On the origin of the term terra Italia, or ; of that fine which is called ; concerning the reason for the name and on the Aternian law; and in what words the fine used to be pronounced in ancient days.

1 TIMAEUS, in the History ¹ which he composed in the Greek language about the affairs of the Roman people, and Marcus Varro in his Human Antiquities, ² wrote that the land of Italy derived its name from a Greek word, oxen in the old Greek tongue being called i)taloi/; for in Italy there was a great abundance of cattle, and in that land pastures are numerous and grazing is a frequent employment.

Furthermore, we may infer that it was for the same reason—namely, since Italy at that time so abounded in cattle—that the fine was established which is called consisting of two sheep and thirty oxen each day, obviously proportionate to the abundance of oxen and the scarcity of sheep. But when a fine of that sort, consisting of cattle and sheep, was pronounced by a magistrate, oxen and sheep were brought, now of small, again of greater value; and this made the penalty of the fine unequal. Therefore later, by the Aternian law, ³ the value of a sheep was fixed at ten pieces of brass, of the cattle at a hundred apiece. Now the fine is that of one sheep. The fine is of that number which we have mentioned, beyond which it is not lawful to impose a fine for a period of successive days; ⁴ and for that reason it is called that is, greatest and heaviest.

When therefore even now, according to ancient usage, either the or the fine is pronounced by Roman magistrates, it is regularly observed that oves ( ) be given the masculine gender; and Marcus Varro has thus recorded the words of the law by which the smallest fine was pronounced: ⁵ ; and they declared that the fine did not appear to be legal unless that gender was used.

Furthermore, Marcus Varro, in the twenty-first book of his Human Antiquities, also says ⁶ that the word for fine ( multa) is itself not Latin, but Sabine, and he remarks that it endured even to within his own memory in the speech of the Samnites, who are sprung from the Sabines. But the upstart herd of grammarians have asserted that this word, like some others, is used on the principle of opposites. ⁷ Furthermore, since it is a usage and custom in language for us to say even now, as the greater number of the early men did, multam dixit and multa dicta est, I have thought it not out of place to note that Marcus Cato spoke otherwise. ⁸ For in the fourth book of his Origins are these words: But it may seem that Cato changed the word with an eye to propriety, since the fine was imposed in camp and in the army, not pronounced in the comitium or in the presence of the people.

That the word elegantia in earlier days was not used of a more refined nature, but of excessive fastidiousness in dress and mode of life, and was a term of reproach.

1 IT was not customary to call a man elegans, or by way of praise, but up to the time of Marcus Cato that word as a rule was a reproach, not a compliment. And this we may observe both in some other writers, and also in the work of Cato entitled Carmen de Moribus. In this book is the following passage: ^{9 10} It is evident from these words that in days of old the man was so called, not because of refinement of character, but because he was excessively particular and extravagant in his attire and mode of life.

Later, the man ceased indeed to be reproached, but he was deemed worthy of no commendation, unless his elegance was very moderate. Thus Marcus Tullius commended Lucius Crassus and Quintus Scaevola, not for mere elegance, but for elegance combined with great frugality. he says, ¹¹

Besides this, in the same work of Cato, I recall also these scattered and cursory remarks: ¹² says he, This sentiment too, of conspicuous truthfulness, is to be found in the same work: ¹³

The nature and degree of the variety of usage in the particle pro; and some examples of the differences.

1 WHEN I have leisure from legal business, and walk or ride for the sake of bodily exercise, I have the habit sometimes of silently meditating upon questions that are trifling indeed and insignificant, even negligible in the eyes of the uneducated, but are nevertheless highly necessary for a thorough understanding of the early writers and a knowledge of the Latin language. For example, lately in the retirement of Praeneste, ¹⁴ as I was taking my evening walk alone, I began to consider the nature and degree of variety in the use of certain particles in the Latin language; for instance, in the preposition pro. For I saw that we had one use in and another in ; that Marcus Cato used it in still another way in the fourth book of his Origins: ¹⁵ and also in the fifth book: ¹⁶ Also is one form of expression, another, ¹⁷ another, another, and still another. Now, I thought that anyone who imagined that all these expressions were wholly alike and equal, or were entirely different, was in error; for I was of the opinion that this variety came from the same origin and source, but yet that its end was not the same. And this surely anyone will easily understand, ¹⁸ if he attentively considers the question and has a somewhat extensive use and knowledge of the early language.

How Quintus Ennius rivalled ¹⁹ certain verses of Euripides.

1 IN the Hecuba of Euripides there are some verses remarkable and brilliant in their diction, their thought and their terseness. Hecuba is speaking to Ulysses: ²⁰ These verses Quintus Ennius, when he translated that tragedy, rivalled with no little success. The verses of Ennius are the same in number, as follows: ²¹ Ennius, as I have said, did well; but yet ignobiles and opulenti do not seem to express the full force of a)docou/ntwn and dokou/ntwn; for not all who are obscure are contemned, nor are the great all revered.

Some brief notes about the Pyrronian philosophers and the Academics; and of the difference between them.

1 THOSE whom we call the Pyrronian philosophers are designated by the Greek name skeptikoi/, or which means about the same as and For they decide nothing and determine nothing, but are always engaged in inquiring and considering what there is in all nature concerning which it is possible to decide and determine. And moreover they believe that they do not see or hear anything clearly, but that they undergo and experience something like seeing and hearing; but they are in doubt as to the nature and character of those very things which cause them those experiences, and they deliberate about them: and they declare that in everything assurance and absolute truth seem so beyond our grasp, owing to the mingling and confusing of the indications of truth and falsehood, that any man who is not rash and precipitate in his judgment ought to use the language which they say was used by Pyrro, the founder of that philosophy: For they deny that proofs of anything and its real qualities can be known and understood, and they try in many ways to point this out and demonstrate it. On this subject Favorinus too with great keenness and subtlety has composed ten books, which he entitled Purrwnei=oi Tro/poi, or The Pyrronian Principles. ²²

It is besides a question of long standing, which has been discussed by many Greek writers, whether the Pyrronian and Academic philosophers differ at all, and to what extent. For both are called since both affirm nothing and believe that nothing is understood. But they say that appearances, which they call fantasi/ai, are produced from all objects, not according to the nature of the objects themselves, but according to the condition of mind or body of those to whom those appearances come. Therefore they call absolutely all things that affect men's senses ta\ pro/s ti. ²³ This expression means that there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have and seem to be such as their appearance is while they are seen, and such as they are formed by our senses, to which they come, not by the things themselves, from which they have proceeded. But although the Pyrronians and the Academics express themselves very much alike about these matters, yet they are thought to differ from each other both in certain other respects and especially for this reason—because the Academics do, as it were, ²⁴ the very fact that nothing can be comprehended, and, as it were, decide that nothing can be decided, while the Pyrronians assert that not even that can by any means be regarded as true, because nothing is regarded as true.

That at Rome women did not swear by Hercules nor men by Castor.

1 IN our early writings neither do Roman women swear by Hercules nor the men by Castor. But why the women did not swear by Hercules is evident, since they abstain from sacrificing to Hercules. On the other hand, why the men did not name Castor in oaths is not easy to say. Nowhere, then, is it possible to find an instance, among good writers, either of a woman saying or a man, ; but edepol, which is an oath by Pollux, is common to both man and woman. Marcus Varro, however, asserts ²⁵ that the earliest men were wont to swear neither by Castor nor by Pollux, but that this oath was used by women alone and was taken from the Eleusinian initiations; that gradually, however, through ignorance of ancient usage, men began to say edepol, and thus it became a customary expression; but that the use of by a man appears in no ancient writing.

That very old words which have become antiquated and obsolete ought not to be used.

1 To use words that are too antiquated and worn out, or those which are unusual and of a harsh and unpleasant novelty, seems to be equally faulty. But for my own part I think it more offensive and censurable to use words that are new, unknown and unheard of, than those that are trite and mean. Furthermore, I maintain that those words also seem new which are out of use and obsolete, even though they are of ancient date. ²⁶ In fact, it is a common fault of lately acquired learning, or o)yimaqi/a as the Greeks call it, to make a great point anywhere and everywhere, and in connection with any subject whatever, to talk about what you have never learned and of which you were long ignorant, when at last you have begun to know something about it. For instance, at Rome in my presence a man of experience and celebrated as a pleader, who had acquired a sudden and, so to speak, haphazard kind of education, was speaking before the prefect of the city and wished to say that a certain man lived upon poor and wretched food, ate bread made from bran, and drank flat and spoiled wine: said he, All who were present looked at one another, at first somewhat seriously, with a disturbed and inquiring aspect, wondering what in the world the two words meant; then presently they all burst into a laugh, as if he had said something in Etruscan or Gallic. Now that man had read that the farmers of ancient days called the chaff of grain apluda, and that the word was used by Plautus in the comedy entitled Astraba, ²⁷ if that play be the work of Plautus. He had also heard that flocces in the early language meant the lees of wine pressed from the skins of grapes, corresponding to the dregs of oil from olives. This he had read in the Polumeni ²⁸ of Caecilius, ²⁹ and he had saved up those two words as ornaments for his speeches.

Another Einfaltspinsel also, after some little reading of that kind, when his opponent requested that a case be postponed, said: And he bawled it out three or four times in a loud voice: A murmur began to arise from many of those who were present, as if in wonder at this monster of a word. But he, waving his arms and gesticulating, cried: And, in fact, this verse occurs in Lucilius' eleventh book: ³⁰

If trifling shuffler ( bovinator) with abusive tongue.

What Marcus Cato thought and said of Albinus, who, though a Roman, wrote a history of Rome in the Greek language, having first asked indulgence for his lack of skill in that tongue.

1 MARCUS CATO is said to have rebuked Aulus Albinus with great justice and neatness. Albinus, who had been consul with Lucius Lucullus, ³¹ composed a Roman History in the Greek language. In the introduction to his work he wrote to this effect: ³² that no one ought to blame him if he had written anything then in those books that was incorrect or inelegant; he continues, ; and accordingly he asked indulgence and freedom from adverse criticism in case he had made any errors. When Marcus Cato had read this, said he, said he, This is told in the thirteenth book of Cornelius Nepos' work On Famous Men. ³³

The story of the Milesian envoys and the orator Demosthenes, found in the works of Critolaus.

1 CRITOLAUS has written ³⁴ that envoys came from Miletus to Athens on public business, perhaps for the purpose of asking aid. Then they engaged such advocates as they chose, to speak for them, and the advocates, according to their instructions, addressed the people in behalf of the Milesians. Demosthenes vigorously opposed the demands of the Milesians, maintaining that the Milesians did not deserve aid, nor was it to the interest of the State to grant it. The matter was postponed to the next day. The envoys came to Demosthenes and begged him earnestly not to speak against them; he asked for money, and received the amount which he demanded. On the following day, when the case was taken up again, Demosthenes, with his neck and shoulders wrapped in thick wool, came forward before the people and said that he was suffering from quinsy and hence could not speak against the Milesians. Then one of the populace cried out that it was, not quinsy, but from which Demosthenes was suffering.

Demosthenes himself too, as Critolaus also relates, did not afterwards conceal that matter, but actually made a boast of it. For when he had asked Aristodemus, the player, what sum he had received for acting, and Aristodemus ³⁵ had replied, Demosthenes rejoined:

That Gaius Gracchus in a speech of his applied the story related above to the orator Demades, and not to Demosthenes; and a quotation of Gracchus' words.

1 THE story which in the preceding chapter we said was told by Critolaus about Demosthenes, Gaius Gracchus, in the speech Against the Aufeian Law, applied to Demades in the following words: ³⁶

The words of Publius Nigidius, in which he says that there is a difference between and

1 THESE are the very words of Publius Nigidius, ³⁷ a man of great eminence in the pursuit of the liberal arts, whom Marcus Cicero highly respected because of his talent and learning: He also adds this: He also had this on the same subject: says he, With variety, by Heaven! and neatness has Nigidius distinguished so many opinions relating to the same thing, as if he were constantly saying something new.

That the philosopher Chrysippus says that every word is ambiguous and of doubtful meaning, while Diodorus, on the contrary, thinks that no word is ambiguous.

1 CHRYSIPPUS asserts ³⁸ that every word is by nature ambiguous, since two or more things may be understood from the same word. But Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, says: said he,

What Titus Castricius thought about the wording of a sentence of Gaius Gracchus; and that he showed that it contributed nothing to the effectiveness of the sentence.

1 THE speech of Gaius Gracchus Against Publius Popilius ³⁹ was read before Titus Castricius, a teacher of the art of rhetoric and a man of sound and solid judgment. At the beginning of that speech the sentences were constructed with more care and regard for rhythm than was customary with the early orators. The words, arranged as I have said, are as follows:

Well then, the flow and rhythm of this well-rounded and smooth-flowing sentence pleased us to a remarkable and unparalleled degree, and still more the evidence that composition of that kind appealed even in those early days to Gaius Gracchus, a man of distinction and dignity. But when those very same words were read again and again at our request, we were admonished by Castricius to consider what the force and value of the thought was, and not to allow our ears to be charmed by the rhythm of a well-turned sentence and through mere pleasure to confuse our judgment as well.

And when by this admonition he had made us more alert, said he, said he, said he, said he,

The discreet and admirable reply of King Romulus as to his use of wine.

1 Lucius Piso FRUGI has shown an elegant simplicity of diction and thought in the first book of his Annals, when writing of the life and habits of King Romulus. His words are as follows: ⁴⁰

On ludibundus and errabundus and the suffix in words of that kind; that Laberius used amorabunda in the same way as ludibunda and errabunda; also that Sisenna in the case of a word of that sort made a new form.

1 LABERIUS in his Lake Avernus spoke ⁴² of a woman in love as amorabunda, coining a word in a somewhat unusual manner. Caesellius Vindex in his Commentary on Archaic Words said that this word was used on the same principle that ludibunda, ridibunda and errabunda are used for ludens, ridens and errans. But Terentius Scaurus, a highly distinguished grammarian of the time of the deified Hadrian, among other things which he wrote On the Mistakes of Caesellius, declared ⁴³ that about this word also he was wrong in thinking that ludens and ludibunda, ridens and ridibunda, errans and errabunda were identical. he says,

But why Scaurus was led to censure Caesellius on this point, I certainly could not understand. For there is no doubt that these words, each after its own kind, have the same meaning that is indicated by the words from which they are derived. But I should prefer to seem not to understand the meaning of or rather than charge Scaurus himself with lack of knowledge. But Scaurus ought rather, in censuring the commentaries of Caesellius, to have taken him to task for what he left unsaid; namely, whether ludibundus, ridibundus and errabundus differ at all from ludens, ridens and errans, and to what extent, and so with other words of the same kind; whether they differ only in some slight degree from their primitives, and what is the general force of the suffix which is added to words of that kind. For in examining a phenomenon of that nature that were a more pertinent inquiry, just as in vinulentus, lutulentus and turbulentus it is usual to ask whether that suffix is superfluous and without meaning, paragwgh/, as the Greeks say, ⁴⁴ or whether the suffix has some special force of its own.

However, in noting this criticism of Scaurus it occurred to me that Sisenna, in the fourth book of his Histories, used a word of the same form. He says: ⁴⁵ which of course means not, as Sisenna says of similar words,

But when I was inquiring about the signification and origin of such forms as populabundus, errabundus, laetabundus, ludibundus, and many other words of that kind, our friend Apollinaris—very appositely by Heaven! —remarked that it seemed to him that the final syllable of such words indicated force and abundance, and as it were, an excess of the quality belonging to the primitive word. Thus laetabundus is used of one who is excessively joyful, and errabundus of one who has wandered long and far, and he showed that all other words of that form are so used that this addition and ending indicates a great and overflowing force and abundance ⁴⁶

That the translation of certain Greek words into the Latin language is very difficult, for example, that which in Greek is called polupragmosu/nh. ⁴⁷ The word means often with the idea of or

1 WE have frequently observed not a few names of things which we cannot express in Latin by single words, as in Greek; and even if we use very many words, those ideas cannot be expressed in Latin so aptly and so clearly as the Greeks express them by single terms. Lately, when a book of Plutarch had been brought to me, and I had read its title, which was Peri\ Polupragmosu/nhs, a man who was unacquainted with Greek letters and words asked who the author was and what the book was about. The name of the writer I gave him at once, but I hesitated when on the point of naming the subject of the work. At first indeed, since it did not seem to me that it would be a very apt interpretation if I said that it was written De Negotiositale or I began to rack my brains for something else which would render the title word for word, as the saying is. But there was absolutely nothing that I remembered to have read, or even that I could invent, that was not to a degree harsh and absurd, if I fashioned a single word out of multitudo, or and negotium, or in the same way that we say multiiugus ( ), multicolorus ( ) and multiformius ( ). But it would be no less uncouth an expression than if you should try to translate by one word polufili/a (abundance of friends), polutropi/a (versatility), or polusarki/a (fleshiness). Therefore, after spending a brief time in silent thought, I finally answered that in my opinion the idea could not be expressed by a single word, and accordingly I was preparing to indicate the meaning of that Greek word by a phrase.

said I, Then that illiterate fellow, misled by my unfinished, rough-and-ready language and believing that polupragmosu/nh was a virtue, said: said I; said I,

The meaning of the expression found in the old praetorian edicts:

1 As I chanced to be sitting in the library of Trajan's temple, ⁴⁸ looking for something else, the edicts of the early praetors fell into my hands, and I thought it worth while to read and become acquainted with them. Then I found this, written in one of the earlier edicts: Thereupon the question arose what meant.

Then a friend of mine who was sitting with us said that he had read in the seventh book of Gavius On the Origin of Words ⁴⁹ that those trees which either projected from the banks of rivers, or were found in their beds, were called retae, and that they got their name from nets, because they impeded the course of ships and, so to speak, netted them. Therefore he thought that the custom was to farm out the rivers to be that is to say, cleaned out, in order that vessels meeting such branches might suffer neither delay nor danger.

The punishment which Draco the Athenian, in the laws which he made for his fellow-citizens, inflicted upon thieves; that of Solon later; and that of our own decemvirs, who compiled the Twelve Tables; to which it is added, that among the Egyptians thefts were permitted and lawful, while among the Lacedaemonians they were even strongly encouraged and commended as a useful exercise; also a memorable utterance of Marcus Cato about the punishment of theft.

1 DRACO the Athenian was considered a good man and of great wisdom, and he was skilled in law, human and divine. This Draco was the first of all to make laws for the use of the Athenians. In those laws he decreed and enacted that one guilty of any theft whatsoever should be punished with death, and added many other statutes that were excessively severe.

Therefore his laws, since they seemed very much too harsh, were abolished, not by order and decree, but by the tacit, unwritten consent of the Athenians. After that, they made use of other, milder laws, compiled by Solon. This Solon was one of the famous seven wise men. ⁵⁰ He thought proper by his law to punish thieves, not with death, as Draco had formerly done, but by a fine of twice the value of the stolen goods.

But our decemvirs, who after the expulsion of the kings compiled laws on Twelve Tables for the use of the Romans, did not show equal severity in punishing thieves of every kind, nor yet too lax leniency. For they permitted ⁵¹ a thief who was caught in the act to be put to death, only if it was night when he committed the theft, or if in the daytime he defended himself with a weapon when taken. But other thieves taken in the act, if they were freemen, the decemvirs ordered to be scourged and handed over ⁵² to the one from whom the theft had been made, provided they had committed the theft in daylight and had not defended themselves with a weapon. Slaves taken in the act were to be scourged and hurled from the rock, ⁵³ but they decided that boys under age should be flogged at the discretion of the praetor and the damage which they had done made good. Those thefts also which were detected by the girdle and mask, ⁵⁴ they punished as if the culprit had been caught in the act.

But to-day we have departed from that law of the decemvirs; for if anyone wishes to try a case of manifest theft by process of law, action is brought for four times the value. But says Masurius, ⁵⁵ When stolen goods are found in possession of the thief ( concepti) or in that of another ( oblati), the penalty is threefold.

But one who wishes to learn what oblatum means, and conceptum, and many other particulars of the same kind taken from the admirable customs of our forefathers, and both useful and agreeable to know, will consult the book of Sabinus entitled On Thefts. In this book there is also written ⁵⁶ a thing that is not commonly known, that thefts are committed, not only of men and movable objects which can be purloined and carried off secretly, but also of an estate and of houses; also that a farmer was found guilty of theft, because he had sold the farm which he had rented and deprived the owner of its possession. And Sabinus tells this also, which is still more surprising, that one person was convicted of having stolen a man, who, when a runaway slave chanced to pass within sight of his master, held out his gown as if he were putting it on, and so prevented the slave from being seen by his master.

Then upon all other thefts, which were called they imposed a two-fold penalty. ⁵⁷ I recall also that I read in the work of the jurist Aristo, ⁵⁸ a man of no slight learning, that among the ancient Egyptians, a race of men known to have been ingenious in inventions and keen in getting at the bottom of things, thefts of all kinds were lawful and went unpunished.

Among the Lacedaemonians too, those serious and vigorous men (a matter for which the evidence is not so remote as in the case of the Egyptians) many famous writers, who have composed records of their laws and customs, affirm that thieving was lawful and customary, and that it was practised by their young men, not for base gain or to furnish the means for indulgence or amassing wealth, but as an exercise and training in the art of war; for dexterity and practice in thieving made the minds of the youth keen and strong for clever ambuscades, and for endurance in watching, and for the swiftness of surprise.

Marcus Cato, however, in the speech which he wrote On Dividing Spoils among the Soldiers, complains in strong and choice language about unpunished thievery and lawlessness. I have quoted his words, since they pleased me greatly: ⁵⁹

But I think I ought not to pass over the highly ethical and strict definition of theft made by the wisest men, lest anyone should consider him only a thief who privately purloins anything or secretly carries it off. The words are those of Sabinus in his second book On Civil Law: ⁶⁰ Also in another chapter: ⁶¹

Thus has Sabinus written, in the book which I just now mentioned, about handling things for the purpose of stealing them. But we ought to remember, according to what I have written above, that a theft may be committed even without touching anything, when the mind alone and the thoughts desire that a theft be committed. Therefore Sabinus says ⁶² that he has no doubt that a master should be convicted of theft who has ordered a slave of his to steal something.