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BOOK I

I

Plutarch's account of the method of comparison and the calculations which the philosopher Pythagoras used in determining the great height of Hercules, while the hero was living among men.

1 In the treatise ¹ which he wrote on the mental and physical endowment and achievements of Hercules while he was among men, Plutarch says that the philosopher Pythagoras reasoned sagaciously and acutely in determining and measuring the hero's superiority in size and stature. For since it was generally agreed that Hercules paced off the racecourse of the stadium at Pisae, near the temple of Olympian Zeus, and made it six hundred feet long, and since the other courses in the land of Greece, constructed later by other men, were indeed six hundred feet in length, but yet were somewhat shorter than that at Olympia, he readily concluded by a process of comparison that the measured length of Hercules' foot was greater than that of other men in the same proportion as the course at Olympia was longer than the other stadia. Then, having ascertained the size of Hercules' foot, he made a calculation of the bodily height suited to that measure, based upon the natural proportion of all parts of the body, and thus arrived at the logical conclusion that Hercules was as much taller than other men as the course at Olympia exceeded the others that had been constructed with the same number of feet. ²

II

2arg

The apt use made by Herodes Atticus, the ex-consul, in reply to an arrogant and boastful young fellow, a student of philosophy in appearance only, of the passage in which Epictetus the Stoic humorously set apart the true Stoic from the mob of prating triflers who called themselves Stoics.

1 While we were students at Athens, Herodes Atticus, a man of consular rank and of true Grecian eloquence, often invited me to his country houses near that city, in company with the honourable ³ Servilianus and several others of our countrymen who had withdrawn from Rome to Greece in quest of culture. And there at that time, while we were with him at the villa called Cephisia, both in the heat of summer and under the burning autumnal sun, we protected ourselves against the trying temperature by the shade of its spacious groves, its long, soft ⁴ promenades, the cool location of the house, its elegant baths with their abundance of sparkling water, and the charm of the villa as a whole, which was everywhere melodious with plashing waters and tuneful birds.

There was with us there at the time a young student of philosophy, of the Stoic school according to his own account, but intolerably loquacious and presuming. In the course of the conversations which are commonly carried on at table after dinner, this fellow often used to prattle unseasonably, absurdly, and at immoderate length, on the principles of philosophy, maintaining that compared with himself all the Greek-speaking authorities, all wearers of the toga, and the Latin race in general were ignorant boors. As he spoke, he rattled off unfamiliar terms, the catchwords of syllogisms and dialectic tricks, declaring that no one but he could unravel the

master,

the

resting,

and the

heap

arguments, ⁵ and other riddles of the kind. Furthermore, as to ethics, the nature of the human intellect, and the origin of the virtues with their duties and limits, or on the other hand the ills caused by disease and sin, and the wasting and destruction of the soul, he stoutly maintained that absolutely no one else had investigated, understood and mastered all these more thoroughly than himself. Further, he believed that torture, bodily pain and deadly peril could neither injure nor detract from the happy state and condition of life which, in his opinion, he had attained, and that no sorrow could even cloud the serenity of the Stoic's face and expression.

Once when he was puffing out these empty boasts, and already all, weary of his prating, were thoroughly disgusted and longing for an end, Herodes, speaking in Greek as was his general custom, said:

Allow me, mightiest of philosophers, since we, whom you call laymen, cannot answer you, to read from a book of Epictetus, greatest of Stoics, what he thought and said about such big talk as that of yours.

And he bade them bring the first ⁶ volume of the Discourses of Epictetus, arranged by Arrian, in which that venerable old man with just severity rebukes those young men who, though calling themselves Stoics, showed neither virtue nor honest industry, but merely babbled of trifling propositions and of the fruits of their study of such elements as are taught to children.

Then, when the book was brought, there was read the passage which I have appended, in which Epictetus with equal severity and humour set apart and separated from the true and genuine Stoic, who was beyond question without restraint or constraint, unembarrassed, free, prosperous and happy, that other mob of triflers who styled themselves Stoics, and casting the black soot of their verbiage before the eves of their hearers, laid false claim to the name of the holiest of sects:

"'Speak to me of good and evil.'—Listen:

The wind, bearing me from Ilium, drove me to the Cicones. ⁷

Of all existing things some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good things are virtues and what partakes of them, the evil are vice and what partakes of vice, and the indifferent lie between these: wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. ⁸ —'How do you know this?'—Hellanicus says so in his Egyptian Histoy. For what difference does it make whether you say that, or that it was Diogenes in his Ethics or Chrysippus or Cleanthes? Have you then investigated any of these matters and formed an opinion of your own? Let me see how you are accustomed to act in a storm at sea. Do you recall this classification when the sail cracks and you cry aloud? If some idle fellow should stand beside you and say: 'Tell me, for Heaven's sake, what you told me before. It isn't a vice to suffer shipwreck, is it? It doesn't partake of vice, does it?' Would you not hurl a stick of wood at him and cry: 'What have we to do with you, fellow? We perish and you come and crack jokes.' But if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation. . .

On hearing these words, that most arrogant of youths was mute, just as if the whole diatribe had been pronounced, not by Epictetus against others, but against himself by Herodes.

III

3arg

The difficult decision which the Lacedaemonian Chilo made to save a friend; and that one should consider scrupulously and anxiously whether one ought ever to do wrong in the interest of friends, with notes and quotations on that subject from the writings of Theophrastus and Marcus Cicero.

1 OF Chilo the Lacedaemonian, one of that famous group of sages, ⁹ it is written in the books of those who have recorded the lives and deeds of distinguished men, that he, Chilo, at the close of his life, when death was already close upon him, thus addressed the friends about his bedside:

"That very little of what I have said and done in the course of a long life calls for repentance, you yourselves may perhaps know. I, at any rate, at such a time as this do not deceive myself in believing that I have done nothing that it troubles me to remember, except for just one thing; and as to that it is not even now perfectly clear to me whether I did right or wrong.

I was judge with two others, and a friend's life was at stake. The law was such that the man must be found guilty. Therefore, either my friend must suffer capital punishment or violence must be done to the law. I considered for a long time how to remedy so difficult a situation. The course which I adopted seemed, in comparison with the alternative, the less objectionable; I myself secretly voted for conviction, but I persuaded my fellow judges to vote for acquittal. Thus I myself in a matter of such moment did my duty both as a judge and as a friend. But my action torments me with the fear that there may be something of treachery and guilt in having recommended to others, in the same case, at the same time, and in a common duty, a course for them contrary to what I thought best for myself.

This Chilo, then, though a man of surpassing wisdom, was in doubt how far he ought to have gone counter to law and counter to equity for the sake of a friend, and that question distressed him even at the very end of his life. So too many subsequent students of philosophy, as appears in their works, have inquired very carefully and very anxiously, to use their own language, ei) dei= bohqei=n tw=| fi/lw| para\ to\ di/kaion kai\ me/xri po/sou kai\ poi=a.¹⁰ That is to say, they inquired

whether one may sometimes act contrary to law or contrary to precedent in a friend's behalf, and under what circumstances and to what extent.

This problem has been discussed, as I have said, not only by many others, but also with extreme thoroughness by Theophrastus, the most conscientious and learned of the Peripatetic school; the discussion is found, if I remember correctly, in the first book of his treatise On Friendship. That work Cicero evidently read when he too was composing a work On Friendship. Now, the other material that Cicero thought proper to borrow from Theophrastus his talent and command of language enabled him to take and to translate with great taste and pertinence; but this particular topic which, as I have said, has been the object of much inquiry, and is the most difficult one of all, he passed over briefly and hurriedly, not reproducing the thoughtful and detailed argument of Theophrastus, but omitting his involved and as it were over-scrupulous discussion and merely calling attention in a few words to the nature of the problem. I have added Cicero's words, in case anyone should wish to verify my statement: ¹¹

Therefore these are the limits which I think ought to be observed, namely: when the characters of friends are blameless, then there should be complete harmony of opinions and inclinations in everything without any exception; and, even if by some chance the wishes of a friend are not altogether honourable and require to be forwarded in matters which involve his life or reputation, we should turn aside from the straight path, provided, however, utter disgrace does not follow. For there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship.

¹²

When it is a question,

he says,

either of a friend's life or good name, we must turn aside from the straight path, to further even his dis-honourable desire.

But he does not tell us what the nature of that deviation ought to be, how far we may go to help him, and how dis-honourable tile nature of the friend's desire may be. But what does it avail me to know that I must turn aside from the straight path in the event of such dangers to my friends, provided I commit no act of utter disgrace, unless he also informs me what he regards as utter disgrace and, once having turned from the path of rectitude, how far I ought to go?

For,

he says,

there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship.

But that is the very point on which we most need instruction, but which the teachers make least clear, namely, how far and to what degree indulgence must be allowed to friendship. The sage Chilo, whom I mentioned above, turned from the path to save a friend. But I can see how far lie went; for he gave unsound advice to save his friend. Yet even as to that he was in doubt up to his last hour whether he deserved criticism and censure.

Against one's fatherland,

says Cicero, ¹³

one must not take up arms for a friend.

That of course everybody knew, and

before The ognis was born,

as Lucilius says. ¹⁴ But what I ask and wish to know is this: when it is that one must act contrary to law and contrary to equity in a friend's behalf, albeit without doing violence to the public liberty and peace; and when it is necessary to turn aside from the path, as he himself puts it, in what way and how much, under what circumstances, and to what extent that ought to be done. Pericles, the great Athenian, a man of noble character and endowed with all honourable accomplishments, declared his opinion— in a single instance, it is true, but yet very clearly. For when a friend asked him to perjure himself in court for his sake, he replied in these words:

One ought to aid one's friends, but only so far as the gods allow.

¹⁵

Theophrastus, however, in the book that I have mentioned, discusses this very question more exhaustively and with more care and precision than Cicero. But even he in his exposition does not express an opinion about separate and individual action, nor with the corroborative evidence of examples, but treats classes of actions briefly and generally, in about the following terms:

A small and trifling amount of disgrace or infamy,

he says, "should be incurred, if thereby great advantage may be gained for a friend; for the insignificant loss from impairment of honour is repaid and made good by the greater and more substantial honour gained by aiding a friend, and that slight break or rift, so to speak, in one's reputation is repaired by the buttress formed by the advantages gained for one's friend. Nor ought we," says he,

to be influenced by mere terms, because my fair fame and the advantage of a friend under accusation are not of the same class. For such things must be estimated by their immediate weight and importance, not by verbal terms and the merits of the classes to which they belong. For when the interests of a friend are put into the balance with our own honour in matters of equal importance, or nearly so, our own honour unquestionably turns the scale; but when the advantage of a friend is far greater, but our sacrifice of reputation in a matter of no great moment is insignificant, then what is advantageous to a friend gains in importance in comparison with what is honourable for us, exactly as a great weight of bronze is more valuable than a tiny shred of gold.

On this point I append Theophrastus' own words: ¹⁶

If such and such a thing belongs to a more valuable class, yet it is not true that some part of it, compared with a corresponding part of something else, will be preferable. This is not the case, for example, if gold is more valuable than bronze, and a portion of gold, compared with a portion of bronze of corresponding size, is obviously of more worth; but the number and size of the portions will have some influence on our decision.

The philosopher Favorinus too, somewhat loosening and inclining the delicate balance of justice to suit the occasion, thus defined such an indulgence in favour: ¹⁷

That which among men is called favour is the relaxing of strictness in time of need.

Later on Theophrastus again expressed himself to about this effect:

The relative importance and insignificance of things, and all these considerations of duty, are sometimes directed, controlled, and as it were steered by other external influences and other additional factors, so to say, arising from individuals, conditions and exigencies, as well as by the requirements of existing circumstances; and these influences, which it is difficult to reduce to rules, make them appear now justifiable and now unjustifiable.

On these and similar topics Theophrastus wrote very discreetly, scrupulously and conscientiously, yet with more attention to analysis and discussion than with the intention or hope of arriving at a decision, since undoubtedly the variations in circumstances and exigencies, and the minute distinctions and differences, do not admit of a definite and universal rule that can be applied to individual cases; and it is such a rule, as I said at the beginning of this essay, of which we are in search.

Now this Chilo, with whom I began this little discussion, is the author not only of some other wise and salutary precepts, but also of the following, which has been found particularly helpful, since it confines within due limits those two most ungovernable passions, love and hatred.

So love,

said he,

as if you were possibly destined to hate; and in the same way, hate as if you might perhaps afterwards love.

¹⁸

Of this same Chilo the philosopher Plutarch, in the first book of his treatise On the Soul, wrote as follows: ¹⁹

Chilo of old, having heard a man say that he had no enemy, asked him if he had no friend, believing that enmities necessarily followed and were involved in friendships.

IV

4arg

The care and fine taste with which Antonius Julianus examined the artful substitution of one word for another by Marcus Cicero in one of his orations.

1 THE rhetorician Antonius Julianus had an exceedingly noble and winning personality. He also possessed learning of a delightful and helpful sort, devoting great attention to the refinements of the writers of old and readily recalling them. Moreover, he inspected all the earlier literature with such care, weighing its merits and ferreting out its defects, that you might say that his judgment was perfect. ²⁰

This Julianus expressed the following opinion of the syllogism which is found in the speech of Marcus Tullius spoken In Defence of Gnaeus Plancius²¹ —but first I will quote the exact words on which he passed judgment: "And yet, a debt of money is a different thing from a debt of gratitude. For he who discharges a debt in money ceases forthwith to have that which he has paid, while one who continues in debt keeps what belongs to another. But in the case of a debt of gratitude, he who returns it has it; and he who has it returns it by the mere fact of having it. ²² In the present instance I shall not cease to be Plancius' debtor if I pay this debt, nor should I be paying him any the less simply by feeling goodwill, if the present unfortunate situation had not occurred" ²³

Here,

said Julianus,

is to be sure a fine artistry in the way the words are marshalled, something well-rounded that charms tile ear by its mere music; but it must be read with the privilege of a slight change in the meaning of one word in order to preserve the truth of the proposition. Now the comparison of a debt of gratitude with a pecuniary debt demands the use of the word 'debt' in both instances. For a debt of money and a debt of gratitude will seem to be properly compared, if we may say that both money and gratitude are owed; but let us consider what happens in the owing or paying of money, and on the other hand in the owing and paying of a debt of gratitude, if we retain the word 'debt' in both instances. Now Cicero,

continued Julianus,

having said that a debt of money was a different thing from a debt of gratitude, in giving his reason for that statement applies the word 'owe' to money, but in the case of gratitude substitutes ' has' ( i.e. 'feels') for ' owes'; for this is what he says: ' But in the case of a debt of gratitude, he who returns it has it; and he who has it returns it by the mere fact of having it.' But that word 'has' does not exactly fit the proposed comparison. For it is the owing, and not the having, of gratitude that is compared with money, and therefore it would have been more consistent to say: 'He who owes pays by the mere fact of owing.' But it would be absurd and quite too forced if a debt of gratitude that was not yet paid should be said to be paid by the mere fact that it was owed. Therefore,

said Julianus,

Cicero made a change and substituted a similar word for one which he had dropped, in order to seem to have kept the idea of a comparison of debts, and at the same time retained the careful balance of his period.

Thus it was that Julianus elucidated and criticized passages in the earlier literature, which a select group of young men read under his guidance.

V

5arg

That the orator Demosthenes was criticized because of his care for his person and attire, and taunted with foppishness; and that the orator Hortensius also, because of similar foppishness and the use of theatrical gestures when he spoke, was nicknamed Dionysia the dancing-girl.

1 IT is said that Demosthenes in his dress and other personal habits was excessively spruce, elegant and studied. It was for that reason that he was taunted by his rivals and opponents with his

exquisite, pretty mantles

and

soft, pretty tunics

; ²⁴ for that reason, too, that they did not refrain from applying to him foul and shameful epithets, alleging that he was no mall and was even guilty of unnatural vice.

In like manner Quintus Hortensius, quite the most renowned orator of his time with the exception of Marcus Tullius, because he dressed with extreme foppishness, arranged the folds of his toga with great care and exactness, and in speaking used his hands to excess in lively gestures, was assailed with gibes and shameful charges; and many taunts were hurled at him, even while he was pleading in court, for appearing like an actor. But when Sulla was on trial, and Lucius Torquatus, a man of somewhat boorish and uncouth nature, with great violence and bitterness did not stop with calling Hortensius an actor in the presence of the assembled jurors, but said that he was a posturer and a Dionysia—which was the name of a notorious dancing-girl—then Hortensius replied in a soft and gentle tone:

I would rather be a Dionysia, Torquatus, yes, a Dionysia, than like you, a stranger to the Muses, to Venus and to Dionysus.

²⁵

VI

6arg

An extract from the speech delivered to the people by Metellus Numidicus when he was censor, urging them to marry; why that speech has been criticized and how on the contrary it has been defended.

1 A number of learned men were listening to the reading of the speech which Metellus Numidicus, ²⁶ an earnest and eloquent man, delivered to the people when he was censor, On Marriage, urging them to be ready to undertake its obligations. In that speech these words were written:

If we could get on without a wife, Romans, we would all avoid that annoyance; but since nature has ordained that we can neither live very comfortably with them nor at all without them, we must take thought for our lasting well-being rather than for the pleasure of the moment.

It seemed to some of the company that Quintus Metellus, whose purpose as censor was to encourage the people to take wives, ought not to have admitted the annoyance and constant inconveniences of the married state; that to do this was not so much to encourage, as to dissuade and deter them. But they said that his speech ought rather to have taken just the opposite tone, insisting that as a rule there were no annoyances in matrimony, and if after all they seemed sometimes to arise, they were slight, insignificant and easily endured, and were completely forgotten in its greater pleasures and advantages; furthermore, that even these annoyances did not fall to the lot of all or from any fault natural to matrimony, but as the result of the misconduct and injustice of some husbands and wives. Titus Castricius, however, thought that Metellus had spoken properly and as was altogether worthy of his position.

A censor,

said he,

ought to speak in one way, an advocate in another. It is the orator's privilege to make statements that are untrue, daring, crafty, deceptive and sophistical, provided they have some semblance of truth and can by any artifice be made to insinuate themselves into the minds of the persons who are to be influenced. Furthermore,

he said,

it is disgraceful for an advocate, even though his case be a bad one, to leave anything unnoticed or undefended. But for a Metellus, a blameless man, with a reputation for dignity and sense of honour, addressing the Roman people with the prestige of such a life and course of honours, it was not becoming to say anything which was not accepted as true by himself and by all men, especially when speaking on a subject which was a matter of everyday knowledge and formed a part of the common and habitual experience of life. Accordingly, having admitted the existence of annoyances notorious with all men, and having thus established confidence in his sincerity and truthfulness, he then found it no difficult or uphill work to convince them of what was the soundest and truest of principles, that the State cannot survive without numerous marriages.

This other passage also from the same address of Metellus in my opinion deserves constant reading, not less by Heaven! than the writings of the greatest philosophers. His words are these:

The immortal gods have mighty power, but they are not expected to be more indulgent to us than our parents. But parents, if their children persist in wrong-doing, disinherit them. What different application of justice then are we to look for from the immortal gods, unless we put an end to our evil ways? Those alone may fairly claim the favour of the gods who are not their own worst enemies. ²⁷ The immortal gods ought to support, not supply, virtue.

VII

7arg

In these words of Cicero, from his fifth oration Against Verres, hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum, there is no error in writing or grammar but those are wrong who do violence to good copies by writing futuram; and in that connection mention is also made of another word of Cicero's which, though correct, is wrongly changed; with a few incidental remarks on the melody and cadence of periods for which Cicero earnestly strove.

1 IN the fifth oration of Cicero Against Verres,²⁸ in a copy of unimpeachable fidelity, since it was the result of Tiro's ²⁹ careful scholarship, is this passage:

Men of low degree and humble birth sail the seas; they come to places which they had never before visited. They are neither known to those to whom they have come nor can they always find acquaintances to vouch for them, yet because of this mere faith in their citizenship they believe that they will be safe, not only before our magistrates, who are constrained by fear of the laws and public opinion, and not only among Roman citizens, who are united by the common bond of language, rights, and many interests, but wherever they may come, they hope that this possession will protect them.

It seemed to many that there was an error in the last word. For they thought that futuram should be written instead of futurum, and they were sure that the book ought to be corrected, lest like the adulterer in the comedy of Plautus ³⁰ —for so they jested about the error which they thought they had found—this solecism in an oration of Cicero's should be

caught in the act.

There chanced to be present there a friend of mine, who had become an expert from wide reading and to whom almost all the older literature had been the object of study, meditation and wakeful nights. He, on examining the book, declared that there was no mistake in writing or grammar in that word, but that Cicero had written correctly and in accordance with early usage.

For futurum is not,

said he, " to be taken with rem, as hasty and careless readers think, nor is it used as a participle. It is an infinitive, the kind of word which the Greeks call a)pare/mfatos or 'indeterminate,' affected neither by number nor gender, but altogether free and independent, such a word as Gaius Gracchus used in the speech entitled On Publius Popilius, delivered in the places of assembly,³¹ in which we read: 'I suppose that my enemies will say this.' He said dicturum, not dicturos; and is it not clear that dicturum in Gracchus is used according to the same principle as futurum in Cicero? Just as in the Greek language, without any suspicion of error, words such as e)rei=n, poih/sein, e)/sesqai, and the like, are used in all genders and all numbers without distinction." He added that in the third book of the Annals of Claudius Quadrigarius are these words: ³²

While they were being cut to pieces, the forces of the enemy would be busy there ( copias . . . futurum)

; and at the beginning of the eighteenth book of the same Quadrigarius: ³³

If you enjoy health proportionate to your own merit and our good-will, we have reason to hope that the gods will bless the good ( deos . . . facturum)

; that similarly Valerius Antias also in his twenty-fourth book wrote:

If those religious rites should be performed, and the omens should be wholly favourable, the soothsayers declared that everything would proceed as they desired ( omnia . . . processurum esse).

³⁴

Plautus also in the Casina,³⁵ speaking of a girl, used occisurum, not occisuram in the following passage: Has Casina a sword?—Yes, two of them.— Why two?—With one she'd fain the bailiff slay, With t'other you. So too Laberius in The Twins wrote: ³⁶ I thought not she would do ( facturum) it. Now, all those men were not unaware of the nature of a solecism, but Gracchus used dicturum, Quadrigarius futurum and facturum, Antias processurum, Plautus occisurum and Laberius facturum, in the infinitive mood, a mood which is not inflected for mood or number or person or tense or gender, but expresses them all by one and the same form, just as Marcus Cicero did not use fiturum in the masculine or neuter gender—for that would clearly be a solecism—but employed a form which is independent of any influence of gender.

³⁷

Furthermore, that same friend of mine used to say that in the oration of that same Marcus Tullius On Pompey's Military Command³⁸ Cicero wrote the following, and so my friend always read it:

Since you know that your harbours, and those harbours from which you draw the breath of life, were in tile power of the pirates.

And he declared that in potestatem fuisse³⁹ was not a solecism, as the half-educated vulgar think, but he maintained that it was used in accordance with a definite and correct principle, one which the Greeks also followed; and Plautus, who is most choice in his Latinity, said in the Amphitruo: ⁴⁰

Número mihi in mentém fuit,

not in mente, as we commonly say.

But besides Plautus, whom my friend used as an example in this instance, I myself have come upon a great abundance of such expressions in the early writers, and I have jotted them down here and there in these notes of mine. But quite apart from that rule and those authorities, the very sound and order of the words make it quite clear that it is more in accordance with the careful attention to diction and the rhythmical style of Marcus Tullius that, either being good Latin, he should prefer to say potestatem rather than potestate. For the former construction is more agreeable to the ear and better rounded, the latter harsher and less finished, provided always that a man has an ear attuned to such distinctions, not one that is dull and sluggish; it is for the same reason indeed that he preferred to say explicavit rather than explicuit, which was already coming to be the commoner form.

These are his own words from the speech which he delivered On Pomnpey's Military Command:⁴¹

Sicily is a witness, which, begirt on all sides by many dangers, he freed ( explicavit), not by the threat of war, but by his promptness in decision.

But if lie had said explicuit, the sentence would halt with weak and imperfect rhythm. ⁴²

VIII

8arg

An anecdote found in the works of the philosopher Sotion about the courtesan Lais and the orator Demosthenes.

1 SOTION was a man of the Peripatetic school, far from unknown. He wrote a book filled with wide and varied information and called it Ke/ras )Amalqei/as,⁴³ which is about equivalent to The Horn of Plenty.

In that book is found the following anecdote about the orator Demosthenes and the courtesan Lais:

Lais of Corinth,

he says,

used to gain a great deal of money by the grace and charm of her beauty, and was frequently visited by wealthy men from all over Greece; but no one was received who did not give what she demanded, and her demands were extravagant enough.

He says that this was the origin of the proverb common among the Greeks:

Not every man may fare to Corinth town, ⁴⁴

for in vain would any man go to Corinth to visit Lais who could not pay her price.

The great Demosthenes approached her secretly and asked for her favours. But Lais demanded ten thousand drachmas

—a sum equivalent in our money to ten thousand denarii. ⁴⁵

Amazed and shocked at the woman's great impudence and the vast sum of money demanded, Demosthenes turned away, remarking as he left her: 'I will not buy regret at such a price.'

But the Greek words which he is said to have used are neater; he said: Ou)k w)nou=mai muri/wn draxmw=n metame/leian.⁴⁶ .

IX

9arg

What the method and what the order of the Pythagorean training was, and the amount of time which was prescribed and accepted as the period for learning and at the same time keeping silence.

1 IT is said that the order and method followed by Pythagoras, and afterwards by his school and his successors, in admitting and training their pupils were as follows: At the very outset he

physiognomized

the young men who presented themselves for instruction. That word means to inquire into the character and dispositions of men by an inference drawn from their facial appearance and expression, and from the form and bearing of their whole body. Then, when he had thus examined a man and found him suitable, he at once gave orders that he should be admitted to the school and should keep silence for a fixed period of time; this was not the same for all, but differed according to his estimate of the man's capacity for learning quickly. But the one who kept silent listened to what was said by others; he was, however, religiously forbidden to ask questions, if he had not fully understood, or to remark upon what he had heard. Now, no one kept silence for less than two years, and during the entire period of silent listening they were called a)koustikoi/ or

auditors.

But when they had learned what is of all things the most difficult, to keep quiet and listen, and had finally begun to be adepts in that silence which is called e)xemuqi/a or

continence in words,

they were then allowed to speak, to ask questions, and to write down what they had heard, and to express their own opinions. During this stage they were called maqhmatikoi/ or

students of science,

evidently from those branches of knowledge which they had now begun to learn and practise; for the ancient Greeks called geometry, gnomonics, ⁴⁷ music and other higher studies maqh/mata or

sciences

; but the common people apply the term mathematici to those who ought to be called by their ethnic name, Chaldaeans. ⁴⁸ Finally, equipped with this scientific training, they advanced to the investigation of the phenomena of the universe and the laws of nature, and then, and not till then, they were called fusikoi/ or

natural philosophers.

Having thus expressed himself about Pythagoras, my friend Taurus continued: "But nowadays these fellows who turn to philosophy on a sudden with unwashed feet, ⁴⁹ not content with being wholly 'without purpose, without learning, and without scientific training,' even lay down the law as to how they are to be taught philosophy. One says, 'first teach me this,' another chimes in,' I want to learn this, I don't want to learn that'; one is eager to begin with the Symposiumn of Plato because of the revel of Alcibiades, ⁵⁰ another with the Phaedrus on account of the speech of Lysias. ⁵¹ By Jupiter!" said he,

one man actually asks to read Plato, not in order to better his life, but to deck out his diction and style, not to gain in discretion, but in prettiness.

That is what Taurus used to say, in comparing the modern students of philosophy with the Pythagoreans of old.

But I must not omit this fact either—that all of them, as soon as they had been admitted by Pythagoras into that band of disciples, at once devoted to the common use whatever estate and property they had, and an inseparable fellowship was formed, like the old-time association which in Roman legal parlance was termed an

undivided inheritance.

⁵²

X

10arg

In what terms the philosopher Favorinus rebuked a young man who used language that was too old-fashioned and archaic.

1 THE philosopher Favorinus thus addressed a young man who was very fond of old words and made a display in his ordinary, everyday conversation of many expressions that were quite too unfamiliar and archaic:

Curius,

said he,

and Fabricius and Coruncanius, men of the olden days, and of a still earlier time than these those famous triplets, the Horatii, talked clearly and intelligibly with their fellows, using the language of their own day, not that of the Aurunci, the Sicani, or the Pelasgi, who are said to have been the earliest inhabitants of Italy. You, on the contrary, just as if you were talking to-day with Evander's mother, ⁵³ use words that have already been obsolete for many years, because you want no one to know and comprehend what you are saying. Why not accomplish your purpose more fully, foolish fellow, and say nothing at all? But you assert that you love the olden time, because it is honest, sterling, sober and temperate. Live by all means according to the manners of the past, but speak in the language of the present, and always remember and take to heart what Gaius Caesar, a man of surpassing talent and wisdom, wrote in the first book of his treatise On Analogy:⁵⁴ 'Avoid, as you would a rock, a strange and unfamiliar word.'

XI

11arg

The statement of the celebrated writer Thucydides, that the Lacedaemonians in battle used pipes and not trumpets, with a citation of his words on that subject; and the remark of Herodotus that king Alyattes had female lyre-players as part of his military equipment; and finally, some notes on the pipe used by Gracchus when addressing assemblies.

1 THUCYDIDES, the most authoritative of Greek historians, tells us ⁵⁵ that the Lacedaemonians, greatest of warriors, made use in battle, not of signals by horns or trumpets, but of the music of pipes, certainly not in conformity with any religious usage or from any ceremonial reason, nor yet that their courage might be roused and stimulated, which is the purpose of horns and trumpets; but on the contrary that they might be calmer and advance in better order, because the effect of the flute-player's notes is to restrain impetuosity. So firmly were they convinced that in meeting the enemy and beginning battle nothing contributed more to valour and confidence than to be soothed by gentler sounds and keep their feelings under control. Accordingly, when the army was drawn up, and began to advance in battle-array against the foe, pipers stationed in the ranks began to play. Thereupon, by this quiet, pleasant, and even solemn prelude the fierce impetuosity of the soldiers was checked, in conformity with a kind of discipline of military music, so to speak, so that they might not rush forth in straggling disorder.

But I should like to quote the very words of that outstanding writer, which have greater distinction and credibility than my own:

And after this the attack began. The Argives and their allies rushed forward eagerly and in a rage, but the Lacedaemonians advanced slowly to the music of many flute-players stationed at regular intervals; this not for any religious reason, but in order that they might make the attack while marching together rhythmically, and that their ranks might not be broken, which commonly happens to great armies when they advance to the attack.

Tradition has it that the Cretans also commonly entered battle with the lyre playing before them and regulating their step. Futhermore, Alyattes, king of the land of Lydia, a man of barbaric manners and luxury, when he made war on the Milesians, as Herodotus tells us in his History,⁵⁶ had in his army and his battle-array orchestras of pipe and lyre-players, and even female flute-players, such as are the delight of wanton banqueters. Homer, however, says ⁵⁷ that the Achaeans entered battle, relying, not on the music of lyres and pipes, but on silent harmony and unanimity of spirit:

In silence came the Achaeans, breathing rage,

Resolved in mind on one another's aid.

What then is the meaning of that soul-stirring shout of the Roman soldiers which, as the annalists have told us, was regularly raised when charging the foe? ⁵⁸ Was that done contrary to so generally accepted a rule of old-time discipline? Or are a quiet advance and silence needful when an army is marching against an enemy that is far off and visible from a distance, but when they have almost come to blows, then must the foe, already at close quarters, be driven back by a violent assault and terrified by shouting?

But, look you, the Laconian pipe-playing reminds me also of that oratorical pipe, which they say was played for Gaius Gracchus when he addressed the people, and gave him the proper pitch. But it is not at all true, as is commonly stated, that a musician always stood behind him as he spoke, playing the pipe, and by varying the pitch now restrained and now animated his feelings and his delivery. For what could be more absurd than that a piper should play measures, notes, and a kind of series of changing melodies for Gracchus when addressing an assembly, as if for a dancing mountebank? But more reliable authorities declare that the musician took his place unobserved in the audience and at intervals sounded on a short pipe a deeper note, to restrain and calm the exuberant energy of the orator's delivery. And that in my opinion is the correct view, for it is unthinkable that Gracchus' well-known natural vehemence needed any incitement or impulse from without. Yet Marcus Cicero thinks that the piper was employed by Gracchus for both purposes, in order that with notes now soft, now shrill, he might animate his oratory when it was becoming weak and feeble, or check it when too violent and passionate. I quote Cicero's own words: ⁵⁹

And so this same Gracchus, Catulus, as you may hear from your client Licinius, an educated man, who was at that time Gracchus' slave and amanuensis, ⁶⁰ used to have a skilful musician stand behind him in concealment when he addressed an audience, who could quickly breathe a note to arouse the speaker if languid, or recall him from undue vehemence.

Finally, Aristotle wrote in his volume of Problems⁶¹ that the custom of the Lacedaemonians which I have mentioned, of entering battle to the music of pipers, was adopted in order to make the fearlessness and ardour of the soldiers more evident and indubitable.

For,

said he,

distrust and fear are not at all consistent with an advance of that kind, and such an intrepid and rhythmical advance cannot be made by the faint-hearted and despondent.

I have added a few of Aristotle's own words on the subject:

Why, when on the point of encountering danger, did they advance to music of the pipe? In order to detect the cowards by their failure to keep time.

* * * ⁶²

XII

12arg

AT what age, from what kind of family, by what rites, ceremonies and observances, and under what title a Vestal virgin is

taken

by the chief pontiff; what legal privileges she has immediately upon being chosen; also that, according to Labeo, she is lawfully neither heir of an intestate person, nor is anyone her heir, in case she dies without a will.

1 Those who have written about

taking

a Vestal virgin, of whom the most painstaking is Antistius Labeo, ⁶³ have stated that it is unlawful for a girl to be chosen who is less than six, or more than ten, years old; she must also have both father and mother living; she must be free too from any impediment in her speech, must not have impaired hearing, or be marked by any other bodily defect; she must not herself have been freed from paternal control, ⁶⁴ nor her father before her, even if her father is still living and she is under the control of her grandfather; ⁶⁵ neither one nor both of her parents may have been slaves or engaged in mean occupations. ⁶⁶ But they say that one whose sister has been chosen to that priesthood acquires exemption, as well as one whose father is a1 flamen or an augur, one of the Fifteen in charge of the Sibylline Books, ⁶⁷ one of the Seven who oversee the banquets of the gods, or a dancing priest of Mars. Exemption from that priesthood is regularly allowed also to the betrothed of a pontiff and to the daughter of a priest of the tubilustrium. ⁶⁸ Furthermore the writings of Ateius Capito inform us ⁶⁹ that the daughter of a man without residence in Italy must not be chosen, and that the daughter of one who has three children must be excused.

Now, as soon as the Vestal virgin is chosen, escorted to the House of Vesta and delivered to the pontiffs, she immediately passes from the control of her father without the ceremony of emancipation or loss of civil rights, and acquires the right to make a will.

But as to the method and ritual for choosing a Vestal, there are, it is true, no ancient written records, except that the first to be appointed was chosen by Numa. There is, however, a Papian law, ⁷⁰ which provides that twenty maidens be selected from the people at the discretion of the chief pontiff, that a choice by lot be made from that number in the assembly, ⁷¹ and that the girl whose lot is drawn be

taken

by the chief pontiff and become Vesta's. But that allotment in accordance with the Papian law is usually unnecessary at present. For if any man of respectable birth goes to the chief pontiff and offers his daughter for the priesthood, provided consideration may be given to her candidacy without violating any religious requirement, the senate grants him exemption from the Papian law.

Now the Vestal is said to be

taken,

it appears, because she is grasped by the hand of the chief pontiff and led away from the parent under whose control she is, as if she had been taken in war. In the first book of Fabius Pictor's History⁷² the formula is given which the chief pontiff should use in choosing a Vestal. It is this:

I take thee, Amata, as one who has fulfilled all the legal requirements, to be priestess of Vesta, to perform the rites which it is lawful for a Vestal to perform for the Roman people, the Quirites.

Now, many think that the term

taken

ought to be used only of a Vestal. But, as a matter of fact, the flamens of Jupiter also, as well as the augurs, were said to be

taken.

Lucius Sulla, in the second book of his Autobiography,⁷³ wrote as follows:

Publius Cornelius, the first to receive the surname Sulla, was taken to be flamen of Jupiter.

Marcus Cato, in his accusation of Servius Galba, says of the Lusitanians: ⁷⁴

Yet they say that they wished to revolt. I myself at the present moment wish a thorough knowledge of the pontifical law; shall I therefore be taken as chief pontiff? If I wish to understand the science of augury thoroughly, shall anyone for that reason take me as augur?

Furthermore, in the Commentaries on the Twelve Tables compiled by Labeo ⁷⁵ we find this passage:

A Vestal virgin is not heir to any intestate person, nor is anyone her heir, should she die without making a will, but her property, they say, reverts to the public treasury. The legal principle involved is an unsettled question.

The Vestal is called

Amata

when taken by the chief pontiff, because there is a tradition that the first one who was chosen bore that name. ⁷⁶

XIII

13arg

On the philosophical question, what would be more proper on receipt of an order-to do scrupulously what was commanded, or sometimes even to disobey, in the hope that it would be more advantageous to the giver of the order; and an exposition of varying views on that subject.

1 IN interpreting, evaluating and weighing the obligations which the philosophers call kaqh/konta, or

duties,

the question is often asked, when some task has been assigned to you and exactly what was to be done has been defined, whether you ought to do anything contrary to instructions, if by so doing it might seem that the outcome would be more successful and more advantageous to the one who imposed the task upon you. It is a difficult question which has been answered both ways by wise men. For several have taken a position on the one side and expressed the decided belief that when a matter has once for all been determined, after due deliberation, by the one whose business and right are concerned, nothing should be done contrary to his order, even if some unlooked for occurrence should promise a better way of accomplishing the end in view; for fear that, if the expectation were not realized, the offender would be liable to blame and inexorable punishment for his insubordination. If, on the other hand, the affair chanced to result more favourably, thanks would indeed be due the gods, but nevertheless a precedent would seem to have been established, which might ruin well-laid plans by weakening the binding force of a command. Others have thought that the disadvantages to be feared, in case the order was not strictly obeyed, should carefully be weighed in advance against the advantage looped for, and if the former were comparatively light and trivial, while on the contrary a greater and more substantial advantage was confidently to be expected, then they judged that one might go counter to instructions, to avoid losing a providential opportunity for successful action; and they did not believe that a precedent for disobedience was to be feared, provided always that considerations of such a kind could be urged. But they thought that particular regard should be paid to the temperament and disposition of the person whose business and command were involved: he must not be stern, hard, autocratic and implacable, as in the case of the orders of a Postumius and a Manlius. ⁷⁷ For if an account must be rendered to such a commander, they recommended that nothing be done contrary to the letter of his order.

I think that this question of obedience to commands of such a nature will be more clearly defined, if I add the example set by Publius Crassus Mucianus, a distinguished and eminent man. This Crassus is said by Sempronius Asellio ⁷⁸ and several other writers of Roman history to have had the five greatest and chiefest of blessings; for he was very rich, of the highest birth, exceedingly eloquent, most learned in the law, and chief pontiff. When he, in his consulship, was in command in ⁷⁹ the province of Asia, and was making preparations to beset and assault Leucae, he needed a long, stout beam from which to make a battering-ram, to breach the walls of that city. Accordingly, he wrote to the chief engineer of the people of Mylatta, ⁸⁰ allies and friends of the Romans, to have the larger of two masts which he had seen in their city sent him. Then the chief engineer on learning the purpose for which Crassus wanted the mast, did not send him the larger, as had been ordered, but the smaller, which he thought was more suitable, and better adapted for making a ram, besides being easier to transport. Crassus ordered him to be summoned, asked why he had not sent the mast which had been ordered, and ignoring the excuses and reasons which the man urged, caused him to be stripped and soundly beaten with rods; for he thought that all the authority of a commander was weakened and made of no effect, if one might reply to orders which he received, not with due obedience, but with an unsolicited plan of his own.

XIV

14arg

What was said and done by Gaius Fabricius, a man of great renown and great deeds, but of simple establishment and little money, when the Samnites offered him a great amount of gold, in the belief that he was a poor man.

1 JULIUS HYGINUS, in the sixth book of his work On the Lives and Deeds of Famous Men,⁸¹ says that a deputation from the Samnites came to Gaius Fabricius, the Roman general, and after mentioning his many important acts of kindness and generosity to the Samnites since peace was restored, offered him a present of a large sum of money, begging that he would accept and use it. And they said that they did this because they saw that his house and mode of life were far from magnificent, and that he was not so well provided for as his high rank demanded. Thereupon Fabricius passed his open hands from his ears to his eyes, then down to his nose, his mouth, his throat, and finally to the lower part of his belly; then he replied to the envoys:

So long as I can restrain and control all those members which I have touched, I shall never lack anything; therefore I cannot accept money, for which I have no use, from those who, I am sure, do have use for it.

XV

15arg

What a tiresome and utterly hateful fault is vain and empty loquacity, and how often it has been censured in deservedly strong language by the greatest Greek and Latin writers.

1 THE talk of empty-headed, vain and tiresome babblers, who with no foundation of solid matter let out a stream of tipsy, tottering words, has justly been thought to come from the lips and not from the heart. Moreover, men say that the tongue ought not to be unrestrained and rambling, but guided and, so to speak, steered by cords connected with the heart and inmost breast. Yet you may see some men spouting forth words with no exercise of judgment, but with such great and profound assurance that many of them in the very act of speaking are evidently unaware that they are talking. Ulysses, on the contrary, a man gifted with sagacious eloquence, spoke, not from his lips but from his heart, as Hommer says—a remark which applies less to the sound and quality of his utterance than to the depth of the thoughts inwardly conceived; and the poet went on to say, with great aptness, that the teeth form a rampart to check wanton words, in order that reckless speech may not only be restrained by that watchful sentry the heart, but also hedged in by a kind of outpost, so to speak, stationed at the lips.

The words of Homer which I mentioned above are these: ⁸²

When from his breast his mighty voice went forth

and: ⁸³

What a word has passed the barrier of your teeth.

I have added also a passage from Marcus Tullius, in which he expresses his strong and just hatred of silly and unmeaning volubility. He says: ⁸⁴

Provided this fact be recognized, that neither should one commend the dumbness of a man who knows a subject, but is unable to give it expression in speech, nor the ignorance of one who lacks knowledge of his subject, but abounds in words; yet if one must choose one or the other alternative, I for my part would prefer tongue-tied knowledge to ignorant loquacity.

Also in the first book of the De Oratore⁸⁵ he wrote as follows:

For what is so insane as the empty sound of words, however well-chosen and elegant, if there be no foundation of sense or sagacity?

But Marcus Cato in particular is a relentless assailant of this fault. For in the speech entitled If Caelius, tribune of the commons, should have summoned him,⁸⁶ he says:

That man is never silent who is afflicted with the disease of talking, as one in a lethargy is afflicted with that of drinking and sleeping. For if you should not come together when he calls an assembly, so eager is he to talk that he would hire someone to listen. And so you hear him, but you do not listen, just as if he were a quack. For a quack's words are heard, but no one trusts himself to him when he is sick.

Again Cato, in the same speech, ⁸⁷ upbraiding the same Marcus Caelius, tribune of the commons, for the cheapness at which not only his speech but also his silence could be bought, says:

For a crust of bread he can be hired either to keep silence or to speak.

Most deservedly too does Homer call Thersites alone of all the Greeks a)metroeph/s,

of measureless speech,

and a)krito/muqos,⁸⁸

a reckless babbler,

declaring that his words are many and a)/kosma, or

disordered,

like the endless chatter of daws; ⁸⁹ for what else does e)kolw/a (

he chattered

) mean? There is also a line of Eupolis most pointedly aimed at men of that kind: ⁹⁰

In chatter excellent, unable quite to speak,

and our countryman Sallust, wishing to imitate this, writes: ⁹¹

Talkative rather than eloquent.

It is for the same reason that Hesiod, wisest of poets, says ⁹² that the tongue should not be vulgarly exposed but hidden like a treasure, and that it is exhibited with best effect when it is modest, restrained and musical. His own words are:

The greatest of man's treasures is the tongue,

Which wins most favour when it spares its words

And measured is of movement.

The following verse of Epicharmus is also to the point: ⁹³

Thou art not skilled in speech, yet silence cannot keep,

and it is from this line surely that the saying arose:

Who, though he could not speak, could not be silent.

I once heard Favorinus say that the familiar lines of Euripides: ⁹⁴

Of unrestrained mouth

And of lawless folly

Is disaster the end,

ought not to be understood as directed only at those who spoke impiously or lawlessly, but might even with special propriety be used also of men who prate foolishly and immoderately, whose tongues are so extravagant and unbridled that they ceaselessly flow and seethe with the foulest dregs of language, the sort of persons to whom the Greeks apply the highly significant term kata/glwssoi, or

given to talk.

I learned from a friend of his, a man of learning, that the famous grammarian Valerius Probus, shortly before his death, began to read Sallust's well-known saying, ⁹⁵

a certain amount of eloquence but little discretion,

abundant talkativeness, too little discretion,

and that he insisted that Sallust left it in that form, since the word loquentia was very characteristic of Sallust, an innovator in diction, ⁹⁶ while eloquentia was not at all consistent with lack of discretion.

Finally, loquacity of this kind and a disorderly mass of empty grandiloquence is scored with striking epithets by Aristophanes, wittiest of poets, in the following lines: ⁹⁷

A stubborn-creating, stubborn-pulling fellow,

Uncurbed, unfettered, uncontrolled of speech,

Unperiphrastic, bombastiloquent.

And no less pointedly did our forefathers also call men of that kind, who were drowned in words, "babblers, gabbllers and chatterboxes."

XVI

16arg

That those words of Quadrigarius in the third book of his Annals,

there a thousand of men is killed,

are not used arbitrarily or by a poetic figure, but in accordance with a definite and approved rule of the science of grammar.

1 QUADRIGARIUS in the third book of his Annals⁹⁸ wrote the following: "There a thousand of men is killed," using occiditur, not occiduntur. So too Lucilius in the third book of his Satires,

From gate to gate a thousand of paces is.

Thence to Salcrnum six, ⁹⁹

has mille est, not mille sunt. Varro in the seventeenth book of his Antiquilies of Man writes: ¹⁰⁰

To the beginning of Romulus' reign is more than a thousand and one hundred years,

Marcus Cato in the first book of his Origins,¹⁰¹

From there it is nearly a thousand of paces.

Marcus Cicero has in his sixth Oration against Antony,¹⁰²

Is the middle Janus ¹⁰³ so subject to the patronage of Lucius Antonius? Who has ever been found in that Janus who would lend Lucius Antonius a thousand of sesterces?

In these and many other passages mile is used in the singular number, and that is not, as some think, a concession to early usage or admitted as a neat figure of speech, but it is obviously demanded by rule. For the word mille does not stand for the Greek xilioi,

thousand,

but for xilia/s,

a thousand

; and just as they say one xilia/s, or two xilia/des, so we say one thousand and two thousands according to a definite and regular rule. Therefore these common expressions are correct and good usage,

There is a thousand of denarii in the chest,

and

There is a thousand of horsemen in the army.

Furthermore Lucilius, in addition to the example cited above, makes this point still clearer in another place also: for in his fifteenth book he says: ¹⁰⁴

This horse no jolting fine Campanian steed,

Though he has passed him by one thousand, aye

And twain, of paces, can in a longer course

Compete with, but he will in fact appear

To run the other way.

So too in the ninth book: ¹⁰⁵

With sesterces a thousand you can gain

A hundred thousand.

Lucilius wrote milli passum instead of mille passibus and uno milli nummum for unis mille nunmis, thus showing clearly that mille is a noun, used in the singular number, that its plural is milia, and that it also forms an ablative case. Nor ought we to expect the rest of the cases; for there are many other words which are declined only in single cases, and even some which are not declined at all. Therefore we can no longer doubt that Cicero, in the speech which he wrote In Defence of Milo,¹⁰⁶ used these words:

Before the estate of Clodius, where fully a thousand of ablebodied men was employed on those crazy substructures,

not

were employed,

as we find it in less accurate copies; for one rule requires us to say

a thousand men,

but another,

a thousand of men.

XVII

17arg

The patience with which Socrates endured his wife's shrewish disposition; and in that connection what Marcus Varro says in one of his satires about the duty of a husband.

1 XANTHIPPE, the wife of the philosopher Socrates, is said to have been ill-tempered and quarrelsome to a degree, with a constant flood of feminine tantrums and annoyances day and night. Alcibiades, amazed at this outrageous conduct of hers towards her husband, asked Socrates what earthly reason he had for not showing so shrewish a woman the door.

Because,

replied Socrates,

it is by enduring such a person at home that I accustom and train myself to bear more easily away from home the impudence and injustice of other persons.

In the same vein Varro also said in the Menippean Satire¹⁰⁷ which he entitled On the Duty of a Husband:¹⁰⁸

A wife's faults must be either put down or put up with. He who puts down her faults, makes his wife more agreeable; he who puts up with them, improves himself.

Varro contrasted the two words tollere and ferre very cleverly, ¹⁰⁹ to be sure, but he obviously uses tollere in the sense of

correct.

It is evident too that Varro thought that if a fault of that kind in a wife cannot be corrected, it should be tolerated, in so far of course as a man may endure it honourably; for faults are less serious than crimes.

XVIII

18arg

How Marcus Varro, in the fourteenth book of his Antiquities of Man,¹¹⁰ criticizes his master Lucius Aelius for a false etymology; and how Varro in his turn, in the same book, gives a false origin for fur.

1 IN the fourteenth book of his Divine Antiquities¹¹¹ Marcus Varro shows that Lucius Aelius, the most learned Roman of his time, went astray and followed a false etymological principle in separating an old Greek word which had been taken over into the Roman language into two Latin words, just as if it were of Latin origin.

I quote Varro's own words on the subject:

In this regard our countryman Lucius Aelius, the most gifted man of letters within my memory, was sometimes misled. For he gave false derivations of several early Greek words, under the impression that they were native to our tongue. We do not use the word lepus ('hare') because the animal is levipes ('light-footed'), as he asserts, but because it is an old Greek word. Many of the early words of that people are unfamiliar, because to-day the Greeks use other words in their place; and it may not be generally known that among these are Graecus, for which they now use (/Ellhn, puteus ('well') which they call fre/ar, and lepus, which they call lagwo/s. But as to this, far from disparaging Aelius' ability, I commend his diligence; for it is good fortune that brings success, endeavour that deserves praise.

Tis is what Varro wrote in the first part of his book, with great skill in the explanation of words, with wide knowledge of the usage of both languages, and marked kindliness towards Aelius himself. But in the latter part of the same book he says that fur is so called because the early Romans used furvus for ater (

black

), and thieves steal most easily in the night, which is black. Is it not clear that Varro made the same mistake about fur that Aelius did about lepus. For what the Greeks now call kle/pths, or

thief,

in the earlier Greek language was called fw/r. Hence, owing to the similarity in sound, he who in Greek is fw/r, in Latin is fur. But whether that fact escaped Varro's memory at the time, or on the other hand he thought that fur was more appropriately and consistently named from furvus, that is,

black,

as to that question it is not for me to pass judgment on a man of such surpassing learning.

XIX

19arg

The story of king Tarquin the Proud and the Sibylline Books.

1 IN ancient annals we find this tradition about the Sibylline Books. An old woman, a perfect stranger, came to king Tarquin the Proud, bringing nine books; she declared that they were oracles of the gods and that she wished to sell them. Tarquin inquired the price; the woman demanded an immense and exorbitant sum: the king laughed her to scorn, believing her to be in her dotage. Then she placed a lighted brazier before him, burned three of the books to ashes, and asked whether he would buy the remaining six at the same price. But at this Tarquin laughed all the more and said that there was now no doubt that the old woman was crazy. Upon that the woman at once burned up three more books and again calmly made the same request, that he would buy the remaining three at the original figure. Tarquin now became serious and more thoughtful, and realising that such persistence and confidence were not to be treated lightly, he bought the three books that were left at as high a price as had been asked for all nine. Now it is a fact that after then leaving Tarquin, that woman was never seen again anywhere. The three books were deposited in a shrine ¹¹² and called

Sibylline

; ¹¹³ to them the Fifteen ¹¹⁴ resort whenever tile immortal gods are to be consulted as to the welfare of the State.

XX

20arg

On what the geometers call e)pi/pedos, stereo/s, ku/bos and grammh/, with the Latin equivalents for all these terms.

1 OF the figures which the geometers call sxh/mata there are two kinds,

plane

and

solid.

These the Greeks themselves call respectively e)pi/pedos and stereo/s. A

plane

figure is one that has all its lines in two dimensions only, breadth and length; for example, triangles and squares, which are drawn on a flat surface without height. We have a

solid

figure, when its several lines do not produce merely length and breadth in a plane, but are raised so as to produce height also; such are in general the triangular columns which they call

pyramids,

or those which are bounded on all sides by squares, such as the Greeks call ku/boi,¹¹⁵ and we quadrantalia. For the ku/bos is a figure which is square on all its sides,

like the dice,

says Marcus Varro, ¹¹⁶

with which we play on a gaming-board, for which reason the dice themselves are called ku/boi

Similarly in numbers too the term ku/bos is used, when every factor ¹¹⁷ consisting of the same number is equally resolved into the cube number itself, ¹¹⁸ as is the case when three is taken three times and the resulting number itself is then trebled.

Pythagoras declared that the cube of the number three controls the course of the moon, since the moon passes through its orbit in twenty-seven days, and the ternio, or

triad,

which the Greeks call tria/s, when cubed makes twenty-seven.

Furthermore, our geometers apply the term linea, or

line,

to what the Greeks call grammh/. This is defined by Marcus Varro as follows: ¹¹⁹

A line,

says he,

is length without breadth or height.

But Euclid says more tersely, omitting

height

: ¹²⁰

A line is mh=kos a)plate/s, or 'breadthless length.'

)Aplate/s cannot be expressed in Latin by a single word, unless you should venture to coin the term inlatabile.

XXI

21arg

The positive assertion of Julius Hyginus that he had read a manuscript of Virgil from the poet's own household, in which there was written et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror and not the usual reading, sensu torquebit amaro.

1 NEARLY everyone reads these lines from the Georgics of Virgi ¹²¹ in this way:

At sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora

Tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro. ¹²²

Hyginus, however, on my word no obscure grammarian, in the Commentaries¹²³ which he wrote on Virgil, declares and insists that it was not this that Virgil left, but what he himself found in a copy which had come from the home and family of the poet:

et ora

Tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror, ¹²⁴

and this reading has commended itself, not to Hyginus alone, but also to some other learned men, because it seems absurd to say

the taste will distort with its bitter sensation.

Since,

they say,

taste itself is a sensation, it cannot have another sensation in itself, but it is exactly as if one should say, 'the sensation will distort with a bitter sensation.'

Moreover, when I had read Hyginus' note to Favorinus, and the strangeness and harshness of the phrase

sensu torquebit amaro

at once had displeased him, he said with a laugh:

I am ready to swear by Jupiter and the stone, ¹²⁵ which is considered the most sacred of oaths, that Virgil never wrote that, but I believe that Hyginus is right. For Virgil was not the first to coin that word arbitrarily, but he found it in the poems of Lucretius and made use of it, not disdaining to follow the authority of a poet who excelled in talent and power of expression.

The passage, from the fourth book of Lucretius, reads as follows: ¹²⁶

dilutaque contra

Cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror. ¹²⁷

And in fact we see that Virgil imitated, not only single words of Lucretius, but often almost whole lines and passages.

XXII

22arg

Whether it is correct Latin for counsel for the defence to say superesse se,

that he is appearing for

those whom he is defending; and the proper meaning of superesse.

1 AN incorrect and improper meaning of a word has been established by long usage, in that we use the expression hic illi superest when we wish to say that anyone appears as another's advocate and pleads his cause. And this is not merely the language of the streets and of the common people, but is used in the forum, the comitium and the courts. Those, however, who have spoken language undefiled have for the most part used superesse in the sense of

to overflow, be superfluous, or exceed the required amount.

Thus Marcus Varro, in the satire entitled

You know not what evening may bring,

¹²⁸ uses superfuisse in the sense of having exceeded the amount proper for the occasion. These are his words:

Not everything should be read at a dinner party, but preferably such works as are at the same time improving and diverting, so that this feature of the entertainment also may seem not to have been neglected, rather than overdone.

I remember happening to be present in the court of a praetor who was a man of learning, and that on that occasion an advocate of some repute pleaded in such fashion that he wandered from the subject and did not touch upon the point at issue. Thereupon the praetor said to the man whose case was before him:

You have no counsel.

And when the pleader protested, saying

I am present ( supersum) for the honourable gentleman,

the praetor wittily retorted:

You surely present too much, but you do not represent your client.

¹²⁹

Marcus Cicero, too, in his book entitled On Reducing the Civil Law to a System¹³⁰ wrote these words:

Indeed Quintus Aelius Tubero did not fall short of his predecessors in knowledge of the law, in learning he even outstripped them.

In this passage superfuit seems to mean

he went beyond, surpassed and excelled his predecessors in his learning, which, however, was excessive and overabundant

; ¹³¹ for Tubero was thoroughly versed in Stoic dialectics. Cicero's use of the word in the second book ¹³² of the Republic also deserves attention. This is the passage in question:

I should not object, Laelius, if I did not think that these friends wished, and if I myself did not desire, that you should take some part in this discussion of ours, especially since you yourself said yesterday that you would give us even more than enough ( te superfuturum). But that indeed is impossible: we all ask you not to give us less than enough ( ne desis).

Now Julius Paulus, the most learned man within my recollection, used to say witll keenness and understanding that superesse and its Greek equivalent had more than one meaning: for he declared that the Greeks used perisso/n both ways, either of what was superfluous and unnecessary or of what was too abundant, overflowing and excessive; that in the same way our earlier writers also employed superesse sometimes of what was superfluous, idle and not wholly necessary, a sense which we have just cited from Varro, and sometimes, as in Cicero, of that which indeed surpassed other things in copiousness and plentifulness, yet was immoderate and too extensive, and gushed forth more abundantly than was sufficient. Therefore one who says superesse se with reference to a man whom he is defending tries to convey none of these meanings, but uses superesse in a sense that is unknown and not in use. And he will not be able to appeal even to the authority of Virgil, who in his Georgics wrote as follows: ¹³³

I will be first to bear, so but my life still last ( supersit),

Home to my native land . . .

For in this place Virgil seems to have used that word somewhat irregularly in giving supersit the sense of

be present for a longer or more extended period,

but on the contrary his use of the word in the following line is more nearly the accepted one: ¹³⁴

They cut him tender grass,

Give corn and much fresh water, that his strength

Be more than equal to ( superesse) the pleasing toil.

for here superesse means to be more than equal to the task and not to be crushed by it.

I also used to raise the question whether the ancients used superesse in the sense of

to be left and be lacking for the completion of an act.

For to express that idea Sallust says, not superesse, but superare. These are his words in the Jugurtha:¹³⁵

This man was in the habit of exercising a command independently of the king, and of attending to all business which had been left undone ( superaverant) by Jugurtha when he was weary or engaged in more important affairs.

But we find in the third book of Ennius' Annals:¹³⁶

Then he declares one task's left over ( super esse) for him,

that is, is left and remains undone; but there superesse must be divided and read as if it were not one part of speech, but two, as in fact it is. Cicero, however, in his second Oration against Antony¹³⁷ expresses

what is left

by restare, not by superesse.

Besides these uses we find superesse with the meaning

survive.

For it is so employed in the book of letters of Marcus Cicero to Lucius Plancus, ¹³⁸ as well as in a letter of Marcus Asinius Pollio to Cicero, ¹³⁹ as follows:

For I wish neither to fail the commonwealth nor to survive it ( superesse),

meaning that if the commonwealth should be destroyed and perish, he does not wish to live. Again in the Asinaria of Plautus that same force is still more evident in these, the first verses of that comedy: ¹⁴⁰

As you would hope to have your only son

Survive ( superesse) you and be ever sound and hale.

Thus we have to avoid, not merely an improper use of the word, but also the evil omene, in case an older man, acting as advocate for a youth, should say that he

survives

him.

XXIII

23arg

Who Papirius Praetextatus was; the reason for that surname; and the whole of the entertaining story about that same Papirius.

1 THE story of Papirius Praetextatus was told and committed to writing in the speech which Marcus Cato made To the soldiers against Galba,¹⁴¹ with great charm, brilliance and elegance of diction. I should have included Cato's own words in this very commentary, if I had had access to the book at the time when I dictated this extract. But if you would like to hear the bare tale, without the noble and dignified language, the incident was about as follows: It was formerly the custom at Rome for senators to enter the House with their sons under age. ¹⁴² In those days, when a matter of considerable importance had been discussed and was postponed to the following day, it was voted that no one should mention the subject of the debate until the matter was decided. The mother of the young Papirius, who had been in the House with his father, asked her son what the Fathers had taken up in the senate. The boy replied that it was a secret and that he could not tell. The woman became all the more eager to hear about it; the secrecy of the matter and the boy's silence piqued her curiosity; she therefore questioned him more pressingly and urgently. Then the boy, because of his mother's insistence, resorted to a witty and amusing falsehood. He said that the senate had discussed the question whether it seemed more expedient, and to the advantage of the State, for one man to have two wives or one woman to have two husbands. On hearing this, she is panic-stricken, rushes excitedly from the house, and carries the news to the other matrons. Next day a crowd of matrons came to the senate, imploring with tears and entreaties that one woman might have two husbands rather than one man two wives. The senators, as they entered the House, were wondering at this strange madness of the women and the meaning of such a demand, when young Papirius, stepping forward to the middle of the House, told in detail what his mother had insisted on hearing, what he himself had said to her, in fact, the whole story exactly as it had happened. The senate paid homage to the boy's cleverness and loyalty, but voted that thereafter boys should not enter the House with their fathers, save only this Papirius; and the boy was henceforth honoured with the surname Praetextatus, because of his discretion in keeping silent and in speaking, while he was still young enough to wear the purple-bordered gown.

XXIV

24arg

Three epitaphs of three early poets, Naevius, Plautus and Pacuvius, composed by themselves and inscribed upon their tombs.

1 THERE are three epitaphs of famous poets, Gnaeus Naevius, Plautus and Marcus Pacuvius, composed by themselves and left to be inscribed upon their tombs, which I have thought ought to be included among these notes, because of their distinction and charm.

The epitaph of Naevius, although full of Campanian ¹⁴³ arrogance, might have been regarded as a just estimate, if he had not written it himself: ¹⁴⁴

If that immortals might for mortals weep,

Then would divine Camenae ¹⁴⁵ weep for Naevius.

For after he to Orcus as treasure was consigned,

The Romans straight forgot to speak the Latin tongue.

We should be inclined to doubt whether the epitaph of Plautus was really by his own hand, if it had not been quoted by Marcus Varro in the first book of his work On Poets:¹⁴⁶

Since Plautus has met death, Comedy mourns,

Deserted is the stage; then Laughter, Sport and Wit,

And Music's countless numbers ¹⁴⁷ all together wept. ¹⁴⁸

Pacuvius' epitaph is the most modest and simple, worthy of his dignity and good taste: ¹⁴⁹

Young man, although you haste, this little stone

Entreats thee to regard it, then to read its tale.

Here lie the bones of Marcus, hight Pacuvius.

Of this I would not have you unaware. Good-bye.

XXV

25arg

Marcus Varro's definition of the word

indutiae

; to which is added a somewhat careful investigation of the derivation of that word.

1 MARCUS VARRO, in that book of his Antiquities of Man which treats Of War and Peace,¹⁵⁰ defines indutiae (a truce) in two ways.

A truce,

he says,

is peace for a few days in camp;

and again in another place,

A truce is a holiday in war.

But each of these definitions seems to be wittily and happily concise rather than clear or satisfactory. For a truce is not a peace—since war continues, although fighting ceases—nor is it restricted to a camp or to a few days only. For what are we to say if a truce is made for some months, and the troops withdraw from camp into the towns? Have we not then also a truce? Again, if a truce is to be defined as only lasting for a few days, what are we to say of the fact, recorded by Quadrigarius in the first book of his Annals, that Gaius Pontius the Samnite asked the Roman dictator for a truce of six hours? ¹⁵¹ The definition

a holiday in war,

too, is rather happy than clear or precise.

Now the Greeks, more significantly and more pointedly, have called such an agreement to cease from fighting e)kexeiri/a, or

a staying of hands,

substituting for one letter of harsher sound a smoother one. ¹⁵² For since there is no fighting at such a time and their hands are withheld, they called it e)kexeiri/a. But it surely was not Varro's task to define a truce too scrupulously, and to observe all the laws and canons of definition; for he thought it sufficient to give an explanation of the kind which the Greeks call tu/poi (

typical

) and u(pografai/ (

outline

), rather than o(rismoi/ (

exact definition

I have for a long time been inquiring into the derivation of indutiae, but of the many explanations which I have either heard or read this which I am going to mention seems most reasonable. I believe that indutiae is made up of inde uti iam (

that from then on

). The stipulation of a truce is to this effect, that there shall be no fighting and no trouble up to a fixed time, but that after that time all the laws of war shall again be in force. Therefore, since a definite date is set and an agreement is made that before that date there shall be no fighting but when that time comes,

that from then on,

fighting shall be resumed: by uniting (as it were) and combining those words which I have mentioned the term indutiae is formed. ¹⁵³

But Aurelius Opilius, in the first book of his work entitled The Muses, says: ¹⁵⁴

It is called a truce when enemies pass back and forth from one side to another safely and without strife; from this the name seems to be formed, as if it were initiae,¹⁵⁵ that is, an approach and entrance.

I have not omitted this note of Aurelius, for fear that it might appear to some rival of these Nights a more elegant etymology, merely because he thought that it had escaped my notice when I was investigating the origin of the word.

XXVI

26arg

The answer of the philosopher Taurus, when I asked him whether a wise man ever got angry.

1 I ONCE asked Taurus in his lecture-room whether a wise man got angry. For after his daily discourses he often gave everyone the opportunity of asking whatever questions he wished. On this occasion he first discussed the disease or passion of anger seriously and at length, setting forth what is to be fund in the books of the ancients and in his own commentaries; then, turning to me who had asked the question, he said:

This is what I think about getting angry, but it will not be out of place for you to hear also the opinion of my master Plutarch, a man of great learning and wisdom. Plutarch,

said he,

once gave orders that one of his slaves, a worthless and insolent fellow, but one whose ears had been filled with the teachings and arguments of philosophy, should be stripped of his tunic for some offence or other and flogged. They had begun to beat him, and the slave kept protesting that he did not deserve the flogging; that he was guilty of no wrong, no crime. Finally, while the lashing still went on, he began to shout, no longer uttering complaints or shrieks and groans, but serious reproaches. Plutarch's conduct, he said, was unworthy of a philosopher; to be angry was shameful: his master had often descanted on the evil of anger and had even written an excellent treatise Peri\ )Aorghsi/as; ¹⁵⁶ it was in no way consistent with all that was written in that book that its author should fall into a fit of violent rage and punish his slave with many stripes. Then Plutarch calmly and mildly made answer: ' What makes you think, scoundrel, that I am now angry with you. Is it from my expression, my voice, my colour, or even my words, that you believe me to be in the grasp of anger? In my opinion my eyes are not fierce, my expression is not disturbed, I am neither shouting madly nor foaming at the mouth and getting red in the face; I am saying nothing to cause me shame or regret; I am not trembling at all from anger or making violent gestures. For all these actions, if you did but know it, are the usual signs of angry passions.' And with these words, turning to the man who was plying the lash, he said: 'In the meantime, while this fellow and I are arguing, do you keep at it.'

Now the sum and substance of Taurus' whole disquisition was this: he did not believe that a)orghsi/a or

freedom from anger,

and a)nalghsi/a, or

lack of sensibility,

were identical; but that a mind not prone to anger was one thing, a spirit a)na/lghtos and a)nai/sqhtos, that is, callous and unfeeling, quite another. For as of all the rest of the emotions which the Latin philosophers call affects or affectiones, and the Greeks pa/qh, so of the one which, when it becomes a cruel desire for vengeance, is called

anger,

he did not recommend as expedient a total lack, ste/rhsis as the Greeks say, but a moderate amount, which they call metrio/ths.

Noctes Atticae. Aulus Gellius. John C. Rolfe (Translator). Cambridge, Mass.. 1927.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by Tufts University.

Current edition Perseus

Attic Nights (English) (Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Noctes Atticae Perseus (Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., editor. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).) — 1.1 focus

I

Argument

Quali proportione quibusque collectionibus Plutarchus ratiocinatum esse Pythagoram philosophum dixerit de comprehendenda corporis proceritate qua fuit Hercules, cum vitam inter homines viveret.

[1] Plutarchus in libro quem de Herculis quam diu ¹ inter homines fuit animi corporisque ingenio atque virtutibus conscripsit, scite subtiliterque ratiocinatum Pythagoram philosophum dicit in reperienda modulandaque status longitudinisque eius praestantia.

[2] Nam cum fere constaret, curriculum stadii quod est Pisis apud Iovem Olympium Herculem pedibus suis metatum idque fecisse longum pedes sescentos, cetera quoque stadia in terra Graecia ab aliis postea instituta pedum quidem esse numero sescentum, sed tamen esse aliquantulum breviora, facile intellexit, modum spatiumque plantae Herculis, ratione proportionis habita, tanto fuisse quam aliorum procerius, quanto Olympicum stadium longius esset quam cetera.

[3] Comprehensa autem mensura Herculani pedis, quanta longinquitas corporis ei mensurae conveniret secundum naturalem membrorum omnium inter se competentiam modificatus est atque ita id collegit, quod erat consequens, tanto fuisse Herculem corpore excelsiorem quam alios, quanto Olympicum stadium ceteris pari numero factis anteiret.

II

Argument

Ab Herode Attico C. V. tempestive deprompta in quondam iactantem et gloriosum adulescentem, specie tantum philosophiae sectatorem, verba Epicteti Stoici, quibus festiviter a vero Stoico seiunxit vulgus loquacium loquliciuin nebulonum qui se Stoicos nuncuparent.

[1] HERODES ATTICUS, vir et Graeca facundia et consulari honore praeditus, accersebat saepe, nos cum apud magistros Athenis essemus, in villas ei urbi proximas me et clarissimum virum Servilianum compluresque alios nostrates qui Roma in Graeciam ad capiendum ingenii cultum concesserant.

[2] Atque ibi tunc, cum essemus apud eum in villa cui nomen est Cephisia, et aestu anni et sidere autumni flagrantissimo, propulsabamus incommoda caloris lucorum umbra ingentium, longis ambulacris et mollibus, medium positu refrigeranti, lavacris nitidis nlitidis et abundis et collucentibus totiusque totiusqiue villae venustate, aquis undique canoris atque avibus personante.²

[3] Erat ibidem nobiscum simul adulescens philosophiae sectator, disciplinae, ut ipse dicebat, stoicae, sed loquacior inpendio et promptior.

[4] Is plerumque in convivio sermonibus, qui post epulas haberi solent, multa atque inmodica de ³ philosophiae doctrinis intempestive atque insubide disserebat praeque se uno ceteros omnes linguae Atticae principes gentemque omnem togatam, quodcumque nomen Latinum rudes esse et agrestes praedicabat atque interea vocabulis haut facile cognitis, syllogismorum captionumque dialecticarum laqueis strepebat, χυριεύοντας et σωρείτας aliosque id genus griphos neminem posse dicens nisi se dissolvere. Rem vero ethicam naturamque humani ingenii virtutumque origines officiaque earum et confinia, aut contra morborum vitiorumque fraudes animorumque labes et ⁴ pestilentias, asseverabat nulli esse ulli magis ea omnia explorata, comperta meditataque.

[5] Cruciatibus autem doloribusque corporis et periculis mortem minitantibus habitum statumque vitae beatae, quem se esse adeptum putabat, neque laedi neque inminui existimabat, ac ne oris quoque et vultus serenitatem stoici hominis umquam ulla posse aegritudine obnubilari.

[6] Has ille inanes glorias cum flaret iamque omnes finem cuperent verbisque eius defetigati pertaeduissent, tum Herodes Graeca, uti plurimus ei mos fuit fruit, oratione utens, Permitte, inquit, philosophorum amplissime, quoniam respondere nos tibi, quos vocas idiotas, non quimus, recitari ex libro quid de huiuscemodi magniloquentia vestra senserit dixeritque Epictetus, Stoicorum maximus, iussitque proferri Dissertationum Epicteti digestarum ab Arriano primum librum, in quo ille venerandus senex iuvenes qui se Stoicos appellabant, neque frugis neque operae probae, sed theorematis tantum nugalibus et puerilium isagogarum commentationibus deblaterantes, obiurgatione iusta incessuit.

[7] Lecta igitur sunt ex libro qui prolatus est ea quae addidi; quibus verbis Epictetus severe simul et festiviter seiunxit atque divisit a vero atque sincero Stoico, qui esset procul dubio ἀκώλυτος, ἀνανάγκαστος, ἀπαραπόδιστος, ἐλεύθερος, εὐπορῶν, εὐδαιμονῶν, vulgus

[8] κακῶν. Ἄκουε. aliud nebulonum hominum qui se Stoicos nuncuparent, atraque verborum et argutiarum fuligine ob oculos audientium iacta ⁵ sanctissimae disciplinae nomen ementirentur: Εἰπέ μοι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. Ἄκουε.

Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν.

[9] Τῶν ὅντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρεταὶ τὰ μετέχοιτα αὐτῶν, κακὰ δὲ κακία καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ τούων, πλοῦτος, ὑγεία, ζωή, θάνατος, ἡδονή, πόνος.

[10] Πόθεν οἶδας; Ἑλλάνικος λέγει ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς. Τι γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ἢ ὅτι Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ ἢ Χρύσιππος ἢ Κλεάνθης; βεβασάνικας οὖν τι⁶ αὐτῶν καὶ

[11] δόγμα σαυτοῦ πεποίησαι. Δείκνυε πῶς εἴωθας ἐν πλοίῳ χειμάζεσθαι·⁷ μέμνησαι ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως, ὅταν ψοφήσῃ τὸ ἱστίον καὶ ἀνακραυγάσῃς. Ἄν σοί τις κακόσχολός πως παραστὰς εἴπῃ, λέγε μοι, τοὺς θεούς σοι, ἃ πρῴην ἔλεγες, μή τι κακία ἐστὶν τὸ ναυαγῆσαι; μήτι κακίας μετέχον; οὐκ ἄρα⁸ ξύλον ἐνσείσεις αὐτῷ; τί ἡμῖν καὶ σοί, ἄνθρωπε; ἀπολλύμεθα, καὶ σὺ ἐλθὼν

[12] παίζεις. Ἐὰν δέ σε ὁ Καῖσαρ μεταπέμψηται κατηγορούμενον

[13] His ille auditis insolentissimus adulescens obticuit, tamquam si ea omnia non ab Epicteto in quosdam quosdan alios, sed ab Herode in eum dicta essent. ⁹

III

Argument

Quod Chilo Lacedaemonius consilium anceps pro salute amici cepit; quodque est circumspecte et anxie considerandum an pro utilitatibus amicorum delinquendum aliquando sit; notataque inibi et relata quae et Theophrastus et M. Cicero super ea re scripserunt.

[1] LACEDAEMONIUM Chilonem, virum ex illo incluto numero sapientium, scriptum est in libris eorum qui vitas resque gestas clarorum hominum memoriae mandaverunt, eum Chilonem in vitae suae postremo, cum iam inibi mors occuparet, ad circumstantis amicos sic locutum:

[2] Dicta, inquit, mea factaque in aetate longa pleraque omnia fuisse non paenitenda, fors sit ut vos etiam sciatis.

[3] Ego quidem in hoc certe tempore non fallo me, nihil esse quicquam commissum a me cuius memoria mihi aegritudini sit, ni illud profecto unum sit, quod rectene an perperam fecerim nondum mihi plane liquet.

[4] Super amici capite index cum duobus aliis fui. Ita lex fuit uti eum hominem condemnari necessum esset. Aut amicus igitur capitis perdendus aut adhibenda fraus legi fuit.

[5] Multa cum animo meo ad casum tam ancipitem medendum consultavi. Visum est esse id quod feci praequam erant alia toleratu facilius:

[6] ipse tacitus ad condemnandum sententiam tuli, is qui simul iudicabant ut absolverent persuasi.

[7] Sic mihi et iudicis et amici officium in re tanta salvum fuit. Hanc capio ex eo facto molestiam, quod metuo ne a perfidia et culpa non abhorreat, in eadem re eodemque tempore inque communi negotio, quod mihi optimum factu duxerim, diversum eius aliis suasisse.

[8] Et hic autem Chilo, praestabilis homo sapientiae, quonam usque debuerit contra legem contraque ius pro amico progredi dubitavit, eaque res in fine quoque vitae ipso animum eius anxit,

[9] et alii deinceps multi philosophiae sectatores, ut in libris eorum scriptum est, satis inquisite satisque sollicite quaesiverunt, ut verbis quae scripta sunt ipsis utar, εἰ δεῖ βοηθεῖν τῷ φίλῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέχρι πόσου καὶ ποῖα. Ea verba significant, quaesisse eos an nonnumquam contra ius contrave morem faciendum pro amico sit et in qualibus causis et quemnam usque ad modum.

[10] Super hac quaestione cum ab aliis, sicuti dixi, multis, tum vel diligentissime a Theophrasto disputatur, viro in philosophia peripatetica modestissimo doctissimoque, eaque disputatio scripta est, si recte meminimus, in libro eius De Amicitia primo.

[11] Eum librum M. Cicero videtur legisse, cum ipse quoque librum De Amicitia componeret. Et cetera quidem quae sumenda a Theophrasto existimavit, ut ingenium facundiaque eius fuit, sumpsit et transposuit commodissime aptissimeque;

[12] hunc autem locum de quo satis quaesitum esse dixi, omnium rerum aliarum difficillimum, strictim atque cursim transgressus est, neque ea quae a Theophrasto pensiculate atque enucleate scripta sunt exsecutus executus est, sed anxietate illa et quasi morositate disputationis praetermissa, genus ipsum rei tantum paucis verbis notavit.

[13] Ea verba Ciceronis, si recensere quis vellet, apposui: His igitur finibus utendum esse arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum ainicorum sunt, ¹⁰ tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut etiam, si qua fortuna accident, ut minus iustae voluntates amicorum adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput ¹¹ agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae venia dari possit.

Cum agetur, inquit, aut caput amici aut fama, declinandum est de via, ut etiam iniquam voluntatem illius adiutemus.

[14] Sed cuiusmodi declinatio esse ista debeat qualisque ad adiuvandum digressio et in quanta voluntatis amici iniquitate, non dicit.

[15] Quid autem refert scire me in eiusmodi periculis amicorum, si non magna me turpitudo insecutura est, de via esse recta declinandum, nisi id quoque me docuerit, quam putet magnam turpitudinem, et cum decessero de via, quousque degredi debeam? Est enim, inquit, quatenus dari amicitiae venia possit.

[16] Hoc immo ipsum est quod maxime discendum est quodque ab his qui docent ¹² minime dicitur, quatenus quaque fini dari amicitiae anicitiae venia debeat.

[17] Chilo ille sapiens, de quo paulo ante dixi, conservandi amici causa de via declinavit. Sed video quousque progressus sit; falsum enim pro amici salute consilium dedit.

[18] Id ipsum tamen in fine quoque vitae an iure posset reprehendi culparique dubitavit.

Contra patriam, inquit Cicero, arma Pro amico sumenda non sunt.

[19] Hoc profecto nemo ignoravit, et priusquam Theognis, quod ¹³ Lucilius ait, nasceretur. Set id quaero, id desidero: cum pro amico contra ius, contra quam licet, salva tamen libertate atque pace, faciendum est et cum de via, sicut ipse ait, declinandum est, quid et quantum et in quali causa et quonam usque id fieri debeat.

[20] Pericles ille Atheniensis, vir egregio ingenio bonisque omnibus disciplinis ornatus, in una quidem specie, set planius tamen quid existimaret professus est. Nam cum amicus eum rogaret ut pro re causaque eius falsum deiuraret, ¹⁴ his ad eum verbis usus est: Δεῖ μὲν συμπράττειν τοῖς φίλοις, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῶν φεῶν.

[21] Theophrastus autem in eo quo dixi libro inquisitius quidem super hac ipsa re et exactius expressiusque ¹⁵ quam Cicero disserit.

[22] Set is quoque in docendo non de unoquoque facto singillatim existimat neque certis exemplorum documentis, set generibus rerum summatim universimque utitur ad hunc ferme modum:

[23] Parva, inquit, et tenuis vel turpitudo vel infamia infamnia subeunda est, si ea re magna utilitas amico quaeri potest. Rependitur quippe et compensatur leve damnum delibatae honestatis maiore alia gravioreque in adiuvando amico honestate, minimaque illa labes et quasi lacuna famae munimentis partarum amico utilitatium solidatur.

[24] Neque nominibus, inquit, moveri nos oportet, quod paria genere ipso non sunt honestas meae famae et rei amici utilitas. Ponderibus haec enim potestatibusque praesentibus, non vocabulorum appellationibus neque dignitatibus generum diiudicanda sunt.

[25] Nam cum in rebus aut paribus aut non longe secus utilitas amici aut honestas nostra consistit, honestas procul dubio praeponderat; cum vero amici utilitas nimio est amplior, honestatis autem nostrae in re non gravi levis iactura est, tunc quod utile amico est, id prae illo quod honestum nobis est fit plenius, sicuti est magnum pondus aeris parva lamna auri pretiosius.

Verba adeo ipsa Theophrasti super ea re adscripsi:

[26] Οὐκ, εἰ δή που τοῦτο τῷ γένει τιμιώτερον, ἤδη καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ᾖ μέρος τούτου πρὸς τ ὸ τηλίκον θατέρου συγκρινόμενον αἱρετὸν ἔσται. Λέγω δὲ οἷον, οὐκ, εἰ χρυσίον τιμιώτερον χαλκοῦ, καὶ τηλίκον τοῦ χρυσίου πρὸς τὸ τηλίκον χαλκοῦ μέγεθος ἀντιπαραβαλλόμενον πλέον δόξει· ἀλλὰ ποιήσει τινὰ ῥοπὴν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος.

[27] Favorinus Favoriinus quoque philosophus philosophlus huiuscemodi huiuscemlodi indulgentiam gratiae, tempestive laxato paulum remissoque subtili iustitiae examine, his verbis definivit: Ἡ καλουμέιν χάρις παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τοῦτο ἔστιν ὕφεσις ἀκριβείας ἐν δέοντι.

[28] Post deinde idem Theophrastus ad hanc ferme sententiam disseruit: Has tamen tarnen, inquit, parvitates rerum et magnitudines miagnitudines atque atquc has omnes officiorum aestimationes alia nonnumquam momenta extrinsecus atque aliae quasi appendices personarum et causarum et temporum et circumstantiae ipsius necessitates, quas includere in praecepta difficilest, moderantur et regunt et quasi gubernant et nunc ratas efficiunt, nunc inritas.

[29] Haec taliaque Theophrastus satis caute et sollicite et religiose, cum discernendi magis disceptandique diligentia quam cum decernendi sententia atque fiducia scripsit, quoniam profecto causarum ac temporum varietates discriminumque ac differentiarum tenuitates derectum atque perpetuum distinctumque in rebus singulis praeceptum, quod ego nos in prima tractatus istius parte desiderare dixeram, non capiunt.

[30] Eius autem Chilonis, a quo disputatiunculae huius initium fecimus, cum alia quaedam sunt monita utilia atque prudentia, tum id maxime exploratae utilitatis est, quod duas ferocissimas adfectiones amoris atque odii intra modum cautum coercuit. Hac, inquit, fini ames, tamquam forte fortuna et osurus; hac itidem tenus oderis, tamquam fortasse post amaturus.

[31] Super hoc eodem Chilone Plutarchus philosophus, in libro Περὶ Ψυχῆς primo, verbis his ita scripsit: Χείλων ὁ παλαιός, ἀκούσας τινὸς λέγοντος, μηδένα ἔχειν ἐχθρόν, ἠρώτησεν, εἰ μηδένα δίλον ἔχει, νομίζων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθεῖν καὶ συνεμπλέκεσθαι ταῖς φιλίαις ἀπεχθείας.

IV

Argument

Quam tenuiter curioseque exploraverit Antonius Iulianus in oratione M. Tullii verbi ab eo mutati argutiam.

[1] ANTONIUS Iulianus lulianus rhetor perquam fuit honesti atque amoeni ingeni. Doctrina quoque iste ¹⁶ utiliore ac delectabili veterumque elegantiarum cura et memoria multa fuit; ad hoc scripta script omnia antiquiora tam curiose spectabat et aut virtutes pensitabat aut vitia rimabatur, ut iudicium esse factum ad amussim diceres.

[2] Is Iulianus super eo enthymemate, quod est in oratione M. Tullii,

[3] quam Pro Cn. Plancio dixit, ita existimavit—sed verba prius, de quibus iudicium ab eo factum est, ipsa ponam: Quamquam dissimilis est pecuniae debitio et gratiae. Nam qui pecuniam dissolvit, statim non habet id quod reddidit, qui autem debet dlebet, is retinet alienun; gratiam autem et qui refert habet, et qui habet in eo ipso quod habet refert. Neque ego nunc Plancio desinam debere, si hoc hioc solvero, nec minus ei redderem voluntate ipsa, si hoc molestiae non accidisset — Crispum sane,

[4] inquit, agmen orationis rotundumque ac modulo ipso numerorum venustum, sed quod cum venia legendum sit verbi paulum ideo inmutati, ut sententiae fides salva esset.

[5] Namque debitio gratiae et pecuniae conlata verbum utrubique servari postulat. Ita enim recte opposita inter sese gratiae pecuniaeque debitio videbitur, si et pecunia quidem deberi dicatur et gratia, sed quid eveniat in pecunia debita solutave, quid contra in gratia debita redditave, debitionis verbo utrimque servato disseratur.

[6] Cicero autem, inquit, cum gratiae pecuniaeque debitionem dissimilem esse dixisset eiusque sententiae rationem redderet, verbum debet in pecunia ponit, in gratia habet subicit pro debet; ita enim dicit: gratiam autem et qui refert habet, et qui habet in eo ipso quod habet refert.

[7] Sed id verbum habet cum proposita comparatione non satis convenit. Debitio enim gratiae, non habitio, cum pecunia confertur, atque ideo consequens quidem fuerat sic dicere: et qui debet in eo ipso quod debet refert; sed absurdum et nimis coactum foret, si nondum redditam gratiam eo ipso redditam diceret, quia debetur.

[8] Inmutavit ergo, inquit, et ¹⁷ subdidit verbum ei verbo, quod omiserat, finitimum, ut videretur et sensum debitionis conlatae non reliquisse et concinnitatem sententiae retinuisse. Ad hunc modum Iulianus enodabat diiudicabatque veterum scriptorum sententias, quae aput eum adulescentes delecti lectitabant. ¹⁸

V

Argument

Quod Demosthenes rhetor cultu corporis atque vestitu probris obnoxio infamique munditia fuit; quodque item Hortensius orator, ob eiusmodi munditias gestumque in agendo histrionicum, Dionysiae saltatriculae cognomento compellatus est.

[1] DEMOSTHENEN traditum est vestitu ceteroque cultu corporis nitido venustoque nimisque accurato fuisse. Et hinc ei τὰ κομψὰ illa χλανίσκια et μαλακοὶ χιτωνίσκοι ab aemulis adversariisque probro data, hinc etiam turpibus indignisque in eum verbis non temperatum, quin parum vir et ore quoque polluto diceretur.

[2] Ad eundem modum Q. Hortensius omnibus ferme oratoribus aetatis suae, nisi M. Tullio, clarior, quod multa munditia et circumspecte compositeque indutus et amictus esset manusque eius inter agendum forent argutae admodum et gestuosae, maledictis compellationibusque probris iactatus est multaque in eum, quasi in histrionem, in ipsis causis atque iudiciis dicta sunt.

[3] Sed cum L. Torquatus, subagresti homo ingenio et infestivo, gravius acerbiusque acerliusque apud consilium iudicum, cum de causa Sullae quaereretur, non iam histrionem eum esse diceret, sed gesticulariam Dionysiamque eum notissimae saltatriculae nomine appellaret, tum voce molli atque atoue demissa Hortensius Dionysia, inquit, Dionysia malo equidem esse quam quod tu, Torquate, ἄμουσος, ἀναφρόδιτος, ἀπροσδιόνυσος.

VI

Argument

Verba ex oratione Metelli Numidici quam dixit in censura ad populum, cum eum ad uxores ducendas adhortaretur; eaque oratio quam ob causam reprehensa et quo contra modo defensa sit.

[1] MULTIS et eruditis viris audientibus legebatur oratio Metelli Numidici, gravis ac diserti viri, quam in censura dixit ad populum de ducendis uxoribus, cum eum ad matrimonia capessenda hortaretur. In ea oratione ita scriptum fuit:

[2] Si sine uxore pati ¹⁹ possemus, Quirites, omnes ²⁰ ea molestia careremus; set quoniam ita natura tradidit, ut nec cum illis satis commode, nec sine illis ullo modo vivi possit, saluti perpetuae potius quam brevi voluptati consulendum est.

[3] Videbatur quibusdam, Q. Metellum censorem, cui consilium esset ad uxores ducendas populum hortari, non oportuisse de molestia incommodisque perpetuis rei uxoriae confiteri, neque id hortari magis esse quam dissuadere absterrereque; set contra in id potius orationem debuisse sumi dicebant, ut et nullas plerumque esse in matrimoniis molestias adseveraret et, si quae tamen accidere nonnumquam viderentur, parvas et leves facilesque esse toleratu diceret maioribusque eas emolumentis et voluptatibus oblitterari easdemque ipsas neque omnibus neque naturae vitio, set quorundam maritorum culpa et iniustitia evenire.

[4] Titus autem Castricius recte atque condigne Metellum esse locutum existimabat. Aliter, inquit, censor loqui debet, aliter rhetor. rhetori concessum est, sententiis uti falsis, audacibus, versutis, subdolis, captiosis, si veri modo similes sint et possint movendos hominumn animos qualicunque astu inrepere. Praeterea turpe esse ait rhetori, si quid in mala causa destitutum atque inpropugnatum relinquat.

[5] Sed enim Metellum, inquit, sanctum virum, illa gravitate et fide praeditum cum tanta honorum atque vitae dignitate aput populum Romanum loquentem, nihil decuit aliud dicere quam quod verum esse sibi atque omnibus videbatur, praesertim cum super ea re diceret quae cotidiana intellegentia et communi pervolgatoque vitae usu comprenderetur.

[6] De molestia igitur cunctis hominibus notissima confessus, fidem sedulitatis ²¹ veritatisque commeritus, tum denique facile et procliviter, quod fuit rerum omnium validissimum atque verissimum velissimum i, persuasit civitatem salvam esse sine matrimoniorum frequentia non posse.

[7] Hoc Hoe quoque aliut ex eadem oratione Q. Metelli dignum esse existimavimus adsidua lectione non hercle minus quam quae a gravissimis philosophis scripta sunt.

[8] Verba Metelli haec sunt: Di immortales plurimum possunt; sed non plus velle nobis debent quam parentes. At parentes, si pergunt liberi errare, bonis exheredant. Quid ergo nos ab immortalibus dissimile ius ²² expectemus, nisi malis rationibus finem faciamus? Is demum deos propitios esse aecum est, qui sibi adversarii non sunt. Dii immortales virtutem adprobare, non adhibere debent.

VII

Argument

In hisce verbis Ciceronis ex oratione quinta in Verrem hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum, neque mendum esse neque vitium, errareque istos qui bonos libros violant et futuram scribunt; atque ibi de quodam alio Ciceronis verbo dictum, quod probe scriptum perperam mutatur; et aspersa pauca de modulis numerisque orationis, quos Cicero avide sectatus est.

[1] IN oratione Ciceronis quinta In Verrem, libro spectatae fidei,

[2] Tironiana cura atque disciplina facto, ita ²³ scriptum fuit:

Homines tenues, obscuro loco nati, navigant; adeunt ad ea loca quae numquam antea adierant. ²⁴ Neque noti esse iis quo venerunt neque semper cum cognitoribus esse possunt, hac una tamen fiducia civitatis, non modo apud nostros magistratus, qui et legum et existimationis periculo continentur, neque apud cives solum Romanos, qui et sermonis et iuris et multarum rerum societate iuncti sunt, fore se tutos arbitrantur, sed quocumque venerint, hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum. ²⁵

[3] Videbatur compluribus in extremo verbo menda esse. Debuisse enim scribi putabant non futurum, sed futuram, neque dubitabant quin liber emendandus esset, ne, ut in Plauti comoedia moechus, sic enim mendae suae inludiabant, ita in Ciceronis oratione soloecismus esset manifestarius.

[4] Aderat forte ibi amicus noster, homo lectione multa exercitus, cui pleraque omnia veterum litterarum quaesita, meditata evigilataque erant.

[5] Is, libro inspecto, ait nullum esse in eo verbo neque mendum neque vitium et Ciceronem probe ac vetuste locutum.

[6] Nam futurum, inquit, non refertur ad rem, sicut legentibus temere et incuriose videtur, neque pro participio positum est, set verbum est indefinitum, quod Graeci appellant ἀπαρέμφατον, neque numeris neque generibus praeserviens,

[7] set liberum undique et impromiscum, quali C. Gracchus verbo usus est in oratione cuius titulus est De P. Popilio circum Conciliabula, in qua ita scriptum scripturm est: Credo ego inimicos meos hoc dicturum. Inimicos dicturum, inquit, non dicturos; videturne ea ratione positum esse aput Gracchum dicturum,

[8] qua est aput Ciceronem futurum? Sicut in Graeca oratione sine ulla vitii suspicione omnibus numeris generibusque sine discrimine tribuuntur huiuscemodi verba: ἐρεῖν, ποιήσειν, ἔσεσθαι et similia.

[9] In Claudi quoque Quadrigarii tertio Annali verba haec esse dixit: I²⁶ dum conciderentur, hostium copias ibi occupatas futurum ; in duodevicesimo Annali eiusdem Quadrigarii principium libri sic scriptum: Si pro tua bonitate et nostra voluntate tibi valitudo subpetit, est quod speremus deos bonis benefacturum;

[10] item in Valerii Antiatis libro quarto vicesimo simili modo scriptum esse: Si eae res divinae factae recteque perlitatae essent, haruspices dixerunt omnia ex sententia processurum esse. Plautus etiam in Casina,

[11] cum de puella loqueretur, occisurum dixit, non occisuram, his verbis:

Etiamne habet ²⁷ Casina gladium?

Habét, sed duós.—Quid duós? ²⁸ —Alteró te

Occísurum aít, alteró vilicum.

[12] Item Laberius in Gemellis:

Nón putavi (inquit) hoc eám facturum.

[13] Non ergo isti omnes soloecismus quid esset ignorarunt, sed et Gracchus dicturum et Quadrigarius futurum futurunm et facturum et Antias processurum et Plautus occisurum et Laberius facturum indefinito modo dixerunt,

[14] qui modus neque in numeros neque in personas neque in tempora neque in genera distrahitur, sed omnia istaec una eademque declinatione complectitur,

[15] sicuti M. Cicero futurum dixit non virili genere neque neutro, soloecismus enim plane foret, sed verbo usus est ab omni necessitate generum absoluto.

[16] Idem autem ille amicus noster in eiusdem M. Tullii oratione, quae est De imperio Cn. Pompei, ita scriptum esse a Cicerone dicebat atque ipse ita lectitabat: Cum vestros portus, atque eos portus quibus vitam ac spiritum ducitis, in praedonum fuisse potestatem sciatis,

[17] neque soloecismum esse aiebat in potestatem fuisse, ut vulgus semidoctum putat, sed ratione dictum certa et proba contendebat, qua et Graeci ita uterentur; et Plautus, verborum Latinorum elegantissimus, in Amphitruone dixit:

número ²⁹ mihi in mentem mentdm fuit,

non, ut dici solitum est, in mente.

[18] Sed enim praeter Plautum, cuius ille in praesens exemplo usus est, multam nos quoque apud veteres scriptores locutionum talium copiam offendimus atque his vulgo adnotamentis inspersimus.

[19] Ut et rationem autem istam missam facias et auctoritates, sonus tamen et positura ipsa verborum satis declarat id potius ἐπιμελείᾳ τῶν λέξεων modulamentisque orationis M. Tullii convenisse, ut, quoniam utrumvis dici Latine posset, potestatem dicere mallet, non potestate.

[20] Illud enim sic compositum iucundius ad aurem completiusque, insuavius hoc imperfectiusque est, si modo ita explorata aure homo sit, non surda nec iacenti; sicuti est hercle quod explicavit dicere maluit quam explicuit, quod esse iam usitatius coeperat.

Verba sunt haec ipsius ex oratione, quam De inperio Cn. Pompei habuit: Testis est Sicilia, quam, multis undique cinctam periculis, non terrore belli, sed consilii celeritate explicavit. At si explicuit diceret, inperfecto et debili numero verborum sonus clauderet.

VIII

Argument

Historia in libris Sotionis philosophi reperta super Laide meretrice et Demosthene rhetore.

[1] SOTION ex peripatetica disciplina haut sane ignobilis vir fuit. Is librum multae variaeque historiae refertum composuit eumque inscripsit Κέρας Ἀμαλθείας.

[2] Ea vox hoc ferme valet, tamquam si dicas Cornum Copiae.

[3] In eo libro super Demosthene rhetore et Laide meretrice historia haec scripta est: Lais, inquit, Corinthia ob elegantiam venustatemque formae grandem pecuniam demerebat conventusque ad eam ditiorum hominum ex omni Graecia celebres erant, neque admittebatur nisi qui dabat quod poposcerat; poscebat autem illa nimium quantum.

[4] Hinc ait natum esse illud frequens apud Graecos adagium:

Οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐς Κόρινθον ἔσθʼ ὁ πλοῦς,

quod frustra iret Corinthum ad Laidem qui non quiret dare quod posceretur.

[5] Ad hanc ille Demosthenes clanculum adit et ut sibi copiam sui faceret petit. At Lais μυρίας δραχμὰς poposcit— hoc facit nummi nostratis denarium decem milia.

[6] Tali petulantia mulieris atque pecuniae magnitudine ictus expavidusque Demosthenes avertitur et discedens ego, inquit, paenitere tanti non emo. Sed Graeca ipsa, quae fertur dixisse, lepidiora sunt: οὐκ ὠνοῦμαι, inquit, μυρίων δραχμῶν μεταμέλειαν.

IX

Argument

Quis modus fuerit, quis ordo disciplinae Pythagoricae, quantumque temporis imperatum observatumque sit discendi simul ac tacendi.

[1] ordo atque ratio Pythagorae, ac deinceps familiae et ³⁰ successionis eius, recipiendi instituendique discipulos huiuscemodi fuisse traditur:

[2] Iam lam a principio adulescentes qui sese ad discendum obtulerant εφυ- σιογνωμόνει. Id verbum significat, mores naturasque hominum coniectatione quadam de oris et vultus ingenio deque totius corporis filo atque habitu sciscitari.

[3] tum Turn qui exploratus ab eo idoneusque inventus ³¹ fuerat recipi in disciplinam statim iubebat et tempus certum tacere; non omnes idem, sed alios ³² aliud tempus pro aestimato captu sollertiae.

[4] Is autem qui tacebat quae dicebantur ab aliis audiebat, neque percontari, si parum intellexerat, commentari quae audierat fas erat; sed non minus quisquam tacuit quam biennium: hi prorsus appellabantur intra tempus tacendi audiendique ἀκουστικοί.

[5] Ast ubi res didicerant rerum omnium difficillimas, tacere audireque, atque esse iam coeperant silentio eruditi cui erat nomen ἐχεμυθία, tum verba facere et quaerere, quaeque audissent scribere, et quae ipsi opinarentur expromere potestas erat;

[6] hi dicebantur in eo tempore μαθηματικοί, ab his scilicet artibus quas iam discere atque meditari inceptaverant: quoniam geometriam, gnomonicam, musicam ceterasque item disciplinas altiores μαθήματα veteres Graeci appellabant; vulgus autem, quos gentilicio vocabulo Chaldaeos dicere oportet, mathematicos dicit.

[7] Exinde, his scientiae studiis ornati, ad perspicienda mundi opera et principia naturae procedebant ac tunc denique nominabantur φυσικοί.

[8] Haec eadem super Pythagora noster Taurus cum dixisset: Nunc autem, inquit, isti qui repente pedibus inlotis inotis ad philosophos devertunt, non est hoc satis quod sunt omnino ἀθεώρητοι, ἄμουσοι, ἀγεωμέτρητοι, sed legem etiam dant qua philosophari discant.

[9] Alius ait hoc me primum doce, item alius hoc volo, inquit, discere, istud nolo; hic a Symposio Platonis incipere gestit propter Alcibiadae comisationem, ille a Phaedro propter Lysiae orationem.

[10] Est etiam, inquit, pro Iuppiter! qui Platonem legere postulet non vitae ornandae, sed linguae orationisque comendae gratia, nec ut modestior fiat, sed ut lepidior.

[11] Haec Taurus dicere solitus, novicios philosophorum philosoplorum sectatores cum veteribus Pythagoricis pensitans.

[12] Sed id quoque non Praetereundum est, quod omnes, simul atque a ³³ Pythagora in cohortem illam disciplinarum recepti erant, quod quisque familiae, pecuniae habebat in medium dabat et coibatur societas inseparabilis, tamquam tamquanla³⁴ illud fuit anticum consortium, quod iure atque verbo Romano appellabatur ercto non cito.

X

Argument

Quibus verbis compellaverit Favorinus philosophus adulescentem casce nimis et prisce loquentem.

[1] FAVORINUS philosophus adulescenti veterum verborum cupidissimo et plerasque voces nimis priscas et ignotas in cotidianis communibusque sermonibus expromenti: Curius, inquit, et Fabricius et Coruncanius, antiquissimi viri, et his antiquiores Horatii illi trigemini, plane ac dilucide cum suis fabulati sunt neque Auruncorum aut Sicanorum aut Pelasgorum, qui primi coluisse Italiam ³⁵ dicuntur, sed aetatis suae verbis locuti sunt;

[2] tu autem, proinde quasi cum matre Euandri nunc loquare, sermone abhinc multis annis iam desito uteris, quod scire atque intellegere neminem vis quae dicas. Nonne, homo inepte, ut quod vis abunde consequaris, taces?

[3] Sed antiquitatem tibi placere ais, quod honesta et bona et sobria et modesta sit.

[4] Vive ergo moribus praeteritis, loquere verbis praesentibus atque id, quod a C. Caesare, excellentis ingenii ac prudentiae viro, in primo De Analogia libro scriptum est, habe semper in memoria memorial atque in pectore, ut tamquam scopulum, sic fugias inauditum ³⁶ atque insolens verbum.

XI

Argument

Quod Thucydides, scriptor inclitus, Lacedaemonios in acie non tuba, sed tibiis esse usos dicit verbaque eius super ea re posita; quodque Herodotus Alyattem regem fidicinas in procinctu procinct habuisse halbuisse tradit; atque inibi quaedam notata de Gracchi fistula contionaria.

[1] AUCTOR historiae Graecae gravissimus Thucydides, Lacedaemonios, summos bellatores, non cornuum tubarumve signis, sed tibiarum modulis in proeliis esse usos refert, non prorsus ex aliquo ritu religionum neque rei divinae gratia neque autem ut excitarentur atque evibrarentur animi, quod cornua et litui moliuntur; sed contra, ut moderatiores modulatioresque fierent, quod tibicinis numeris vis ³⁷ temperatur.

[2] Nihil adeo in congrediendis hostibus atque in principiis proeliorum ad salutem virtutemque aptius rati, quam si permulti permulcti sonis mitioribus non inmodice ferocirent.

[3] Cum procinctae igitur classes erant et instructa acies coeptumque coeptunique in hostem progredi tibicines inter exercitum positi canere inceptabant.

[4] Ea ibi praecentione tranquilla et delectabili atque adeo ³⁸ venerabili ad quandam quasi militaris musicae disciplinam vis et impetus militum, ne sparsi dispalatique proruerent, cohibebatur.

[5] Sed ipsius illius egregii scriptoris uti verbis libet, quae et dignitate et fide graviora sunt: Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ξύνοδος ἦν· Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν, νόμου³⁹ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν

[6] Cretenses quoque proelia ingredi solitos memoriae datum est praecinente ac praemoderante cithara gressibus;

[7] Alyattes autem, rex terrae Lydiae, more atque luxu barbarico praeditus, cum bellum Milesiis faceret, ut Herodotus in Historiis tradit, concinentes habuit fistulatores et fidicines atque feminas etiam tibicinas in exercitu atque in procinctu habuit, lascivientium delicias conviviorum.

[8] Sed enim Achaeos Homerus pugnam indipisci ait non fidicularum tibiarumque, sed mentium animorumque ⁴⁰ concentu conspiratuque tacito nitibundos:

Οἱ δ᾽ ἄρʼ ἴσαν σιγῇ μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,

Ἐν θυμῷ μεμαῶτες ἀλεξέμεν ἀλλήλοισιν

[9] Quid ille vult ardentissimus clamor militum Romanorum, quem in congressibus proeliorum fieri solitum scriptores annalium memoravere? Contrane institutum fiebat antiquae disciplinae tam probabile? An tum et gradu clementi et silentio est opus, cum ad hostem itur in conspectu longinquo procul distantem, cum vero prope ad manus ventum est tum iam e propinquo hostis et impetu propulsandus et clamore terrendus est?

[10] Ecce autem per tibicinia Laconica tibiae quoque illius contionariae in mentem venit, quam C. Graccho cum populo agente praeisse ac praeministrasse praerinistrasse modulos ferunt.

[11] Sed nequaquam neuquaquam sic est, ut a vulgo dicitur, canere tibia solitum qui pone eum loquentem staret, et variis modis tum demulcere animum actionemque eius, tum intendere.

[12] Quid enim foret ista re ineptius, si, ut planipedi saltanti, ita Graccho contionanti numeros et modos et frequentamenta ⁴¹ quaedam varia tibicen incineret?

[13] Sed qui hoc compertius memoriae tradiderunt, stetisse in circumstantibus dicunt occultius, qui fistula brevi sensim graviusculum sonum inspiraret ad reprimendum sedandumque inpetus vocis eius effervescentes; ⁴²

[14] namque inpulsu et instinctu extraneo naturalis illa Gracchi vehementia indiguisse, non, opinor, existimanda est.

[15] M. tamen Cicero fistulatorem istum utrique rei adhibitum adhibituim esse a Graccho putat, ut sonis tum placidis tum citatis aut demissam iacentemque orationem eius erigeret aut ferocientem saevientemque cohiberet. Verba ipsius Ciceronis apposui:

[16] Itaque idem Gracchus, quod potes audire, Catule, ex Licinio cliente tuo, litterato homine, quem servum sibi habuit ad manum, cum eburnea ⁴³ solitus est habere fistula, qui staret occulte post ipsum cum contionaretur, peritum hominem, qui inflaret celeriter eum sonum, qui ⁴⁴ illum aut remissum excitaret aut a contentione revocaret.

[17] Morem autem illum ingrediendi ad tibicinum modulos proelii institutum esse a Lacedaemonis, Aristoteles in libris Problematon⁴⁵ scripsit, quo manifestior fieret exploratiorque militum securitas et alacritas.

[18] Nam diffidentiae, inquit, et timori cum ingressione huiuscemodi minime convenit et maesti atque formidantes ab hac tam intrepida ac tam decora incedendi modulatione alieni sunt.

[19] Verba pauca Aristotelis super ea re apposui: Διὰ τί, ἐπειδὰν κινδυνεύειν μέλλωσιν, πρὸς αὐλὸν ἐμβαίνουσιν; ἵνα τοὺς δειλοὺς ἀσχημονοῦντας γινώσκωσιν.

XII

Argument

Virgo Vestae quid aetatis et ex quali familia et quo ritu quibusque caerimoniis et religionibus ac quo nomine a pontifice maximo capiatur, et quo statim iure esse incipiat simul atque capta est; quodque, ut Labeo dicit, nec nee intestato cuiquam nec eius intestatae quisquam iure heres est.

[1] QUI de virgine capienda scripserunt, quorum diligentissime scripsit Labeo Antistius, minorem quam annos sex, maiorem quam annos decem natam, negaverunt capi fas esse;

[2] item quae non sit patrima et matrima;

[3] item quae lingua debili sensuve aurium deminuta aliave qua corporis labe insignita sit;

[4] item quae ipsa aut cuius pater emancipatus sit, etiamsi vivo patre in avi potestate sit;

[5] item cuius parentes alter amboue above servitutem servierunt aut in negotiis sordidis versantur.

[6] Set et ⁴⁶ eam cuius soror ad id sacerdotium lecta est excusationem mereri aiunt; item cuius pater flamen aut augur aut quindecimvirum sacris faciundis aut ⁴⁷ septemvirum epulonum aut Salius est.

[7] Sponsae quoque pontificis et tubicinis sacrorum filiae vacatio a sacerdotio isto tribui solet.

[8] Praeterea Capito Ateius scriptum reliquit, neque eius legendam filiam qui domicilium in Italia non haberet, et excusandam eius qui liberos tres haberet.

[9] Virgo autem Vestalis simul est capta atque in atrium Vestae deducta et pontificibus tradita est, eo statim tempore sine emancipatione ac sine capitis minutione e patris potestate exit et ius testamenti faciundi adipiscitur.

[10] De more autem rituque capiundae virginis litterae quidem antiquiores non extant, nisi quae capta prima est a Numa rege esse captam.

[11] Sed Papiam legem invenimus, qua cavetur ut pontificis maximi arbitratu virgines e populo viginti legantur sortitioque in contione ex eo numero fiat et ⁴⁸ cuius sors ⁴⁹ virginis ducta erit, ut eam pontifex maximus capiat eaque Vestae fiat.

[12] Sed ea sortitio ex lege Papia non necessaria nunc videri solet. Nam si quis honesto loco natus adeat pontificem maximum atque offerat ad sacerdotium filiam suam, cuius dumtaxat salvis religionum observationibus ratio haberi possit, gratia Papiae ⁵⁰ legis per senatum fit.

[13] Capi autem virgo propterea dici videtur, quia pontificis maximi manu prensa ab eo parente in cuius potestate est, veluti bello capta, abducitur.

[14] In libro primo Fabii Pictoris, quae verba pontificem maximum dicere oporteat, cum virginem capiat, scriptum est. Ea verba haec sunt: Sacerdotem Vestalem, quae sacra faciat quae ius siet sacerdotem Vestalem facere pro populo Romano Quiritibus, uti quae ⁵¹ optima lege fuit, ita te, Amata, capio.

[15] Plerique autem capi virginem solam debere dici putant. Sed flamines quoque Diales, item pontifices et augures capi dicebantur.

[16] L. Sulla Rerum Gestarum libro secundo ita scripsit: P. Cornelius, cui primum cognomen Sullae impositum est, flamen Dialis captus.

[17] M. Cato de Lusitanis, cum Servium Galbam accusavit ⁵² : Tamen dicunt deficere voluisse. Ego me nunc volo ius pontificium optime scire; iamne ea causa pontifex capiar? Si volo augurium optime tenere, ecquis me ob eam earn rem ⁵³ augurem capiat?

[18] Praeterea in commentariis Commenlariis Labeonis, quae ad duodecim Duodecin Tabulas composuit, ita scriptum est: Virgo Vestalis neque heres est cuiquam intestato, neque intestatae quisquam, sed bona eius in ⁵⁴ publicum redigi aiunt. Id quo iure fiat, quaeritur.

[19] Amata inter capiendum a pontifice maximo appellatur, quoniam quae prima capta est hoc fuisse nomen traditum est.

XIII

Argument

Quaesitum esse in philosophia, quidnam foret in recepto mandato rectius, idne omnino facere quod mandatum est, an nonnumquam etiam contra, si id speres ei qui mandavit utilius fore; superque ea quaestione expositae diversae sententiae.

[1] IN officiis capiendis, censendis iudicandisque, quae καθήκοντα philosophi appellant, quaeri solet an negotio tibi dato et quid omnino faceres definite. contra quid facere debeas, si eo facto videri possit res eventura prosperius exque utilitate eius qui id tibi negotium mandavit.

[2] Anceps quaestio et in utramque partem a prudentibus viris arbitrata est.

[3] Sunt enim non pauci qui sententiam suam una in parte defixerint et re semel statuta deliberataque ab eo cuius id negotium pontificiumque esset, nequaquam putaverint contra dictum eius esse faciendum, etiamsi repentinus aliqui casus rem commodius agi posse polliceretur; ne, si spes fefellisset, culpa inpatientiae et poena indeprecabilis subeunda esset;

[4] si res forte melius vertisset, dis quidem gratia habenda, sed exemplum tamen intromissum videretur, quo bene consulta consilia religione mandati soluta corrumperentur.

[5] Alii existimaverunt incommoda prius quae metuenda essent, si res gesta aliter foret quam imperatum est, cum emolumento spei pensitanda esse et, si ea leviora minoraque, utilitas autem contra gravior et amplior spe quantum potest firma ostenderetur, tum posse adversum mandata fieri censuerunt, ne oblata divinitus rei bene gerendae occasio amitteretur;

[6] neque timendum exemplum non parendi crediderunt, si rationes dumtaxat huiuscemodi non abessent.

[7] Cumprimis cum autem respiciendum putaverunt ingenium naturamque illius cuia ⁵⁵ res praeceptumque esset: ne ferox, durus, indomitus inexorabilisque sit, qualia fuerunt Postumiana imperia et Manliana.

[8] Nam si tali praeceptori ratio reddenda sit, nihil faciendum esse monuerunt aliter quam praeceptum est.

[9] Instructius deliberatiusque fore arbitramur theorematium hoc de mandatis huiuscemodi obsequendis, si exemplum quoque P. Crassi Muciani, clari atque incluti viri, apposuerimus.

[10] Is Crassus a Sempronio Asellione et plerisque aliis historiae Romanae scriptoribus traditur habuisse quinque rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod pontifex maximus.

[11] Is cum in consulatu obtineret Asiam provinciam et circumsedere oppugnareque Leucas pararet opusque esset firma atque procera trabe, qui arietem faceret quo muros eius oppidi quateret, scripsit ad magistrum ἀρχιτεκτόνων Mylattensium, ⁵⁶ sociorum amicorumque populi Romani, ut ex malis duobus, quos apud eos vidisset, uter maior esset eum mittendum curaret.

[12] Tum magister ἀρχιτεκτόνων⁵⁷ comperto quamobrem malum desideraret, non, uti iussus erat, maiorem, sed quem esse magis idoneum aptioremque faciendo arieti facilioremque portatu existimabat, minorem misit.

[13] Crassus eum vocari iussit et, cum interrogasset cur non quem iusserat misisset, causis rationibusque quas dictitabat spretis, vestimenta detrahi imperavit virgisque multum cecidit, corrumpi atque dissolvi officium omne imperantis ratus. si quis ad id quod facere iussus est non obsequio debito, sed consilio non desiderato respondeat.

XIV

Argument

Quid dixerit feceritque C. Fabricius, magna vir gloria magnisque rebus gestis, sed familiae pecuniaeque inops, cum ei Samnites tamquam indigent grave aurum donarent.

[1] IULIUS Hyginus, in libro De Vita Rebusque inlustrium Inlustrirm Virorum sexto, legatos dicit a Samnitibus ad C. Fabricium Fabriciuni, imperatorem imnperatorem populi Romani, venisse et memoratis multis magnisque rebus quae bene ac benivole post redditam pacem Samnitibus fecisset, obtulisse dono grandem pecuniam orasseque uti acciperet utereturque, atque id facere Samnites dixisse, quod viderent multa ad splendorem domus atque victus defieri neque pro amplitudine dignitateque lautum paratum esse.

[2] tum Turn Fabricium planas manus ab auribus ad oculos et infra deinceps ad nares et ad os et ad gulam atque inde porro ad ventrem imum deduxisse et legatis ita respondisse: dum illis omnibus membris quae attigisset obsistere atque imperare posset, numquam quicquam defuturum; propterea se pecuniam qua nihil sibi esset usus ab his quibus eam earn sciret usui esse non accipere.

XV

Argument

Quam inportunum vitium vitiimn plenumque odii sit futilis inanisque loquacitas, et quam multis in locis a principibus utriusque linguae viris detestatione iusta culpata sit.

[1] QUI sunt leves et futiles et importuni locutores quique nullo rerum pondere innixi verbis uvidis ⁵⁸ et lapsantibus diffluunt, eorum orationem bene existimatum est in ore nasci, non in pectore, linguam autem debere aiunt non esse liberam nec vagam, sed vinclis de pectore imo ac de corde aptis moveri rnoveri et quasi gubernari.

[2] Sed enim videas quosdam scatere verbis sine ullo iudicii negotio cum securitate multa et profunda, ut loquentes plerumque videantur loqui sese nescire.

[3] Ulixen contra Homerus, virum sapienti facundia praeditum, vocem mittere ait non ex ore, sed ex pectore, quod ⁵⁹ scilicet non ad sonum magis habitumque habitunmque vocis quam ad sententiarum penitus conceptarum altitudinem pertineret, petulantiaeque verborum coercendae vallum esse oppositum dentium luculente dixit, ut loquendi temeritas non cordis tantum custodia atque vigilia cohibeatur, sed et quibusdam quasi excubiis in ore positis saepiatur. Homerica,

[4] de quibus supra dixi, haec sunt:

Ἀλλʼ ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἵη,

et:

Ποῖόν σε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων.

[5] M. Tullii quoque verba posui, quibus stultam et inanem dicendi copiam graviter et vere detestatus est:

[6] Dummodo, inquit, hoc constet, neque infantiam eius, qui rem norit, sed eam explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cui res non subpetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam; quorum si alterum sit optandum, malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultam loquacitatem.⁶⁰

[7] Item in libro De Oratore primo verba haec posuit: Quid enim est tam furiosum quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia nec scientia?

[8] Cumprimis autem M. Cato atrocissimus huiusce vitii insectator est.

[9] Namque in oratione, quae inscripta est Si se Caelius tribunus plebis appellasset, Numquam, inquit, tacet, quem quern morbus tenet loquendi tamquam veternosum bibendi atque dormiendi. Quod si non conveniatis, cum convocari iubet, ita cupidus orationis conducat, qui auscultet. Itaque auditis, non auscultatis, tamquam pharmacopolam. Nam eius verba audiuntur, verum se ei ⁶¹ nemo committit, si aeger est.

[10] Idem Cato in eadem oratione eidem M. Caelio tribuno plebi vilitatem obprobrans non loquendi tantum, verum etiam tacendi: Frusto, inquit, panis conduci potest, vel uti taceat vel uti loquatur.

[11] Neque non merito Homerus unum ex omnibus Thersitam ἀμετροεπῆ et ἀκριτόμυθον appellat verbaque illius multa et ἄκοσμα strepentium sine modo graculorum similia esse dicit. Quid enim est aliud ἐκολώα?

[12] Eupolidis quoque versus de id genus hominibus consignatissime factus est:

Λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν,

quod Sallustius noster imitari volens ⁶² sic scribit:

[13]

[14] Loquax, inquit, magis quam facundus. Quapropter Hesiodus, poetarum poetartum prudentissimus, linguam non vulgandam, sed recondendam esse dicit proinde ut thesaurum, eiusque esse in promendo gratiam plurimam, si modesta et parca et modulata sit:

Γλώσσης τοι θησαυρὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστος,

Φειδωλῆς πλείστη δὲ χαρις κατὰ μέτροι ἰούσης,

Epicharmium quoque illud non inscite se habet:

[15]

Οὐ λέγειν τύγʼ ἐσσὶ δεινός, ἀλλὰ σιγᾶν ἀδύνατος,

ex quo hoc profecto sumptum est:

[16] Qui cum loqui non posset, tacere non potuit.

[17] Favorinum ego audivi dicere versus istos Euripidi:

Ἀχαλίνων στομάτων

Ἀνόμου τʼ ἀφροσύνας

Τὸ τέλος δυστυχία,

non de his tantum factos accipi debere, qui impia aut inlicita dicerent, sed vel maxime de hominibus quoque posse dici stulta et inmodica blaterantibus, quorum lingua tam prodiga infrenisque sit, ut fluat semper et aestuet conluvione verborum taeterrima, quod genus homines a Graecis significantissimo vocabulo κατάγλωσσοι appellantur.

[18] Valerium Probum, grammaticum inlustrem, ex familiari eius, docto viro, comperi, Sallustianum illud, satis eloquentiae, sapientiae parum, brevi antequam vita decederet, sic legere coepisse et sic a Sallustio relictum affirmavisse: satis loquentiae, sapientiae parum, quod loquentia novatori verborum Sallustio maxime congrueret, eloquentia cum insipientia minime conveniret.

[19] Huiuscemodi autem loquacitatem verborumque turbam magnitudine inani vastam facetissimus poeta Aristophanes insignibus vocabulis denotavit in his versibus:

Ἄνθρωπον ἀγριοποιόν, αὐθαδόστομον,

Ἔχοντʼ ἀχάλινον, ἀκρατές, ἀπύλωτον στόμα,

Ἀπεριλάλητον, κομποφακελορρήμονα,

[20] neque minus insigniter veteres quoque nostri hoc genus homines in verba proiectos locutuleios et blaterones et linguaces dixerunt

XVI

Argument

Quod verba istaec Quadrigari ex Annali tertio, ibi mille hominum occiditur, non licenter neque de poetarum figura, sed ratione certa et proba grammaticae disciplinae dicta sunt.

[1] QUADRIGARIUS in tertio Annalium ita scripsit: Ibi occiditur mille hominum. Occiditur, inquit, non occiduntur.

[2] Item Lucilius in tertio satirarum Satirarm:

Ad portam mille a porta est, sex inde Salernum,

mille, inquit, est, non mille sunt.

[3] Varro in XVII. Humanarum: Ad Romuli initium plus mille et centum annorum est.

[4] M. Cato in primo Originum: Inde est ferme mille passum.

[5] M. Cicero in sexta in Antonium: Itane Ianus lanus medius in L. Antonii clientela est? Quis umquam in illo Iano inventus est, qui L. Antonio mille nummum ferret expensum?

[6] In his atque in multis aliis mille numero singulari dictum est;

[7] neque hoc, ut quidam putant, vetustati concessum est aut per figurarum concinnitatem admissum est, scd sed sic videtur ratio poscere. Mille enim non pro eo ponitur,

[8] quod Graece χίλιοι dicitur, sed quod χιλιάς et sicuti una χιλιὰς et duae χιλιάδες, ita unum mille et duo milia certa atque directa ratione dicitur.

[9] Quamobrem id quoque recte et probabiliter dici solitum mille denarium in area est et mille equitum in exercitu est.

[10] Lucilius autem, praeterquam supra posui, alio quoque in loco id manifestius demonstrat,

[11] nam in libro XV. ita dicit:

hunc Hune, milli passum qui vicerit atque duobus,

Campanus sonipes succussor nullus sequetur

Maiore in spatio ac diversus videbitur ire;

item libro nono:⁶³

[12]

Tu milli nummum potes uno quaerere centum;

[13] milli passum dixit pro mille passibus et uno milli nummum pro unis mille nummis aperteque ostendit mille et vocabulum esse et singulari numero dici eiusque plurativum esse milia et casum etiam capere ablativum.

[14] Neque ceteros casus requiri oportet, cum sint alia pleraque vocabula, quae in singulos tantum casus, quaedam etiam, quae in nullum inclinentur.

[15] Quapropter nihil iam dubium est, quin M. Cicero in oratione, quam scripsit pro Milone, ita scriptum reliquerit: Ante fundum Clodi, quo in fundo propter insanas illas substructiones facile mille hominum versabatur valentium, non versabantur, quod in libris minus accuratis scriptum est; alia enim ratione mille homines, alia ⁶⁴ mille hominum dicendum est.

XVII

Argument

Quanta cum animi aequitate toleraverit Socrates uxoris ingenium intractabile; atque inibi, quid M. Varro in quadam satura de officio mariti scripserit.

[1] XANTHIPPE, Socratis philosophi philosophy uxor, morosa admodum fuisse fertur et iurgiosa, irarumque et molestiarum muliebrium per diem perque noctem scatebat.

[2] Has eius intemperies in maritum Alcibiades demiratus, interrogavit Socraten quaenam ratio esset cur mulierem tam acerbam domo non exigeret.

[3] Quoniam, inquit Socrates, cum illam domi talem perpetior, insuesco et exerceor, ut ceterorum quoque foris petulantiam et iniuriam facilius feram.

[4] Secundum hanc sententiam quoque Varro in Satura Menippea, quam De Officio Mariti inscripsit: ⁶⁵ Vitium, inquit, uxoris aut tollendum aut ferendum est. Qui tollit vitium, uxorem commodiorem praestat, qui fert, sese meliorem facit.

[5] Haec verba Varronis tollere et ferre lepide quidem composita sunt, sed tollere apparet dictum pro corrigere.

[6] Id etiam apparet, eiusmodi vitium uxoris, si corrigi non possit, ferendum esse Varronem censuisse, quod ferri scilicet a viro honeste potest; vitia enim flagitiis leviora sunt.

XVIII

Argument

Quod M. Varro in quarto decimo Humanarum L. Aelium magistrum suum in ⁶⁶ ἐτμολογίᾳ falsa reprehendit; quodque idem Varro in eodem libro falsum furis ἔτυμον dicit.

[1] IN XIV. Rerum Divinarum libro M. Varro doctissimum tunc civitatis hominem L. Aelium errasse ostendit, quod vocabulum Graecum vetus traductum in linguam Romanam, proinde atque si primitus Latine fictum esset, resolverit in voces Latinas ratione etymologica falsa.

[2] Verba ipsa super ea re Varronis posuimus: In quo L. Aelius noster, litteris ornatissimus memoria nostra, erravit aliquotiens. Nam aliquot verborum Graecorum antiquiorum, proinde atque essent propria nostra, reddidit causas falsas. Non leporem dicimus, ut ait, quod est levipes, sed quod est vocabulum anticum Graecum. Multa vetera illorum ignorantur, quod pro his aliis nunc vocabulis utuntur; et illorum esse plerique ignorent Graecum, quod nunc nominant Ἕλληνα, puteum, quod vocant φρέαρ leporem, quod λαγωὸν dicunt. In quo non modo Aelii ingenium non reprehendo, sed industriam laudo; successum enim fert ⁶⁷ fortuna, experientiam laus sequitur.

[3] Haec Iaec Varro in primore libro scripsit, de ratione vocabulorum scitissime scitissirne, de usu utriusque linguae peritissime, de ipso Aelio clementissime.

[4] Sed in posteriore eiusdem libri parte furem dicit ex eo dictum, quod veteres Romani furuum furvurm atrum appellaverint appellavcrint et fures per noctem, quae atra sit, facilius furentur.

[5] Nonne sic videtur Varro de fure, ⁶⁸ tamquam Aelius de lepore? Nam quod a Graecis nunc κλέπτης dicitur, antiquiore Graeca lingua φὼρ dictum est. Hinc per adfinitatem litterarum, qui φὼρ Graece, est Latine fur.

[6] Sed ea res fugeritne tunc Varronis memoriam memioriamr , an contra aptius et cohaerentius colaerentius putarit, furem a furvo, id est nigro, ⁶⁹ appellari, in hac re de viro tam excellentis doctrinae non meum iudicium est.

XIX

Argument

Historia super libris Sibyllinis ac de Tarquinio Superbo rege.

[1] IN antiquis annalibus memoria super libris Sibyllinis haec prodita est:

[2] Anus hospita atque incognita ad Tarquinium Superbum regem adiit, novem novein libros ferens, quos esse divina diceebat divina oracula: eos velle venundare.

[3] Tarquinius pretium percontatus est.

[4] Mulier nimium atque inmensum poposcit; rex, quasi anus aetate desiperet, derisit.

[5] tum Turn illa foculum coram cum igni apponit, tris libros ex novem deurit et ecquid reliquos sex eodem pretio emere vellet regem interrogavit.

[6] Sed enim Tarquinius id multo risit magis dixitque anum iam procul dubio delirare.

[7] Mulier ibidem statim tris alios libros exussit atque id ipsum denuo placide rogat, ut tris reliquos eodem modern illo pretio emat.

[8] Tarquinius ore iam serio atque attentiore animo fit, eam earn constantiam confidentiamque non insuper habendam intellegit, libros tris reliquos mercatur nihilo minore pretio quam quod erat petitum pro omnibus.

[9] Sed eam earn mulierem tunc a Tarquinio digressam postea nusquam loci visam constitit.

[10] Libri tres, in sacrarium conditi, Sibyllini appellati;

[11] ad eos quasi ad oraculum quindecimuiri quindeciimviri adeunt, cum di immortales publice public consulendi sunt.

XX

Argument

Quid geometrae dicant ἐπίπεδον, quid στερεόν, quid κύβον quid γραμμήν; quibusque ista omnia Latinis vocabulis appellentur.

[1] FIGURARUM quae σχήματα geometrae appellant, genera sunt duo, planum et solidum.

[2] Haec ipsi vocant ἐπίπεδον καὶ στερεόν. Planum est quod in duas partis solum lineas habet, qua latum est et qua longum; qualia sunt triquetra et quadrata, quae in area fiunt, sine altitudine.

[3] Solidum est quando non longitudines modo et latitudines planas plans numeri linearum efficiunt, sed etiam extollunt altitudines, quales sunt ferme metae triangulae quas pyramidas appellant, vel qualia sunt quadrata undique, quae, κύβους illi, nos quadrantalia dicimus.

[4] Κύβος enim est figura ex omni latere quadrate, quales sunt, inquit M. Varro, tesserae quibus in alveolo luditur,

[5] ex quo ipsae quoque appellatae κύβοι In numeris etiam similiter κύβος dicitur, cum omne latus eiusdem numeri aequabiliter in sese solvitur, sicuti fit cum ter terna ducuntur atque ipse numerus terplicatur.

[6] Huius numeri cubum Pythagoras vim habere lunaris circuli dixit, quod et luna orbem suum lustret septem et viginti diebus et numerus ternio, ⁷⁰ qui τριὰς Graece dicitur, tantundem tatutndem efficiat in cubo.

[7] Linea autem a nostris dicitur, quam γραμμὴν Graeci nominant.

[8] Eam ⁷¹ M. Varro ita definit: Linea est, inquit, longitudo quaedam sine latitudine et altitudine.

[9] Εὐκλείδης autem brevius, praetermissa altitudine: γραμμὴ, inquit, est μῆκος ἀπλατές, quod exprimere uno Latino verbo non queas, nisi audeas dicere inlatabile.

XXI

Argument

Quod Iulius Hyginus affirmatissime contendit, legisse se librum P. Vergilii domesticum, ubi ⁷² scriptum esset et ora Tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror, non quod vulgus legeret sensu torquebit amaro.

[1] VERSUS istos ex Georgicis Vergilii plerique omnes sic legunt:

At sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora

Tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro.

[2] Hyginus autem, non hercle ignobilis grammaticus, in Coninmientariis commentariis quae in Vergilium fecit, confirmat et perseverat, non hoc a Vergilio relictum, sed quod ipse invenerit in libro qui fuerit ex domo atque ex familia Vergilii:

et ora

Tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror,

neque id soli Hygino,

[3] sed doctis quibusdam etiam viris complacitum, quoniam videtur absurde dici sapor sensu amaro torquet. Cum ipse, inquiunt, sapor sensus sit, non alium in semet ipso sensum habeat ac proinde sit quasi dicatur ‘sensus sensu amaro torquet.’

[4] Sed enim cum Favorino Hygini commentarium coommentarium legissem atque ei statim static displicita esset insolentia et insuavitas illius sensu torquebit amaro, risit et ⁷³ : Iovem lapidem,⁷⁴ inquit, quod sanctissimum iusiurandum habitum est, paratus ego iurare sum Vergilium hoc numquam scripsisse, sed Hyginum ego verum dicere arbitror.

[5] Non enim enin primus finxit hoc verbum Vergilius insolenter, sed in carminibus carnminibus Lucreti invento usus est, non ⁷⁵ aspernatus auctoritatem poetae ingenio et facundia praecellentis.

[6] Verba ex IV. Lucreti haec sunt:

dilutaque contra

Cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror.

[7] Non verba autem sola, sed versus prope totos et locos quoque Lucreti plurimos sectatum esse Vergilium videmus.

XXII

Argument

An qui causas defendit recte Latineque dicat superesse se⁷⁶ is ⁷⁷ quos ⁷⁸ defendit; et superesse proprie quid sit.

[1] INROBORAVIT inveteravitque falsa atque aliena verbi significatio, quod dicitur hic illi superest, cum dicendum est advocatum esse quem cuipiam causamque eius defendere.

[2] Atque id dicitur non in compitis coinpitis tantum neque in plebe vulgaria, sed in foro, in comitio, apud tribunalia.

[3] Qui integre autem locuti sunt magnam nagnam partem superesse ita dixerunt, ut eo verbo significarent superfluere et supervacare atque esse supra necessarium modum.

[4] Itaque M. Varro, in satura quae inscripta est Nescis Quid Vesper Vehat, superfuisse dicit immodice et intempestive fuisse.

[5] Verba ex eo libro haec sunt: In convivio legi nec omnia debent et ea potissimum, quae simul sint βιωφελῆ et delectent, potius ut id quoque videatur non defuisse quam superfuisse.⁷⁹

[6] Memini ego praetoris, docti hominis, tribunali me forte assistere atque ibi advocatum non incelebrem sic postulare, ut extra causam diceret remque quae agebatur non attingeret. Tunc praetorem ei cuia res erat dixisse advocatum eum non habere, et cum is qui verba faciebat reclamasset ego illi V. C. supersum, respondisse praetorem festiviter tu plane superes, non ades.

[7] M. autem Cicero, in libro qui inscriptus est De iure lure Civili in Artem Redigendo, verba haec posuit: Nec vero scientia iuris maioribus suis Q. Aelius Tubero defuit, doctrina etiam superfuit. In quo loco superfuit significare videtur supra fuit et praestitit superavitque maiores suos doctrina sua, superfluenti tamen et nimis abundanti, disciplinas enim Tubero stoicas et dialecticas percalluerat

[8] . In libro quoque De Republica secundo id ipsum verbum Cicero ponit non temere transeundum. Verba ex eo libro haec sunt: Non gravarer, Laeli, nisi et hos velle putarem et ipse cuperem te quoque aliquam partem huius nostri sermonis attingere, praesertim cum heri ipse dixeris te nobis etiam superfuturum. Verum id quidem fieri non potest; ne desis omnes te rogamus.

[9] Exquisite igitur et comperte Iulius Paulus dicebat, homo in nostra memoria doctissimus, superesse non simplici ratione dici tam Latine quam Graece; Graecos enim περισσὸν in utramque partem parteni ponere, vel quod supervacaneum esset ac non necessarium,

[10] vel quod abundans nimis et afluens et exuberans ⁸⁰ ; sic nostros quoque veteres superesse alias dixisse pro superfluenti et vacivo neque admodum necessario, ita ut supra posuimus Varronem dicere, alias ita ut Cicero dixit, pro eo quod copia quidem et facultate ceteris anteiret, super modum tamen et largius prolixiusque flueret quam esset satis.

[11] Qui dicit ergo superesse se ei quem defendit, nihil istorum vult dicere sed nescio quid 12 aliud indictum inscitumque dicit licit

[12] ac ne Vergilii quidem poterit auctoritate uti, qui in Georgicis ita scripsit·

Primus ego in patriam mecum, modo vita supersit

Hoc enim in loco Vergilius ἀκυρότερον eo verbo usus videtur, quod supersit dixit pro longinquius diutiusque adsit,

[13] illudque contra eiusdem Vergili aliquanto est probabilius:

Florentisque secant herbas fluviosque ministrant

Farraque, ne blando nequeat superesse labori;

significat enim supra laborem esse neque opprimi a labore.

[14] An autem superesse dixerint veteres pro restare et perficiendae rei deesse, quaerebamus. Nam Sallustius in significatione ista non superesse,

[15] sed superare dicit. Verba eius in Iugurtha haec sunt: Is ⁸¹ plerumque seorsum a rege exercitum ductare et omnis res exequi solitus erat, quae Iugurthae fesso aut maioribus astricto superaverant.

[16] Sed invenimus in tertio Enni Annalium in hoc versu:

Inde sibi memorat unum super esse laborem,

id est relicum esse et restare, quod, quia id est, divise pronuntiandum est, ut non una pars orationis esse videatur, sed duae.

[17] Cicero autem in secunda Antonianarum,⁸² quod est relicum, non superesse, sed restare dicit.

[18] Praeter haec superesse invenimus dictum pro superstitem esse.

[19] Ita enim scriptum est in libro epistularum M. Ciceronis ad L. Plancum, et in epistula M. Asini Pollionis ad Ciceronem, verbis his: Nam neque deesse reipublicae volo neque superesse, per quod significant, si respublica emoriatur et pereat, nolle se vivere.

[20] In Plauti autem Asinaria manifestius id ipsum scriptum scrituin est in his versibus, qui sunt eius comoediae conoediae primi prinii:

Sicút tuum vis únicum gnatúm tuae

Superésse vitae sóspitem et supérstitem.

[21] Cavenda igitur est non inproprietas imnproprietas sola verbi, sed etiam pravitas ominis, ⁸³ si quis senior advocatus adulescenti superesse se dicat.

XXIII

Argument

Quis fuerit Papirius Praetextatus; quae istius causa cognomenti sit; historiaque ista omnis super eodem Papirio cognitu iucunda.

[1] HISTORIA de Papirio Praetextato dicta scriptaque est a M. Catone in oratione qua usus est Ad Milites contra Galbam, cum multa quidem venustate atque luce atque munditia verborum.

[2] Ea Catonis verba huic prorsus commentario indidissem, si libri copia fuisset id temporis, cum haec dictavi.

[3] Quod si non virtutes dignitatesque verborum, sed rem ipsam scire quaeris, res ferme ad hunc modum est:

[4] Mos antea senatoribus Romae fuit in curiam cum praetextatis filiis introire.

[5] Tum, cum in senatu res maior quaepiam consultata eaque in diem posterum prolata est placuitque ut eam earn rem super qua tractavissent ne quis enuntiaret priusquam decreta esset, mater Papirii pueri, qui cum cuim parente suo in curia fuerat, percontata est filium quidnam in senatu patres egissent.

[6] Puer respondit tacendum esse neque id dici licere.

[7] Mulier fit audiendi cupidior; secretum rei et silentium pueri animum eius ad inquirendum everberat; quaerit igitur compressius violentiusque.

[8] tum Turn puer, matre urgente, lepidi atque festivi mendacii consilium capit. Actum in senatu dixit, utrum videretur utilius exque republica esse unusne ut duas uxores haberet, an ut una apud duos nupta esset.

[9] Hoc illa ubi audivit, animus compavescit,

[10] domo trepidans egreditur, ad ceteras matronas perfert. Venit ⁸⁴ ad senatum postridie matrum familias caterva. Lacrimantes atque obsecrantes orant una potius ut duobus nupta fieret quam ut uni duae.

[11] Senatores, ingredientes in curiam, quae illa mulierum intemperies et quid sibi postulatio istaec vellet, mirabantur.

[12] Puer Papirius in medium curiae progressus, quid mater audire institisset, quid ipse matri dixisset, rem, sicut fuerat, denarrat.

[13] Senatus fidem atque ingenium pueri exosculatur, consultum facit uti posthac pueri cum patribus in curiam ne introeant, praeter ille unus Papirius, atque puero postea cognomentum honoris gratia inditum Praetextatus ob tacendi loquendique in aetate praetextae prudentiam.

XXIV

Argument

Tria epigrammata trium veterum poetarum, Naevii, Plauti, Pacuvii, quae facta ab ipsis sepulcris eorum incisa sunt.

[1] TRIUM poetarum inlustrium epigrammata, Cn. Naevii, Plauti, M. Pacuvii, quae ipsi fecerunt et incidenda sepulcro suo reliquerunt, nobilitatis eorum gratia et venustatis scribenda in his commentariis esse duxi.

[2] Epigramma Naevi plenum superbiae Campanae, quod testimonium esse iustum potuisset, nisi ab ipso dictum esset:

Inmórtalés mortáles si forét fas flére,

Flerént divaé Caménae Naéviúm poétam.

Itáque póstquam est Ó Orcho rcho⁸⁵ tráditús thesaúro,

Oblíti súnt Romaé loquiér linguá Latína. ⁸⁶

[3] Epigramma Plauti, quod dubitassemus an Plauti foret, nisi a M. Varrone positum esset in libro De Poetis primo:

Postquam est mortem aptus Plautus, Comoedia luget,

Scaena est deserta, dein Risus, Ludus Iocusque

Et Numeri innumeri simul omnes conlacrimarunt.

[4] Epigramma Pacuvii verecundissimum et purissimum dignumque eius elegantissima gravitate:

Adulescens, tametsi ⁸⁷ próperas, hoc te saxúlum ⁸⁸ rogat,

Ut sése aspicias, deínde quod scriptum ést legas.

Hic súnt poetae Pácuvi ⁸⁹ Marcí sita

Ossa. Hóc volebam néscius ne essés. Vale.

XXV

Argument

Quibus verbis M. Varro indutias definierit; quaesitumque inibi curiosius cnriosius, quaenam ratio sit vocabuli indutiarum.

[1] DUOBUS modis M. Varro in libro Humanarum, qui est De Bello et Pace, indutiae quid sint, definit. Indutiae sunt, inquit, pax castrensis paucorum dierum;

[2] item alio in loco, indutiae sunt, inquit, belli feriae.

[3] Sed lepidae magis atque iucundae brevitatis utraque definitio quam plana aut proba esse videtur.

[4] Nam neque pax est indutiae— bellum enim manet, pugna cessat—neque in solis castris neque paucorum tantum dierum indutiae sunt.

[5] Quid enim dicemus, si indutiis mensum aliquot factis in oppida castris concedatur? Nonne tum quoque indutiae sunt?

[6] Aut rursus quid esse id dicemus quod in primo Annalium Quadrigarii scriptum est, C. Pontium Samnitem a dictatore Romano sex horarum indutias postulasse, si indutiae paucorum tantum dierum appellandae sunt?

[7] Belli autem ferias festive magis dixit quam aperte atque definite.

[8] Graeci autem significantius consignatiusque cessationem istam pugnae pacticiam ἐκεχειρίαν dixerunt, exempta littera una sonitus vastioris et subdita ⁹⁰ lenioris.

[9] Nam quod eo tempore non pugnetur et manus cohibeantur, ἐκεχειρίαν appellarunt.

[10] Sed profecto non id fuit Varroni negotium, ut indutias superstitiose definiret et legibus rationibusque omnibus definitionum inserviret.

[11] Satis enim visum vistum est, eiusmodi facere demonstrationemn, quod genus Graeci τύπους magis et ὑπογραφὰς quam ὁρισμοὺς vocant.

[12] Indutiarum autem vocabulum qua sit ratione factum, iam diu est, cum quaerimus.

[13] Sed ex multis, quae vel audimus vel legimus, probabilius id, quod dicam, videtur.

[14] Indutias sic dictas arbitramur arbitramu, quasi tu dicas inde uti iam.

[15] Pactum indutiarum eiusmodi est, ut in diem certum non pugnetur nihilque iihilque incommodetur, sed ex eo die postea uti iam omnia belli iure agantur.

[16] Quod igitur ⁹¹ dies certus praefinitur pactumque fit, ut ante eum diem ne pugnetur atque is dies ubi venit ⁹² inde uti iam pugnetur, idcirco ex his quibus dixi vocibus, quasi per quendam coitum et copulam nomen indutiarum conexum conexuni est.

[17] Aurelius autem Opilius in primo librorum, quos Musarum inscripsit, indutiae, inquit, dicuntur, cum hostes inter sese utrimque utroque alteri ad alteros impune et sine pugna ineunt; inde adeo inquit nomen factum videtur, quasi initiae, ⁹³ hoc est initus atque introitus.

[18] Hoc ab Aurelio scriptum propterea non praeterii, ne cui harum Noctium aemulo eo tantum nomine elegantius id videretur, tamquam id nos originem verbi requirentes fugisset.

XXVI

Argument

Quem in modum mihi Taurus philosophus responderit percontanti an sapiens irasceretur.

[1] INTERROGAVI in diatriba Taurum, an sapiens irasceretur.

[2] Dabat enim saepe post cotidianas lectiones quaerendi quod quis vellet potestatem.

[3] Is cum graviter, copiose de morbo affectuve irae disseruisset, quae et in veterum libris et in ipsius commentariis exposita sunt, convertit ad me, qui interrogaveram, et haec ego, inquit, super irascendo sentio;

[4] sed, quid et Plutarchus noster, vir doctissimus ac prudentissimus, senserit, non ab re est ut id quoque audias.

[5] Plutarchus, inquit, servo suo, nequam homini et contumaci, sed libris disputationibusque philosophiae aures inbutas inbuftas habenti, tunicam detrahi detrahli ob nescio quod delictum caedique eum loro iussit.

[6] Coeperat verberari et obloquebatur obloquebatum non meruisse ut vapulet, ⁹⁴ nihil mali, nihil sceleris admisisse. Postremo vociferari inter vapulandum incipit,

[7] neque iam querimonias aut gemitus eiulatusque facere, ⁹⁵ sed verba seria et obiurgatoria: non ita esse Plutarchum, ut philosophum deceret; irasci turpe esse: saepe eum de malo irae dissertavisse, librum quoque Περὶ Ἀοργησίας pulcherrimum conscripsisse; his omnibus quae in eo libro scripta sint nequaquam convenire, quod provolutus effususque efususque in iram plurimis se plagis multaret.

[8] tum Turn Plutarchus lente et leniter quid autem, inquit, verbero, nunc ego tibi irasci videor? Ex vultune meo an ex voce an ex colore an etiam ex verbis correptum esse me ira intellegis? Mihi quidem neque oculi, opinor, truces sunt neque os turbidum neque inmaniter clamo neque in spumam ruborenve effervesco neque pudenda dico aut paenitenda neque omnino trepido ira et gestio.

[9] Haec enim omnia, si ignoras, signa esse irarum solent. Et simul ad eum qui caedebat conversus, interim, inquit, dum ego atque hic disputamus, tu hoc age.

[10] Summa autem totius sententiae Tauri haec fuit: Non idem esse existimavit ἀοργησίαν et ἀναλγησίαν aliudque esse non iracundum animum, aliud ἀνάλγητον et ἀναίσθητον, id est hebetem et stupentem.

[11] Nam sicut aliorum omnium, quos Latini philosophi affectus vel affectiones, Graeci πάθη appellant, ita huius quoque motus animi, qui cum est ulciscendi causa saevior ira dicitur, non privationem esse utilem censuit, quam Graeci στέρησιν dicunt, sed mediocritatem, quam μετριότητα illi appellant.

Notes on the current edition

Attic Nights

1. This work, probably entitled bi/os )Hrakle/ous, has not survived.

2. According to Apollodorus, II. iv. 9, Hercules was 4 cubits in height; according to Herodorus, 4 cubits and one foot; see J. Tzetzes, Chilides, ii. 210. The phrase ex pede Herculem has become proverbial, along with ex ungue leonem and ab uno disce ones (Virg. Aen. ii. 65 f.).

3. Clarisximus became a standing title of men of high rank, especially of the senatorial order.

4. Cf. Plin. Epist. ii. xvii. 15, vinea . . . ndis etiam pedibus mollis et cedens.

5. Where there are three propositions, any two of which are at variance with the third, they may be taken in pairs as true, rejecting the third as false. This is called the

master

argument, from kurieu/w,

to be master over

; see Epictetus, ii. 18 and 19. The fallacy is due to the fact that all persons do not hold to the truth of the same pair, and it is impossible to maintain all three propositions at once. The

sorites

raised the question, if one grain at a time were taken from a heap, when it would cease to be a heap; and conversely, if one grain at a time were added, when it would become a heap; see Cic. Acad. ii. 49. A variant, called the falakro/s, inquired whether a man was bald after the loss of one hair, of two, or of how many. Horace, in Epist. ii. 1. 45–47, has combined both of these with the story told by Plutarch of Sertorius ( Sert. 16). The

silent,

resting

argument consisted in stopping and refusing to answer. It was used to meet the logical fallacy of the

sorites.

6. Actually the second book, ii. 19.

7. Ei)pe/ . . . is the request of the pseudo-philosopher, )/Akoue the answer of Epictetus, who quotes a line of Homer ( Odyss. ix. 39) which is here meaningless, implying that the pretended Stoics quote both poetry and ethics glibly, but without understanding.

8. Some assign this speech—

Of all existing things . . . pain

to Epictetus, quoting the pseudo-Stoic jargon; others to the pseudo-philosopher. The former seems to fit best with what follows.

9. The names of these are variously given. They generally include, in addition to Chilo: Cleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Periander of Corinth, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Thales of Miletus, and Solon of Athens. Plato, Protag. p. 343 A, gives Myson of Chen in place of Periander.

10. The sentence which follows translates the Greek literally, except that for to\ di/kaion

what is right,

we have in the Latin ius moremve,

law or precedent.

The Romans laid great stress on the mos maiorum, the precedent set by their forefathers.

11. De Amicitia, 61.

12. Translation by Falconer, L. C. L.

13. De Amicitia, 36; Gellius does not quote verbally from Cicero.

14. 952 Marx, who cites for the proverb Plutarch, Cum princip. esse philos. 2, p. 777, c (C.A.F. iii, p. 495, K) and restores Lucilius' line as: hoc priusquan nasceretur Theognis omnes noveratt.

15. That is, so far as one can do so without violating the laws of the gods or breaking an oath which one has taken in the name of a god; cf. Cic. Off. iii. 44, quae salva fide facere possit.

16. Fr. 81, Wimmer.

17. Fr. 102, Marres.

18. Cicero, De Amicitia, 59, attributes this saying to Bias, another of the seven sages, as do also Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius and Valerius Maximus. It has appeared in various forms in later times.

19. vii, p. 19, Bern.

20. Lit.,

according to a rule or level.

21. §68.

22. The point of this passage depends on the meaning of referre grafiam,

requite

(

pay

a debt of gratitude), and habere gratiam,

feel gratitude.

I have followed to some extent the rendering of Watts ( L.C.L.), but with some changes.

23. That is, the prosecution of Plancius, which enabled Cicero to pay his debt by defending his friend.

24. Aeschines, in Tim. 131.

25. Cf.

Wer nicht liebt Wein, Weib und Sang, Der bleibt ein Narr sein Leben lang

, falsely attributed to Luther.

26. Metellus Numidicus was censor in 102 B.C. Livy (Periocha 59) attributes a speech on this subject to Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, censor in 131 B.C., which he says was read to the people by Augustus; cf. Suet. Aug. lxxxix. Since Suetonius, who gives the name simply as Q. Metellus, cites the speech under the title De Prole Augenda and the Periocha says that it was delivered ut co g e re nt omnes ducere uxores liberorum creandorum causa, it seems probable that it was not identical with this address of Metellus Numidicus.

27. Sibi is taken by some as referring to dii, but see Lane, Lat. Gr. 2343.

28. ii. 5. 167.

29. Cicero's favourite freedman, who not only aided him in his literary work, but also, after the orator's death, collected, arranged, and published his patron's writings, in particular his correspondence.

30. Bacch. 918.

31. Gracchus delivered two speeches against Popilius, one in the Forum at Rome ( pro rostris), the other circum conciliabula, in the market-places of various towns of Latium; see Meyer, O. R. F, 2 p. 239.

32. Fr. 43, Peter.

33. Fr. 79, Peter.

34. Fr. 59, Peter.

35. v. 691.

36. v. 51, Ribbeck. 3

37. Cellius' friend was partly right. Such forms as dicturum were derived from the second supine dictu + * erom (earlier * esom), the infinitive of sum. Later, the resulting form dicturum was looked upon as a participle and declined. In the early writers such infinitives did not change their form, and did not add the tautological esse.

38. § 33.

39. That is, for in potestate.

40. v. 180. Leo reads num número mi in mentém fruit

it hasn't just occurred to me, has it?

41. § 30.

42. The cadence _u_u was a favourite one with Cicero at the end of a sentence.

43. The Horn of Amantheia; see Greek Index.

44. Cf. Horace, Epist. i. 17. 36.

45. The drachma and the denarius (about 8 d. or 16 cents) was the average wage of a day-labourer.

46. I will not buy regret for ten thousand drachmas.

47. The science of dialling, concerned with the making and testing of sun-dials ( gnw/mones).

48. Chaldaei and mathematici were general terms for astrologers at Rome; see e.g. Suet. Dom. xiv. 1, xv. 3; Tib. lxix; etc.

49. Proverbial for

without preparation.

50. Ch. 30.

51. Ch. 6.

52. See Servius on Aen. viii. 612,

ercto non cito,

id est, hereditate non divisa; nam citus divisus siqnificat.

53. Evander, a Greek from Pallanteum in Arcadia, migrated to Italy and settled on the Palatine hill before the coming of Aeneas.

54. A work on grammar in two books, mentioned among the writings of Caesar by Suet. Jul. lvi. 5; Fronto, p. 221, Naber ( L.C.L. ii, pp. 29 and 255 ff.); described by Cic. Brut. 253 as de ratione Latine loquendi.

55. v. 70.

56. i. 17.

57. Iliad, iii. 8.

58. This is approved by Julius Caesar, Bell. Civ. iii. 92. 5.

59. De Orat. iii. 225.

60. The more usual expression for

amanuensis

is ( servus) a manu, but ad manum also occurs.

61. The marching of the cowards, because of their fear, would not be in time with the music.

62. Some comment on the quotation should follow. Hertz indicated a lacuna.

63. De Iure Pontificali, fr. 21, Huschke; 3, Bremer.

64. The Roman father had control over his children ( patria potestas) until he died, or lost his civic rights through some misconduct, or voluntarily

emancipated

them; for a striking example see Suet. Tib. xv. 2.

65. If a man was emancipated after having children born to him, the latter remained under the control of their grand-father (cf. Gains, i. 133) and were legally orphans, hence not patrima et matrimra; Pruner, Hestia- Vesta, p. 273, N. 1.

66. Cf. Cic. De Off. i. 150.

67. The X V viri sacris faciundis, who had charge of the Sibylline Books. Tarquin appointed IIviri sacris faciundis for the purpose (Livy, v. 13. 6), but by the Licinian laws of 367 B.C. the number was increased to ten, five patricians and five plebeians. The Fifteen are first mentioned by Cicero ( Epist. viii. 4. 1) in 51 B.C. They were ex-praetors or ex-consuls until a late period, and the priesthood continued to exist until the books were burned by Stilicho in the fourth century.

68. At the tubilustrium, on March 23, the trumpets used in sacred rites were purified by the tibicines sacrorum populi Romani; at the same time the Salii had their third procession in honour of Mars and Nerio; cf. Festus, 482. 27, Lindsay.

69. De lure Pontificali, fr. 11, Huschke; 7, Bremer.

70. The date of this law is unknown; it is not identical with the lex Papia-Poppaea of 250 B.C.

71. The comitia calata; see xv. 27. l. ff.

72. Fr. 4, Huschke; 1, Bremer.

73. Fr. 2, Peter.

74. The title of the oration is variously given as Contra Servium Galbam and Pro Direptis Lusitanis; perhaps the two titles were combined in one. See Jordan's Cato, p. 27.

75. Fr. 24, Huschke; 2, Bremer. The comment quoted by Gellius is on Twelve Tables V. 1.

76. Various other reasons have been given, of which perhaps the most attractive is that it is from an original a)dama/ta, inwedded. According to Pruner, Hestia-Vesta, p. 276, followed by Rossbach in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v., amata is not a proper name, but means

beloved.

77. Titus Manlius Torquatus had his own son executed for disobedience to his father's command; see ix. 13. 29. A similar story is told of Postumius; see xvii. 21. 17; cf. Otto, Sprichw. p. 209.

78. Fr. 8, Peter.

79. In the year of his consulship (131 B.C.) he was sent with an army against Aristonicus, who laid claim to the kingdom of Pergamum, which Attalus III had bequeathed to the Romans.

80. The text seems hopelessly corrupt. We perhaps have a fusion of e)pa/rxwn a)rxitekto/nwn (Dittenberger 3, 804. 5) and its equivalent magister( == praefectus) fabrumt. With a)rxite/ktona (Hertz), the meaning would be

'builder.

With matgistrumn (Hosius),

the chief magistrate,

or perhaps

a ship-captain

(sc. navis). For the town, Bergk proposed Mytilene; Hosius, Myrina. The MSS. suggest Mylasa (Mylassa, Mylatta).

81. Fr. 3, Peter.

82. Iliad, iii. 221.

83. Iliad, iv. 350, etc.

84. De Orat. iii. 142.

85. i. 51.

86. See Jordan's Cato, xl. 1. The meaning of the title, which is uncertain, is discussed in his Prolegomena, p. lxix f. Se refers to Cato himself. By some the speech is regarded as identical with the one mentioned by Fronto, vol. i, p. 117, L.C.L., and by Plutarch, Cato ix. 7, vol. ii, p. 329, L. C.L.

87. xl. 2, Jordan.

88. Iliad ii. 212 246.

89. Iliad, ii 213.

90. Fr. 95, Koch.

91. Hist. iv. 43, Maur.

92. Works and Days, 719.

93. Fr. 272, Kaib.

94. Bacch. 386.

95. Cat. v. 4.

96. It is true that Sallust was fond of new words, but the best MSS. of Sallust are unanimous for eloquentiae. Besides this passage of Gellius, L. and S. cite loquentia only in Plin. Epist. v. 20. 5, Iulius Cordus . . . solet dicere aliud esse eloquentiam, aliud loquentiam.

97. Frogs, 837 ff., Rogers ( L. C. L.). The epithets are applied to Aeschylus!

98. Fr. 44, Peter.

99. v. 124, Marx, who has exinde for sex inde and supplies sumus, mus profecti.

100. xviii, fr. 2, Mirsch.

101. Fr. 26, Peter.

102. Phil. vi. 15.

103. The

middle Janus

was the seat of money-lenders and bankers. As a district it extended along the northern side of the Forum Romanum. The

Janus

itself was near the basilica Aemlia, perhaps at the entrance to the Argiletum.

104. 506 ff., Marx, who punctuates with a comma after succussor, with a slight change in the meaning, taking nullus seqetur in the sense of non sequetur. On the Campanian horses see Livy, viii.11.5 and xxvi.4.3, 6; Val. Max. ii.3.3.

105. 327, Marx.

106. §53.

107. Varro's Menippean Satires, in 150 books, based to some extent on the Speudoge/loion of Menippus, a Cynic philosopher of the third century B.C., treated in a mixture of prose and verse a great variety of moral and serious topics in a playful and sometimes jocose manner. For other titles see Index under (M.) Terentius Varro, and for the fragments, Bücheler's Petronius, 3d. ed., Berlin, 1882, pp. 161 ff.

108. Fr 83, Bücheler.

109. For a similar play on two meanings of tollere, cf. Suet. Aug. xii.

110. Fr. 99, Agahd. In the lemma, or chapter heading, Varro's statement is wrongly reffered to the Antiquities of Man, the other division of his great work Antiquitatum Libri XLI, treating the political and religious institutions of the Romans. Only scanty fragments have survived.

111. Fr. 99, Agahd. In the lemma, or chapter heading, Varro's statement is wrongly referred to the Antiquities of Man, the other division of his great work Antiquitatum Libri XLI, treating the political and religious institutions of the Romans. Only scanty fragments have survived.

112. In the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. Augustus transferred them to the temple of Apollo on the Palatine; see Suet. Aug. xxxi. 1.

113. Because the old woman was regarded as a Sibyl. Although the books came to Tarquin by way of Cumae, the origin of the Sibylline books was probably Asia Minor. There were several Sibyls (Varro enumerates ten), of whom the Erythraean, from whom the books apparently came, was the most important; see Marquardt, Stautsverew. 1112. 350 ff.

114. See note 4, page 61.

115. See Euclid, Elementa I, Definitions, 20, cubs autem est aequaliter aequalis aequaliter, sive qui tribus aequalibus numeris comprehenditur.

116. Fr. p. 350, Bipont.

117. Euclid, l. c., 17, "ubi autem tres numeri inter se multiplicantes numerum aliquem efficiunt, numerus inde ortus soliduss" (= ku/bos) est, latera autem eius numeri inter se multiplicantes.

118. That is, is an equal factor in the cube number.

119. Fr. p. 337, Bipont.

120. l.c. 2, grammh\ de\ mh=kos a)plate/s.

121. ii. 246 f.

122. But the taste will tell its tale full plainly, and with its bitter flavour will distort the testers' poured mouths.

123. Fr. 4, p. 528, Fun.

124. But the bitterness of the sensation will distort the testers' soured mouths.

125. This much discussed oath is best taken as equivalent to per lovem et lapidem; see Fowler, Roman Festivals, p. 231; Nettleship, Essays, p. 35, and others. The locus classicus on the process is Polybius, iii. 25; of. Plutarch, Sulla, 10.

126. iv. 221 f.

127. When we look on at the mixing of a decoction of wormwood in our presence, its bitterness affects us.

128. Fr. 340, Bücheler.

129. It is difficult to reproduce the word-play on superesse,

be present for

and

be superfluous.

There is a pun also on adesse,

be present

and

help, assist.

130. Fr. 2, p. 980, Orelli 2; Fr. 1, Huschke, and Bremer.

131. It was superfluous in being more than he needed for the practice of his profession.

132. An error of Gellius; the reference is iii. 32.

133. iii. 10.

134. iii. 126.

135. lxx. 2.

136. v. 158, Vahlen 2.

137. Phil. ii. 71, cum praescrtim belli pars tanta restaret.

138. The tenth book of the Epist. ad Fam. contains numerous letters of Cicero to Plancus and of Plancus to Cicero.

139. Ad Fam. x. 33.5. It should be Gaius Asinius Pollio.

140. v. 16.

141. xxxix, Jordan.

142. The toga praetexta, with a purple border, was worn by senators and also by boys of free birth until they assumed the toga virlis.

143. This has been regarded as evidence that Naevius was a native of Campania; but Campanian arrogance was proverbial.

144. The authorship of all these epitaphs is questioned: Gudeman thought they came from Varro's Imagines; see Trans. Amer Phil. Assoc. xxv, 150 ff.; cf p. 296. 3, Bährens.

145. The Latin equivalent of the Greek Muses.

146. p. 296. 4, Bährens.

147. Numeri innumeri was formerly rendered

unrhythmic measures

and applied to Plautus' supposed irregularities in scansion; it rather refers to the variety of his metres.

148. The metre of the Latin is dactylic hexameter; final a in deserta is lengthened, and s in ludus is suppressed.

149. p. 296, 5, Bährens.

150. xxii, fr. 1, 2, Mirsch.

151. Fr. 21, Peter.

152. That is, e)kexeiri/a instead of an original e)xexeiri/a, from e)/xw and xei/r, the first x, an aspirate, being reduced to the smooth mute k, since in Greek an aspirate may not begin two successive syllables.

153. The correct derivation seems to be from *in-du-tus (cf. duellum for bellum),

not in a state of war.

154. p. 88, Fun.

155. This derivation is clearer from the older form induitiae; see the critical note.

156. On Freedom from Anger; the work has not survived.