Plutarch's account of the method of comparison and the calculations which the philosopher Pythagoras used in determining the great height of Hercules, while the hero was living among men.

1 In the treatise ¹ which he wrote on the mental and physical endowment and achievements of Hercules while he was among men, Plutarch says that the philosopher Pythagoras reasoned sagaciously and acutely in determining and measuring the hero's superiority in size and stature. For since it was generally agreed that Hercules paced off the racecourse of the stadium at Pisae, near the temple of Olympian Zeus, and made it six hundred feet long, and since the other courses in the land of Greece, constructed later by other men, were indeed six hundred feet in length, but yet were somewhat shorter than that at Olympia, he readily concluded by a process of comparison that the measured length of Hercules' foot was greater than that of other men in the same proportion as the course at Olympia was longer than the other stadia. Then, having ascertained the size of Hercules' foot, he made a calculation of the bodily height suited to that measure, based upon the natural proportion of all parts of the body, and thus arrived at the logical conclusion that Hercules was as much taller than other men as the course at Olympia exceeded the others that had been constructed with the same number of feet. ²

The apt use made by Herodes Atticus, the ex-consul, in reply to an arrogant and boastful young fellow, a student of philosophy in appearance only, of the passage in which Epictetus the Stoic humorously set apart the true Stoic from the mob of prating triflers who called themselves Stoics.

1 While we were students at Athens, Herodes Atticus, a man of consular rank and of true Grecian eloquence, often invited me to his country houses near that city, in company with the honourable ³ Servilianus and several others of our countrymen who had withdrawn from Rome to Greece in quest of culture. And there at that time, while we were with him at the villa called Cephisia, both in the heat of summer and under the burning autumnal sun, we protected ourselves against the trying temperature by the shade of its spacious groves, its long, soft ⁴ promenades, the cool location of the house, its elegant baths with their abundance of sparkling water, and the charm of the villa as a whole, which was everywhere melodious with plashing waters and tuneful birds.

There was with us there at the time a young student of philosophy, of the Stoic school according to his own account, but intolerably loquacious and presuming. In the course of the conversations which are commonly carried on at table after dinner, this fellow often used to prattle unseasonably, absurdly, and at immoderate length, on the principles of philosophy, maintaining that compared with himself all the Greek-speaking authorities, all wearers of the toga, and the Latin race in general were ignorant boors. As he spoke, he rattled off unfamiliar terms, the catchwords of syllogisms and dialectic tricks, declaring that no one but he could unravel the the and the arguments, ⁵ and other riddles of the kind. Furthermore, as to ethics, the nature of the human intellect, and the origin of the virtues with their duties and limits, or on the other hand the ills caused by disease and sin, and the wasting and destruction of the soul, he stoutly maintained that absolutely no one else had investigated, understood and mastered all these more thoroughly than himself. Further, he believed that torture, bodily pain and deadly peril could neither injure nor detract from the happy state and condition of life which, in his opinion, he had attained, and that no sorrow could even cloud the serenity of the Stoic's face and expression.

Once when he was puffing out these empty boasts, and already all, weary of his prating, were thoroughly disgusted and longing for an end, Herodes, speaking in Greek as was his general custom, said: And he bade them bring the first ⁶ volume of the Discourses of Epictetus, arranged by Arrian, in which that venerable old man with just severity rebukes those young men who, though calling themselves Stoics, showed neither virtue nor honest industry, but merely babbled of trifling propositions and of the fruits of their study of such elements as are taught to children.

Then, when the book was brought, there was read the passage which I have appended, in which Epictetus with equal severity and humour set apart and separated from the true and genuine Stoic, who was beyond question without restraint or constraint, unembarrassed, free, prosperous and happy, that other mob of triflers who styled themselves Stoics, and casting the black soot of their verbiage before the eves of their hearers, laid false claim to the name of the holiest of sects:

On hearing these words, that most arrogant of youths was mute, just as if the whole diatribe had been pronounced, not by Epictetus against others, but against himself by Herodes.

The difficult decision which the Lacedaemonian Chilo made to save a friend; and that one should consider scrupulously and anxiously whether one ought ever to do wrong in the interest of friends, with notes and quotations on that subject from the writings of Theophrastus and Marcus Cicero.

1 OF Chilo the Lacedaemonian, one of that famous group of sages, ⁹ it is written in the books of those who have recorded the lives and deeds of distinguished men, that he, Chilo, at the close of his life, when death was already close upon him, thus addressed the friends about his bedside:

"That very little of what I have said and done in the course of a long life calls for repentance, you yourselves may perhaps know. I, at any rate, at such a time as this do not deceive myself in believing that I have done nothing that it troubles me to remember, except for just one thing; and as to that it is not even now perfectly clear to me whether I did right or wrong.

This Chilo, then, though a man of surpassing wisdom, was in doubt how far he ought to have gone counter to law and counter to equity for the sake of a friend, and that question distressed him even at the very end of his life. So too many subsequent students of philosophy, as appears in their works, have inquired very carefully and very anxiously, to use their own language, ei) dei= bohqei=n tw=| fi/lw| para\ to\ di/kaion kai\ me/xri po/sou kai\ poi=a. ¹⁰ That is to say, they inquired

This problem has been discussed, as I have said, not only by many others, but also with extreme thoroughness by Theophrastus, the most conscientious and learned of the Peripatetic school; the discussion is found, if I remember correctly, in the first book of his treatise On Friendship. That work Cicero evidently read when he too was composing a work On Friendship. Now, the other material that Cicero thought proper to borrow from Theophrastus his talent and command of language enabled him to take and to translate with great taste and pertinence; but this particular topic which, as I have said, has been the object of much inquiry, and is the most difficult one of all, he passed over briefly and hurriedly, not reproducing the thoughtful and detailed argument of Theophrastus, but omitting his involved and as it were over-scrupulous discussion and merely calling attention in a few words to the nature of the problem. I have added Cicero's words, in case anyone should wish to verify my statement: ^{11 12}

he says, But he does not tell us what the nature of that deviation ought to be, how far we may go to help him, and how dis-honourable tile nature of the friend's desire may be. But what does it avail me to know that I must turn aside from the straight path in the event of such dangers to my friends, provided I commit no act of utter disgrace, unless he also informs me what he regards as utter disgrace and, once having turned from the path of rectitude, how far I ought to go? he says, But that is the very point on which we most need instruction, but which the teachers make least clear, namely, how far and to what degree indulgence must be allowed to friendship. The sage Chilo, whom I mentioned above, turned from the path to save a friend. But I can see how far lie went; for he gave unsound advice to save his friend. Yet even as to that he was in doubt up to his last hour whether he deserved criticism and censure.

says Cicero, ¹³ That of course everybody knew, and as Lucilius says. ¹⁴ But what I ask and wish to know is this: when it is that one must act contrary to law and contrary to equity in a friend's behalf, albeit without doing violence to the public liberty and peace; and when it is necessary to turn aside from the path, as he himself puts it, in what way and how much, under what circumstances, and to what extent that ought to be done. Pericles, the great Athenian, a man of noble character and endowed with all honourable accomplishments, declared his opinion— in a single instance, it is true, but yet very clearly. For when a friend asked him to perjure himself in court for his sake, he replied in these words: ¹⁵

Theophrastus, however, in the book that I have mentioned, discusses this very question more exhaustively and with more care and precision than Cicero. But even he in his exposition does not express an opinion about separate and individual action, nor with the corroborative evidence of examples, but treats classes of actions briefly and generally, in about the following terms:

he says, "should be incurred, if thereby great advantage may be gained for a friend; for the insignificant loss from impairment of honour is repaid and made good by the greater and more substantial honour gained by aiding a friend, and that slight break or rift, so to speak, in one's reputation is repaired by the buttress formed by the advantages gained for one's friend. Nor ought we," says he,

On this point I append Theophrastus' own words: ¹⁶

The philosopher Favorinus too, somewhat loosening and inclining the delicate balance of justice to suit the occasion, thus defined such an indulgence in favour: ¹⁷

Later on Theophrastus again expressed himself to about this effect:

On these and similar topics Theophrastus wrote very discreetly, scrupulously and conscientiously, yet with more attention to analysis and discussion than with the intention or hope of arriving at a decision, since undoubtedly the variations in circumstances and exigencies, and the minute distinctions and differences, do not admit of a definite and universal rule that can be applied to individual cases; and it is such a rule, as I said at the beginning of this essay, of which we are in search.

Now this Chilo, with whom I began this little discussion, is the author not only of some other wise and salutary precepts, but also of the following, which has been found particularly helpful, since it confines within due limits those two most ungovernable passions, love and hatred. said he, ¹⁸

Of this same Chilo the philosopher Plutarch, in the first book of his treatise On the Soul, wrote as follows: ¹⁹

The care and fine taste with which Antonius Julianus examined the artful substitution of one word for another by Marcus Cicero in one of his orations.

1 THE rhetorician Antonius Julianus had an exceedingly noble and winning personality. He also possessed learning of a delightful and helpful sort, devoting great attention to the refinements of the writers of old and readily recalling them. Moreover, he inspected all the earlier literature with such care, weighing its merits and ferreting out its defects, that you might say that his judgment was perfect. ²⁰

This Julianus expressed the following opinion of the syllogism which is found in the speech of Marcus Tullius spoken In Defence of Gnaeus Plancius ²¹ —but first I will quote the exact words on which he passed judgment: "And yet, a debt of money is a different thing from a debt of gratitude. For he who discharges a debt in money ceases forthwith to have that which he has paid, while one who continues in debt keeps what belongs to another. But in the case of a debt of gratitude, he who returns it has it; and he who has it returns it by the mere fact of having it. ²² In the present instance I shall not cease to be Plancius' debtor if I pay this debt, nor should I be paying him any the less simply by feeling goodwill, if the present unfortunate situation had not occurred" ²³ said Julianus, continued Julianus, said Julianus, Thus it was that Julianus elucidated and criticized passages in the earlier literature, which a select group of young men read under his guidance.

That the orator Demosthenes was criticized because of his care for his person and attire, and taunted with foppishness; and that the orator Hortensius also, because of similar foppishness and the use of theatrical gestures when he spoke, was nicknamed Dionysia the dancing-girl.

1 IT is said that Demosthenes in his dress and other personal habits was excessively spruce, elegant and studied. It was for that reason that he was taunted by his rivals and opponents with his and ; ²⁴ for that reason, too, that they did not refrain from applying to him foul and shameful epithets, alleging that he was no mall and was even guilty of unnatural vice.

In like manner Quintus Hortensius, quite the most renowned orator of his time with the exception of Marcus Tullius, because he dressed with extreme foppishness, arranged the folds of his toga with great care and exactness, and in speaking used his hands to excess in lively gestures, was assailed with gibes and shameful charges; and many taunts were hurled at him, even while he was pleading in court, for appearing like an actor. But when Sulla was on trial, and Lucius Torquatus, a man of somewhat boorish and uncouth nature, with great violence and bitterness did not stop with calling Hortensius an actor in the presence of the assembled jurors, but said that he was a posturer and a Dionysia—which was the name of a notorious dancing-girl—then Hortensius replied in a soft and gentle tone: ²⁵

An extract from the speech delivered to the people by Metellus Numidicus when he was censor, urging them to marry; why that speech has been criticized and how on the contrary it has been defended.

1 A number of learned men were listening to the reading of the speech which Metellus Numidicus, ²⁶ an earnest and eloquent man, delivered to the people when he was censor, On Marriage, urging them to be ready to undertake its obligations. In that speech these words were written:

It seemed to some of the company that Quintus Metellus, whose purpose as censor was to encourage the people to take wives, ought not to have admitted the annoyance and constant inconveniences of the married state; that to do this was not so much to encourage, as to dissuade and deter them. But they said that his speech ought rather to have taken just the opposite tone, insisting that as a rule there were no annoyances in matrimony, and if after all they seemed sometimes to arise, they were slight, insignificant and easily endured, and were completely forgotten in its greater pleasures and advantages; furthermore, that even these annoyances did not fall to the lot of all or from any fault natural to matrimony, but as the result of the misconduct and injustice of some husbands and wives. Titus Castricius, however, thought that Metellus had spoken properly and as was altogether worthy of his position. said he, he said,

This other passage also from the same address of Metellus in my opinion deserves constant reading, not less by Heaven! than the writings of the greatest philosophers. His words are these:

In these words of Cicero, from his fifth oration Against Verres, hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum, there is no error in writing or grammar but those are wrong who do violence to good copies by writing futuram; and in that connection mention is also made of another word of Cicero's which, though correct, is wrongly changed; with a few incidental remarks on the melody and cadence of periods for which Cicero earnestly strove.

1 IN the fifth oration of Cicero Against Verres, ²⁸ in a copy of unimpeachable fidelity, since it was the result of Tiro's ²⁹ careful scholarship, is this passage:

It seemed to many that there was an error in the last word. For they thought that futuram should be written instead of futurum, and they were sure that the book ought to be corrected, lest like the adulterer in the comedy of Plautus ³⁰ —for so they jested about the error which they thought they had found—this solecism in an oration of Cicero's should be

There chanced to be present there a friend of mine, who had become an expert from wide reading and to whom almost all the older literature had been the object of study, meditation and wakeful nights. He, on examining the book, declared that there was no mistake in writing or grammar in that word, but that Cicero had written correctly and in accordance with early usage. said he, " to be taken with rem, as hasty and careless readers think, nor is it used as a participle. It is an infinitive, the kind of word which the Greeks call a)pare/mfatos or 'indeterminate,' affected neither by number nor gender, but altogether free and independent, such a word as Gaius Gracchus used in the speech entitled On Publius Popilius, delivered in the places of assembly, ³¹ in which we read: 'I suppose that my enemies will say this.' He said dicturum, not dicturos; and is it not clear that dicturum in Gracchus is used according to the same principle as futurum in Cicero? Just as in the Greek language, without any suspicion of error, words such as e)rei=n, poih/sein, e)/sesqai, and the like, are used in all genders and all numbers without distinction." He added that in the third book of the Annals of Claudius Quadrigarius are these words: ³² ; and at the beginning of the eighteenth book of the same Quadrigarius: ³³ ; that similarly Valerius Antias also in his twenty-fourth book wrote: ^{34 37}

Furthermore, that same friend of mine used to say that in the oration of that same Marcus Tullius On Pompey's Military Command ³⁸ Cicero wrote the following, and so my friend always read it: And he declared that in potestatem fuisse ³⁹ was not a solecism, as the half-educated vulgar think, but he maintained that it was used in accordance with a definite and correct principle, one which the Greeks also followed; and Plautus, who is most choice in his Latinity, said in the Amphitruo: ⁴⁰ not in mente, as we commonly say.

But besides Plautus, whom my friend used as an example in this instance, I myself have come upon a great abundance of such expressions in the early writers, and I have jotted them down here and there in these notes of mine. But quite apart from that rule and those authorities, the very sound and order of the words make it quite clear that it is more in accordance with the careful attention to diction and the rhythmical style of Marcus Tullius that, either being good Latin, he should prefer to say potestatem rather than potestate. For the former construction is more agreeable to the ear and better rounded, the latter harsher and less finished, provided always that a man has an ear attuned to such distinctions, not one that is dull and sluggish; it is for the same reason indeed that he preferred to say explicavit rather than explicuit, which was already coming to be the commoner form.

These are his own words from the speech which he delivered On Pomnpey's Military Command: ⁴¹ But if lie had said explicuit, the sentence would halt with weak and imperfect rhythm. ⁴²

An anecdote found in the works of the philosopher Sotion about the courtesan Lais and the orator Demosthenes.

1 SOTION was a man of the Peripatetic school, far from unknown. He wrote a book filled with wide and varied information and called it Ke/ras )Amalqei/as, ⁴³ which is about equivalent to The Horn of Plenty.

In that book is found the following anecdote about the orator Demosthenes and the courtesan Lais: he says, He says that this was the origin of the proverb common among the Greeks: for in vain would any man go to Corinth to visit Lais who could not pay her price. —a sum equivalent in our money to ten thousand denarii. ⁴⁵ But the Greek words which he is said to have used are neater; he said: Ou)k w)nou=mai muri/wn draxmw=n metame/leian. ⁴⁶ .

What the method and what the order of the Pythagorean training was, and the amount of time which was prescribed and accepted as the period for learning and at the same time keeping silence.

1 IT is said that the order and method followed by Pythagoras, and afterwards by his school and his successors, in admitting and training their pupils were as follows: At the very outset he the young men who presented themselves for instruction. That word means to inquire into the character and dispositions of men by an inference drawn from their facial appearance and expression, and from the form and bearing of their whole body. Then, when he had thus examined a man and found him suitable, he at once gave orders that he should be admitted to the school and should keep silence for a fixed period of time; this was not the same for all, but differed according to his estimate of the man's capacity for learning quickly. But the one who kept silent listened to what was said by others; he was, however, religiously forbidden to ask questions, if he had not fully understood, or to remark upon what he had heard. Now, no one kept silence for less than two years, and during the entire period of silent listening they were called a)koustikoi/ or But when they had learned what is of all things the most difficult, to keep quiet and listen, and had finally begun to be adepts in that silence which is called e)xemuqi/a or they were then allowed to speak, to ask questions, and to write down what they had heard, and to express their own opinions. During this stage they were called maqhmatikoi/ or evidently from those branches of knowledge which they had now begun to learn and practise; for the ancient Greeks called geometry, gnomonics, ⁴⁷ music and other higher studies maqh/mata or ; but the common people apply the term mathematici to those who ought to be called by their ethnic name, Chaldaeans. ⁴⁸ Finally, equipped with this scientific training, they advanced to the investigation of the phenomena of the universe and the laws of nature, and then, and not till then, they were called fusikoi/ or

Having thus expressed himself about Pythagoras, my friend Taurus continued: "But nowadays these fellows who turn to philosophy on a sudden with unwashed feet, ⁴⁹ not content with being wholly 'without purpose, without learning, and without scientific training,' even lay down the law as to how they are to be taught philosophy. One says, 'first teach me this,' another chimes in,' I want to learn this, I don't want to learn that'; one is eager to begin with the Symposiumn of Plato because of the revel of Alcibiades, ⁵⁰ another with the Phaedrus on account of the speech of Lysias. ⁵¹ By Jupiter!" said he, That is what Taurus used to say, in comparing the modern students of philosophy with the Pythagoreans of old.

But I must not omit this fact either—that all of them, as soon as they had been admitted by Pythagoras into that band of disciples, at once devoted to the common use whatever estate and property they had, and an inseparable fellowship was formed, like the old-time association which in Roman legal parlance was termed an ⁵²

In what terms the philosopher Favorinus rebuked a young man who used language that was too old-fashioned and archaic.

1 THE philosopher Favorinus thus addressed a young man who was very fond of old words and made a display in his ordinary, everyday conversation of many expressions that were quite too unfamiliar and archaic: said he,

The statement of the celebrated writer Thucydides, that the Lacedaemonians in battle used pipes and not trumpets, with a citation of his words on that subject; and the remark of Herodotus that king Alyattes had female lyre-players as part of his military equipment; and finally, some notes on the pipe used by Gracchus when addressing assemblies.

1 THUCYDIDES, the most authoritative of Greek historians, tells us ⁵⁵ that the Lacedaemonians, greatest of warriors, made use in battle, not of signals by horns or trumpets, but of the music of pipes, certainly not in conformity with any religious usage or from any ceremonial reason, nor yet that their courage might be roused and stimulated, which is the purpose of horns and trumpets; but on the contrary that they might be calmer and advance in better order, because the effect of the flute-player's notes is to restrain impetuosity. So firmly were they convinced that in meeting the enemy and beginning battle nothing contributed more to valour and confidence than to be soothed by gentler sounds and keep their feelings under control. Accordingly, when the army was drawn up, and began to advance in battle-array against the foe, pipers stationed in the ranks began to play. Thereupon, by this quiet, pleasant, and even solemn prelude the fierce impetuosity of the soldiers was checked, in conformity with a kind of discipline of military music, so to speak, so that they might not rush forth in straggling disorder.

But I should like to quote the very words of that outstanding writer, which have greater distinction and credibility than my own:

Tradition has it that the Cretans also commonly entered battle with the lyre playing before them and regulating their step. Futhermore, Alyattes, king of the land of Lydia, a man of barbaric manners and luxury, when he made war on the Milesians, as Herodotus tells us in his History, ⁵⁶ had in his army and his battle-array orchestras of pipe and lyre-players, and even female flute-players, such as are the delight of wanton banqueters. Homer, however, says ⁵⁷ that the Achaeans entered battle, relying, not on the music of lyres and pipes, but on silent harmony and unanimity of spirit:

What then is the meaning of that soul-stirring shout of the Roman soldiers which, as the annalists have told us, was regularly raised when charging the foe? ⁵⁸ Was that done contrary to so generally accepted a rule of old-time discipline? Or are a quiet advance and silence needful when an army is marching against an enemy that is far off and visible from a distance, but when they have almost come to blows, then must the foe, already at close quarters, be driven back by a violent assault and terrified by shouting?

But, look you, the Laconian pipe-playing reminds me also of that oratorical pipe, which they say was played for Gaius Gracchus when he addressed the people, and gave him the proper pitch. But it is not at all true, as is commonly stated, that a musician always stood behind him as he spoke, playing the pipe, and by varying the pitch now restrained and now animated his feelings and his delivery. For what could be more absurd than that a piper should play measures, notes, and a kind of series of changing melodies for Gracchus when addressing an assembly, as if for a dancing mountebank? But more reliable authorities declare that the musician took his place unobserved in the audience and at intervals sounded on a short pipe a deeper note, to restrain and calm the exuberant energy of the orator's delivery. And that in my opinion is the correct view, for it is unthinkable that Gracchus' well-known natural vehemence needed any incitement or impulse from without. Yet Marcus Cicero thinks that the piper was employed by Gracchus for both purposes, in order that with notes now soft, now shrill, he might animate his oratory when it was becoming weak and feeble, or check it when too violent and passionate. I quote Cicero's own words: ⁵⁹

Finally, Aristotle wrote in his volume of Problems ⁶¹ that the custom of the Lacedaemonians which I have mentioned, of entering battle to the music of pipers, was adopted in order to make the fearlessness and ardour of the soldiers more evident and indubitable. said he, I have added a few of Aristotle's own words on the subject: * * * ⁶²

AT what age, from what kind of family, by what rites, ceremonies and observances, and under what title a Vestal virgin is by the chief pontiff; what legal privileges she has immediately upon being chosen; also that, according to Labeo, she is lawfully neither heir of an intestate person, nor is anyone her heir, in case she dies without a will.

1 Those who have written about a Vestal virgin, of whom the most painstaking is Antistius Labeo, ⁶³ have stated that it is unlawful for a girl to be chosen who is less than six, or more than ten, years old; she must also have both father and mother living; she must be free too from any impediment in her speech, must not have impaired hearing, or be marked by any other bodily defect; she must not herself have been freed from paternal control, ⁶⁴ nor her father before her, even if her father is still living and she is under the control of her grandfather; ⁶⁵ neither one nor both of her parents may have been slaves or engaged in mean occupations. ⁶⁶ But they say that one whose sister has been chosen to that priesthood acquires exemption, as well as one whose father is a1 flamen or an augur, one of the Fifteen in charge of the Sibylline Books, ⁶⁷ one of the Seven who oversee the banquets of the gods, or a dancing priest of Mars. Exemption from that priesthood is regularly allowed also to the betrothed of a pontiff and to the daughter of a priest of the tubilustrium. ⁶⁸ Furthermore the writings of Ateius Capito inform us ⁶⁹ that the daughter of a man without residence in Italy must not be chosen, and that the daughter of one who has three children must be excused.

Now, as soon as the Vestal virgin is chosen, escorted to the House of Vesta and delivered to the pontiffs, she immediately passes from the control of her father without the ceremony of emancipation or loss of civil rights, and acquires the right to make a will.

But as to the method and ritual for choosing a Vestal, there are, it is true, no ancient written records, except that the first to be appointed was chosen by Numa. There is, however, a Papian law, ⁷⁰ which provides that twenty maidens be selected from the people at the discretion of the chief pontiff, that a choice by lot be made from that number in the assembly, ⁷¹ and that the girl whose lot is drawn be by the chief pontiff and become Vesta's. But that allotment in accordance with the Papian law is usually unnecessary at present. For if any man of respectable birth goes to the chief pontiff and offers his daughter for the priesthood, provided consideration may be given to her candidacy without violating any religious requirement, the senate grants him exemption from the Papian law.

Now the Vestal is said to be it appears, because she is grasped by the hand of the chief pontiff and led away from the parent under whose control she is, as if she had been taken in war. In the first book of Fabius Pictor's History ⁷² the formula is given which the chief pontiff should use in choosing a Vestal. It is this:

Now, many think that the term ought to be used only of a Vestal. But, as a matter of fact, the flamens of Jupiter also, as well as the augurs, were said to be Lucius Sulla, in the second book of his Autobiography, ⁷³ wrote as follows: Marcus Cato, in his accusation of Servius Galba, says of the Lusitanians: ⁷⁴

Furthermore, in the Commentaries on the Twelve Tables compiled by Labeo ⁷⁵ we find this passage:

The Vestal is called when taken by the chief pontiff, because there is a tradition that the first one who was chosen bore that name. ⁷⁶

On the philosophical question, what would be more proper on receipt of an order-to do scrupulously what was commanded, or sometimes even to disobey, in the hope that it would be more advantageous to the giver of the order; and an exposition of varying views on that subject.

1 IN interpreting, evaluating and weighing the obligations which the philosophers call kaqh/konta, or the question is often asked, when some task has been assigned to you and exactly what was to be done has been defined, whether you ought to do anything contrary to instructions, if by so doing it might seem that the outcome would be more successful and more advantageous to the one who imposed the task upon you. It is a difficult question which has been answered both ways by wise men. For several have taken a position on the one side and expressed the decided belief that when a matter has once for all been determined, after due deliberation, by the one whose business and right are concerned, nothing should be done contrary to his order, even if some unlooked for occurrence should promise a better way of accomplishing the end in view; for fear that, if the expectation were not realized, the offender would be liable to blame and inexorable punishment for his insubordination. If, on the other hand, the affair chanced to result more favourably, thanks would indeed be due the gods, but nevertheless a precedent would seem to have been established, which might ruin well-laid plans by weakening the binding force of a command. Others have thought that the disadvantages to be feared, in case the order was not strictly obeyed, should carefully be weighed in advance against the advantage looped for, and if the former were comparatively light and trivial, while on the contrary a greater and more substantial advantage was confidently to be expected, then they judged that one might go counter to instructions, to avoid losing a providential opportunity for successful action; and they did not believe that a precedent for disobedience was to be feared, provided always that considerations of such a kind could be urged. But they thought that particular regard should be paid to the temperament and disposition of the person whose business and command were involved: he must not be stern, hard, autocratic and implacable, as in the case of the orders of a Postumius and a Manlius. ⁷⁷ For if an account must be rendered to such a commander, they recommended that nothing be done contrary to the letter of his order.

I think that this question of obedience to commands of such a nature will be more clearly defined, if I add the example set by Publius Crassus Mucianus, a distinguished and eminent man. This Crassus is said by Sempronius Asellio ⁷⁸ and several other writers of Roman history to have had the five greatest and chiefest of blessings; for he was very rich, of the highest birth, exceedingly eloquent, most learned in the law, and chief pontiff. When he, in his consulship, was in command in ⁷⁹ the province of Asia, and was making preparations to beset and assault Leucae, he needed a long, stout beam from which to make a battering-ram, to breach the walls of that city. Accordingly, he wrote to the chief engineer of the people of Mylatta, ⁸⁰ allies and friends of the Romans, to have the larger of two masts which he had seen in their city sent him. Then the chief engineer on learning the purpose for which Crassus wanted the mast, did not send him the larger, as had been ordered, but the smaller, which he thought was more suitable, and better adapted for making a ram, besides being easier to transport. Crassus ordered him to be summoned, asked why he had not sent the mast which had been ordered, and ignoring the excuses and reasons which the man urged, caused him to be stripped and soundly beaten with rods; for he thought that all the authority of a commander was weakened and made of no effect, if one might reply to orders which he received, not with due obedience, but with an unsolicited plan of his own.

What was said and done by Gaius Fabricius, a man of great renown and great deeds, but of simple establishment and little money, when the Samnites offered him a great amount of gold, in the belief that he was a poor man.

1 JULIUS HYGINUS, in the sixth book of his work On the Lives and Deeds of Famous Men, ⁸¹ says that a deputation from the Samnites came to Gaius Fabricius, the Roman general, and after mentioning his many important acts of kindness and generosity to the Samnites since peace was restored, offered him a present of a large sum of money, begging that he would accept and use it. And they said that they did this because they saw that his house and mode of life were far from magnificent, and that he was not so well provided for as his high rank demanded. Thereupon Fabricius passed his open hands from his ears to his eyes, then down to his nose, his mouth, his throat, and finally to the lower part of his belly; then he replied to the envoys:

What a tiresome and utterly hateful fault is vain and empty loquacity, and how often it has been censured in deservedly strong language by the greatest Greek and Latin writers.

1 THE talk of empty-headed, vain and tiresome babblers, who with no foundation of solid matter let out a stream of tipsy, tottering words, has justly been thought to come from the lips and not from the heart. Moreover, men say that the tongue ought not to be unrestrained and rambling, but guided and, so to speak, steered by cords connected with the heart and inmost breast. Yet you may see some men spouting forth words with no exercise of judgment, but with such great and profound assurance that many of them in the very act of speaking are evidently unaware that they are talking. Ulysses, on the contrary, a man gifted with sagacious eloquence, spoke, not from his lips but from his heart, as Hommer says—a remark which applies less to the sound and quality of his utterance than to the depth of the thoughts inwardly conceived; and the poet went on to say, with great aptness, that the teeth form a rampart to check wanton words, in order that reckless speech may not only be restrained by that watchful sentry the heart, but also hedged in by a kind of outpost, so to speak, stationed at the lips.

The words of Homer which I mentioned above are these: ⁸² and: ⁸³ I have added also a passage from Marcus Tullius, in which he expresses his strong and just hatred of silly and unmeaning volubility. He says: ⁸⁴ Also in the first book of the De Oratore ⁸⁵ he wrote as follows: But Marcus Cato in particular is a relentless assailant of this fault. For in the speech entitled If Caelius, tribune of the commons, should have summoned him, ⁸⁶ he says: Again Cato, in the same speech, ⁸⁷ upbraiding the same Marcus Caelius, tribune of the commons, for the cheapness at which not only his speech but also his silence could be bought, says: Most deservedly too does Homer call Thersites alone of all the Greeks a)metroeph/s, and a)krito/muqos, ⁸⁸ declaring that his words are many and a)/kosma, or like the endless chatter of daws; ⁸⁹ for what else does e)kolw/a ( ) mean? There is also a line of Eupolis most pointedly aimed at men of that kind: ⁹⁰ and our countryman Sallust, wishing to imitate this, writes: ⁹¹ It is for the same reason that Hesiod, wisest of poets, says ⁹² that the tongue should not be vulgarly exposed but hidden like a treasure, and that it is exhibited with best effect when it is modest, restrained and musical. His own words are: The following verse of Epicharmus is also to the point: ⁹³ and it is from this line surely that the saying arose:

I once heard Favorinus say that the familiar lines of Euripides: ⁹⁴ ought not to be understood as directed only at those who spoke impiously or lawlessly, but might even with special propriety be used also of men who prate foolishly and immoderately, whose tongues are so extravagant and unbridled that they ceaselessly flow and seethe with the foulest dregs of language, the sort of persons to whom the Greeks apply the highly significant term kata/glwssoi, or I learned from a friend of his, a man of learning, that the famous grammarian Valerius Probus, shortly before his death, began to read Sallust's well-known saying, ⁹⁵ as and that he insisted that Sallust left it in that form, since the word loquentia was very characteristic of Sallust, an innovator in diction, ⁹⁶ while eloquentia was not at all consistent with lack of discretion.

Finally, loquacity of this kind and a disorderly mass of empty grandiloquence is scored with striking epithets by Aristophanes, wittiest of poets, in the following lines: ⁹⁷ And no less pointedly did our forefathers also call men of that kind, who were drowned in words, "babblers, gabbllers and chatterboxes."

That those words of Quadrigarius in the third book of his Annals, are not used arbitrarily or by a poetic figure, but in accordance with a definite and approved rule of the science of grammar.

1 QUADRIGARIUS in the third book of his Annals ⁹⁸ wrote the following: "There a thousand of men is killed," using occiditur, not occiduntur. So too Lucilius in the third book of his Satires, has mille est, not mille sunt. Varro in the seventeenth book of his Antiquilies of Man writes: ¹⁰⁰ Marcus Cato in the first book of his Origins, ¹⁰¹ Marcus Cicero has in his sixth Oration against Antony, ¹⁰²

In these and many other passages mile is used in the singular number, and that is not, as some think, a concession to early usage or admitted as a neat figure of speech, but it is obviously demanded by rule. For the word mille does not stand for the Greek xilioi, but for xilia/s, ; and just as they say one xilia/s, or two xilia/des, so we say one thousand and two thousands according to a definite and regular rule. Therefore these common expressions are correct and good usage, and Furthermore Lucilius, in addition to the example cited above, makes this point still clearer in another place also: for in his fifteenth book he says: ¹⁰⁴ So too in the ninth book: ¹⁰⁵ Lucilius wrote milli passum instead of mille passibus and uno milli nummum for unis mille nunmis, thus showing clearly that mille is a noun, used in the singular number, that its plural is milia, and that it also forms an ablative case. Nor ought we to expect the rest of the cases; for there are many other words which are declined only in single cases, and even some which are not declined at all. Therefore we can no longer doubt that Cicero, in the speech which he wrote In Defence of Milo, ¹⁰⁶ used these words: not as we find it in less accurate copies; for one rule requires us to say but another,

The patience with which Socrates endured his wife's shrewish disposition; and in that connection what Marcus Varro says in one of his satires about the duty of a husband.

1 XANTHIPPE, the wife of the philosopher Socrates, is said to have been ill-tempered and quarrelsome to a degree, with a constant flood of feminine tantrums and annoyances day and night. Alcibiades, amazed at this outrageous conduct of hers towards her husband, asked Socrates what earthly reason he had for not showing so shrewish a woman the door. replied Socrates,

In the same vein Varro also said in the Menippean Satire ¹⁰⁷ which he entitled On the Duty of a Husband: ¹⁰⁸ Varro contrasted the two words tollere and ferre very cleverly, ¹⁰⁹ to be sure, but he obviously uses tollere in the sense of It is evident too that Varro thought that if a fault of that kind in a wife cannot be corrected, it should be tolerated, in so far of course as a man may endure it honourably; for faults are less serious than crimes.

How Marcus Varro, in the fourteenth book of his Antiquities of Man, ¹¹⁰ criticizes his master Lucius Aelius for a false etymology; and how Varro in his turn, in the same book, gives a false origin for fur.

1 IN the fourteenth book of his Divine Antiquities ¹¹¹ Marcus Varro shows that Lucius Aelius, the most learned Roman of his time, went astray and followed a false etymological principle in separating an old Greek word which had been taken over into the Roman language into two Latin words, just as if it were of Latin origin.

I quote Varro's own words on the subject:

Tis is what Varro wrote in the first part of his book, with great skill in the explanation of words, with wide knowledge of the usage of both languages, and marked kindliness towards Aelius himself. But in the latter part of the same book he says that fur is so called because the early Romans used furvus for ater ( ), and thieves steal most easily in the night, which is black. Is it not clear that Varro made the same mistake about fur that Aelius did about lepus. For what the Greeks now call kle/pths, or in the earlier Greek language was called fw/r. Hence, owing to the similarity in sound, he who in Greek is fw/r, in Latin is fur. But whether that fact escaped Varro's memory at the time, or on the other hand he thought that fur was more appropriately and consistently named from furvus, that is, as to that question it is not for me to pass judgment on a man of such surpassing learning.

The story of king Tarquin the Proud and the Sibylline Books.

1 IN ancient annals we find this tradition about the Sibylline Books. An old woman, a perfect stranger, came to king Tarquin the Proud, bringing nine books; she declared that they were oracles of the gods and that she wished to sell them. Tarquin inquired the price; the woman demanded an immense and exorbitant sum: the king laughed her to scorn, believing her to be in her dotage. Then she placed a lighted brazier before him, burned three of the books to ashes, and asked whether he would buy the remaining six at the same price. But at this Tarquin laughed all the more and said that there was now no doubt that the old woman was crazy. Upon that the woman at once burned up three more books and again calmly made the same request, that he would buy the remaining three at the original figure. Tarquin now became serious and more thoughtful, and realising that such persistence and confidence were not to be treated lightly, he bought the three books that were left at as high a price as had been asked for all nine. Now it is a fact that after then leaving Tarquin, that woman was never seen again anywhere. The three books were deposited in a shrine ¹¹² and called ; ¹¹³ to them the Fifteen ¹¹⁴ resort whenever tile immortal gods are to be consulted as to the welfare of the State.

On what the geometers call e)pi/pedos, stereo/s, ku/bos and grammh/, with the Latin equivalents for all these terms.

1 OF the figures which the geometers call sxh/mata there are two kinds, and These the Greeks themselves call respectively e)pi/pedos and stereo/s. A figure is one that has all its lines in two dimensions only, breadth and length; for example, triangles and squares, which are drawn on a flat surface without height. We have a figure, when its several lines do not produce merely length and breadth in a plane, but are raised so as to produce height also; such are in general the triangular columns which they call or those which are bounded on all sides by squares, such as the Greeks call ku/boi, ¹¹⁵ and we quadrantalia. For the ku/bos is a figure which is square on all its sides, says Marcus Varro, ¹¹⁶ Similarly in numbers too the term ku/bos is used, when every factor ¹¹⁷ consisting of the same number is equally resolved into the cube number itself, ¹¹⁸ as is the case when three is taken three times and the resulting number itself is then trebled.

Pythagoras declared that the cube of the number three controls the course of the moon, since the moon passes through its orbit in twenty-seven days, and the ternio, or which the Greeks call tria/s, when cubed makes twenty-seven.

Furthermore, our geometers apply the term linea, or to what the Greeks call grammh/. This is defined by Marcus Varro as follows: ¹¹⁹ says he, But Euclid says more tersely, omitting : ¹²⁰ )Aplate/s cannot be expressed in Latin by a single word, unless you should venture to coin the term inlatabile.

The positive assertion of Julius Hyginus that he had read a manuscript of Virgil from the poet's own household, in which there was written et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror and not the usual reading, sensu torquebit amaro.

1 NEARLY everyone reads these lines from the Georgics of Virgi ¹²¹ in this way: Hyginus, however, on my word no obscure grammarian, in the Commentaries ¹²³ which he wrote on Virgil, declares and insists that it was not this that Virgil left, but what he himself found in a copy which had come from the home and family of the poet: and this reading has commended itself, not to Hyginus alone, but also to some other learned men, because it seems absurd to say they say, Moreover, when I had read Hyginus' note to Favorinus, and the strangeness and harshness of the phrase at once had displeased him, he said with a laugh: The passage, from the fourth book of Lucretius, reads as follows: ¹²⁶ And in fact we see that Virgil imitated, not only single words of Lucretius, but often almost whole lines and passages.

Whether it is correct Latin for counsel for the defence to say superesse se, those whom he is defending; and the proper meaning of superesse.

1 AN incorrect and improper meaning of a word has been established by long usage, in that we use the expression hic illi superest when we wish to say that anyone appears as another's advocate and pleads his cause. And this is not merely the language of the streets and of the common people, but is used in the forum, the comitium and the courts. Those, however, who have spoken language undefiled have for the most part used superesse in the sense of Thus Marcus Varro, in the satire entitled ¹²⁸ uses superfuisse in the sense of having exceeded the amount proper for the occasion. These are his words:

I remember happening to be present in the court of a praetor who was a man of learning, and that on that occasion an advocate of some repute pleaded in such fashion that he wandered from the subject and did not touch upon the point at issue. Thereupon the praetor said to the man whose case was before him: And when the pleader protested, saying the praetor wittily retorted: ¹²⁹

Marcus Cicero, too, in his book entitled On Reducing the Civil Law to a System ¹³⁰ wrote these words: In this passage superfuit seems to mean ; ¹³¹ for Tubero was thoroughly versed in Stoic dialectics. Cicero's use of the word in the second book ¹³² of the Republic also deserves attention. This is the passage in question:

Now Julius Paulus, the most learned man within my recollection, used to say witll keenness and understanding that superesse and its Greek equivalent had more than one meaning: for he declared that the Greeks used perisso/n both ways, either of what was superfluous and unnecessary or of what was too abundant, overflowing and excessive; that in the same way our earlier writers also employed superesse sometimes of what was superfluous, idle and not wholly necessary, a sense which we have just cited from Varro, and sometimes, as in Cicero, of that which indeed surpassed other things in copiousness and plentifulness, yet was immoderate and too extensive, and gushed forth more abundantly than was sufficient. Therefore one who says superesse se with reference to a man whom he is defending tries to convey none of these meanings, but uses superesse in a sense that is unknown and not in use. And he will not be able to appeal even to the authority of Virgil, who in his Georgics wrote as follows: ¹³³ For in this place Virgil seems to have used that word somewhat irregularly in giving supersit the sense of but on the contrary his use of the word in the following line is more nearly the accepted one: ¹³⁴ for here superesse means to be more than equal to the task and not to be crushed by it.

I also used to raise the question whether the ancients used superesse in the sense of For to express that idea Sallust says, not superesse, but superare. These are his words in the Jugurtha: ¹³⁵ But we find in the third book of Ennius' Annals: ¹³⁶ that is, is left and remains undone; but there superesse must be divided and read as if it were not one part of speech, but two, as in fact it is. Cicero, however, in his second Oration against Antony ¹³⁷ expresses by restare, not by superesse.

Besides these uses we find superesse with the meaning For it is so employed in the book of letters of Marcus Cicero to Lucius Plancus, ¹³⁸ as well as in a letter of Marcus Asinius Pollio to Cicero, ¹³⁹ as follows: meaning that if the commonwealth should be destroyed and perish, he does not wish to live. Again in the Asinaria of Plautus that same force is still more evident in these, the first verses of that comedy: ¹⁴⁰

Thus we have to avoid, not merely an improper use of the word, but also the evil omene, in case an older man, acting as advocate for a youth, should say that he him.

Who Papirius Praetextatus was; the reason for that surname; and the whole of the entertaining story about that same Papirius.

1 THE story of Papirius Praetextatus was told and committed to writing in the speech which Marcus Cato made To the soldiers against Galba, ¹⁴¹ with great charm, brilliance and elegance of diction. I should have included Cato's own words in this very commentary, if I had had access to the book at the time when I dictated this extract. But if you would like to hear the bare tale, without the noble and dignified language, the incident was about as follows: It was formerly the custom at Rome for senators to enter the House with their sons under age. ¹⁴² In those days, when a matter of considerable importance had been discussed and was postponed to the following day, it was voted that no one should mention the subject of the debate until the matter was decided. The mother of the young Papirius, who had been in the House with his father, asked her son what the Fathers had taken up in the senate. The boy replied that it was a secret and that he could not tell. The woman became all the more eager to hear about it; the secrecy of the matter and the boy's silence piqued her curiosity; she therefore questioned him more pressingly and urgently. Then the boy, because of his mother's insistence, resorted to a witty and amusing falsehood. He said that the senate had discussed the question whether it seemed more expedient, and to the advantage of the State, for one man to have two wives or one woman to have two husbands. On hearing this, she is panic-stricken, rushes excitedly from the house, and carries the news to the other matrons. Next day a crowd of matrons came to the senate, imploring with tears and entreaties that one woman might have two husbands rather than one man two wives. The senators, as they entered the House, were wondering at this strange madness of the women and the meaning of such a demand, when young Papirius, stepping forward to the middle of the House, told in detail what his mother had insisted on hearing, what he himself had said to her, in fact, the whole story exactly as it had happened. The senate paid homage to the boy's cleverness and loyalty, but voted that thereafter boys should not enter the House with their fathers, save only this Papirius; and the boy was henceforth honoured with the surname Praetextatus, because of his discretion in keeping silent and in speaking, while he was still young enough to wear the purple-bordered gown.

Three epitaphs of three early poets, Naevius, Plautus and Pacuvius, composed by themselves and inscribed upon their tombs.

1 THERE are three epitaphs of famous poets, Gnaeus Naevius, Plautus and Marcus Pacuvius, composed by themselves and left to be inscribed upon their tombs, which I have thought ought to be included among these notes, because of their distinction and charm.

The epitaph of Naevius, although full of Campanian ¹⁴³ arrogance, might have been regarded as a just estimate, if he had not written it himself: ¹⁴⁴

We should be inclined to doubt whether the epitaph of Plautus was really by his own hand, if it had not been quoted by Marcus Varro in the first book of his work On Poets: ¹⁴⁶

Pacuvius' epitaph is the most modest and simple, worthy of his dignity and good taste: ¹⁴⁹

Marcus Varro's definition of the word ; to which is added a somewhat careful investigation of the derivation of that word.

1 MARCUS VARRO, in that book of his Antiquities of Man which treats Of War and Peace, ¹⁵⁰ defines indutiae (a truce) in two ways. he says, and again in another place, But each of these definitions seems to be wittily and happily concise rather than clear or satisfactory. For a truce is not a peace—since war continues, although fighting ceases—nor is it restricted to a camp or to a few days only. For what are we to say if a truce is made for some months, and the troops withdraw from camp into the towns? Have we not then also a truce? Again, if a truce is to be defined as only lasting for a few days, what are we to say of the fact, recorded by Quadrigarius in the first book of his Annals, that Gaius Pontius the Samnite asked the Roman dictator for a truce of six hours? ¹⁵¹ The definition too, is rather happy than clear or precise.

Now the Greeks, more significantly and more pointedly, have called such an agreement to cease from fighting e)kexeiri/a, or substituting for one letter of harsher sound a smoother one. ¹⁵² For since there is no fighting at such a time and their hands are withheld, they called it e)kexeiri/a. But it surely was not Varro's task to define a truce too scrupulously, and to observe all the laws and canons of definition; for he thought it sufficient to give an explanation of the kind which the Greeks call tu/poi ( ) and u(pografai/ ( ), rather than o(rismoi/ ( ).

I have for a long time been inquiring into the derivation of indutiae, but of the many explanations which I have either heard or read this which I am going to mention seems most reasonable. I believe that indutiae is made up of inde uti iam ( ). The stipulation of a truce is to this effect, that there shall be no fighting and no trouble up to a fixed time, but that after that time all the laws of war shall again be in force. Therefore, since a definite date is set and an agreement is made that before that date there shall be no fighting but when that time comes, fighting shall be resumed: by uniting (as it were) and combining those words which I have mentioned the term indutiae is formed. ¹⁵³

But Aurelius Opilius, in the first book of his work entitled The Muses, says: ¹⁵⁴ I have not omitted this note of Aurelius, for fear that it might appear to some rival of these Nights a more elegant etymology, merely because he thought that it had escaped my notice when I was investigating the origin of the word.

The answer of the philosopher Taurus, when I asked him whether a wise man ever got angry.

1 I ONCE asked Taurus in his lecture-room whether a wise man got angry. For after his daily discourses he often gave everyone the opportunity of asking whatever questions he wished. On this occasion he first discussed the disease or passion of anger seriously and at length, setting forth what is to be fund in the books of the ancients and in his own commentaries; then, turning to me who had asked the question, he said: said he,

Now the sum and substance of Taurus' whole disquisition was this: he did not believe that a)orghsi/a or and a)nalghsi/a, or were identical; but that a mind not prone to anger was one thing, a spirit a)na/lghtos and a)nai/sqhtos, that is, callous and unfeeling, quite another. For as of all the rest of the emotions which the Latin philosophers call affects or affectiones, and the Greeks pa/qh, so of the one which, when it becomes a cruel desire for vengeance, is called he did not recommend as expedient a total lack, ste/rhsis as the Greeks say, but a moderate amount, which they call metrio/ths.