Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 1.50

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

Nach ihrem Siege gaben sich die Korinther nicht lange
damit ab, die von ihnen leck gemachten feindlichen Schiffe in
Schlepptau zu nehmen, sondern fuhren an sie heran, um ihre
Wut an den darauf befindlichen Leuten auszulassen, die sie
bis auf den letzten Mann schonungslos niedermachten. Weil
sie aber nicht wußten, daß sie auf ihrem rechten Flügel selbst
- geschlagen waren, töteten sie hin und wieder unabsichtlich auch
ihre eigenen Freunde. Denn da die Zahl der Schiffe auf
beiden Seiten groß und die See weithin davon bedeckt war.
konnten sie im Gewirr nicht immer gleich unterscheiden, ob
einer zu den Siegern oder den Besiegten gehörte. In An
sehung der Zahl der Schiffe nämlich war dies die größte See
schlacht, in welcher bis dahin Griechen gegen Griechen ge
fochten hatten.

Nachdem die Korinther die Kerkyräer bis ans Land verfolgt
hatten, machten sie kehrt, um sich nach ihren schadhaft ge
wordenen Schiffen und ihren Toten umzusehen, die sie dann
auch größtenteils bergen konnten und nach Sybota, einem ab
gelegenen Hafenplatze in Thesprotien, brachten, wo sich das
ihnen zu Hilfe gekommene Barbarenheer befand. Als sie dies
besorgt und sich wieder gesammelt hatten, wandten sie sich mit
ihrer Flotte von neuem gegen die Kerkyräer. Diese aber fuhren
ihnen mit den noch feefähigen, namentlich ihren bei den Athe
nern gebliebenen frischen Schiffen aus Furcht, sie könnten bei
ihnen eine Landung versuchen, auch ihrerseits entgegen. Es war
schon spät, und sie hatten ihr Schlachtlied schon angestimmt, als
die Korinther plötzlich rückwärts ruderten, weil sie zwanzig athe
nische Schiffe kommen sahen, die man den zehn ersten aus Athen
nachgeschickt hatte, da man dort besorgte, was ja auch nicht
ausblieb, die Kerkyräer könnten geschlagen werden und die
zehn Schiffe zu ihrem Schutz zu wenig sein. Die Korinther
vermuteten nämlich, die Schiffe, die sie in der Ferne gesehen,
könnten von Athen kommen und ihrer wohl gar noch mehr sein,
als bereits in Sicht waren, und deshalb zogen sie sich zurück.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 1.50.1 focus

[1] τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὰ σκάφη μὲν οὐχ εἷλκον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἃς καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ζωγρεῖν, τούς τε αὑτῶν φίλους, οὐκ ᾐσθημένοι ὅτι ἥσσηντο οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ, ἀγνοοῦντες ἔκτεινον.

[2] πολλῶν γὰρ νεῶν οὐσῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεχουσῶν, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέμειξαν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐποιοῦντο ὁποῖοι ἐκράτουν ἢ ἐκρατοῦντο· ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη Ἕλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὑτῆς γεγένηται.

[3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεδίωξαν τοὺς Κερκυραίους οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐς τὴν γῆν, πρὸς τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἐτράποντο, καὶ τῶν πλείστων ἐκράτησαν ὥστε προσκομίσαι πρὸς τὰ Σύβοτα, οἷ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν βαρβάρων προσεβεβοηθήκει· ἔστι δὲ τὰ Σύβοτα τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος λιμὴν ἐρῆμος. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαντες αὖθις ἁθροισθέντες ἐπέπλεον τοῖς Κερκυραίοις.

[4] οἱ δὲ ταῖς πλωίμοις καὶ ὅσαι ἦσαν λοιπαὶ μετὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντεπέπλεον, δείσαντες μὴ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν πειρῶσιν ἀποβαίνειν.

[5] ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὀψὲ καὶ ἐπεπαιάνιστο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο κατιδόντες εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων προσπλεούσας, ἃς ὕστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοὺς ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δείσαντες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μὴ νικηθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεραι δέκα νῆες ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὦσιν.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 1.50.1 focus

[1] The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, stayed not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk unto their own galleys that so they might tow them after, but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive, and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends.

[2] For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle for number of ships that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians.

[3] When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead, which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota where also lay the land forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves and made again to the Corcyraeans.

[4] And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining of the former battle together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory.

[5] By this time the day was far spent, and the song which they used to sing when they came to charge was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern, for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys sent from Athens to second the former ten for fear lest the Corcyraeans (as it also fell out) should be overcome and those ten galleys of theirs be too few to defend them.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 1.50.1 focus

[1] After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing.

[2] For the number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult after they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged.

[3] After the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbor of Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans,

[4] who on their part advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in their territory.

[5] It was by this time getting late, and the paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and the inability of their handful of ships to protect them.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 1.50 focus

Als die Feinde sich zur Flucht gewandt hatten, nahmen
die Korinther die von ihnen etwa leck gemachten Schiffe nicht in's
Schlepptau, sondern kehrten sich gegen die Bemannung, und zwischen
den feindlichen Schiffen durchsegelnd gingen sie mehr darauf aus zu
morden, als Gefangene zu machen. Daß sie aber auf ihrem rechten
Flügel selbst geschlagen waren, wußten sie nicht, und es geschah ihnen
daher auch, daß sie aus ihre eigenen Freunde einHieben, denn es war
nicht leicht, in dem Getümmel Sieger und Besiegte von einander zu
unterscheiden, weil aus beiden Seiten die Zahl der Schiffe groß war
und eine weite Fläche des Meeres bedeckte. Denn in Bezug auf die
Schiffszahl war diese Schlacht die bedeutendste, in welcher Griechen
noch gegen Griechen gekämpft hatten.

Nachdem nun die Korinther die Kerkyräer bis an's Land
verfolgt hatten, wandten sie ihre Aufmerksamkeit ihren eigenen
Schiffstrümmern und Todten zu, wurden auch der meisten habhaft und
brachten sie nach Sybota, wo das Hilfsheer der Barbaren stand. Dies
Sybota ist ein verlassener Hafen Thesprotiens ^gegenüber den
gleichnamigen Inseln^. Nachdem also dies verrichtet war und sie sich
wieder gesammelt hatten, rückten sie von Neuem gegen die Kerkyräer an.
Diese aber segelten mit ihren noch seetüchtigen Fahrzeugen, worunter
auch die bei den Athenischen Schiffen zurückgebliebenen waren, ihnen
selbst entgegen, aus Furcht, der Feind möchte eine Landung wagen.
Es war bereits spät am Tag, und schon war der Schlachtgesang zum
Vorgehen angestimmt 93), da fingen die Korinthischen Schiffe plötzlich
an, rückwärts zu rudern^). Sie hatten nämlich zwanzig attische
Schiffe heransegeln sehen, welche die Athener später zur Unterstützung
der zehn ersten abgeschickt hatten, aus Besorgniß, die Kerkyräer möch- ¹²
ten, was auch wirklich eingetroffen war, geschlagen werden, und
die zehn Schiffe möchten zu ihrem Schutze zu schwach sein.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 1.50 focus

L. Lorsque la déroute fut complète, les Corinthiens ne s’arrêtèrent pas à remorquer les coques des bâtiments¹ qu’ils avaient submerges ; ils s’attachèrent aux hommes et manoeuvrèrent en tout sens pour les massacrer, bien plus que pour faire des prisonniers. Ignorant la défaite de l’aile droite, ils tuaient, sans le savoir, leurs propres amis ; car les deux flottes étaient si nombreuses et occupaient une telle étendue sur la mer que, du moment où elles se furent mêlées, il devint difficile de distinguer les vainqueurs des vaincus ; c’était, pour le nombre des vaisseaux, le combat naval le plus important qui eût été livré jusque-là entre Grecs.

Après avoir poursuivi les Corcyréens jusqu’à terre, les Corinthiens se mirent à recueillir les débris des navires et leurs morts. Ils en recouvrèrent la plus grande partie et les transportèrent à Sybota², port désert de la Thesprotide, où campait le corps des barbares auxiliaires. Ce soin rempli, ils se rallièrent et firent voile de nouveau contre les Corcyréens. Ceux-ci, de leur côté, craignant une descente sur leurs côtes, rallièrent les navires en état de tenir la mer, y joignirent tout ce qui leur restait, et, secondés par les vaisseaux athéniens, allèrent à la rencontre des Corinthiens. Il était déjà tard et l’on avait chanté le péan signal de l’attaque, lorsque les Corinthiens reculèrent soudain en ramant sur la poupe³ : ils venaient de découvrir vingt vaisseaux athéniens qui cinglaient vers eux. C’était un secours que les Athéniens avaient envoyé après le départ des dix premiers bâtiments, dans la crainte que les Corcyréens ne fussent vaincus (ce qui arriva) et que ces dix vaisseaux ne fussent insuffisants à les défendre.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 1.50 focus

Après la défaite, les Corinthiens ne s’arrêtèrent pas à remorquer les coques des bâtiments coulés; ils ne s’occupèrent que des hommes, et ce fut pour les massacrer bien plus que pour les faire prisonniers. Ignorant la défaite de leur aile droite, ils allaient tuant indistinctement amis et ennemis; comme les deux flottes étaient très-nombreuses et qu’elles couvraient une vaste étendue de mer, il n’était pas facile dans la mêlée de discerner les vainqueurs et les vaincus. Ce fut, pour le nombre des vaisseaux, le combat naval le plus considérable que les Grecs se fussent encore livré entre eux.

Les Corinthiens, après avoir poursuivi les Corcyréens jusqu’à terre, se mirent à rassembler les débris des navires et leurs propres morts. Ils en recueillirent la majeure partie et les amenèrent aux Sybota, port désert de la Thesprotide, où étaient postés les Barbares auxiliaires ¹. Cela fait, ils se rallièrent et cinglèrent de nouveau contre les Corcyréens. Ceux-ci, craignant une descente sur leur territoire, réunirent ce qui leur restait de bâtiments en état de service, y joignirent ceux qui n’avaient pas combattu, et, accompagnés des vaisseaux athéni ens, ils se portèrent à la rencontre de la flotte ennemie. Il était déjà tard et Ton avait chanté le péan ² comme signal d’attaque, lorsque soudain les Corinthiens se mirent à reculer, en voyant s’approcher vingt vaisseaux d’Athènes. C’était un renfort que les Athéniens avaient envoyé après le départ de leur première escadre; ils avaient craint, non sans raison, que les Cor-cyréens ne fussent vaincus, et que leurs dix vaisseaux ne fussent pas suffisants pour les défendre.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 1.50.1 focus

[1] After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the ships which had been disabled, but turned their attention to the men, cruising up and down and killing them in preference to taking them alive; and they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being aware that their right wing had been worsted.

[2] For since the ships or the two fleets were many and covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to determine just who were conquering and who were being conquered; for this sea-fight was in number of ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had ever before fought against Hellenes.¹

[3] But as soon as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead,² and they were able to recover most of them and to fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thesprotia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had come to their aid. When they had accomplished this, they got their forces together and sailed once more against the Corcyraeans.

[4] And they, with such of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that they would attempt to disembark on their territory.

[5] It was now late and the paean had been sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be defeated and their own ten ships would be too few to help them.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 1.50.1 focus

[1] Now when the rout had taken place, the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the vessels which they might happen to have sunk, ¹ but turned their attention to the men, sailing throughout to butcher, rather than to make prisoners; and some of their own friends, not being aware that those in the right wing had been worsted, they unwittingly killed.

[2] For as both fleets were numerous, and extended over a wide space of the sea; when they closed with each other, they did not easily distinguish, who were conquering, or being conquered; for this engagement, for one of Greeks against Greeks, was greater in the number of vessels than any of those before it.

[3] After the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to land, they turned their attention to the wrecks, and their own dead, and got possession of most of them, so as to take them to Sybota, where their land force composed of the barbarians had come to their assistance. Now Sybota is a desert port of Thesprotis.

[4] Having done this, they mustered again, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who with their seaworthy ships, and such as were left, ² in conjunction with those of the Athenians, on their side also sailed out to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land on their territory.

[5] It was now late, and the Paean had been sung by them for the advance, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row sternwards, on observing twenty ships of the Athenians sailing up; which the Athenians had sent after the ten to help them fearing, (as was the case,) that the Corcyraeans might be conquered, and their own ten ships be ³ too few to aid them.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 1.50.1 focus

[1] Sed versis in fugam hostibus, Corinthii alveos navium, quas demersissent, non trahebant remulco, at transcurrentes ad homines trucidandos potius, quam vivos capiendos, se converterunt, et suos amicos per ignorantiam interficiebant, quia illos, qui in dextro cornu erant, superatos nesciebant.

[2] Nam quum multae essent utrorumque naves et late mare occuparent, postquam manus inter se conseruerunt, non facile dignoscere poterant, quinam victores, aut qui victi essent. Hoc enim navale proelium Graecorum cum Graecis commissum navium numero omnia superiora longe superavit.

[3] Corinthii vero, postquam Corcyraeos ad terram usque sunt persecuti, ad naves fractas et cadavera suorum se converterunt, et maxima eorum parte potiti sunt, ita ut ea ad Sybota comportare possent, quo terrestres barbarorum copiae auxilio venerant. Sybota autem est desertus Thesprotidis portus.

[4] Hac re gesta rursus collecti Corcyraeos classe invadebant. Illi Yero cum suis navibus, quas ad navigationem adhuc erant aptae, et quotquot erant reliquae, una cum Atticis, et ipsi infesta classe occurrebant, veriti, ne illi in suum agrum descendere conarentur.

[5] Jam autem erat diei serum et paeana tanquam congressuri cecinerant, quum Corinthii repente in puppim remigare coeperunt, XX naves Atheniensium contra se navigantes conspicati , quas post illas decem auxilio miserant Athenienses, veriti id quod accidit, ne Corcyraei vincerentur, neve suae decem illae naves ob numeri paucitatem ab illis vim propulsare non possent.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 1.50 focus

Ma fugati i Corfuotti, i Corintii non rimorchiavano le carene delle navi che avevano mandate a fondo, ma si rivolsero a trascorrere di mezzo alla flotta nemica, per uccidere piuttosto che prender vive le ciurme. Nè sapendo essere stati battuti quei dell’ ala destra, ammazzavano anche gli amici senza conoscerli ; perchè pel gran numero delle navi che da ambe le parti ingombravano molto spazio della marina, poscia che si furono azzufla ti, non era facile discernere i vincitori dai vinti. E veramente questa battaglia navale tra Greci e Greci fu, per la moltitudine della navi, la più considerabile di quante la precedettero. I Corintii poi, incalzati sino a terra i Corfuotti, si volsero a ricercare i rottami delle navi ; ed i cadaveri de’ suoi, i quali riebbero in tanta copia da doverli trasportare alle Sibote, ove le truppe terrestri de’ barbari erano venute in loro aiuto. Sono le Sibote una spiaggia deserta della Tesprotide. Fatto ciò, si unirono di nuovo per navigare contro' i Corfuotti, i quali pure con quante navi buone a navigare erano loro restate , e con quelle degli

Ateniesi andarono ad incontrarli temendo non tentassero di sbarcar nella loro terra. Già si avvicinava la sera ed avevano intonato il Peana per animare al conflitto, quando i Corintii improvvisamente presero a indietreggiare, avendo veduto venirsi incontro le venti navi spedite da Atene in soccorso dopo le dieci, temendo, siccome avvenne, non i Corfuotti restassero vinti, e le dieci fossero poche per respingere il nemico.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.50

Theodor Braun (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

Stable identifiers