kamen, ihn am meisten geehrt Aber wir haben
auch die entschlossenste Aufopferung gezeigt. Denn da uns zu Lande
Niemand zu Hilfe kam, weil alle bis auf euch schon unterworfen
waren, so haben wir nicht angestanden, unsere Stadt zu verlassen und
unsern Besitz dem Verderben preiszugeben, um die gemeinsame Sache
der Bundesgenossen nicht im Stich zu lassen; und um durch unsere
Zerstreuung nicht nutzlos zu werden, haben wir uns aus die See
gewagt, ohne auf euch erzürnt zu sein, daß ihr uns nicht rechtzeitig zu
Hilft gekommen wäret. Wir behaupten daher, euch nicht weniger
genützt zu haben, als ihr uns. Denn ihr zogt damals aus euren
bewohnten Städten aus, und zwar eben nur, um auch ferner noch darin
wohnen zu können, weil ihr euretwegen, weniger unsertwegen besorgt
wäret. Denn so lange Athen noch unbeschädigt stand, wäret ihr nicht
zu sehen. Wir aber sind aus einer Stadt ausgezogen, die nicht mehr
war, und haben den Kampf gewagt um sie, obgleich ihre
Wiedergewinnung nur auf schwacher Hoffnung beruhte, und doch haben wir,
wie uns selbst, so zum Theil auch Euch mit gerettet. Wären wir aber
aus Furcht um unser Land zu den Persern übergetreten, wie die
Andern, oder hätten wir uns später verloren gegeben und nicht mehr
gewagt die Schiffe zu besteigen, so konntet ihr euren Seekampf nur
bleiben lassen, denn ihr hattet ja zu wenig Schiffe, und der Barbar
hätte dann in aller Bequemlichkeit die Dinge nach Wunsch
durchgeführt."

LXXIV. « Dans ce grand événement, qui montra clairement que le salut des Grecs reposait sur leurs vaisseaux, nous avons mis au service de la Grèce les trois principaux éléments du succès, la flotte la plus nom- breuse, un général d’une rare habileté, un zèle infatigable. Sur les trois cents vaisseaux ¹ nous en avons fourni presque les deux tiers ; le commandant était Thémistocle, à qui l’on doit surtout d’avoir combattu dans un détroit, circonstance qui évidemment sauva la Grèce : aussi lui avez-vous fait l’accueil le plus magnifique que jamais ait reçu étranger venu parmi vous ² . Quant au zèle et à l’audace, nous en avons donné la preuve la plus éclatante : nous ne recevions aucun se- cours par terre ; nous voyions les autres peuples déjà asservis jusqu’à nos frontiers ; et c’est alors que, fidèles jusqu’au bout aux intérêts des alliés qui restaient, nous nous sommes décidés à laisser notre ville et à sacrifier tout ce qui nous appartenait ! Au lieu de nous disperser, ce qui nous eût rendus inutiles aux antres, nous sommes montés sur nos vaisseaux pour aller au devant du péril, sans nous irriter de ce que vos secours nous avaient précédemment fait défaut. Aussi pouvonsnous dire qu’en fait de services nous ne vous avons pas donné moins que nous n’avons reçu : vous, en effet, vous ne laissiez point vos villes désertes ; quand vous avez envoyé des secours, c’était dans le but de garantir vos foyers pour l’avenir, alors que vous craigniez tout autant pour vous-mêmes que pour nous ; car quand notre ville était encore debout, vous notes pas accourus. Nous, au contraire, nous laissions derrière nous une patrie qui déjà n’était plus ; l’espoir de la patrie à venir était peu de chose alors ; et cependant, affrontant le danger, nous avons contribué à vous sauver en nous sauvant nous-mêmes. Si, au contraire, craignant comme tant d'autres pour notre pays, nous avions commencé par nous soumettre au Mède ; si, plus tard, nous croyant perdus, nous n’avions eu l’audace de monter sur nos vaisseaux, vous n’auriez pu utilement combattre sur mer, faute d’une flotte suffisante, et l’ennemi eût pai- siblement atteint le but qu’il se proposait.

« En cet événement qui montra d’une manière éclatante que le salut des Grecs était dans leurs navires, nous mîmes pour notre part au service de la Grèce les trois principaux éléments de succès : les vaisseaux les plus nombreux, le général le plus habile et un zèle à toute épreuve. Sur quatre cents vaisseaux, nous en fournîmes à peu près les deux tiers ¹ ; notre général fut ce Thémistocle, qui obtint qu’on livrerait bataille dans un détroit, et qui par là évidemment sauva la patrie commune : aussi lui avez-vous décerné plus d’honneurs qu’à aucun des étrangers qui sont venus jamais à Lacédémone ² ; enfin notre zèle fut poussé jusqu’aux dernières limites. Quand nous vîmes que, par terre, nul ne venait à notre aide, et que les autres peuples jusqu’à nos frontières étaient asservis, nous abandonnâmes notre ville, nous détruisîmes nos propriétés; et, ne voulant pas même alors trahir les alliés qui nous restaient encore, ou par notre dispersion leur devenir inutiles, nous montâmes sur nos vaisseaux pour affronter l’orage, sans vous garder rancune de votre tiédeur à nous secourir. Aussi pouvons-nous affirmer que nous ne fîmes pas moins pour vous que pour nous-mêmes. Quant à vous, c’est en laissant vos villes habitées, c’est pour en coqperver la possession, qu’alarmés sur votre salut bien plus que sur le nôtre, vous vous mîtes en campagne : car tant qu’Athènes fut debout, rien ne vint de votre côté ; tandis que nous, c’est en partant d’une ville qui n’existait plus, c’est en bravant le péril avec une bien faible espérance de la reconquérir, que nous aidâmes à vous sauver en nous sauvant nous-mêmes. Si au contraire, craignant comme tant d’autres pour notre pays, nous nous étions d’abord soumis aux Mèdes, ou que plus tard, nous considérant comme perdus, nous n’eussions pas eu le courage de nous embarquer, l’insuffisance de votre marine vous eût empêchés de livrer une bataille navale, et le Barbare fût arrivé sans obstacle à ses fins.

[1] "Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. Of the four hundred ¹ ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds. The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation; and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you. ²

[2] And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received;

[3] for whereas the population of the cities from which you brought aid was still undisturbed and you could hope to possess them in the future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather than for us—at any rate you did not come near so long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, setting forth from a city that was no more, ³ and risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving both you and ourselves.

[4] But if we had acted as others did, and through fear of losing our territory had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on our ships, in the conviction that we were already ruined, it would from that moment have been useless for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on quietly just as he wished.

[1] "Such now having been the result, and it having been clearly shown that it was on the fleet of the Greeks that their cause depended, we contributed the three most useful things towards it; viz. the greatest number of ships, the most able man as a genera, and the most unshrinking zeal. Towards the four hundred ships we contributed not less than two parts; ¹ and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly instrumental of their fighting in the Strait, which most clearly saved their cause; and you yourselves for this reason honoured him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gone to you.

[2] And a zeal by far the most daring we exhibited, inasmuch as when no one came to assist us by land, the rest as far as us being already enslaved, we determined, though we had left our city, and sacrificed our property, not even in those circumstances to abandon the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to become useless to them by dispersing; but to go on board our ships, and face the danger; and not to be angry because you had not previously assisted us.

[3] So then we assert that we ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we obtained one. For you, setting out from cities that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in future, came to our assistance, [only] after you were afraid for yourselves, and not so much for us; (at any rate, when we were still in safety, you did not come to us;) but we, setting out from a country which was no more, and running the risk for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the deliverance both of you and of ourselves.

[4] But if we had before joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, or had afterwards had no heart to go on board our ships, considering ourselves as ruined men; there would have been no longer any need of your fighting by sea without a sufficient number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed for him just as he wished.

[1] « Quum autem res sic acciderint, quumque citra controversiam patefactum sit Graecorum fortunas in navium prscsidkvsitas fuisse, tria ad has res utilissima contulimus, et maximum navium numerum, et prudentissimiim ducem, et impigerrimam animi promptitudinem, naves quidem ad quadringentas, paulo pauciores duabus totius classis partibus , Themistoclem vero ducem, qui praecipuus auctor fuit, ut navale praelium in maris angustiis committeretur, quod manifeste res servavit; eique propteiea, licet vir esset peregrinus, vos honorem habuistis longe majorem, quam nilis aliis, qui ad vos venerunt.

[2] Animi vero ardorem vel longe audacissimum demonstravimus, qui quidem, quum terra nobis nemo opem ferret, et ceteri ad nos usque jam in servitutem concessissent, voluimus urbe relicta et re familiari eversa ne sic quidem reliquorum sociorum communionem deserere, neque dispersi inutiles iis esse, sed in naves ingressi periculum adire, nec succensere, quod nobis auxilium ante non tulissetis.

[3] Quamobrem praedicamus nos non minorem utilitatem vobis attulisse, quam quae nobis contigit. Vos enim ex urbibus vestris integris adhuc atque ut eas in posterum habitaretis, quum vobis magis, quam nobis timuissetis, auxilium tulistis (quo enim tempore adhuc eramus salvi, praesto non fuistis): nos vero. ex urbe, quae jam nulla erat, profecti, et pro ea, de cujus salute perexigua spes erat, periculis nos objicientes, et vos. pro parte virili et nos ipsos una servavimus.

[4] Sed si Medis ante nos adjunxissemus, agro nostro, ut et alii, timentes , aut si postea naves conscendere ausi non essemus, ut profligati, non sane erat necesse, vos, qui classem satis firmam non liabebatis, navali proelio amplius certare, sed sine certamine res barbaro ex animi sententia successissent.

« Ora in quel fatto sì stupendo, ove chiaro mostrassi che l’esser de’ Greci consisteva nelle navi, tre cose offrimmo le più conducevoli a lieto riuscimento : cioè , numerosissimo naviglio, capitano prudentissimo, deciso coraggio : delle quattrocento navi, poco meno dei due terzi ; per capitano Temistocle , cui solo deesi che la battaglia seguisse nefllo stretto, per lo che manifestamente foron salve le cose dei Greci : e a lui quantunque straniero (che gran cosa è) rendeste per ciò onori più grandi che a tutti gli altri venuti prima tra voi. Mostrammo in fine coraggio di gran lunga il più magnanimo, noi i quali ( poiché nissuno ci soccorreva per terra, e gli altri insino a noi erano ridotti in servitù ) credemmo di nostro decoro abbandonar la città e rovinare le cose nostre, e quantunque ridotti in questo stato , anzi che abbandonare gli altri alleati, o andando sparsi rendersi loro inutili, montammo sulle navi, e ci facemmo incontro al pericolo , senza adirarci per non averci voi di prima soccorsi : cosi che diciamo avervi recato vantaggio non minore di quello che noi stessi conseguimmo. Ed invero, solo da che vedeste esservi più da temere per voi che per noi, ci soccorreste movendo da città tuttora abitate, e confidando di ritornare al possedimento di quelle ; ma fino a che furono in salvo le cose nostre voi non compariste. Noi per opposito uscendo risoluti da città che più non era, e di cui rimaneva menoma speranza , affrontando il pericolo salvammo dal canto nostro e voi e noi medesimi. Ma se di prima per la paura di veder rovinato il nostro suolo, dati ci fossimo , siccome gli altri, al Medo ; ovvero se dappoi, tenendoci per vinti e perduti, non avessimo osato montar le navi, non occorreva altrimenti che voi, mancanti come eravate di flotta sufficiente , veniste a riaval combattimento, anzi per lui avrebbero le cose tranquillamente progredito a suo talento.