Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 7.36

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Die Syrakusaner, die das Herannahen der feindlichen Flotte
erfuhren, gedachten nun abermals sowohl mit ihren Schiffen einen
Versuch zu machen, als auch mit der übrigen Macht an Landtruppen,
welche sie eben zu dem Zweck gesammelt hatten, um noch vor der
Ankunft jener eine Entscheidung herbeizuführen. Nicht nur hatten sie ¹
auf ihrer Flotte sonst alle die Einrichtungen getroffen, von denen
sie nach ihren Erfahrungen im ersten Seekampf größere Vortheile
voraussahen, sondern auch die Vordertheile ihrer Schiffe verkürzt und
sie dadurch stärker gemacht, sowie auch an den Vordertheilen dicke
Stoßbalken angebracht und diese wieder außen wie innen durch sechs
Ellen lange Strebebalken, die sich an die Schiffswandung stimmten,
gestützt's), welche Einrichtung auch die Korinther vor Naupaktos mit
ihren Schissen getroffen und dann in der Schlacht mit den
Vordertheilen den Angriff gemacht hatten. Hiedurch glaubten sich nämlich
die Syrakusaner vortheilhast gegen die Schiffe der Athener gestellt zu
haben, welche keine entsprechende Gegenvorrichtung, sondern nur dünne
Vordertheile hatten, weil sie nicht sowohl Vordertheil gegen
Vordertheil, als vielmehr vermittelst Umsegelung den Schnabelangriff in die
Flanken zu machen pflegten. Auch berechneten sie, daß eine Seeschlacht
innerhalb des großen Hafens, wo auf nicht großem Raume zahlreiche
Schifft kämpfen würden, ihnen günstig ausfallen werde, denn mit
dem Stoße Schnabel gegen Schnabel würden sie den Athenern das
Vordertheil aufreißen, da sie mit starken und dicken Schnäbeln auf
hohle und schwache Stellen träfen. Die Athener aber hätten ausdem
beengten Raume auch nicht die Möglichkeit zur Umsegelung oder zum
Zwischendurchfahren, Geschicklichkeiten, auf welche sie sich am meisten
verließen. Das Zwischendurchfahren wollten sie ihnen selbst nach
Möglichkeit wehren, am Umsegeln aber werde sie schon die
Beschränktheit des Raumes hindern. Was früher nur eine Ungeschicklichkeit
der Steuerleute zu sein schien, das Zusammenstoßen mit den
Vordertheilen nämlich, das wollten sie jetzt mit voller Absicht anwenden,
denn grade davon würden sie den größten Vortheil haben. Den
Athenern nämlich, wenn sie aus ihrer Stellung verdrängt würden, bliebe
kein anderer Rückzug, als der gegen das Land hin, und auch dieser
ginge nur über einen schmalen Zwischenraum und auf einen
beschränkten Raum am Land, nämlich längs ihrer eigenen Verschanzung; — ²
den übrigen Theil des Hafens würden sie selbst beherrschen — und ³
wenn jene irgendwie in's Gedränge kämen und sich dann auf einen
beschränkten Raum und Alle auf denselben Punkt zusammenziehen
müßten, so würden sie mit den Schiffen an einander stoßen und sich
selbst in Verwirrung bringen — und in der That waren die Athener
in allen Seegefechten auf diese Art am meisten zu Schaden
gekommen, da sie nicht, wie die Syrakusaner, sich nach allen Punkten des
Hafens zurückziehen konnten — eine Umsegelung aber bis in die offene
See hinaus, während sie selbst die Zufahrt vom Meer her
beherrschten und beliebig rückwärts fahren könnten, würden die Athener nicht
durchzusetzen vermögend sein, zumal auch Plemmyrion sich ihnen
feindselig erzeigen werde, und die Mündung des Hafens nicht groß sei.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.36.1 focus

[1] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ πυνθανόμενοι αὐτῶν τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὖθις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποπειρᾶσαι ἐβούλοντο καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἥνπερ ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς φθάσαι βουλόμενοι ξυνέλεγον.

[2] παρεσκευάσαντο δὲ τό τε ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὡς ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας τι πλέον ἐνεῖδον σχήσοντες, καὶ τὰς πρῴρας τῶν νεῶν ξυντεμόντες ἐς ἔλασσον στεριφωτέρας ἐποίησαν, καὶ τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐπέθεσαν ταῖς πρῴραις παχείας, καὶ ἀντηρίδας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὑπέτειναν πρὸς τοὺς τοίχους ὡς ἐπὶ ἓξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν· ᾧπερ τρόπῳ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς ἐπισκευασάμενοι πρῴραθεν ἐναυμάχουν.

[3] ἐνόμισαν γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντινεναυπηγημένας, ἀλλὰ λεπτὰ τὰ πρῴραθεν ἐχούσας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρῴροις μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν, πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι· ἀντιπρῴροις γὰρ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρώμενοι ἀναρρήξειν τὰ πρῴραθεν αὐτοῖς, στερίφοις καὶ παχέσι πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενῆ παίοντες τοῖς ἐμβόλοις.

[4] τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔσεσθαι σφῶν ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ οὔτε περίπλουν οὔτε διέκπλουν, ᾧπερ τῆς τέχνης μάλιστα ἐπίστευον· αὐτοὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὸ μὲν οὐ δώσειν διεκπλεῖν, τὸ δὲ τὴν στενοχωρίαν κωλύσειν ὥστε μὴ περιπλεῖν.

[5] τῇ τε πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρῳρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν· τὴν γὰρ ἀνάκρουσιν οὐκ ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξωθουμένοις ἄλλοσε ἢ ἐς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ταύτην δι’ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἑαυτῶν· τοῦ δ’ ἄλλου λιμένος αὐτοὶ κρατήσειν, καὶ ξυμφερομένους αὐτούς, ἤν πῃ βιάζωνται,

[6] ἐς ὀλίγον τε καὶ πάντας ἐς τὸ αὐτό, προσπίπτοντας ἀλλήλοις ταράξεσθαι (ὅπερ καὶ ἔβλαπτε μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις, οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐς πάντα τὸν λιμένα τῆς ἀνακρούσεως, ὥσπερ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις)· περιπλεῦσαι δὲ ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, σφῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἐπίπλευσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους τε καὶ ἀνάκρουσιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθαι αὐτούς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου πολεμίου τε αὐτοῖς ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ στόματος οὐ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ λιμένος.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.36.1 focus

[1] The Syracusians in the meantime, upon intelligence of their coming on, resolved to try again what they could do with their navy and with their new supply of landmen, which they had gotten together on purpose to fight with the Athenians before Demosthenes and Eurymedon should arrive.

[2] And they furnished their navy, both otherwise and according to the advantages they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter the heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger, and made beaks to them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with rafters fastened to the sides of the galleys, both within and without, of six cubits long, in such manner as the Corinthians had armed their galleys a-head to fight with those before Naupactus.

[3] For the Syracusians made account that against the Athenian galleys not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the enemy a-head as upon the side by fetching a compass, they could not but have the better, and that to fight in the great haven, many galleys in not much room was an advantage to them; for that using the direct encounter, they should break with their firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts of the galleys of their enemies;

[4] and that the Athenians, in that narrow room, would want means both to go about and to go through them, which was the point of art they most relied on. For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as much as they could; and for fetching compass, the straitness of the place would not suffer it.

[5] And that fighting a-head, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters [to do otherwise], was what they would now principally make use of; for in this would be their principal advantage. For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land, which was but a little way off and little in compass, near their own camp; and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters.

[6] And the enemy being pressed, could not choose, thronging together into a little room and all into one and the same place, but disorder one another, which was indeed the thing that in all their battles by sea did the Athenians the greatest hurt, having not, as the Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire unto. And to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their power to set upon them from the main sea, and to retire again at pleasure, they should never be able, especially having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's mouth not being large.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.36.1 focus

[1] Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to make a second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on shore, which they had been collecting for this very purpose in order to do something before their arrival.

[2] In addition to other improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they now adopted in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a smaller compass to make them more solid and made their cheeks stouter, and from these let stays into the vessel's sides for a length of six cubits within and without, in the same way as the Corinthians had altered their prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus .

[3] The Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advantage over the Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with equal strength, but were slight in the bows, from their being more used to sail round and charge the enemy's side than to meet him prow to prow, and that the battle being in the great harbor, with a great many ships in not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to prow, they would stave in the enemy's bows, by striking with solid and stout beaks against hollow and weak ones;

[4] and secondly, the Athenians for want of room would be unable to use their favorite manoeuvre of breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans would do their best not to let them do the one, and want of room would prevent their doing the other.

[5] This charging prow to prow which had hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the Syracusans' chief manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back water in any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a little way, and in the little space in front of their own camp. The rest of the harbor would be commanded by the Syracusans;

[6] and the Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space and all to the same point, would run foul of one another and fall into disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the Athenians most harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans, the whole harbor to retreat over. As to their sailing round into the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in possession of the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbor was not large.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.36 focus

Inzwischen hatten die Syrakuser die Nachricht erhalten,
- daß sie mit ihren Schiffen im Anzüge seien, und wollten nun,
bevor sie einträfen, mit der Flotte und ihren Streitkräften zu
Lande, die sie zu dem Zwecke zusammenzogen, nochmals einen
Schlag führen. Auf der Flotte trafen sie vershciedene Ein
richtungen, von deren Zweckmäßigkeit sie sich in der vorigen
Schlacht überzeugt hatten; insbesondere verkürzten sie die
Schnäbel der Schiffe, um sie widerstandsfähiger zu machen,
versahen die Vorderteile mit dicken Sturmbalken und unter
stützten diese durch starke, teils außen, teils inwendig an den
Schiffswänden verstrebte, sechs Ellen lange Widerlagen, eine
Verbesserung, wie sie auch die Korinther in der Schlacht bei
Naupaktos an den Schnäbeln ihrer Schiffe vorgenommen hatten.
Denn da die Schiffe der Athener anders gebaut waren und
schwächere Schnäbel hatten, weil sie das feindliche Schiff nicht
vorn, sondern durch eine geschickte Wendung von hinten zu
treffen suchten, so glaubten die Syrakuser es auf diese Weise
mit ihnen aufnehmen und ihnen im großen Hafen, wo die
Schiffe in einem engen Raume kämpfen mußten, unter günstigen
Bedingungen eine Schlacht liefern zu können. Bei ihrem gegen
das Vorderteil des feindlichen Schiffes gerichteten Stoß würde
nämlich der wuchtige, feste Schnabel dessen schwache und
bauchige Teile treffen und ihm den Bug aufreißen, den Athenern
aber in dem engen Raume weder möglich sein, ihre Schiffe von
hinten zu treffen, noch ihnen durch die Ruder zu fahren; denn
dieses, ihr Lieblingsmanöver, würden sie ihrerseits nach Kräften
zu verhindern wissen, jenes aber, das Umfahren, werde die
Enge des Raumes von selbst verbieten. Und was man früher
als eine Ungeschicklichkeit ihrer Steuerleute angesehen, daß sie
auf das Vorderteil des feindlichen Schiffes gehalten, grade das
wollten sie sich jetzt selbst zunutze machen, weil sie dabei im
Vorteil wären. Den Athenern würde nämlich, wenn sie den
Stoß erhalten, nichts übrigbleiben, als sich auf den nahen
Strand nach ihrem Lagerplatze zurückzuziehen, während ihnen
der ganze übrige Hafen zu Gebote stände, und wenn sie zurück
müßten und dann mit allen Schiffen auf einen einzigen engen
Fleck angewiesen wären, so würden ihre Schiffe sich stoßen
und in Verwirrung geraten; wie es denn auch wirklich für
die Athener in alle den damaligen Seegefechten besonders nach
teilig geworden ist, daß sie nicht wie die Syrakuser durch den
ganzen Hafen zurückrudern konnten. Auch würden die Athener,
da sie, die Syrakuser, es in der Hand hätten, sie nach Belieben
von der See her anzugreifen oder sich^zurükczuziehen, nicht um
die Landspitze herum in die offene See gelangen können, zumal
das Plemmyrion in Feindes Hand und die Mündung des
Hafens nur schmal sei.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.36 focus

XXXVI. Cependant les Syracusains, informés de leur approche, résolurent de faire une nouvelle tentative avec la flotte et toutes les forces de terre qu’ils avaient auparavant réunies afin de prévenir leur arrivée. Ils firent sur la flotte tous les changements dont le précédent combat leur avait démontré l’utilité : entre autres, ils rognèrent les proues des vaisseaux, pour leur donner plus de solidité, et y adaptèrent de fortes antennes¹, arc-boutées de droite et de gauche²³⁴ contre les parois du navire par des élançons de six coudées. C’était la disposition adoptée par les Corinthiens dans le combat contre la flotte de Naupacte, où ils avaient pris l’ennemi en proue⁵. Les Syracusains avaient calculé que cette disposition devait être favorable contre les vaisseaux athéniens, qui n’étaient pas comme les leurs renforcés à l’avant et dont la proue n’était pas protégée, parce qu’au lieu d’attaquer proue contre proue, ils se portaient par une circonvolution sur le flanc de l’ennemi. Ils trouvaient d’ailleurs avantage à combattre dans le grand port, où un nombre considérable de vaisseaux se trouveraient resserrés sur un étroit espace : attaquant en proue, ils enfonceraient l’avant des vaisseaux ennemis, dont les parois faibles et sans épaisseur ne pourraient tenir contre le choc de parties massives et solidement étayées. Les Athéniens, au contraire, ne pourraient, dans un espace étroit, ni les tourner ni percer leur ligne, manoeuvres où ils excellaient; car eux-mêmes les empêcheraient autant que possible de pénétrer dans les lignes, et, quant à les tourner, le défaut d’espace s’y opposerait. Ce qu’on avait jusque-là considéré comme marque d’ignorance chez leurs pilotes, l’attaque en proue, deviendrait dès lors une excellente manoeuvre, puisque c’était surtout là que serait leur supériorité. Les Athéniens, poussés par eux, n’auraient pas la liberté de reculer ailleurs que vers la terre, avec peu de carrière derrière eux, peu de latitude pour leurs manoeuvres, puisque leur ⁶ camp n’occupait qu’un étroit espace et que les Syracusains seraient maîtres du reste du port. Que si on parvenait à les forcer, ils se porteraient tous sur un même point, s’y entasseraient à l’étroitetse heurteraient mutuellement, ce qui jetterait parmi eux le désordre. — En effet, rien ne fut plus nuisible aux Athéniens, dans toutes les affaires navales, que cette impossibilité de reculer⁷, comme les Syracusains, vers tous les points du port. — Quant à passer au large pour leurs évolutions, cela leur serait impossible, puisque c’était précisément du côté de la mer que les Syracusains attaqueraient et pourraient reculer à leur gré; sans compter que les Athéniens auraient contre eux Plemmyrion, et que l’entrée du port avait peu de largeur.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.36 focus

A la nouvelle de leur approehe, les Syracusains résolurent de les prévenir et de tenter de nouveau le sort des armes sur les deux éléments avec les forces qu’ils avaient réunies. Ils firent subir à leur flotte les modifications dont le précédent combat leur avait démontré l’utilité. Ils abattirent l’extrémité des proues de leurs vaisseaux, afin de les fortifier en les accourcissant ; ils adaptèrent aux étraves de lourdes épotides, solidement arc-boutées contre les deux flancs du navire, sur une longueur de six coudées en dedans et en dehors. C’était la disposition employée par les Corinthiens à Naupacte, lorsqu’ils avaient combattu de l’avant. Les Syracusains espéraust avoir ainsi l’avantage sur les vaisseaux athéniens différemment construits et dont la proue était légère, parce que leur manœuvre favorite consistait moins à heurter de l’avant qu’l tourner le navire ennemi. C’était pour les Syracusains une circonstance éminemment heureuse que d’avoir à combattu dans le grand port, où une foule de vaisseaux seraient entassés dans une enceint erétrécie.En attaquant de pointe, ils briseraient l’avant des bâtiments ennemis, dont les proues faibles et creuses ne résisteraient pas au choc d’éperons vigoureux et massifs. Le manque de place empêcherait les Athéniens d’user de la tactique où ils excellaient, savoir : de tourner et dè traverser la ligne ennemie ; car les Syracusains ne leur permettraient pas de faire des trouées, et le peu de largeur du port rendrait impossibles les circuits. Ainsi la manœuvre qu'on avait d’abord imputée à l’inhabileté de leurs pilotes, celle de heurter de i’épe-ron, tournerait à leur avantage et leur assurerait la supériorité. Une fois repoussés, les Athéniens ne pourraient reculeT que vers la terre, à petite distance, vers l’étroite lisière occupée par leur camp, tandis que les Syracusains auraient le champ libre. Si les Athéniens venaient à être enfoncés, ils se porteraient tous ensemble sur le même point, s’embarrasseraient faute d’espace, et tomberaient dans la confusion ; — en effet, rien ne leur fut plus nuisible, dans toutes les rencontres, que de n’avoir pas, comme les Syracusains, toute l’étendue du port pour manœuvrer; — quant à prendre le large pour les tourner, cela ne leur serait pas possible, car les Syracusains seraient les maîtres de l’attaque et de la retraite vers la haute mer, sans compter que les Athéniens auraient contre eux le Piem-myrion et l’étranglement de la passe.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.36.1 focus

[1] The Syracusans, meanwhile, hearing of their approach, wished to make another trial with their fleet, and also with their land-force, which they had been collecting for the very purpose of striking a blow before the Athenian reinforcements came.

[2] They had prepared the fleet generally in such a way as, after the experience of the former sea-fight, seemed likely to offer some advantage, and in particular had shortened the prows of the ships, and had made them stouter by attaching to them thick catheads and stretching underneath stay-beams extending from them to the ships' sides for the length of six cubits both inside and outside the vessel, adopting the same plan as that followed by the Corinthians when they reconstructed their ships at the prows for the battle fought against the Athenian fleet at Naupactus.

[3] For the Syracusans thought that, in a contest with the ships of the Athenians which had not been built in the same manner for defence against their own, but were of light structure about the prows, inasmuch as the Athenians did not use prow-to-prow attacks so much as deploying and ramming the sides¹—they themselves would not be at a disadvantage, and that the fighting in the Great Harbour, where there would be many ships in a narrow space, would be favourable to them; for by employing prow-to-prow attacks they would crush the prows of the enemy's ships, striking as they would with beaks stout and solid against hollow and weak ones. The Athenians, on the other hand, would not find it possible in the narrow space to use either the deploying or the breaking-through manoeuvre, on their skilled use of which they depended most;

[4] for they themselves would as far as possible give them no opportunity of using the latter, and the narrow space would prevent them from deploying. But on the other hand they themselves would chiefly employ that method of crashing into their opponents prow to prow which had formerly been imputed to the ignorance of their pilots, because they would find it greatly to their advantage to do so;

[5] for it would not be possible for the Athenians, if forced out of line, to back water in any other direction than towards the land, and that, too, for only a short distance and to a short stretch of shore—the space in front of their own camp—inasmuch as the Syracusans would command the rest of the harbour.

[6] And the enemy, if they were forced to yield at any point, would be driven together into a small space and all to the same point, so that they would fall foul of each other and be thrown into confusion—the very thing that caused the Athenians most damage in all the fighting there, since it was not possible for them, as it was for the Syracusans, to back water to any part of the harbour. The Syracusans saw, moreover, that the Athenians would not be able to sail round into open water, since they themselves would control not only their entrance into the harbour from the sea outside, but also their backing out of the harbour into the sea, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.36.1 focus

[1] The Syracusans, in the mean time, hearing of their approach, wished to make a second attempt with their fleet and other forces on shore, which they were collecting for this very object, being desirous of striking a blow before they came.

[2] Now they had equipped the rest of their navy according as they saw, from the result of the former sea-fight, that they would obtain any advantage; and having cut down their ships' prows into a less compass, they made them firmer than usual, by fixing stout cheeks to them, and attaching ¹ stays from these to the ships' sides, for the length of six cubits both inside and outside the vessel; in the very same way as the Corinthians had equipped their ships ahead against the squadron at Naupactus, and then proceeded to engage it.

[3] For the Syracusans thought that in this way they would have an advantage against the Athenian vessels, which were not in the same manner built to resist them, but were slight ahead, (because they did not charge prow to prow so much as on the side, after taking a circuit;) and, moreover, that the battle being fought in the larger harbour, against a great number of ships in no great space, would be in their favour; for that by charging stem to stem they would stave in their prows, striking as they would with solid and stout beaks against hollow and weak ones.

[4] Nor would the Athenians in their narrow room have opportunity ² of sailing round or cutting through their line, the manoeuvres of their naval science in which they most confided; for they themselves, to the best of their power, would not allow them to cut through their line, and the want of room would prevent their making a circuit.

[5] And what was before thought to be want of skill in masters, namely, to charge stein to stem, was the very method they would chiefly adopt; for they would have the advantage in it; as the Athenians, if forced out of the line, would have no means of backing water in any direction but towards shore, and that, too, at only a short distance from them, and for a short space, namely, just opposite their own encampment. The rest of the harbour they should themselves command;

[6] and the enemy, if forced at any point, by crowding together into a confined space, and all to the same point, would run foul of each other, and be thrown into confusion; (the very thing, indeed, which most hurt the. Athenians in all their sea-fights, since they had not, like the Syracusans, the power of retreating over the whole harbour.) And as for making a circuit into clearer sea-room, since they themselves commanded the entrance from, and the retreat into, the open deep, they would not be able to do it; especially as Plemyrium would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.36.1 focus

[1] Syracusani vero interea quum eos coolra se venire audirent , belli fortunam classe rursus experiri volebant, et reliquo peditatus apparatu, quem ad boc ipsum ante eorum adventum, praecipere occasionem cupientes, cogebant

[2] Instruxerant autem classem quum aliis rebus ita, ut ex superiore navali proelio se fore meliore conditione oollifebsBt, tum etiam navium proras in exiguam spatium coactas firmiores reddiderunt, et epotidas crassas proris imposoe-runt, iisqoe tigna obliqua, quibus ese sustinerentur, junxerant ad navium parietes pertingentia, spatio fere senum cubito-ram et intus et extra, quo modo et Corinthii advertas naves, qu» ad Naupactum erant, per proras pugnaverant

[3] Existimarunt enim Syracusani, adversus Atheniensium naves, qu» contra non eodem modo erant aedificat», sed circa proram graciles erant, quod illi non tam advertis proris, quam navibus circumactis incurrere consuevissent, se non deteriore conditione futuros, et navale praelium, quod in magno portu a multis navibus in non magno spatio committendum erat, e re sua factum iri; se enim advenis proris incurrentes diffracturos illorum proras, si solidis crassisque rostris vacuas et infirmas quaterent;

[4] Atheniensibus vero in angusto loci spatio nullam fore fecullatem aut naves circumagendi, aut eas per mediam snam classem educendi, qua artificii parte potissimum illi confiderent;« ipsos enim pro viribus hoc quidem praestituros, ut mrilam ipsis per mediam suam classem transeundi facultatem darent ; illud vero ab ipsis loci angustiis impeditum iri, ne naves circumagerent.

[5] Quae autem prius gubernatorum inscitia esse videbatur, quod adversis proris confligerent, et maxime se ipsos usuros; hac enim ratione se optima cnndr tione futuros; Atheniensibus enim, si a se propellerentur, non fore facultatem retrocedendi alio, nisi ad terram, idque ab exiguo spado et in exiguum spacium, juxta ipsa sua castra. Cetero vero portu se ipsos potituros,

[6] et illos. sicubi premerentur, confertos in exiguum spacium et omnes in unum, collisos inter se perturbatum iri, id quod etiam in omnibus navalibus proeliis plurimum Atheniensibus nocebat, quod iis non in omnem portum, ut Syracusanis, retrocedere liceret. In apertum vero mare navibus circumactis evadendi facultatem illos non habituros, quod penes se futurum esset, a pelago et invadere et retrocedere, praecipue vero, quod et Plemyrium illis infestum esset futurum, et quod portus ostium non amplum esset.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.36 focus

In questo i Siracusani informati che l' armata nemica era in corso contro loro, pensavano di provarsi da capo a combattere con le navi e con le forze di terra che a quest’oggetto adunavano , per prevenire l’arrivo di quella. Apparecchiavano tutto il bisognevole per ]a flotta nel modo che dal passato combattimento aveano compreso dover riuscire più utile, scorciavano le prore alle navi per renderle più ferme, e vi applicavano dei grossi oretv chioni, dai quali partivano dei puntelli di circa sei cubiti all’ interno e all’esterno del bordo, in quella guisa medesima che i Corintii fornirono le loro uavi da prora, e combatterono contro la flotta di Naupatto. Discorrevano essi che siccome le navi nemiche uon erano costruite in quella foggia , ma aveano deboli le prore, avvegnaché usassero non di assalire con queste di fronte, ma facendo le volte '9 così e' non sarebbero in peggior condizione. Seuza di che la battaglia che non con molte navi seguirebbe nel porto grande (spazio non troppo ampio) tornerebbe a loro vantaggio ; perchè andando all’assalto colla fronte delle navi, sfascerebbero le prore nemiche col dar dentro coit saldi e grossi rostri, ad esse vuote e deboli. All’opposto gli Ateniesi in quel luogo stretto non potrebbero nè volteggiare nè tramezzare (due manovre nelle quali soprattutto confidano), stàntechè essi a tutta possa non permetterebbero loro di tramezzare , e la ristrettezza del luogo gl’ impedirebbe dal volteggiare. Il modo da tenersi nella battaglia sarebbe più che altro quello attribuito prima all’ imperizia de’ piloti, cioè, l’urtarsi di froute prora contro prora : imperciocché i nemici, venendo respinti, non avranno altra ritirata che verso terra , e questa a breve distanza e in luogo augusto, propio presso l’accampamento. Del rimanente del porto sarebbero padroni essi Siracusani ; e qualora i nemici fossero incalzati a forza , col loro riunirsi in un medesimo luogo e ristretto , urtandosi tra loro isaranno in iscompiglio. Ed in fine (ciò clic principalmente nocque agli Ateniesi in tutte le battaglie navali , non potendo essi retrocedere in tutto il porto come i vSiracusani ) se volteggiando volessero trarsi al largo , non potrebbero farlo, essendo essi padroni di vogar contro loro dall’alto e di cacciarli indietro ; tanto più che sarebbero infestati anche da Plemmirio , e la bocca drl porto non era grande.

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. 413
v.
Chr.

2. 18) Heilmann meint, die Widerhalte (Strebebalken) seien durch eine
Oesfnung in die Stirnwand des Schiffes hineingegangen und hätten sich dort etwa an einem
Pfeiler in einem Winkel eingeschlossen, dessen Schenkel außer dem Schiffe an die
schrägen. an beiden Seiten des Schiffes befestigten und vorne zusammenlaufenden
Sturmbalken befestigt gewesen und dieselben folglich unterstützt hätten (Kr.).

3. 413v
Chr.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.36

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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