Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 1.49

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

Nun wurde auf beiden Seiten das Zeichen zum Angriff
gegeben, und die Schlacht begann. Beide aber waren noch
l recht unzweckmäßig nach alter Weise gerüstet und hatten viele
Hopliten und eine Menge Wurf- und Bogenschützen auf dem
Verdeck. Man schlug sich auf beiden Flotten mit großer Tapfer
keit, aber die Geschicklichkeit stand nicht auf gleicher Höhe, und
die Schlacht glich eher einem Gefecht auf dem festen Lande,
denn wenn Schiffe aneinander gerieten, konnten sie im Gedränge
so leicht nicht wieder loskommen; auch rechnete man für den
Sieg hauptsächlich auf die Hopliten auf dem Verdeck, welche
hier, während sich die Schiffe nicht von der Stelle bewegten,
Mann gegen Mann fochten. Von einem Umfahren der feind
lichen Schiffe war keine Rede; man kämpfte eben weniger kunst-
gerecht als tapfer und mit Ungestüm. Überall aber herrschte
gewaltiger Lärm und wildes Schlachtgetümmel. Die athenischen
Schiffe beschränkten sich einstweilen darauf, wo die Kerkyräer
ins Gedränge gerieten, die Gegner durch ihre Anwesenheit zu
schrecken, vermieden es aber, selbständig in den Kampf einzu
greifen, weil die Befehlshaber dadurch die ihnen von Athen
mitgegebene Weisung zu übertreten fürchteten. Am meisten
litt der rechte Flügel der Korinther. Denn die Kerkyräer mit
zwanzig Schiffen schlugen ihn in die Flucht und verfolgten
ihre einzeln das Weite suchenden Gegner bis zum Festlande,
gelangten auch mit ihren Schiffen bis an das feindliche Lager,
wo sie landeten und die leerstehenden Zelte in Brand steckten
und plünderten. Hier also waren die Korinther und ihre
Bundesgenossen geschlagen und die Kerkyräer Sieger geblieben.
Auf dem linken Flügel dagegen, wo die Korinther selbst standen,
waren sie entschieden im Vorteil, da die Kerkyräer, schon an
sich in der Minderzahl, der Verfolgung wegen zwanzig von
ihren Schiffen nicht zur Stelle hatten. Als die Athener die
Kerkyräer ernstlich in Gefahr kommen sahen, trugen sie nicht
länger Bedenken, auch ihrerseits in die Gefechtslinie einzurücken.
Zunächst freilich vermieden sie es noch, mit dem Gegner hand
gemein zu werden; als dann aber die Kerkyräer offenbar ge
schlagen und von den Korinthern verfolgt wurden, gab es
keinen Halt mehr, aller Unterschied hörte auf, und in der Hitze
des Gefechts kamen nun auch die Athener und die Korinther
miteinander ins Handgemenge.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 1.49.1 focus

[1] ξυμμείξαντες δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα ἑκατέροις ἤρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολλοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστάς, τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἔτι παρεσκευασμένοι.

[2] ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως, πεζομαχίᾳ δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα.

[3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ προσβάλοιεν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἀπελύοντο ὑπό τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου τῶν νεῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν τι πιστεύοντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὁπλίταις ἐς τὴν νίκην, οἳ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο ἡσυχαζουσῶν τῶν νεῶν· διέκπλοι δ’ οὐκ ἦσαν, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ.

[4] πανταχῇ μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχώδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία, ἐν ᾗ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες παραγιγνόμεναι τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἴ πῃ πιέζοιντο, φόβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐναντίοις, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

[5] μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπόνει· οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶν αὐτοὺς τρεψάμενοι καὶ καταδιώξαντες σποράδας ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἐνέπρησάν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν.

[6] ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσῶντό [τε] καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπεκράτουν· ᾗ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ, πολὺ ἐνίκων, τοῖς Κερκυραίοις τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ ἐλάσσονος πλήθους ἐκ τῆς διώξεως οὐ παρουσῶν.

[7] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες τοὺς Κερκυραίους πιεζομένους μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπροφασίστως ἐπεκούρουν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι ὥστε μὴ ἐμβάλλειν τινί· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγίγνετο λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐνέκειντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τότε δὴ ἔργου πᾶς εἴχετο ἤδη καὶ διεκέκριτο οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὥστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 1.49.1 focus

[1] The standard being on either side lift up, they joined battle, having on both parts both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed.

[2] The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought, near unto the manner of a fight at land.

[3] For after they had once run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages through each other they made none but fought it out with courage and strength rather than with skill.

[4] Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder, in which the Athenian galleys being always, where the Corcyraeans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people.

[5] The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress, for the Corcyraeans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents, and took away their baggage.

[6] So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyraeans had the victory. But in the left wing where the Corinthians were themselves they were far superior because the Corcyraeans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy.

[7] And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyraeans were in distress, now aided them manifestly, whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then everyone fell to the business without making difference any longer; and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 1.49.1 focus

[1] As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing.

[2] The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by land.

[3] Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried: in short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science.

[4] Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions.

[5] The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and plundered the stuff.

[6] So in this quarter the Corinthians and their allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit.

[7] Seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 1.49 focus

Als auf beiden Seiten die Zeichen gegeben waren 2°),
trafen die Flotten auf einander. Beide aber waren mehr nach alter
Art und in unvollkommener Weise gerüstet und hatten viel Schwer- ¹
bewaffnete auf dem Verdeck, auch viele Bogenschützen und
Lanzenträger, und so kämpften sie. Die Seeschlacht war erbittert, aber dem
Eifer glich nicht die Geschicklichkeit, und so hatte eS mehr das
Ansehen einer Landschlacht. Denn wenn Schiffe auf einander gestoßen
waren, so konnten sie sich wegen der Menge und des Gedränges der
Fahrzeuge nicht leicht von einander losmachen. Auch erwartete man
den Sieg eher von den Schwerbewaffneten auf dem Verdeck, die festen
Fußes stehend kämpften, während die Schiffe ruhig lagen. Die
Schlachtlinien zu durchbrechen unternahm man nicht ^), sondern
Muth der Einzelnen und persönliche Stärke thaten in diesem
Seekampf mehr, als Erfahrung und Geschicklichkeit, und überall war
großer Lärm und wirres Geschrei. Die Athenischen Schiffe ließen
sich nirgends erster Hand in den Kampf ein, sondern wo irgend die
Kerkyräer bedrängt wurden, da stellten sie sich ihnen zur Seite und
schreckten die Gegner nur zurück, denn die Anführer scheuten sich, der
Athener Verbot zu übertreten. Am meisten gerieth der rechte
Korinthische Flügel in die Enge, denn die Kerkyräer zwangen ihn mit
zwanzig Schiffen zum Wenden, setzten den zerstreuten und gegen das
Festland flüchtenden nach und segelten bis dicht an ihr Lager, wo
sie an's Land stiegen und die leeren Zelte in Brand steckten und
plünderten. Hier also zogen die Korinther und ihre Bundesgenossen den
Kürzeren, und die Kerkyräer waren im Vortheil. Wo aber die
Korinther selbst standen, aus dem linken Flügel, hatten sie bei
Weitem den Vortheil, denn den Kerkyräern, die ohnedies in der
Minderzahl waren 22), gingen die zwanzig verfolgenden Schiffe ab. Da
nun die Athener, welche vorher sich gehütet hatten handgemein zu
werden, die Noth der Kerkyräer sahen, segelten sie unbedenklich zur
Hilfe heran, und als die Flucht entschieden war und die Korinther
nachsetzten, da legte Jeder der Athener Hand an's Werk, und man
konnte keinen Unterschied mehr machen, sondern die Gefahr wurde ²³⁴
so groß, daß Korinther und Athener mit einander handgemein
wurden.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 1.49 focus

XLIX. Les signaux levés¹ de part et d’autre, on s’aborda et l’action commença. Des deux côtés les ponts des navires étaient couverts d’une foule d’hoplites, d’archers et de gens de trait : les dispositions, conformes à l’ancien usage, étaient d’ailleurs fort imparfaites ; la lutte était vive, mais l’art y faisait défaut ; c’était plutôt un combat de terre qu’une bataille navale : car une fois qu’on s’était abordé il était difficile de se séparer, à cause du nombre et de la confusion des vaisseaux. On comptait surtout, pour la victoire, sur les hoplites qui couvraient les ponts et combattaient de pied ferme, pendant que les bâtiments étaient au repos. Il n’y avait pas d’évolutions² ; on se battait avec plus de force et de courage que de science ; aussi ce n’était partout que trouble et confusion. Au milieu de ce désordre les Athéniens se portaient au secours des Corcyréens là où ils fléchissaient, et con- tenaient leurs adversaires par la crainte ; mais les généraux n’osaient pas attaquer, retenus par les instructions des Athéniens. L’aile droite des Corinthiens souffrit extrêmement : les Corcyréens, avec vingt bâ- timents, les mirent en fuite, les dispersèrent, les poussèrent à la côte, et, les poursuivant jusqu’à leur camp, firent une descente, incendièrent les tentes abandonnées et pillèrent le trésor. Sur ce point les Corinthiens et leurs alliés eurent le dessous, et l’avantage resta aux Corcyréens. Mais à l’aile gauche où se trouvaient les Corinthiens en personne, ils remportèrent une victoire complète sur les Corcyréens moins nombreux déjà, et affaiblis encore par l’absence des vingt vaisseaux occupés à la poursuite. Les Athéniens, voyant les Corcyréens accablés, commencèrent à les seconder avec moins de réserve. Ils s’étaient jusque-là abstenus de toute attaque ; mais lorsqu’ils virent les Corcyréens ouvertement en déroute et les Corinthiens acharnés à la poursuite, chacun prit part à l’action, et, au milieu de la confusion générale, Corinthiens et Athéniens en furent réduits à la nécessité de se combattre.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 1.49 focus

Les signaux arborés de part et d’autre¹, on se joignit et l’action s’engagea. Des deiix côtés les tillacs étaient couverts d’hoplites, d’archers et de gens de trait, mais rangés suivant l'ancienne tactique et d’une manière défectueuse. On se battait avec acharnement, mais sans art; on eût dit que l’action se passait sur terre. Une fois aux prises, le nombre et l’entassement des vaisseaux ne permettaient pas de se dégager aisément. Toute l’espérance de la victoire résidait dans les hoplites qui garnissaient les ponts, d’où ils combattaient de pied ferme, tandis que les bâtiments restaient immobiles. On ne cherchait point à forcer la ligne ennemie²; mais on apportait au combat plus de courage et de vigueur que d’habileté ; en un mot, ce n'était partout que tumulte et confusion.

Dans ce désordre, les vaisseaux d’Athènes voyaient-ils les Corcyréens pressés, ils accouraient pour intimider les ennemis; mais leurs généraux évitaient de prendre l'offensive, n’osant pas enfreindre leurs instructions. L’aile droite des Corinthiens fut très-maltraitée. Les Corcyréens, avec vingt-trois vaisseaux, la mirent en fuite, la dispersèrent et la poussèrent à la côte; puis, s’avançant jusqu’au camp, ils débarquèrent, brûlèrent les tentes désertes et pillèrent la caisse. Sur ce point, les Corinthiens et leurs alliés étaient donc vaincus et les Corcyréens vainqueurs; mais il en était tout autrement à la gauche, qu'occupaient les Corinthiens eux-mêmes, et où ils avaient un avantage décidé; car les Corcyréens, déjà inférieurs en nombre, étaient encore affaiblis par l’éloignement de leurs vingt vaisseaux détachés à la poursuite des ennemis. Les Athéniens, voyant leurs alliés ébranlés, les secoururent avec moins d’hésitation. Jusque-là ils s’étaient tenus sur la réserve; mais, quand la déroute fut décidée et que les Corinthiens s’acharnèrent sur leurs ennemis, chacun prit part à l’action; tout fut confondu; alors Corinthiens et Athéniens se virent forcés d’en venir aux mains ensemble.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 1.49.1 focus

[1] When the standards were raised on either side they joined battle and fought, both having many hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather rudely in the ancient fashion.

[2] And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on land.

[3] For when they dashed against one another they could not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number and throng of the ships, still more because they trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships remained motionless; and there was no cutting of the line,¹ but they fought with fury and brute strength rather than with skill.

[4] Accordingly there was everywhere much tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to disobey the instructions of the Athenians.

[5] The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pursued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, burned the deserted tents and plundered their property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans prevailed;

[6] but on the left wing where the Corinthians themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit.

[7] But the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcvraeans were being hard pressed, they began to help them more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it was conspicuously clear that they were being put to flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then at length every man put his hand to work, and fine distinctions were no longer made; matters had come to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of necessity had to attack one another.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 1.49.1 focus

[1] As soon as the signals on each side were raised, they closed, and fought; both sides having many heavy-armed on the decks, and many bowmen and dartmen; as they were still rudely equipped in the old fashion.

[2] And the battle was well contested; not so much in point of skill, but more like a land fight.

[3] For whenever they happened to run on board one another, they did not easily get clear again, owing to the numbers and confusion of the ships; and because they trusted for victory, in a greater measure, to the heavy-armed on deck, who set to and fought, ¹ while the ships remained stationary. There was no breaking through the line, but they fought with fierceness and strength, more than with science.

[4] On all sides then there was much confusion, and the battle was a disorderly one; and during it the Athenian vessels coming up to the Corcyraeans, if they were pressed at any point, struck fear into the enemy, but did not begin fighting, as the commanders were afraid of the charge given by the Athenians.

[5] It was the right wing of the Corinthians which was most distressed; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships having routed and pursued them in a scattered condition to the continent, sailed up to their encampment, and having made a descent upon them, burnt the deserted tents, and plundered their goods.

[6] On that side then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans were victorious: but where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they had a decided victory; as twenty ships of the Corcyraeans, from a number [originally] smaller, had not returned from the pursuit.

[7] But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, assisted them now more unequivocally; though at first they refrained from charging any vessel; but when the rout had clearly taken place, and the Corinthians were lying close on them, then indeed every one at length set to work, and there was no longer any distinction, but it had come to such urgent necessity, that the Corinthians and Athenians attacked each other.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 1.49.1 focus

[1] Postquam vero signa utrinque sunt sublata, commisso proelio navali pugnabant, multos utrique gravis armaturae milites, multos sagittarios et jaculatores in tabulatis navium habentes, vetusto adhuc more imperitius instructi.

[2] Et erat quidem acre boc navale proelium, neque tamen pariter artificiosum, sed pedestri pugnae similius.

[3] Nam quotiens inter se confligere ccppissent, non facile divelli poterant, cum prae multitudine turbaque navium, tum etiam quod ad victoriam oblinendam maxime confidebant militibus super tabulatis, qui navibus quietis pugnam sta- tariam committebant; nullas autem navium perruptiones erant, sed animis et robore magis, quam scientia, pugnabant.

[4] Ubique igitur magnus tumultus et proelium valde turbulentum erat; in quo naves Atticae Corcyraeis, sicubi premerentur, adsistentes metum quidem hostibus incutiebant , sed proelii initium non faciebant, quod earum praefecti metuerent Atheniensium interdictum.

[5] Maxime autem dextrum Corinthiorum cornu laborabat; Corcyraei enim, cum eos XX navibus in fugam vertissent, et dispersos ad continentem usque persecuti essent, et usque au eorum castra navigassent, et in terram descendissent, tentoria deserta incenderunt eorumque res diripuerunt.

[6] Hac igitur in parte Corinthii eorumque socii vincebantur, et Corcyraei superiores erant; al in sinistro, ubi ipsi Corinthii erant, longe superabant, quia ex minore jam ante numero XX naves Corcyraeorum ab hoste persequendo non redibant.

[7] Athenienses vero quum Corcyraeos premi viderent, jam minus dissimulanter illis opcmYerebant, primi» quidem ita sibi temperantes, ut ne in quem impetum darent; sed postquam fuga aperta erat, et Corinthii instabant, tum vero unusquisque manum ad opus admovit, nec ullum amplius erat discrimen, sed eo necessitatis sunt compulsi, ut Corinthii et Athenienses inter se manus consererent.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 1.49 focus

Alzati quinci e quindi i segnali vennero alle mani , e per la poca esperienza, armati essendo tuttora all’uso antico, da ambe le parti si combatteva di sopra coverta con molti di grave armatura, e molti arcieri e saettatori. Accanita era la zuffa, ma poca la perizia del mesticro ; anzi somigliantissima a battaglia di terra : perocché dopo il primo urto delle due (lotte , per lo disordine del gran ninnerò si rendeva difficile alle navi lo staccarsi tra loro , ed i soldati gravi di sopra coverta, nei quali era riposta la principal fiducia della vittoria, restando quelle immobili , combattevano di piè fermo ; nè potendo indietreggiare per quindi correre a romper le file nemiche, pugnavano con furibonda gagliardia più che con perizia del mestiero. Laonde grande era per tutto uno scompiglio, un tumultuar di battaglia, nella quale le navi ateniesi pronte a sostenere i Corfuotti ovunque fosser messi alle strette, facevano gran paura ai nemici : ma i generali non li attaccarono per timore degli ordini ricevuti in Atene. Il corno destro dei Corintii principalmente pativa: conciossiachè, furono messi in fuga dalle venti navi dei Corfuotti, che perseguitarono fino alla costa le navi disperse, e inoltratisi fino all’accampamento scesero a terra, abbruciarono le tende abbandonate , e tutto misero a ruba. Da questo lato erano certamente battuti i Corintii con gli alleati, e vincevano i Corfuotti ; ma sull’ ala sinistra ove erano da sé i Corintii, la vittoria era manifestamente per loro , perocché alle navi dei Corfuotti, che erano in minor numero, mancavano le venti che rincorrevano il nemico. Il perchè gli Ateniesi al veder pressati i Corfuotti, li soccorrevano oramai più francamente; benechè sulle prime si ritenessero dal fare affronto veruno ; ma quando li videro manifestamente dar volta coi Corintii alle spalle, allora davvero, senza aver più riguardo alcuno, presero tutti parte alla pugna , tal che gli stessi Corintii e Ateniesi trovaronsi nella necessità di assalirsi scambievolmente.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.49

Theodor Braun (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

Stable identifiers