Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 5.111

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

Athener: „Nun von diesen Dingen könnte auch euch
etwas treffen, und ihr babt darüber auch schon Erfahrung und wißt,
wohl, daß die Athener auch nicht eine einzige Belagerung aus Furcht
vor Andern aufgegeben haben. Wir bemerken übrigens, daß ihr trotz ¹
eurer Erklärung, ihr wolltet über die Art eurer Rettung berathen,,
in dieser so langen Unterredung auch nicht das Mindeste vorgebracht
habt, worauf die Menschen sonst Vertrauen setzen und die Hoffnung
auf Rettung gründen; > sondern, worauf ihr am Meisten baut, das
liegt noch im Reiche der Ungewißheit, und was euch wirklich zu Gebote
steht, ist unzureichend um euch vor dem zu retten, was euch bereits
kampfbereit gegenüber steht. Ihr werdet großen Unverstand beweisen,
wenn ihr nicht-noch in euch geht und-einen klügeren Entschluß faßt.
Denn ihr werdet euch doch nicht durch das Wort ..Ehre" bestimmen
lassen, welches so oft die Menschen in der schimpflichsten Lage und
den augenscheinlichsten Gefahren hat umkommen lassen! Wie Viele
haben-shcon vorausgesehen, welchem Verderben sie in die Arme
rennen, und doch, hingerissen durch die Macht des verführerischen Begriffs,
der „Schande" heißt, überwältigt also von einem bloßen Worte, sich
freiwillig in das wirklichste und unerträglichste Elend gestürzt, und
mehr durch Unverstand als durch Unglück sich die schimpflichste
Schmach zugezogen. Davor also, wenn ihr wohl berathen seid, hütet
euch und haltet es nicht für schimpflich, euch vor einer so mächtigen
Stadt zu beugen, welche die mäßige Forderung an euch stellt, ihre
zinsbaren Bundesgenossen zu werden, ohne von eurem Gebiete etwas
zu verlieren. Wenn euch die freie Wahl anheimgegeben ist zwischen
Krieg und ruhiger Sicherheit, so besteht nicht hartnäckig auf der
schlechteren Wahl. Denn die kommen am Weitesten, die dem
Gleichtsarken nicht nachgeben, dem Mächtigeren sich geziemend nähern und
dem Schwächeren gegenüber Mäßigung üben. Nun bedenkt euch also
wohl, wenn wir uns jetzt zurückziehen, und haltet eS euch immer im
Gedächtniß, daß es sich darum handelt, ob ihr ein Vaterland haben
werdet! Ihr habt nur dieß Eine, und von Einem Entschlüsse hängt
sein Untergang oder seine Rettung ab!"

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 5.111.1 focus

ΑΘ.

τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι’ ἄλλων φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν.

ΑΘ.

ἐνθυμούμεθα δὲ ὅτι φήσαντες περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσειν οὐδὲν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ εἰρήκατε ᾧ ἄνθρωποι ἂν πιστεύσαντες νομίσειαν σωθήσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὑμῶν τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρότατα ἐλπιζόμενα μέλλεται, τὰ δ’ ὑπάρχοντα βραχέα πρὸς τὰ ἤδη ἀντιτεταγμένα περιγίγνεσθαι. πολλήν τε ἀλογίαν τῆς διανοίας παρέχετε, εἰ μὴ μεταστησάμενοι ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι τῶνδε σωφρονέστερον γνώσεσθε.

ΑΘ.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπί γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψεσθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεσπάσατο ἡσσηθεῖσι τοῦ ῥήματος ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἑκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχῃ προσλαβεῖν.

ΑΘ.

ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, φυλάξεσθε, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι μέτρια προκαλουμένης, ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς, καὶ δοθείσης αἱρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας μὴ τὰ χείρω φιλονικῆσαι· ὡς οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἴκουσι, τοῖς δὲ κρείσσοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥσσους μέτριοί εἰσι, πλεῖστ’ ἂν ὀρθοῖντο.

ΑΘ.

σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ μεταστάντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε πολλάκις ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος βουλεύεσθε, ἧς μιᾶς πέρι καὶ ἐς μίαν βουλὴν τυχοῦσάν τε καὶ μὴ κατορθώσασαν ἔσται.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 5.111.1 focus

[1] Ath. Let them take which course of these they will that you also may find by experience and not be ignorant that the Athenians never yet gave over siege for fear of any diversion upon others.

[2] But we observe that, whereas you said you would consult of your safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said anything which a man relying on could hope to be preserved by; the strongest arguments you use are but future hopes; and your present power is too short to defend you against the forces already arranged against you. You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless, excluding us, you make amongst yourselves some more discreet conclusion;

[3] for [when you are by yourselves], you will no more set your thoughts upon shame, which, when dishonour and danger stand before men's eyes, for the most part undoeth them. For many, when they have foreseen into what dangers they were entering, have nevertheless been so overcome by that forcible word dishonour that that which is but called dishonour hath caused them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities, and so to draw upon themselves really, by their own madness, a greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune.

[4] Which you, if you deliberate wisely, will take heed of, and not think shame to submit to a most potent city, and that upon so reasonable conditions as of league and of enjoying your own under tribute; and seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do not out of peevishness take the worse. For such do take the best course who, though they give no way to their equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their superiors, and towards their inferiors use moderation.

[5] Consider of it, therefore, whilst we stand off; and have often in your mind that you deliberate of your country, which is to be happy or miserable in and by this one consultation.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 5.111.1 focus

‘Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any.

But we are struck by the fact, that after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this.

You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall willfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune.

This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas , when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best.

Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin.’

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 5.111 focus

Athener: „Sollte es wirklich dazu kommen, so wißt auch
. ihr doch aus Erfahrung, daß die Athener noch nie aus Furcht
vor anderen Schwierigkeiten eine Belagerung aufgegeben
haben. Nachdem ihr uns aber gesagt, ihr wolltet mit uns
darüber verhandeln, was zur Sicherung eures Landes ge
schehen könnte, nimmt uns wunder, daß ihr euch in dieser
langen Unterredung noch mit keinem Worte über Mittel und
Wege geäußert habt, von denen man sich sonst Hilfe in der
Not verspricht. Die wirksamste Hilfe, auf die ihr hofft, steht
weit aus, eure eigenen Kräfte aber sind zu gering, um euch
damit auch nur gegen die euch schon jetzt gegenüberstehende
Macht zu behaupten. Es wäre deshalb sehr unklug von euch,
wolltet ihr nicht noch einen vernünftigeren Entschluß fassen,
wenn ihr uns habt abtreten lassen. Fallt nur nicht etwa gar
auf die Ehre hinein, die den Menschen so oft in Gefahren
verderblich geworden ist, die sie voraussehen mußten und sich
nur durch schimpfliche Unvernunft selbst zugezogen hatten.
In der Tat ist schon mancher, obwohl er voraussah, wie
das enden würde, durch den verführerischen Klang deS
Wortes Ehre verleitet worden, sich freiwillig rettungslos ins
Verderben zu stürzen, und mehr durch eigene Torheit als
durch Unglück zuschanden geworden. Seid also vernünftig
und hütet euch davor. Glaubt nicht, es ginge gegen eure
Ehre, den Widerstand gegen eine Großmacht aufzugeben, die
nichts weiter von euch verlangt als den Anschluß an ihren
Bund und die Entrichtung einer Abgabe von eurem Lande,
in dessen Besitz ihr auch ferner bleiben sollt. Noch habt ihr
die Wahl zwischen Krieg und Sicherheit; laßt euch nicht durch
Ehrgeiz zu einer verkehrten Wahl verleiten. Wer seinesgleichen
die Zähne zeigt, sich mit dem Mächtigeren zu stellen weiß und
mit dem Schwächeren säuberlich verfährt, kommt am besten
durch. Nun überlegt euch die Sache, wenn wir abgetreten
sind, und beherzigt dabei wieder und wieder, daß eS sich diesmal¹
um euer Vaterland handelt, dessen Glück und Untergang von
eurer jetzt zu fassenden Entschließung abhängt."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 5.111 focus

CXI. L es A théniens. « A cet égard vous n’ignorez pas, et vous pourrez apprendre par votre propre expé- ¹ rience, que jamais les Athéniens n’ont abandonné un seul siége par crainte de qui que ce fût. Mais nous étions convenus d’aviser aux moyens de vous sauver; et nous nous apercevons que, dans le cours d'un si long entretien, vous n’avez pas dit un mot sur lequel on puisse fonder quelque espoir de salut. Le plus sûr de vos ressources n’est qu’en espérance et dans l’avenir; vos forces réelles sont peu de chose pour triompher de celles qui sont là présentes et prêtes à attaquer. Vous faites preuve d’un grand aveuglement si, pendant qu’il en est temps encore, vous ne prenez pas, quand nous serons retirés, une résolution plus sage. N’écoutez donc pas ce faux point d’honneur qui perd si souvent les hommes, en les jetant au milieu de périls manifestes d’où ils ne peuvent sortir que par la honte. Car bien souvent, tout en voyant clairement où l’on marche, on se laisse entraîner par la force irrésistible de ce qu’on appelle l’honneur. On est subjugué par un mot; et, de fait, on se jette volontairement dans d’irréparables maux; et la honte qu’on en recueille est d’autant plus grande, qu’elle est l’oeuvre de la folie, et non de la fortune. C’est là ce dont vous vous garderez si vous êtes sages : vous ne verrez aucun déshonneur à céder à une grande puissance, modérée dans ses prétentions, qui vous offre son alliance avec jouissance de votre territoire, à la condition d’un tribut; quand vous avez le choix entre la guerre et votre sûreté, vous ne serez pas jaloux de prendre le plus mauvais parti. Car ne pas céder à ses égaux, être prudent avec les forts, modéré avec les faibles, c’est mettre de son côté les chances les plus favorables. Réfléchissez donc encore quand nous nous serons retirés; songez plus d’une fois que vous délibérez sur votre patrie, que vous n’avez qu’elle seule, et qu’une seule délibération, favorable ou funeste, va en décider. »

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 5.111 focus

Les Athéniens. C’est une expérience qui a déjà été iaite. Jamais, vous le savez, la crainte d’autrui n’a fait aban-lonner un siège aux Athéniens. Mais nous étions convenus de lélibérer sur votre salut; et nous remarquons que, dans cette liscussion prolongée, vous n’avez pas encore articulé un seul not qui puisse Vous inspirer l’assurance de votre conserva-,ion. Vos plus fermes soutiens consistent en espérances loin-aines, et vos forces disponibles sont bien peu de chose pour riompher de celles qui se déploient sous vos yeux. Ce serait e comble de l’aveuglement que de ne pas prendre, après notre lépart, une résolution prudente. Vous ne serez pas les jouets de ;e fol amour-propre qui, dans les dangers manifestes et sans gloire, mène les hommes à leur ruine. Combien de gens, sans se faire illusion sur les conséquences de leur conduite, se laissent entraîner par le prestige d’un seul mot, l’honneur! Infatués de sa vertu magique, ils se jettent de gaieté de cœurdans des maux sans remède, et se couvrent d’un opprobre d’autant plus grand qu’il est dû à leur folie plutôt qu’à la fortune. C’est là ce que vous éviterez, si vous écoutez la raison. Tous ne tiendrez pas à déshonneur de céder à une ville puissante, qui borne ses prétentions à vous demander de devenir ses allie tributaires, tout en conservant vos biens. Libres d’opter entre la paix et la guerre, vous ne préférerez pas le mauvais parti. Résister à ses égaux, respecter les forts, ménager les faibles, tel est le moyen de se maintenir. Réfléchissez donc mûrement après notre départ, et dites-vous bien que c’est ici une question de vie ou de mort pour votre patrie ; que vous n’en arei qu’une, et que son avenir dépendra d’une seule résolution bonne ou mauvaise. »

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 5.111.1 focus

[1] ATH. “Of these contingencies one or another might indeed happen; but they would not be new to our experience, and you yourselves are not unaware that the Athenians have never in a single instance withdrawn from a siege through fear of any foe.

[2] However, we cannot but reflect that, although you said¹ that you would take counsel concerning your deliverance, you have not in this long discussion advanced a single argument that ordinary men² would put their confidence in if they expected to be delivered. On the contrary, your strongest grounds for confidence are merely cherished hopes whose fulfilment is in the future, whereas your present resources are too slight, compared with those already arrayed against you, for any chance of success.

[3] And you exhibit a quite unreasonable attitude of mind if you do not even now, after permitting us to withdraw, come to some decision that is wiser than your present purpose. For surely you will not take refuge in that feeling which most often brings men to ruin when they are confronted by dangers that are clearly foreseen and therefore disgraceful—the fear of such disgrace. For many men, though they can still clearly foresee the dangers into which they are drifting, are lured on by the power of a seductive word—the thing called disgrace—until, the victims of a phrase, they are indeed plunged, of their own act, into irretrievable calamities, and thus incur in addition a disgrace that is more disgraceful, because associated with folly rather than with misfortune.

[4] Such a course you will avoid, if you take wise counsel, and you will not consider it degrading to acknowledge yourselves inferior to the most powerful state when it offers you moderate terms—to become allies, keeping your own territory but paying tribute—and, when a choice is given you of war or safety, not to hold out stubbornly for the worse alternative. Since those who, while refusing to submit to their equals, yet comport themselves wisely towards their superiors and are moderate towards their inferiors—these, we say, are most likely to prosper.

[5] Consider, then, once more after our withdrawal, and reflect many times in your deliberations that your fatherland is at stake, your one and only fatherland, and that upon one decision only will depend her fate for weal or woe.”

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 5.111.1 focus

[1] Ath.

On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others.

[2]

But it strikes us, that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allowing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this.

[3]

For you surely will not betake yourselves to that shame, which in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, though they foresee all the time what they are running into, the thing which is called disgrace, by the influence of a seducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and to incur a shame more shameful as the attendant on folly than on fortune.

[4]

Against this then you, if you take good advice, will be on your guard; and will not consider it discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, when it offers you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary allies, with the enjoyment of your own country; and when a choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not yield to their equals, while they keep on good terms with their superiors, and are moderate to their inferiors, they would be most successful.

[5]

Consider then, even after we have retired; and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you are consulting, ¹ which you can do but for one country, and for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 5.111.1 focus

[1] Ath. Horum quidem laborum vobis quoque fortasse quippiam acciderit ita, ut rem experti sitis nec ignoretis Athenienses a nulla unquam obsidione propter aliorum metum recessisse.

[2] Animadvertimus autem, vos, quamvis de salute vestra vos consultaturos dixeritis, nullam tamen in tanto sermone mentionem ullius rei fecisse, qua homines freti se servatum iri arbitrentur, sed ea quidem, in quibus firmissimum vestrae salutis praesidium collocatis, in spe et cunctatione posita sunt, praesentes vero opes parvas sunt ad vos tutandos adversus opes jam contra vos instructas. Quapropter magnam declaratis consilii amentiam, nisi nobis semotis aliquid aliud his prudentius adhuc decernatis.

[3] Non autem certe quidem ad verecundiam, que in foedis et apertis periculis homines plerumque perdit, jam vos convertetis. Multos enim, quamvis adbuc manifeste cernerent, in qualia ferrentur, tamen ea, que turpitudo vocatur, vi nominis animos allicientis, quum verbo superati essent, eo adduxit, ut re ipsa sua sponte in gravissimas calamitates inciderent, et dedecus turpius propter suair stultitiam potius quam propter fortunam acciperent,

[4]

Quod vos, si recte consultaveris, cavebitis, nec indecorum censebitis potentissima* civitati cedere, quae commodis conditionibus provocat, ut socii sitis, et vestrum agrum retinentes, tribulum pendatis, neve, belli et incolumitatis optione data, contentionis studio deteriora sequamini; nam qui paribus quidem non cedunt, erga superiores vero recte se gerunt, et inferioribus se moderatos praebent, ii plerumque res bene gesserint.

[5] Considerate igitur etiam nobis semotis, et saepius vobiscum cogitate* vos de patria consultare , quae una est [et cujus salus] in una bac consultatione, prout haec vel felix fuerit vel rem male gesserit, vertetur.«

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 5.111 focus

Aten. « Quanto a queste minacce, forse forse potrebbe toccar pure a voi a conoscer per prova che gli Ateniesi non si sono mai levati nemmeno da un solo assedio per paura di altri. Riflettiamo poi che dopo esservi protestati di voler deliberare della vostra salvezza , non avete in sì lungo parlare detto nulla che possa umanamente indurre fiducia di restar salvi. I vostri più validi appoggi sono nel futuro della speranza : quelli che ora avete sono piccoli per superare le forze che vi stanno a fronte. Ond’è che mostrate grande irragioncvolezza delibammo se, allontanati noi dal l'assemblea, non vi appigliate ad un partito più saggio di questo. Voi per certo non vi volterete a quel puntiglio d’onore che ne' pericoli più manifesti e vergognosi rovina d’ordinario gli uomini ; avvegnaché questo così detto puntiglio d’onore colla forza del suo nome attrattivo , molti che pure aveano innanzi agli occhi i precipizi ove correvano , e che si erano lasciati vincere da quel vocabolo , gli ha bel bello tirati di fatto in calamità immedicabili , coll’aggiunta di più vergognosa vergogna, perchè causata da stoltezza e non da caso. Lo che voi schiverete , qualora deliberiate bene. E non crediate sconvenevole il cedere a città potentissima che vi chiama alla sua lega con patti discreti, restando padroni del paese vostro gravato solo di tributo ; e non vogliate perfidiare nel partito peggiore quando v’è data Teletta tra la guerra e la sicurezza. Conciossiachè coloro che non cedono agli uguali, e si portano acconciamente coi più forti, e sono discreti coi più deboli ; questi assicurano più fermamente lo stato» Laonde pensateci anche dopo che ci saremo ritirati, e considerate molte volte che deliberate intorno alla patria, la quale in questo e per questo solo consiglio vostro sarà o fortunata o depressa ».

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. 416
v.
Chr.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 5.111

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

ΑΘ.

τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι’ ἄλλων φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν.

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

ΑΘ. τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι’ ἄλλων φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν.

Notes on the current edition

Stable identifiers

ΑΘ.

τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι’ ἄλλων φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν.