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BOOK XI

I

1arg

On the origin of the term terra Italia, or

the land of Italy

; of that fine which is called

supreme

; concerning the reason for the name and on the Aternian law; and in what words the

smallest

fine used to be pronounced in ancient days.

1 TIMAEUS, in the History¹ which he composed in the Greek language about the affairs of the Roman people, and Marcus Varro in his Human Antiquities,² wrote that the land of Italy derived its name from a Greek word, oxen in the old Greek tongue being called i)taloi/; for in Italy there was a great abundance of cattle, and in that land pastures are numerous and grazing is a frequent employment.

Furthermore, we may infer that it was for the same reason—namely, since Italy at that time so abounded in cattle—that the fine was established which is called

supreme,

consisting of two sheep and thirty oxen each day, obviously proportionate to the abundance of oxen and the scarcity of sheep. But when a fine of that sort, consisting of cattle and sheep, was pronounced by a magistrate, oxen and sheep were brought, now of small, again of greater value; and this made the penalty of the fine unequal. Therefore later, by the Aternian law, ³ the value of a sheep was fixed at ten pieces of brass, of the cattle at a hundred apiece. Now the

smallest

fine is that of one sheep. The

supreme

fine is of that number which we have mentioned, beyond which it is not lawful to impose a fine for a period of successive days; ⁴ and for that reason it is called

supreme,

that is, greatest and heaviest.

When therefore even now, according to ancient usage, either the

smallest

or the

supreme

fine is pronounced by Roman magistrates, it is regularly observed that oves (

sheep

) be given the masculine gender; and Marcus Varro has thus recorded the words of the law by which the smallest fine was pronounced: ⁵

Against Marcus Terentius, since, though summoned, he has neither appeared nor been excused, I pronounce a fine of one sheep ( unum ovem)

; and they declared that the fine did not appear to be legal unless that gender was used.

Furthermore, Marcus Varro, in the twenty-first book of his Human Antiquities, also says ⁶ that the word for fine ( multa) is itself not Latin, but Sabine, and he remarks that it endured even to within his own memory in the speech of the Samnites, who are sprung from the Sabines. But the upstart herd of grammarians have asserted that this word, like some others, is used on the principle of opposites. ⁷ Furthermore, since it is a usage and custom in language for us to say even now, as the greater number of the early men did, multam dixit and multa dicta est, I have thought it not out of place to note that Marcus Cato spoke otherwise. ⁸ For in the fourth book of his Origins are these words:

Our commander, if anyone has gone to battle out of order, imposes ( facit) a fine upon him.

But it may seem that Cato changed the word with an eye to propriety, since the fine was imposed in camp and in the army, not pronounced in the comitium or in the presence of the people.

II

2arg

That the word elegantia in earlier days was not used of a more refined nature, but of excessive fastidiousness in dress and mode of life, and was a term of reproach.

1 IT was not customary to call a man elegans, or

elegant,

by way of praise, but up to the time of Marcus Cato that word as a rule was a reproach, not a compliment. And this we may observe both in some other writers, and also in the work of Cato entitled Carmen de Moribus. In this book is the following passage: ⁹

They thought that avarice included all the vices; whoever was considered extravagant, ambitious, elegant, vicious or good-fornothing received praise.

¹⁰ It is evident from these words that in days of old the

elegant

man was so called, not because of refinement of character, but because he was excessively particular and extravagant in his attire and mode of life.

Later, the

elegant

man ceased indeed to be reproached, but he was deemed worthy of no commendation, unless his elegance was very moderate. Thus Marcus Tullius commended Lucius Crassus and Quintus Scaevola, not for mere elegance, but for elegance combined with great frugality.

Crassus,

he says, ¹¹

was the most frugal of elegant men; Scaevola the most elegant of the frugal.

Besides this, in the same work of Cato, I recall also these scattered and cursory remarks: ¹²

It was the custom,

says he,

to dress becomingly in the forum, at home to cover their nakedness. They paid more for horses than for cooks. The poetic art was not esteemed. If anyone devoted himself to it, or frequented banquets, he was called a 'ruffian.'

This sentiment too, of conspicuous truthfulness, is to be found in the same work: ¹³

Indeed, human life is very like iron. If you use it, it wears out; if you do not, it is nevertheless consumed by rust. In the same way we see men worn out by toil; if you toil not, sluggishness and torpor are more injurious than toil.

III

3arg

The nature and degree of the variety of usage in the particle pro; and some examples of the differences.

1 WHEN I have leisure from legal business, and walk or ride for the sake of bodily exercise, I have the habit sometimes of silently meditating upon questions that are trifling indeed and insignificant, even negligible in the eyes of the uneducated, but are nevertheless highly necessary for a thorough understanding of the early writers and a knowledge of the Latin language. For example, lately in the retirement of Praeneste, ¹⁴ as I was taking my evening walk alone, I began to consider the nature and degree of variety in the use of certain particles in the Latin language; for instance, in the preposition pro. For I saw that we had one use in

the priests passed a decree in the name of their order,

and another in

that a witness who had been called in said by way of testimony

; that Marcus Cato used it in still another way in the fourth book of his Origins:¹⁵

The battle was fought and ended before the camp,

and also in the fifth book: ¹⁶

That all the islands and cities were in favour of the Illyrian land.

Also

before the temple of Castor

is one form of expression,

on the rostra

another,

before, or on, the tribunal

¹⁷ another,

in presence of the assembly

another, and

the tribune of the commons interposed a veto in view of his authority

still another. Now, I thought that anyone who imagined that all these expressions were wholly alike and equal, or were entirely different, was in error; for I was of the opinion that this variety came from the same origin and source, but yet that its end was not the same. And this surely anyone will easily understand, ¹⁸ if he attentively considers the question and has a somewhat extensive use and knowledge of the early language.

IV

4arg

How Quintus Ennius rivalled ¹⁹ certain verses of Euripides.

1 IN the Hecuba of Euripides there are some verses remarkable and brilliant in their diction, their thought and their terseness. Hecuba is speaking to Ulysses: ²⁰

Thine high repute, how ill soe'er thou speak'st,

Shall sway them; for the same speech carrieth not

Like weight from men contemned and men revered.

These verses Quintus Ennius, when he translated that tragedy, rivalled with no little success. The verses of Ennius are the same in number, as follows: ²¹

Though thou speak'st ill, thou wilt the Achivi sway;

The selfsame words and speech have other weight

When spoken by the great and by the obscure.

Ennius, as I have said, did well; but yet ignobiles and opulenti do not seem to express the full force of a)docou/ntwn and dokou/ntwn; for not all who are obscure are contemned, nor are the great all revered.

V

5arg

Some brief notes about the Pyrronian philosophers and the Academics; and of the difference between them.

1 THOSE whom we call the Pyrronian philosophers are designated by the Greek name skeptikoi/, or

sceptics,

which means about the same as

inquirers

and

investigators.

For they decide nothing and determine nothing, but are always engaged in inquiring and considering what there is in all nature concerning which it is possible to decide and determine. And moreover they believe that they do not see or hear anything clearly, but that they undergo and experience something like seeing and hearing; but they are in doubt as to the nature and character of those very things which cause them those experiences, and they deliberate about them: and they declare that in everything assurance and absolute truth seem so beyond our grasp, owing to the mingling and confusing of the indications of truth and falsehood, that any man who is not rash and precipitate in his judgment ought to use the language which they say was used by Pyrro, the founder of that philosophy:

Does not this matter stand so, rather than so, or is it neither?

For they deny that proofs of anything and its real qualities can be known and understood, and they try in many ways to point this out and demonstrate it. On this subject Favorinus too with great keenness and subtlety has composed ten books, which he entitled Purrwnei=oi Tro/poi, or The Pyrronian Principles.²²

It is besides a question of long standing, which has been discussed by many Greek writers, whether the Pyrronian and Academic philosophers differ at all, and to what extent. For both are called

sceptics, inquirers and doubters,

since both affirm nothing and believe that nothing is understood. But they say that appearances, which they call fantasi/ai, are produced from all objects, not according to the nature of the objects themselves, but according to the condition of mind or body of those to whom those appearances come. Therefore they call absolutely all things that affect men's senses ta\ pro/s ti.²³ This expression means that there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have

reference to something else

and seem to be such as their appearance is while they are seen, and such as they are formed by our senses, to which they come, not by the things themselves, from which they have proceeded. But although the Pyrronians and the Academics express themselves very much alike about these matters, yet they are thought to differ from each other both in certain other respects and especially for this reason—because the Academics do, as it were,

comprehend

²⁴ the very fact that nothing can be comprehended, and, as it were, decide that nothing can be decided, while the Pyrronians assert that not even that can by any means be regarded as true, because nothing is regarded as true.

VI

6arg

That at Rome women did not swear by Hercules nor men by Castor.

1 IN our early writings neither do Roman women swear by Hercules nor the men by Castor. But why the women did not swear by Hercules is evident, since they abstain from sacrificing to Hercules. On the other hand, why the men did not name Castor in oaths is not easy to say. Nowhere, then, is it possible to find an instance, among good writers, either of a woman saying

by Hercules

or a man,

by Castor

; but edepol, which is an oath by Pollux, is common to both man and woman. Marcus Varro, however, asserts ²⁵ that the earliest men were wont to swear neither by Castor nor by Pollux, but that this oath was used by women alone and was taken from the Eleusinian initiations; that gradually, however, through ignorance of ancient usage, men began to say edepol, and thus it became a customary expression; but that the use of

by Castor

by a man appears in no ancient writing.

VII

7arg

That very old words which have become antiquated and obsolete ought not to be used.

1 To use words that are too antiquated and worn out, or those which are unusual and of a harsh and unpleasant novelty, seems to be equally faulty. But for my own part I think it more offensive and censurable to use words that are new, unknown and unheard of, than those that are trite and mean. Furthermore, I maintain that those words also seem new which are out of use and obsolete, even though they are of ancient date. ²⁶ In fact, it is a common fault of lately acquired learning, or o)yimaqi/a as the Greeks call it, to make a great point anywhere and everywhere, and in connection with any subject whatever, to talk about what you have never learned and of which you were long ignorant, when at last you have begun to know something about it. For instance, at Rome in my presence a man of experience and celebrated as a pleader, who had acquired a sudden and, so to speak, haphazard kind of education, was speaking before the prefect of the city and wished to say that a certain man lived upon poor and wretched food, ate bread made from bran, and drank flat and spoiled wine:

This Roman knight,

said he,

eats apluda and drinks flocces.

All who were present looked at one another, at first somewhat seriously, with a disturbed and inquiring aspect, wondering what in the world the two words meant; then presently they all burst into a laugh, as if he had said something in Etruscan or Gallic. Now that man had read that the farmers of ancient days called the chaff of grain apluda, and that the word was used by Plautus in the comedy entitled Astraba,²⁷ if that play be the work of Plautus. He had also heard that flocces in the early language meant the lees of wine pressed from the skins of grapes, corresponding to the dregs of oil from olives. This he had read in the Polumeni²⁸ of Caecilius, ²⁹ and he had saved up those two words as ornaments for his speeches.

Another Einfaltspinsel also, after some little reading of that kind, when his opponent requested that a case be postponed, said:

I pray you, praetor, help me, aid me! How long, pray, shall this bovinator delay me?

And he bawled it out three or four times in a loud voice:

He is a bovinator.

A murmur began to arise from many of those who were present, as if in wonder at this monster of a word. But he, waving his arms and gesticulating, cried:

What, haven't you read Lucilius, who calls a shuffler bovinator?

And, in fact, this verse occurs in Lucilius' eleventh book: ³⁰

If trifling shuffler ( bovinator) with abusive tongue.

VIII

8arg

What Marcus Cato thought and said of Albinus, who, though a Roman, wrote a history of Rome in the Greek language, having first asked indulgence for his lack of skill in that tongue.

1 MARCUS CATO is said to have rebuked Aulus Albinus with great justice and neatness. Albinus, who had been consul with Lucius Lucullus, ³¹ composed a Roman History in the Greek language. In the introduction to his work he wrote to this effect: ³² that no one ought to blame him if he had written anything then in those books that was incorrect or inelegant;

for

he continues,

I am a Roman, born in Latium, and the Greek language is quite foreign to me

; and accordingly he asked indulgence and freedom from adverse criticism in case he had made any errors. When Marcus Cato had read this,

Surely, Aulus,

said he,

you are a great trifler in preferring to apologize for a fault rather than avoid it. For we usually ask pardon either when we have erred through inadvertence or done wrong under compulsion. But tell me, I pray you,

said he,

who compelled you to do that for which you ask pardon before doing it.

This is told in the thirteenth book of Cornelius Nepos' work On Famous Men.³³

IX

9arg

The story of the Milesian envoys and the orator Demosthenes, found in the works of Critolaus.

1 CRITOLAUS has written ³⁴ that envoys came from Miletus to Athens on public business, perhaps for the purpose of asking aid. Then they engaged such advocates as they chose, to speak for them, and the advocates, according to their instructions, addressed the people in behalf of the Milesians. Demosthenes vigorously opposed the demands of the Milesians, maintaining that the Milesians did not deserve aid, nor was it to the interest of the State to grant it. The matter was postponed to the next day. The envoys came to Demosthenes and begged him earnestly not to speak against them; he asked for money, and received the amount which he demanded. On the following day, when the case was taken up again, Demosthenes, with his neck and shoulders wrapped in thick wool, came forward before the people and said that he was suffering from quinsy and hence could not speak against the Milesians. Then one of the populace cried out that it was, not quinsy, but

silverinsy

from which Demosthenes was suffering.

Demosthenes himself too, as Critolaus also relates, did not afterwards conceal that matter, but actually made a boast of it. For when he had asked Aristodemus, the player, what sum he had received for acting, and Aristodemus ³⁵ had replied,

a talent,

Demosthenes rejoined:

Why, I got more than that for holding my tongue.

X

10arg

That Gaius Gracchus in a speech of his applied the story related above to the orator Demades, and not to Demosthenes; and a quotation of Gracchus' words.

1 THE story which in the preceding chapter we said was told by Critolaus about Demosthenes, Gaius Gracchus, in the speech Against the Aufeian Law, applied to Demades in the following words: ³⁶

For you, fellow citizens, if you wish to be wise and honest, and if you inquire into the matter, will find that none of us comes forward here without pay. All of us who address you are after something, and no one appears before you for any purpose except to carry something away. I myself, who am now recommending you to increase your taxes, in order that you may the more easily serve your own advantage and administer the government, do not come here for nothing; but I ask of you, not money, but honour and your good opinion. Those who come forward to persuade you not to accept this law, do not seek honour from you, but money from Nicomedes; those also who advise you to accept it are not seeking a good opinion from you, but from Mithridates a reward and an increase of their possessions; those, however, of the same rank and order who are silent are your very bitterest enemies, since they take money from all and are false to all. You, thinking that they are innocent of such conduct, give them your esteem; but the embassies from the kings, thinking it is for their sake that they are silent, give them great gifts and rewards. So in the land of Greece, when a Greek tragic actor boasted that he had received a whole talent for one play, Demades, the most eloquent man of his country, is said to have replied to him: 'Does it seem wonderful to you that you have gained a talent by speaking? I was paid ten talents by the king for holding my tongue.' Just so, these men now receive a very high price for holding their tongues.

XI

11arg

The words of Publius Nigidius, in which he says that there is a difference between

lying

and

telling a falsehood.

1 THESE are the very words of Publius Nigidius, ³⁷ a man of great eminence in the pursuit of the liberal arts, whom Marcus Cicero highly respected because of his talent and learning:

There is a difference between telling a falsehood and lying. One who lies is not himself deceived, but tries to deceive another; he who tells a falsehood is himself deceived.

He also adds this:

One who lies deceives, so far as he is able; but one who tells a falsehood does not himself deceive, any more than he can help.

He also had this on the same subject:

A good man,

says he,

ought to take pains not to lie, a wise man, not to tell what is false; the former affects the man himself, the latter does not.

With variety, by Heaven! and neatness has Nigidius distinguished so many opinions relating to the same thing, as if he were constantly saying something new.

XII

12arg

That the philosopher Chrysippus says that every word is ambiguous and of doubtful meaning, while Diodorus, on the contrary, thinks that no word is ambiguous.

1 CHRYSIPPUS asserts ³⁸ that every word is by nature ambiguous, since two or more things may be understood from the same word. But Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, says:

No word is ambiguous, and no one speaks or receives a word in two senses; and it ought not to seem to be said in any other sense than that which the speaker feels that he is giving to it. But when I,

said he,

meant one thing and you have understood another, it may seem that I have spoken obscurely rather than ambiguously; for the nature of an ambiguous word should be such that he who speaks it expresses two or more meanings. But no man expresses two meanings who has felt that he is expressing but one.

XIII

13arg

What Titus Castricius thought about the wording of a sentence of Gaius Gracchus; and that he showed that it contributed nothing to the effectiveness of the sentence.

1 THE speech of Gaius Gracchus Against Publius Popilius³⁹ was read before Titus Castricius, a teacher of the art of rhetoric and a man of sound and solid judgment. At the beginning of that speech the sentences were constructed with more care and regard for rhythm than was customary with the early orators. The words, arranged as I have said, are as follows:

If you now reject rashly the things which all these years you have earnestly sought and longed for, it must be said either that you formerly sought them earnestly, or now have rejected them without consideration.

Well then, the flow and rhythm of this well-rounded and smooth-flowing sentence pleased us to a remarkable and unparalleled degree, and still more the evidence that composition of that kind appealed even in those early days to Gaius Gracchus, a man of distinction and dignity. But when those very same words were read again and again at our request, we were admonished by Castricius to consider what the force and value of the thought was, and not to allow our ears to be charmed by the rhythm of a well-turned sentence and through mere pleasure to confuse our judgment as well.

And when by this admonition he had made us more alert,

Look deeply,

said he,

into the meaning of these words, and tell me pray, some of you, whether there is any weight or elegance in this sentence: 'If you rashly reject the things which all these years you have earnestly sought and longed for, it must be said either that you formerly sought them earnestly or now reject them without consideration.' For to whom of all men does it not occur, that it is certainly natural that you should be said earnestly to have sought what you earnestly sought, and to have rejected without consideration what you rejected without consideration? But I think,

said he,

if it had been written thus: ' If you now reject what you have sought and longed for these many years, it must be said that you formerly sought it earnestly or that you now reject it without consideration'; if,

said he,

it were spoken thus, the sentence would be weightier and more solid and would arouse some reasonable expectation in the hearer; but as it is, these words 'earnestly' and 'without consideration,' on which the whole effect of the sentence rests, are not only spoken at the end of the sentence, but are also put earlier where they are not needed, so that what ought to arise and spring from the very conception of the subject is spoken wholly before the subject demands it. For one who says: ' If you do this, you will be said to have done it earnestly,' says something that is composed and arranged with some regard to sense; but one who says: 'If you do it earnestly, you will be said to have done it earnestly,' speaks in much the same way as if he should say: 'If you do it earnestly, you will do it earnestly.' I have warned you of this,

said he,

not with the idea of censuring Gaius Gracchus—may the gods give me a wiser mind! for if any fault or error can be mentioned in a man of such powerful eloquence, it is wholly excused by his authority and overlooked in view of his antiquity—but in order that you might be on your guard lest the rhythmic sound of any flowing eloquence should easily dazzle you, and that you might first balance the actual weight of the substance against the high quality of the diction; so that if any sentence was uttered that was weighty, honest and sound, then, if you thought best, you might praise also the mere flow of the language and the delivery; that if, on the contrary, thoughts that were cold, trifling and futile should be conveyed in words neatly and rhythmically arranged, they might have the same effect upon you as when men conspicuous for their deformity and their ludicrous appearance imitate actors and play the buffoon.

XIV

14arg

The discreet and admirable reply of King Romulus as to his use of wine.

1 Lucius Piso FRUGI has shown an elegant simplicity of diction and thought in the first book of his Annals, when writing of the life and habits of King Romulus. His words are as follows: ⁴⁰

They say also of Romulus, that being invited to dinner, he drank but little there, giving the reason that he had business for the following day. They ⁴¹ answer: ' If all men were like you, Romulus, wine would be cheaper.' ' Nay, dear,' answered Romulus, ' if each man drank as much as he wished; for I drank as much as I wished.'

XV

15arg

On ludibundus and errabundus and the suffix in words of that kind; that Laberius used amorabunda in the same way as ludibunda and errabunda; also that Sisenna in the case of a word of that sort made a new form.

1 LABERIUS in his Lake Avernus spoke ⁴² of a woman in love as amorabunda, coining a word in a somewhat unusual manner. Caesellius Vindex in his Commentary on Archaic Words said that this word was used on the same principle that ludibunda, ridibunda and errabunda are used for ludens, ridens and errans. But Terentius Scaurus, a highly distinguished grammarian of the time of the deified Hadrian, among other things which he wrote On the Mistakes of Caesellius, declared ⁴³ that about this word also he was wrong in thinking that ludens and ludibunda, ridens and ridibunda, errans and errabunda were identical.

For ludibunda, ridibunda, and errabunda,

he says,

are applied to one who plays the part of, or imitates, one who plays, laughs or wanders.

But why Scaurus was led to censure Caesellius on this point, I certainly could not understand. For there is no doubt that these words, each after its own kind, have the same meaning that is indicated by the words from which they are derived. But I should prefer to seem not to understand the meaning of

act the laugher

imitate the laugher

rather than charge Scaurus himself with lack of knowledge. But Scaurus ought rather, in censuring the commentaries of Caesellius, to have taken him to task for what he left unsaid; namely, whether ludibundus, ridibundus and errabundus differ at all from ludens, ridens and errans, and to what extent, and so with other words of the same kind; whether they differ only in some slight degree from their primitives, and what is the general force of the suffix which is added to words of that kind. For in examining a phenomenon of that nature that were a more pertinent inquiry, just as in vinulentus, lutulentus and turbulentus it is usual to ask whether that suffix is superfluous and without meaning, paragwgh/, as the Greeks say, ⁴⁴ or whether the suffix has some special force of its own.

However, in noting this criticism of Scaurus it occurred to me that Sisenna, in the fourth book of his Histories, used a word of the same form. He says: ⁴⁵

He came to the town, laying waste the fields ( populabundus),

which of course means

while he was laying waste the fields,

not, as Sisenna says of similar words,

when he played the part of, or imitated, one laying waste.

But when I was inquiring about the signification and origin of such forms as populabundus, errabundus, laetabundus, ludibundus, and many other words of that kind, our friend Apollinaris—very appositely by Heaven! —remarked that it seemed to him that the final syllable of such words indicated force and abundance, and as it were, an excess of the quality belonging to the primitive word. Thus laetabundus is used of one who is excessively joyful, and errabundus of one who has wandered long and far, and he showed that all other words of that form are so used that this addition and ending indicates a great and overflowing force and abundance ⁴⁶

XVI

16arg

That the translation of certain Greek words into the Latin language is very difficult, for example, that which in Greek is called polupragmosu/nh.⁴⁷ The word means

being busy about many things,

often with the idea of

officiousness

meddling.

1 WE have frequently observed not a few names of things which we cannot express in Latin by single words, as in Greek; and even if we use very many words, those ideas cannot be expressed in Latin so aptly and so clearly as the Greeks express them by single terms. Lately, when a book of Plutarch had been brought to me, and I had read its title, which was Peri\ Polupragmosu/nhs, a man who was unacquainted with Greek letters and words asked who the author was and what the book was about. The name of the writer I gave him at once, but I hesitated when on the point of naming the subject of the work. At first indeed, since it did not seem to me that it would be a very apt interpretation if I said that it was written De Negotiositale or

On Busyness,

I began to rack my brains for something else which would render the title word for word, as the saying is. But there was absolutely nothing that I remembered to have read, or even that I could invent, that was not to a degree harsh and absurd, if I fashioned a single word out of multitudo, or

multitude,

and negotium, or

business,

in the same way that we say multiiugus (

manifold

), multicolorus (

multicoloured

) and multiformius (

multiform

). But it would be no less uncouth an expression than if you should try to translate by one word polufili/a (abundance of friends), polutropi/a (versatility), or polusarki/a (fleshiness). Therefore, after spending a brief time in silent thought, I finally answered that in my opinion the idea could not be expressed by a single word, and accordingly I was preparing to indicate the meaning of that Greek word by a phrase.

Well then,

said I,

undertaking many things and busying oneself with them all is called in Greek polupragmosu/nh, and the title shows that this is the subject of our book.

Then that illiterate fellow, misled by my unfinished, rough-and-ready language and believing that polupragmosu/nh was a virtue, said:

Doubtless this Plutarch, whoever he is, urges us to engage in business and to undertake very many enterprises with energy and dispatch, and properly enough he has written as the title of the book itself the name of this virtue about which, as you say, he is intending to speak.

Not at all,

said I;

for that is by no means a virtue which, expressed by a Greek term, serves to indicate the subject of this book; and neither does Plutarch do what you suppose, nor do I intend to say that he did. For, as a matter of fact, it is in this book that he tries to dissuade us, so far as he can, from the haphazard, promiscuous and unnecessary planning and pursuit of such a multitude of things. But,

said I,

I realize that this mistake of yours is due to my imperfect command of language, since even in so many words I could not express otherwise than very obscurely what in Greek is expressed with perfect elegance and clearness by a single term.

XVII

17arg

The meaning of the expression found in the old praetorian edicts:

those who have undertaken public contracts for clearing the rivers of nets.

1 As I chanced to be sitting in the library of Trajan's temple, ⁴⁸ looking for something else, the edicts of the early praetors fell into my hands, and I thought it worth while to read and become acquainted with them. Then I found this, written in one of the earlier edicts:

If anyone of those who have taken public contracts for clearing the rivers of nets shall be brought before me, and shall be accused of not having done that which by the terms of his contract he was bound to do.

Thereupon the question arose what

clearing of nets

meant.

Then a friend of mine who was sitting with us said that he had read in the seventh book of Gavius On the Origin of Words⁴⁹ that those trees which either projected from the banks of rivers, or were found in their beds, were called retae, and that they got their name from nets, because they impeded the course of ships and, so to speak, netted them. Therefore he thought that the custom was to farm out the rivers to be

cleaned of nets,

that is to say, cleaned out, in order that vessels meeting such branches might suffer neither delay nor danger.

XVIII

18arg

The punishment which Draco the Athenian, in the laws which he made for his fellow-citizens, inflicted upon thieves; that of Solon later; and that of our own decemvirs, who compiled the Twelve Tables; to which it is added, that among the Egyptians thefts were permitted and lawful, while among the Lacedaemonians they were even strongly encouraged and commended as a useful exercise; also a memorable utterance of Marcus Cato about the punishment of theft.

1 DRACO the Athenian was considered a good man and of great wisdom, and he was skilled in law, human and divine. This Draco was the first of all to make laws for the use of the Athenians. In those laws he decreed and enacted that one guilty of any theft whatsoever should be punished with death, and added many other statutes that were excessively severe.

Therefore his laws, since they seemed very much too harsh, were abolished, not by order and decree, but by the tacit, unwritten consent of the Athenians. After that, they made use of other, milder laws, compiled by Solon. This Solon was one of the famous seven wise men. ⁵⁰ He thought proper by his law to punish thieves, not with death, as Draco had formerly done, but by a fine of twice the value of the stolen goods.

But our decemvirs, who after the expulsion of the kings compiled laws on Twelve Tables for the use of the Romans, did not show equal severity in punishing thieves of every kind, nor yet too lax leniency. For they permitted ⁵¹ a thief who was caught in the act to be put to death, only if it was night when he committed the theft, or if in the daytime he defended himself with a weapon when taken. But other thieves taken in the act, if they were freemen, the decemvirs ordered to be scourged and handed over ⁵² to the one from whom the theft had been made, provided they had committed the theft in daylight and had not defended themselves with a weapon. Slaves taken in the act were to be scourged and hurled from the rock, ⁵³ but they decided that boys under age should be flogged at the discretion of the praetor and the damage which they had done made good. Those thefts also which were detected by the girdle and mask, ⁵⁴ they punished as if the culprit had been caught in the act.

But to-day we have departed from that law of the decemvirs; for if anyone wishes to try a case of manifest theft by process of law, action is brought for four times the value. But

manifest theft,

says Masurius, ⁵⁵

is one which is detected while it is being committed. The act is completed when the stolen object is carried to its destination.

When stolen goods are found in possession of the thief ( concepti) or in that of another ( oblati), the penalty is threefold.

But one who wishes to learn what oblatum means, and conceptum, and many other particulars of the same kind taken from the admirable customs of our forefathers, and both useful and agreeable to know, will consult the book of Sabinus entitled On Thefts. In this book there is also written ⁵⁶ a thing that is not commonly known, that thefts are committed, not only of men and movable objects which can be purloined and carried off secretly, but also of an estate and of houses; also that a farmer was found guilty of theft, because he had sold the farm which he had rented and deprived the owner of its possession. And Sabinus tells this also, which is still more surprising, that one person was convicted of having stolen a man, who, when a runaway slave chanced to pass within sight of his master, held out his gown as if he were putting it on, and so prevented the slave from being seen by his master.

Then upon all other thefts, which were called

not manifest,

they imposed a two-fold penalty. ⁵⁷ I recall also that I read in the work of the jurist Aristo, ⁵⁸ a man of no slight learning, that among the ancient Egyptians, a race of men known to have been ingenious in inventions and keen in getting at the bottom of things, thefts of all kinds were lawful and went unpunished.

Among the Lacedaemonians too, those serious and vigorous men (a matter for which the evidence is not so remote as in the case of the Egyptians) many famous writers, who have composed records of their laws and customs, affirm that thieving was lawful and customary, and that it was practised by their young men, not for base gain or to furnish the means for indulgence or amassing wealth, but as an exercise and training in the art of war; for dexterity and practice in thieving made the minds of the youth keen and strong for clever ambuscades, and for endurance in watching, and for the swiftness of surprise.

Marcus Cato, however, in the speech which he wrote On Dividing Spoils among the Soldiers, complains in strong and choice language about unpunished thievery and lawlessness. I have quoted his words, since they pleased me greatly: ⁵⁹

Those who commit private theft pass their lives in confinement and fetters; plunderers of the public, in purple and gold.

But I think I ought not to pass over the highly ethical and strict definition of theft made by the wisest men, lest anyone should consider him only a thief who privately purloins anything or secretly carries it off. The words are those of Sabinus in his second book On Civil Law:⁶⁰

He is guilty of theft who has touched anything belonging to another, when he has reason to know that he does so against the owner's will.

Also in another chapter: ⁶¹

He who silently carries off another's property for the sake of gain is guilty of theft, whether he knows to whom the object belongs or not.

Thus has Sabinus written, in the book which I just now mentioned, about handling things for the purpose of stealing them. But we ought to remember, according to what I have written above, that a theft may be committed even without touching anything, when the mind alone and the thoughts desire that a theft be committed. Therefore Sabinus says ⁶² that he has no doubt that a master should be convicted of theft who has ordered a slave of his to steal something.

Noctes Atticae. Aulus Gellius. John C. Rolfe (Translator). Cambridge, Mass.. 1927.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by Tufts University.

Current edition Perseus

Attic Nights (English) (Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Noctes Atticae Perseus (Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., editor. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).) — 11.1 focus

I

Argument

De origine vocabuli terrae Italiae; deque ea multa quae suprema appellatur deque eius nominis ratione ac de lege Aternia; et quibus verbis antiquitus multa minima dici solita sit.

[1] TIMAEUS in Historiis quas oratione Graeca de rebus populi Romani composuit, et M. Varro in Antiquitatibus Rerum Humanarum,terram Italiam de Graeco vocabulo appellatam scripserunt, quoniam boves Graeca vetere lingua ἰταλοί vocitati sint, ¹ quorum in Italia magna copia fuerit, bucetaque ² in ea terra gigni pascique solita sint complurima.

[2] Coniectare autem possumus ob eandem causam, quod Italia tunc esset armentosissima multam, quae appellatur suprema institutam in dies singulos duarum ovium, boum triginta, pro copia scilicet boum bourn proque ovium penuria. Sed cum eiusmodi multa pecoris armentique a magistratibus dicta erat, adigebantur boves ovesque alias pretii parvi, alias maioris, eaque res faciebat inaequalem multae poenitionem. Idcirco postea lege Aternia constituti sunt in oves singulas aeris deni, in boves aeris centeni.

[3] Minima autem multa est ovis unius. Suprema multa est eius numeri cuius diximus, ultra quem multam dicere in dies singulos ius non est, et propterea suprema appellatur, id est summa et maxima.

[4] Quando igitur nunc quoque a magistratibus populi Romani more maiorum multa dicitur vel minima vel suprema, observari solet ut oves genere virili appellentur; atque ita M. Varro verba haec legitima, quibus minima multa diceretur, concepit: M. Terentio, quando citatus neque respondit neque excusatus est, ego ei unum ovem multam dico; ac nisi eo genere diceretur, negaverunt iustam videri multam.

[5] Vocabulum autem ipsum multae idem M. Varro in uno vicesimo Rerum Humanarum non Latinum, sed Sabinum esse dicit, idque ad suam memoriam mansisse ait in lingua Samnitium, qui sunt a Sabinis orti. Sed turba grammaticorum novicia κατʼ ἀντίφρασιν, ut quaedam alia, hoc quoque dici tradiderunt.

[6] Cum autem usus et mos sermonum is sit, ut ita et nunc loquamur, ut plerique veterum locuti sunt: multam dixit et multa dicta est, non esse abs re putavi notare quod M. Cato aliter dixit. Nam in quarto Originum verba haec sunt: Imperator noster, si quis extra ordinem depugnatum ivit, ei multam facit.

[7] Potest autem videri consulta elegantia mutasse verbum, cum in castris et in exercitu multa fieret, non in comitio nec ad populum diceretur.

II

Argument

Quod elegantia apud antiquiores, non de amoeniore ingenio, sed de nitidiore cultu atque victu dicebatur, eaque in vitio ponebatur.

[1] ELEGANS homo non dicebatur cum laude, set id fere verbum ad aetatem M. Catonis vitii, non laudis fuit.

[2] Est namque hoc animadvertere, cum in quibusdam aliis, tum in libro Catonis qui inscriptus est Carmen De Moribus. Ex quo libro verba haec sunt: Avaritiam omnia vitia habere putabant; sumptuosus, cupidus, elegans, vitiosus, inritus qui habebatur, is laudabatur;³

[3] ex quibus verbis apparet, elegantem dictum antiquitus non ab ingenii elegantia, sed qui nimis lecto amoenoque cultu victuque esset.

[4] Postea elegans reprehendi quidem desiit, sed laude nulla dignabatur, nisi cuius elegantia erat moderatissima. Sic M. Tullius L. Crasso et Q. Scaevolae non meram elegantiam, set multa parsimonia mixtam, laudi dedit: Crassus, inquit, erat parcissimus elegantium, Scaevola parcorum elegantissimus.

[5] Praeterea ex eodem libro Catonis haec etiam sparsim et intercise commeminimus: Vestiri, inquit, in foro honeste mos erat, domi quod satis erat. Equos carius quam coquos emebant. Poeticae artis honos non erat. Si quis in ea re studebat aut sese ad convivia adplicabat, crassator vocabatur.

[6] Illa quoque ex eodem libro praeclarae veritatis sententia est: Nam vita, inquit, humana prope uti ferrum est. Si exerceas, conteritur; si non exerceas, tamen robigo interficit. Item homines exercendo videmus conteri; si nihil exerceas, inertia atque torpedo plus detrimenti facit quam exercitio.

III

Argument

Qualis quantaque sit pro particulae varietas; deque exemplis eius varietatis.

[1] QUANDO ab arbitriis negotiisque otium est et motandi corporis gratia aut spatiamur aut vectamur, quaerere nonnumquam aput memet ipsum soleo res eiusmodi, parvas quidem minutasque et hominibus non bene eruditis aspernabiles, sed ad veterum scripta penitus noscenda et ad scientiam linguae Latinae cumprimis necessarias; velut est, quod forte nuper in Praenestino recessu ⁴ vespertina ambulatione solus ambulans, considerabam qualis quantaque esset particularum quarundam in oratione Latina varietas.

[2] Quod genus est praepositio pro. Aliter enim dici videbam pontifices pro conlegio decrevisse, aliter quempiam testem introductum pro testimonio dixisse, aliter M. Catonem in Originum quarto: Proelium factum depugnatumque pro castris scripsisse et item in quinto: Urbes insulasque omnis pro agro Illyrio esse, aliter etiam dici pro aede Castoris, aliter pro rostris, aliter pro tribunali, aliter pro contione atque aliter tribunum plebis pro potestate intercessisse.

[3] Sed has omnes dictiones qui aut omnino similes et pares aut usquequaque diversas existimaret, errare arbitrabar; nam varietatem istam eiusdem quidem fontis et capitis, non eiusdem tamen esse finis putabam.

[4] Quod profecto facile intelleget, si quis adhibeat ad meditationem suam intentionem et habeat veteris orationis usum atque notitiam celebriorem.

IV

Argument

Quem in modum Q. Ennius versus Euripidi aemulatus sit.

[1] EURIPIDIS versus sunt in Hecuba verbis, sententia, brevitate insignes inlustresque;

[2] Hecuba est ad Ulixen dicens:

Τὸ δʼ ἀξίωμα, κἂν κακῶς λέγῃ, τὸ σὸν

Νικᾷ· λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τʼ ἀδοξούντων ἰὼν

Κἀκ τῶν δοκούντων αὐτός, οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει

[3] Hos versus Q. Ennius, cum eam tragoediam verteret, non sane incommode aemulatus est. Versus totidem Enniani hi sunt:

Haéc tu etsi pervérse dices, fácile Achivos fléxeris;

Nám opulenti cúm locuntur páriter atque ignóbiles,

Éadem dicta eadémque oratio aéqua non aequé valet.

Bene, sicuti dixi, Ennius;

[4] sed ignobiles tamen et opulenti ἀντὶ ἀδοξούντων καὶ δοκούντων satisfacere sententiae non videntur; nam neque omnes ignobiles ἀδοξοῦσι neque omnes opulenti εὐδοξοῦσιν.

V

Argument

De Pyrronis philosophis quaedam deque Academicis strictim notata; deque inter eos differentia.

[1] Quos Pyrronios philosophos vocamus, hi Graeco cognomento σκεπτικοί appellantur;

[2] id ferme significat quasi quaesitores et consideratores.

[3] Nihil enim decernunt, nihil constituunt, sed in quaerendo semper considerandoque sunt quidnam sit omnium rerum de quo decerni constituique possit.

[4] Ac ne videre quoque plane quicquam neque audire sese putant, sed ita pati adficique quasi videant vel audiant, eaque ipsa quae adfectiones istas in sese efficiant, qualia et cuiusmodi sint cunctantur atque insistunt, omniumque rerum fidem veritatemque mixtis confusisque signis veri atque falsi ita inprensibilem videri aiunt, ut quisquis homo est non praeceps neque iudicii sui prodigus his uti verbis debeat quibus auctorem philosophiae istius Pyrronem esse usum tradunt: οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τόδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθετέρως. Indicia enim rei cuiusque et sinceras proprietates negant posse nosci et percipi, idque ipsum docere atque ostendere multis modis conantur.

[5] Super qua re Favorinus quoque subtilissime argutissimeque decem libros composuit, quos Πυρρωνείων Τρόπων inscribit.

[6] Vetus autem quaestio et a multis scriptoribus Graecis tractata, an quid et quantum Pyrronios et Academicos philosophos intersit. Utrique enim σκεπτικοί, ἐφεκτικοί, ἀπορητικοί dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil adfirmant nihilque comprehendi putant. Sed ex omnibus rebus proinde visa dicunt fieri, quas φαντασίας appellant, non ut rerum ipsarum natura est, sed ut adfectio animi corporisve est eorum, ad quos ea visa perveniunt.

[7] Itaque omnes omnino res quae sensus hominum movent, τῶν πρός τι esse dicunt. Id verbum significat nihil esse quicquam quod ex sese constet nec quod habeat vim propriam et naturam, sed omnia prorsum ad aliquid referri taliaque videri qualis sit eorum species dum videntur, qualiaque apud sensus nostros, quo pervenerunt, creantur, ⁵ non apud sese, unde profecta sunt.

[8] Cum haec autem consimiliter tam Pyrronii dicant quam Academici, differre tamen inter sese et propter alia quaedam et vel maxime propterea existimati sunt, quod Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt, Pyrronii ne id quidem ullo pacto verum videri dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.

VI

Argument

Quod mulieres Romae per Herculem non iuraverint neque viri per Castorem.

[1] IN veteribus scriptis neque mulieres Romanae per Herculem deiurant neque viri per Castorem.

[2] Sed cur illae non iuraverint Herculem non obscurum est, nam Herculaneo sacrificio abstinent.

[3] Cur autem viri Castorem iurantes non appellaverint non facile dictu est. Nusquam igitur scriptum invenire est, apud idoneos quidem scriptores, aut me hercle feminam dicere aut me castor virum;

[4] edepol autem, quod iusiurandum per Pollucem est, et viro et feminae commune est.

[5] Sed M. Varro adseverat antiquissimos viros neque per Castorem neque per Pollucem deiurare solitos, sed id iusiurandum fuisse tantum feminarum, ex initiis Eleusinis acceptum;

[6] paulatim tamen inscitia antiquitatis viros dicere edepol coepisse factumque esse ita dicendi morem, sed me castor a viro dici in nullo vetere scripto inveniri.

VII

Argument

Verbis antiquissimis relictisque iam et desitis minime utendum.

[1] VERBIS uti aut nimis obsoletis exculcatisque aut insolentibus novitatisque durae et inlepidae, par esse delictum videtur. Sed molestius equidem culpatiusque esse arbitror verba nova, incognita, inaudita dicere quam involgata et sordentia.

[2] Nova autem videri dico etiam ea quae sunt inusitata et desita, etsi sunt vetusta.

[3] Est adeo id vitium plerumque serae eruditionis, quam Graeci ὀψιμαθίαν appellant, ut quod numquam ⁶ didiceris, diu ignoraveris, cum id scire aliquando coeperis, magni facias quo in loco cumque et quacumque in re dicere. Veluti Romae, nobis praesentibus, vetus celebratusque homo in causis, sed repentina et quasi tumultuaria doctrina praeditus, cum apud praefectum urbi verba faceret et dicere vellet inopi quendam miseroque victu vivere et furfureum panem esitare, vinumque eructum et fetidum potare, Hic, inquit, eques Romanus apludam edit et flocces bibit.

[4] Aspexerunt omnes qui aderant alius alium, primo tristiores turbato et requirente voltu, quidnam illud utriusque verbi foret; post deinde, quasi nescio quid Tusce aut Gallice dixisset, universi riserunt.

[5] Legerat autem ille apludam veteres rusticos frumenti furfurem dixisse idque a Plauto in comoedia, si ea Plauti est, quae Astraba inscripta est, positum esse.

[6] Item flocces audierat prisca voce significare vini faecem e vinaceis expressam, sicuti fraces ex oleis, idque aput Caecilium in Polumenis legerat, eaque sibi duo verba ad orationum ornamenta servaverat.

[7] Alter quoque a lectionibus id genus paucis apirocalus, cum adversarius causam differri postularet: Rogo, praetor, inquit, subveni, succurre! quonam usque nos bovinator hic demoratur? Atque id voce magna ter quaterve inclamavit: bovinator est.

[8] Commurmuratio fieri coepta est a plerisque qui aderant, quasi monstrum verbi admirantibus. At ille iactans et gestiens:

[9] Non enim Lucilium, inquit, legistis, qui tergiversatorem bovinatorem dicit? Est autem in Lucili XI. versus hic:

Si tricosus ⁷ bovinatorque ore improbus duro.

VIII

Argument

Quid senserit dixeritque M. Cato de Albino, qui homo Romanus Graeca oratione res Romanas, venia sibi ante eius imperitiae petita, composuit.

[1] IUSTE venusteque admodum reprehendisse dicitur Aulum Albinum M. Cato. Albinus,

[2] qui cum L. Lucullo consul fuit, res Romanas oratione Graeca scriptitavit.

[3] In eius Historiae principio scriptum est ad hanc sententiam: neminem suscensere sibi convenire, si quid in his libris parum composite aut minus eleganter tum scriptum foret; nam sum, inquit, homo Romanus natus in Latio, Graeca oratio a nobis alienissima est, ideoque veniam gratiamque malae existimationis, si quid esset erratum, postulavit.

[4] Ea cum legisset M. Cato: Ne tu, inquit, Aule, nimium nugator es, cum maluisti culpam deprecari quam culpa vacare. Nam petere veniam solemus, aut cum inprudentes erravimus aut cum compulsi peccavimus. Dic,⁸ inquit, oro te, quis perpulit ut id committeres, quod, priusquam faceres, peteres ut ignosceretur?

[5] Scriptum hoc est in libro Corneli Nepotis De Inlustribus Viris XIII.

IX

Argument

Historia de legatis Mileti ac Demosthene rhetore in libris Critolai reperta.

[1] CRITOLAUS scripsit legatos Mileto publicae rei causa venisse Athenas, fortasse an auxilii petendi gratia. ⁹ Tum qui pro sese verba facerent quos visum erat advocavisse, aduocatos advocates, uti erat mandatum, verba pro Milesiis ad populum fecisse, Demosthenen Milesiorum postulatis acriter respondisse, neque Milesios auxilio dignos neque ex republica id esse contendisse; rem in posterum diem prolatam. Legatos ad Demosthenen venisse magnoque opere orasse uti contra ne diceret; eum pecuniam petivisse et quantam petiverat abstulisse. Postridie, cum res agi denuo coepta esset, Demosthenen, lana multa collum cervicesque circumvolutum, ad populum prodisse et dixisse se synanchen pati, eo contra Milesios loqui non quire. Tum e populo unum exclamasse, non synanchen, quod Demosthenes pateretur, sed argyranchen esse.

[2] Ipse etiam Demosthenes, ut idem Critolaus refert, non id postea concelavit, quin gloriae quoque hoc sibi adsignavit. Nam cum interrogasset Aristodemum, actorem fabularum, quantum mercedis, uti ageret, accepisset, et Aristodemus talentum respondisset, At ego plus, inquit, accepi, ut tacerem.

X

Argument

Quod C. Gracchus in oratione sua historiam supra scriptam Demadi rhetori, non Demostheni Demostlleni, adtribuit; verbaque ipsius C. Gracchi relata.

[1] QUOD in capite superiore a Critolao scriptum esse diximus super Demosthene, id C. Gracchus in oratione, Qua legem Aufeiam dissuasit, in Demaden contulit verbis hisce:

[2] Nam vos, Quirites, si velitis sapientia atque virtute uti, etsi quaeritis, neminem nostrum invenietis sine pretio huc prodire. Omnes nos qui verba facimus aliquid petimus, neque ullius rei causa quisquam ad vos prodit, nisi ut aliquid auferat.

[3] Ego ipse, qui aput vos verba facio uti vectigalia vestra augeatis, quo facilius vestra commoda et rempublicam administrare possitis, non gratis prodeo; verum peto a vobis, non pecuniam, sed bonam existimationem atque honorem.

[4] Qui prodeunt dissuasuri ne hanc legem accipiatis, petunt non honorem a vobis, verum a Nicomede pecuniam; qui suadent ut accipiatis, hi quoque petunt non a vobis bonam existimationem, verum a Mitridate rei familiari suae pretium et praemium; qui autem ex eodem loco atque ordine tacent, hi vel acerrimi sunt, nam ab omnibus pretium accipiunt et omnis fallunt.

[5] Vos, cum putatis eos ab his rebus remotos esse, inpertitis bonam existimationem;

[6] legationes autem a regibus, cum putant eos sua causa reticere, sumptus atque pecunias maximas praebent, item uti in terra Graecia, quo in tempore Graecus tragoedus gloriae sibi ducebat talentum magnum ob unam fabulam datum esse, homo eloquentissimus civitatis suae Demades ei respondisse dicitur: Mirum tibi videtur, si tu loquendo talentum quaesisti? Ego, ut tacerem, decem talenta a rege accepi. Item nunc isti pretia maxima ob tacendum accipiunt.

XI

Argument

Verba P. Nigidii, quibus differre dicit mentiri et mendacium dicere.

[1] VERBA sunt ipsa haec P. Nigidii, hominis in studiis bonarum artium praecellentis, quem M. Cicero ingenii doctrinarumque nomine summe reveritus est: Inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. Qui mentitur ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur; qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur. Item hoc addidit:

[2] Qui mentitur, inquit, fallit, quantum in se est; at qui mendacium dicit, ipse non fallit, quantum in se est.

[3] Item hoc quoque super eadem re dicit: Vir bonus, inquit, praestare debet ne mentiatur, prudens, ne mendacium dicat; alterum incidit in hominem, alterum non.

[4] Varie me hercule et lepide Nigidius tot sententias in eandem rem, quasi aliud atque aliud diceret, disparavit.

XII

Argument

Quod Chrysippus philosophus omne verbum ambiguum dubiumque esse dicit, Diodorus contra nullum verbum ambiguum esse putat.

[1] CHRYSIPPUS ait omne verbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo vel plura accipi possunt. Diodorus autem,

[2] cui Crono cognomentum fuit, Nullum, inquit, verbum est ambiguum, nec quisquam ambiguum dicit aut sentit, nec aliud dici videri debet quam quod se dicere sentit is qui dicit.

[3] At cum ego, inquit, aliud sensi, tu aliud accepisti, obscure magis dictum videri potest quam ambigue; ambigui enim verbi natura illa esse debuit, ut qui id diceret duo vel plura diceret. Nemo autem duo vel plura dicit, qui se sensit unum dicere.

XIII

Argument

Quid Titus Castricius de verbis deque sententia quadam C. Gracchi existimarit; quodque esse eam sine ullo sensus emolumento docuerit.

[1] APUD Titum Castricium, disciplinae rhetoricae doctorem, gravi atque firmo iudicio virum, legebatur oratio C. Gracchi In P. Popilium.

[2] In eius orationis principio conlocata verba sunt accuratius modulatiusque quam veterum oratorum consuetudo fert.

[3] Ea verba, sicuti dixi conposita, haec sunt: Quae vos cupide per hosce annos adpetistis atque voluistis, ea si temere repudiaritis, abesse non potest quin aut olim cupide adpetisse aut nunc temere repudiasse dicamini.

[4] Cursus igitur hic et sonus rotundae volubilisque sententiae eximie nos et unice delectabat, tanto id magis, quod iam tunc C. Graccho, viro inlustri et severo, eiusmodi compositionem fuisse cordi videbamus.

[5] Sed enim, cum eadem ipsa verba saepius petentibus nobis lectitarentur, admoniti a Castricio sumus ut consideraremus quae vis quodve emolumentum eius sententiae foret, neque pateremur ut aures nostrae cadentis apte orationis modis eblanditae animum quoque nobis voluptate inani perfunderent.

Cumque nos admonitione ista adtentiores fecisset, Inspicite, inquit, penitus quid efficiant verba haec, dicatque mihi, quaeso, aliqui vestrum, an sit ulla huiusce sententiae gravitas aut gratia: Quae vos cupide per hosce annos adpetistis atque voluistis, ea si temere repudiaritis, abesse non potest quin aut olim cupide adpetisse aut nunc temere repudiasse dicamini.

[6] Cui enim omnium hominum in mentem non venit id profecto usu venire, ut quod cupide adpetieris, cupide adpetisse et quod temere repudiaveris, temere repudiasse dicaris?

[7] At si, opinor, inquit, ita scriptum esset: Quae vos per hosce annos adpetistis atque voluistis, ea nunc si repudiaritis, abesse non potest quin aut olim cupide adpetisse aut nunc temere repudiasse dicamini;

[8] si ita, inquit, diceretur, gravior scilicet solidiorque fieret sententia et acciperet aliquid iustae in audiendo expectationis;

[9] nunc autem verba haec cupide et temere, in quibus verbis omne momentum rei est, non in concludenda sententia tantum dicuntur, sed supra quoque nondum desiderata ponuntur et quae nasci oririque ex ipsa rei conceptione debebant, ante omnino quam res postulat dicuntur. Nam qui ita dicit: si hoc feceris, cupide fecisse diceris, rem dicit sensus alicuius ratione conlectam et consertam; qui vero ita dicit: si cupide feceris, cupide fecisse diceris, non longe secus dicit atque si diceret: si cupide feceris, cupide feceris.

[10] Haec ego, inquit, admonui, non ut C. Graccho vitio darem,—dii enim mentem meliorem mihi! nam, si quicquam in tam fortis facundiae viro vitii vel erroris esse dici potest, id omne et auctoritas eius exhausit et vetustas consumpsit,—sed uti caveretis ne vos facile praestringeret modulatus aliqui currentis facundiae sonitus atque ut vim ipsam rerum virtutemque verborum prius pensitaretis et, si quidem gravis atque integra et sincera sententia diceretur, tum, si ita videretur, gressibus quoque ipsis orationis ¹⁰ et gestibus plauderetis; si vero frigidi et leves et futtiles sensus in verba apte numeroseque posita includerentur, non esse id secus crederetis quam cum homines insigni deformitate ac facie deridicula imitantur histriones et gestiunt.

XIV

Argument

Sobria et pulcherrima Romuli regis responsio circa vini usum.

[1] SIMPLICISSIMA suavitate et rei et orationis L. Piso Frugi usus est in primo Annali, cum de Romuli regis vita atque victu scriberet.

[2] Ea verba, quae scripsit, haec sunt: Eundem Romulum dicunt, ad cenam vocatum, ibi non multum bibisse, quia postridie negotium haberet. Ei dicunt: Romule, si istud omnes homines faciant, vinum vilius sit. His respondit: immo vero carum, si quantum quisque volet bibat; nam ego bibi, quantum volui.

XV

Argument

De ludibundo et errabundo atque id genus verborum productionibus; et quod Laberius sic amorabundam dixit, ut dicitur ludibunda et errabunda; atque inibi quod Sisenna per huiuscemodi verbum nova figura usus est.

[1] LABERIUS in Lacu Averno mulierem amantem, verbo inusitatius ficto, amorabundam dixit.

[2] Id verbum Caesellius Vindex in Commentario Lectionum Antiquarum ea figura scriptum dixit, qua ludibunda et ridibunda et errabunda dicitur ludens et ridens et errans.

[3] Terentius autem Scaurus, divi Hadriani temporibus grammaticus vel nobilissimus, inter alia quae De Caeselli Erroribus conposuit, in hoc quoque verbo errasse eum scripsit, quod idem esse putaverit ludens et ludibunda, ridens et ridibunda, errans et errabunda. Nam ludibunda, inquit, et ridibunda et errabunda ea dicitur quae ludentem vel ridentem vel errantem agit aut simulat.

[4] Sed qua ratione Scaurus adductus sit ut Caesellium in eo reprehenderet,non hercle reperiebamus. Non est enim dubium quin haec, genere ipso dumtaxat, idem significent quod ea demonstrant a quibus producuntur. Quid esset autem ludentem agere vel imitari non intellegere videri maluimus quam insimulare eum tamquam ipsum minus intellegentem.

[5] Quin magis Scaurum oportuit, commentaria Caeselli criminantem, hoc ab eo praeteritum requirere, quod non dixerit an quid et quantulum differret a ludibundo ludens et ridibundo ridens et errabundo errans ceteraque quae horum sunt similia, an a principalibus verbis paulum aliquid distarent, et quam omnino vim haberet particula haec extrema eiusmodi vocabulis addita.

[6] Hoc enim fuit potius requirendum in istiusmodi figurae tractatu, sicuti requiri solet in vinulento et lutulento et turbulento, vacuane et inanis sit istaec productio, cuiusmodi sunt quae παραγωγάς Graeci Gracci dicunt, an extrema illa particula habeat aliquid suae propriae significationis.

[7] Cum reprehensionem autem illam Scauri notaremus, in memoriam nobis rediit quod Sisenna in quarto Historiarum eiusdem figurae verbo ita usus est. Populabundus, inquit, agros ad oppidum pervenit, quod scilicet significat cum agros popularetur, non, ut Scaurus in consimilibus verbis ait, cum populantem ageret vel cum imitaretur.

[8] Sed inquirentibus nobis quaenam ratio et origo esset huiuscemodi figurae populabundus et errabundus et laetabundus et ludibundus multorumque aliorum id genus verborum, εὐεπιβόλως hercle Apollinaris noster videri sibi ait particulam istam postremam in quam verba talia exeunt vim et copiam et quasi abundantiam rei cuius id verbum esset demonstrare, ut laetabundus is dicatur qui abunde laetus sit, et errabundus, qui longo atque abundanti errore sit, ceteraque omnia ex ea figura ita dici ostendit, ut productio haec et extremitas largam et fluentem vim et copiam declararet.

XVI

Argument

Quod Graecorum verborum quorundam difficillima est in Latinam linguam mutatio, velut quod Graece dicitur πολυπραγμοσύνη.

[1] ADIECIMUS saepe animum ad vocabula rerum non paucissima quae neque singulis verbis, ut a Graecis, neque, si maxime pluribus eas res verbis dicamus, tam dilucide tamque apte demonstrari Latina oratione possunt quam Graeci ea dicunt privis vocibus.

[2] Nuper etiam cum adlatus esset ad nos Plutarchi liber et eius libri indicem legissemus, qui erat Περὶ Πολυπραγμοσύνης, percontanti cuipiam qui et litterarum et vocum Graecarum expers fuit cuiusnam liber et qua de re scriptus esset, nomen quidem scriptoris statim diximus, rem de qua scriptum ¹¹ fuit dicturi, haesimus.

[3] Ac tum quidem primo, quia non satis commode opinabar interpretaturum me ¹² esse, si dicerem librum scriptum De Negotiositate, aliud institui aput me exquirere, quod, ut dicitur, verbum de verbo expressum esset.

[4] Nihil erat prorsus quod aut meminissem legere me aut, si etiam vellem fingere, quod non insigniter asperum absurdumque esset, si ¹³ ex multitudine et negotio verbum unum compingerem, sicuti multiiuga dicimus et multicolora et multiformia.

[5] Sed non minus inlepide ita diceretur quam si interpretari voce una velis πολυφιλίαν aut πολυτροπίαν aut πολυσαρκίαν.

[6] Quamobrem, cum diutule tacitus in cogitando fuissem, respondi tandem non videri mihi significari eam rem posse uno nomine, et idcirco iuncta oratione quid vellet Graecum id verbum parabam ¹⁴ dicere.

Ad multas igitur res adgressio earumque omnium rerum actio πολυπραγμοσύνη, inquam, Graece dicitur, de qua hunc librum conpositum esse, inscriptio ista indicat.

[7] Tum ille opicus, verbis meis inchoatis et inconditis adductus virtutemque esse πολυπραγμοσύνην ratus, ¹⁵ Hortatur, inquit, nos profecto nescio quis hic Plutarchus ad negotia capessenda et ad res obeundas plurimas cum industria et celeritate, nomenque ipsius virtutis de qua locuturus esset libro ipsi, sicuti dicis, non incommode praescripsit. Minime, inquam, vero;

[8] neque enim ista omnino virtus est, cuius Graeco nomine argumentum hoc libri demonstratur, neque id quod tu opinare aut ego me dicere sentio aut Plutarchus facit. Deterret enim nos hoc quidem in libro, quam potest maxime, a varia ¹⁶ promiscaque et non necessaria rerum cuiuscemodi plurimarum et cogitatione et petitione.

[9] Sed huius, inquam, tui erroris culpam esse intellego in mea scilicet infacundia, qui ne pluribus quidem verbis potuerim non obscurissime dicere quod a Graecis perfectissime verbo uno et planissime dicitur.

XVII

Argument

Quid significet in veteribus praetorum edictis: qui flumina retanda publice redempta habent.

[1] EDICTA veterum praetorum sedentibus forte nobis in bibliotheca templi Traiani et aliud quid quaerentibus cum in manus incidissent, legere atque cognoscere libitum est.

[2] Tum in quodam edicto antiquiore ita scriptum invenimus: Qui flumina retanda publice redempta habent, si quis eorum ad me eductus fuerit, qui dicatur quod eum ex lege locationis facere oportuerit non fecisse.

[3] Retanda igitur quid esset quaerebatur.

[4] Dixit ibi quispiam nobiscum sedens amicus meus in libro se Gavi De Origine Vocabulorum VII. legisse, retas vocari arbores quae aut ripis fluminum eminerent aut in alveis eorum extarent, appellatasque esse a retibus, quod praetereuntes naves inpedirent et quasi inretirent; idcircoque sese arbitrari, retanda flumina locari solita esse, id est purganda, ne quid aut morae aut periculi navibus in ea virgulta incidentibus fieret.

XVIII

Argument

Qua poena Draco Atheniensis, in legibus quas populo Atheniensi scripsit, fures adfecerit; et qua postea Solon; et qua item decemviri nostri, qui duodecim Daodecim Tabulas scripserunt; atque inibi adscriptum quod aput Aegyptios furta licita et permissa sunt, aput Lacedaemonios autem cum studio quoque adfectata et pro exercitio utili celebrata; ac praeterea M. Catonis de poeniendis furtis digna memoria sententia.

[1] DRACO Atheniensis vir bonus multaque esse prudentia existimatus est iurisque divini et humani peritus fuit.

[2] Is Draco leges, quibus Athenienses uterentur, primus omnium tulit.

[3] In illis legibus furem cuiusmodicumque furti supplicio capitis poeniendum esse et alia pleraque nimis severe censuit sanxitque.

[4] Eius igitur leges, quoniam videbantur impendio acerbiores, non decreto iussoque, set tacito inlitteratoque Atheniensium consensu oblitteratae sunt. Postea legibus aliis mitioribus nitioribus,

[5] a Solone compositis cornpositis, usi sunt. Is Solon e septem illis inclutis sapientibus fuit. Is sua lege in fures, non, ut Draco antea, mortis, sed dupli poena vindicandum existimavit.

[6] Decemviri autem nostri, qui post reges exactos leges, quibus populus Romanus uteretur, in XII. Tabulis scripserunt, neque pari severitate in poeniendis omnium generum furibus furious neque remissa nimis lenitate usi sunt.

[7] Nam furem qui manifesto furto prensus esset tum demum occidi permiserunt, si aut, cum faceret furtum, nox esset, aut interdiu telo se, cum prenderetur, defenderet.

[8] Ex ceteris autem manifestis furibus liberos verberari addicique iusserunt ei cui furtum factum esset, si modo id luci fecissent neque se telo defendissent; servos item furti manifesti prensos verberibus adfici et e saxo praecipitari, sed pueros inpuberes praetoris arbitratu verberari voluerunt noxiamque ab his factam sarciri.

[9] Ea quoque furta quae per lancem liciumque concepta essent, proinde ac si manifesta forent, vindicaverunt.

[10] Sed nunc a lege illa decemvirali discessum est. Nam si qui super manifesto furto iure et ordine experiri velit, actio in quadruplum datur.

[11] Manifestum autem furtum est, ut ait Masurius, quod deprehenditur dum fit. Faciendi finis est, cum perlatum est quo ferri coeperat.

[12] Furti concepti, item oblati, tripli poena est.

Sed quod sit oblatum, quod conceptum, et pleraque alia ad eam rem ex egregiis veterum moribus accepta neque inutilia cognitu neque iniucunda qui legere volet, inveniet Sabini librum cui titulus est De Furtis.

[13] In quo id quoque scriptum est, quod volgo inopinatum est, non hominum tantum neque rerum moventium, quae auferri occulte et subripi possunt, sed fundi quoque et aedium fieri furtum; condemnatum quoque furti colonum, qui fundo quem conduxerat vendito, possessione eius dominum intervertisset.

[14] Atque id etiam, quod magis inopinabile est, Sabinus dicit, furem esse hominis iudicatum, qui cum fugitivus praeter oculos forte domini iret, obtentu togae, tamquam se amiciens, ne videretur a domino, obstitisset.

[15] Allis deinde furtis omnibus, quae nec manifesta appellantur, poenam imposuerunt dupli.

[16] Id etiam memini legere me in libro Aristonis iureconsulti, hautquaquam indocti viri, aput veteres Aegyptios, quod genus hominum constat et in artibus reperiendis sollertes extitisse et in cognitione rerum indaganda sagaces, furta omnia fuisse licita et inpunita.

[17] Aput Lacedaemonios quoque, sobrios illos et acres viros, cuius rei non adeo ut Aegyptiis fides longinqua est, non pauci neque ignobiles scriptores, qui de moribus legibusque eorum memorias condiderunt, ius atque usum fuisse furandi dicunt, idque a iuventute eorum non ad turpia lucra neque ad sumptum libidini praebendum comparandamve opulentiam, sed pro exercitio disciplinaque rei bellicae factitatum, quod et furandi sollertia et adsuetudo acueret firmaretque animos adulescentium et ad insidiarum astus et ad vigilandi tolerantiam et ad obrependi celeritatem.

[18] Sed enim M. Cato in oratione, quam De Praeda Militibus Dividenda scripsit, vehementibus et inlustribus verbis de inpunitate peculatus atque licentia conqueritur. Ea verba, quoniam nobis inpense placuerunt. adscripsimus: Fures, inquit, privatorum furtorum in nervo atque in compedibus aetatem agunt, fures publici in auro atque in purpura.

[19] Quam caste autem ac religiose a prudentissimis viris quid esset furtum definitum sit, praetereundum non puto, ne quis eum solum esse furem putet, qui occulte tollit aut clam subripit.

[20] Verba sunt Sabini ex libro luris Civilis secundo: Qui alienam rem adtrectavit, cum id se invito domino facere iudicare deberet, furti tenetur.

[21] Item alio capite: Qui alienum tacens ¹⁷ lucri faciendi causa sustulit, furti obstringitur, sive scit cuius sit, sive nescit.

[22] Haec quidem sic, in eo quo nunc dixi, Sabinus scripsit de rebus furti faciendi causa adtrectatis.

[23] Sed meminisse debemus, secundum ea quae supra scripsi, furtum sine ulla quoque adtrectatione fieri posse, sola mente atque animo ut furtum fiat adnitente.

[24] Quocirca ne id quidem Sabinus ¹⁸ dubitare se ait, quin dominus furti sit condemnandus qui servo suo uti furtum faceret imperavit.

Notes on the current edition

Attic Nights

1. F.H.G. i. 195, Müller

2. x. f. 1, Mirsch.

3. Passed by the consul, A. Atinius, in 454 B.C.

4. That is, for a certain number of animals to be paid on a number of successive days.

5. xxiii. fr. 2, Mirsch.

6. xxi. fr. 1, Mirsch.

7. That is, the

lucus a non lucendo

idea.

8. Fr. 82, Peter 2.

9. p. 82, 10, Jordan.

10. That is, in comparison with the miser.

11. Brut. 148.

12. p. 83, 1, Jordan.

13. Id., p. 83, 5.

14. From this passage some have inferred that Gellius had a villa at Praeneste.

15. Fr. 91, Peter 2.

16. Fr. 96, Peter 2.

17. On the origin of such expressions, see Frank, Riv. di Fil. liii (1925), p. 105.

18. The preceding statement is not

easy to understand.

Gellius seems to mean that all the different significations of pro developed from one or two original meanings. Thus

for

before

will give the general meaning in nearly all the examples except

on the rostra

and

on the tribunal,

for which see Frank's article, cited in the preceding note.

19. The principle of rivalry, the a)gw/n, was a recognized feature of literary technique.

20. v. 293; the translation is that of Way, L.C.L.

21. v. 165, Ribbeck 3.

22. p. 88, Marres. Apparently a discussion of the arguments by which the Pyrronian philosophers supported their beliefs.

23. That is,

things relative to something else.

24. Comprehendo is used in a technical sense; cf. Cic. Acad. Pr. ii. 47, cum plane compresserat (manum) pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat; also Acad. Post. i. 11, where kata/lhpton is rendered by comprehensio, and kata/lhyin by rebus quae manu prenderentur.

25. p. 375, Bipont.

26. Cf. Hor. Ars. Poet. 46 ff.

27. 14, Götz; 16, Linds.

28. The Pwlou/menoi, or

Men offered for sale.

29. 190, Ribbeck 3.

30. 417, Marx.

31. In 151 B.C.

32. Fr. 1, Peter 2.

33. Fr. 15, Peter 2.

34. F. H. G. iv. 373.

35. Ps.-Plutarch, Decem Orat. Vitae, Demosth., p. 848, B, says that the actor was Polos. Famous actors made large sums of money; according to Pliny, N.H. vii. 129, the celebrated Roman actor Roscius made 500,000 sesterces yearly.

36. 0. R. F., p. 242, Meyer 2.

37. Fr. 49, Swoboda.

38. ii. 152, Arn.

39. 0. R. F., p. 238, Meyer.

40. Fr. 8, Peter.

41. That is, his table companions.

42. 57, Ribbeck 3.

43. Fr. 9, Kummrow.

44. That is,

an addition to the end of a syllable.

45. Fr. 55, Peter.

46. In general these words in-bundus have the same force as the pres. participle; the intensive force in a few words comes originally from forms like versabundus, formed from intensive verbs. See Stolz, Hist. Lat. Gr. i, p. 570.

47.

48. The Bibliotheca Ulpia in the temple in Trajan's forum. Other great public libraries at Rome were in Vespasian's temple of Peace (see v. 21. 9 and the note), in Augustus' temple of Apollo on the Palatine hill, and in the porticus Octaniae. The first public library at Rome was founded by Asinius Pollio.

49. Fr. 2, Fun.; Jur. Civ. 126, Bremer.

50. See note 2, vol. i. p. 11.

51. viii. 13 ff.

52. To be his bondsman, until the debt was paid.

53. That is, the Tarpeian Rock on the Capitoline Hill.

54. See Paul. Festus, pp. 104—5, Lindsay. The searchers were clad only in a girdle, that they might not be suspected of bringing anything in with them and saying that it had been stolen, and they held a perforated plate before their faces, because of the presence of the women of the household.

55. Fr. 7, Huschke; Jur. Civ. 126, Bremer (ii, p. 517).

56. Fr. 7, Huschke; 3–5, Bremer (ii, p. 383).

57. XII. Tab. viii. 16.

58. Fr. 1, Huschke; ii. 2, p. 393, Bremer.

59. p. 69, 1, Jordan.

60. Fr. 2, Huschke; 113, Bremer (ii, p. 513).

61. Fr. 3, Huschke; 119, Bremer (ii, p. 515).

62. Fr. 4, Huschke; 127, Bremer.

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