Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 28.42

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[1]

" externa et nimis antiqua repeto. Africa eadem ista et M. Atilius, insigne utriusque fortunae exemplum, nobis documento sint.

[2] ne tibi, P. Corneli, cum ex alto Africam conspexeris, ludus et iocus fuisse Hispaniae tuae videbuntur. quid¹ enim simile?

[3] pacato mari mar praeter ² oram Italiae Galliaeque vectus Emporias in urbem sociorum classem adpulisti; expositos milites per tutissima omnia ad socios et amicos populi Romani Tarraconem duxisti;

[4] ab Tarracone deinde iter per praesidia Romana; circa Hiberum exercitus patris patruique tui post amissos imperatores ferociores calamitate ipsa facti,

[5] et dux tumultuarius quidem ille L. Marcius et militari suffragio ad tempus lectus, ceterum, si nobilitas ac iusti honores adornarent, claris imperatoribus qualibet arte belli par; oppugnata per summum otium Carthago nullo trium Punicorum exercituum socios defendente;

[6] cetera—neque ea elevo—nullo tamen modo Africo bello comparanda, ubi non portus ullus classi nostrae apertus, non ager pacatus, non civitas socia, non rex amicus, non consistendi usquam locus, non ³ procedendi;

[7] quacumque circumspexeris, hostilia omnia atque infesta. "An Syphaci Numidisque credis? satis sit semel creditum; non semper temeritas est felix, et fraus fidem in parvis sibi praestruit, ut, cum operae pretium sit, cum mercede magna fallat.

[8] non hostes patrem patruumque tuum armis prius quam Celtiberi socii fraude circumvenerunt; nec tibi ipsi a Magone et Hasdrubale, hostium ducibus, quantum ab Indibili ⁴ et Mandonio in fidem acceptis periculi fuit.

[9] Numidis tu credere potes, defectionem militum tuorum expertus? et Syphax et Masinissa se quam Carthaginienses malunt potentis ⁵ in Africa esse, Carthaginienses quam quemquam alium.

[10] nunc illos aemulatio inter se ⁶ et omnes causae certaminum acuunt, quia procul externus metus est; ostende Romana arma et exercitum alienigenam; iam ⁷ velut ad commune restinguendum incendium concurrent.

[11] aliter eidem illi Carthaginienses Hispaniam defenderunt, aliter moenia patriae, templa deum, aras et focos defendent, cum euntes in proelium pavida prosequetur coniunx et parvi liberi occursabunt.

[12] " quid porro, si satis confisi Carthaginienses consensu Africae, fide sociorum regum, moenibus suis, cum tuo exercitusque tui praesidio nudatam Italiam viderint, ultro ipsi novum exercitum in Italiam aut ex Africa miserint,

[13] aut Magonem, quem a Baliaribus classe transmissa iam praeter oram Ligurum Alpinorum vectari constat, Hannibali se coniungere iusserint?

[14] nempe in eodem terrore erimus in quo nuper fuimus, cum Hasdrubal in Italiam transcendit, quem tu, qui non solum Carthaginem sed omnem Africam exercitu tuo es clausurus, e manibus tuis in Italiam emisisti.

[15] victum a te dices; eo quidem minus vellem—et id tua, non rei publicae solum causa— ⁸ iter datum victo in Italiam esse. patere nos omnia quae prospera tibi ac populi Romani imperio evenere tuo consilio adsignare, adversa casibus incertis belli et fortunae delegare: ⁹

[16] quo melior fortiorque es, eo magis talem praesidem sibi patria ¹⁰ atque universe Italia retinet. non potes ne ipse quidem dissimulare, ubi Hannibal sit, ibi caput atque arcem huius belli esse, quippe qui prae te feras eam earn tibi causam traiciendi in Africam ¹¹ esse ut Hannibalem eo trahas.

[17] sive hic igitur ¹² sive illic, cum Hannibale est tibi futura res.

utrum tandem ergo firmior eris in Africa solus an hic tuo conlegaeque tui ¹³ exercitu coniuncto? ne Claudius quidem et Livius consules tam recenti exemplo quantum id intersit documento sunt? quid ?

[18]

Hannibalem utrum tandem extremus angulus agri Bruttii, frustra iam diu poscentem ab domo auxilia, an propinqua Carthago et tota socia Africa potentiorem armis virisque faciet?

[19]

quod istud consilium est, ibi malle decernere ubi tuae dimidio minores copiae sint, hostium multo maiores, quam ubi duobus exercitibus adversus unum tot proeliis et tam diuturna ac gravi militia fessum pugnandum sit?

[20]

quam compar consilium tuum parentis tui consilio sit reputa. ille consul profectus in Hispaniam, ut Hannibali ab Alpibus descendenti occurreret, in ¹⁴ Italiam ex provincia rediit: tu, cum Hannibal in Italia sit, relinquere Italiam paras, non quia rei publicae id ¹⁵ utile, sed quia tibi ¹⁶ amplum et gloriosum censes esse,

[21]

sicut cum provincia et exercitu relicto sine lege, sine senatus consulto duabus navibus populi Romani imperator fortunam publicam et maiestatem imperii, quae tum in tuo capite periclitabantur, commisisti.

[22]

ego¹⁷ P. Cornelium rei publicae nobisque, non sibi ipsi privatim creatum consulem existimo, exercitusque ad custodiam urbis atque Italiae scriptos esse, non quos regio more per superbiam consules quo terrarum velint traiciant.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

Ab urbe condita (Latin) (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).)

Editions (2)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 28.42 focus

[1] externa et nimis antiqua repeto; Africa eadem ista et M. Atilius, insigne utriusque fortunae exemplum, nobis documento sint.

[2] ne tibi, P. Corneli, cum ex alto Africam conspexeris, ludus et iocus fuisse Hispaniae tuae videbuntur! uidebuntur. quid enim simile?

[3] pacato mari praeter oram Italiae Galliaeque vectus Emporias in urbem sociorum classem adpulisti; expositos milites per tutissima omnia ad socios et amicos populi Romani Tarraconem duxisti;

[4] ab Tarracone deinde iter per praesidia Romana; circa Hiberum exercitus patris patruique tui post amissos imperatores ferociores calamitate ipsa facti, et dux tumultuarius quidem ille L. Marcius et militari suffragio ad tempus lectus, ceterum, si nobilitas ac iusti honores adornarent, claris imperatoribus qualibet arte belli par;

[5] oppugnata per summum otium Carthago nullo trium Punicorum exercituum socios defendente;

[6] cetera, neque ea elevo, nullo tamen modo Africo bello comparanda, ubi non portus ullus classi nostrae apertus, non ager pacatus, non civitas socia, non rex amicus, non consistendi usquam locus, non procedendi;

[7] quacumque circumspexeris, hostilia omnia atque infesta. an Syphaci Numidisque credis? satis sit semel creditum: non semper temeritas est felix, et fraus fidem in parvis sibi praestruit, ut, cum operae pretium sit, cum mercede magna fallat.

[8] non hostes patrem patruumque tuum armis prius quam Celtiberi socii fraude circumvenerunt; nec tibi ipsi a Magone et Hasdrubale, hostium ducibus, quantum ab Indibili et Mandonio, in fidem acceptis, periculi fuit.

[9] Numidis tu credere potes, defectionem militum tuorum expertus? et Syphax et Masinissa se quam Carthaginienses malunt potentes in Africa esse, Carthaginienses quam quemquam alium.

[10] nunc illos aemulatio inter se et omnes causae certaminum acuunt, quia procul externus metus est; ostende Romana arma et exercitum alienigenam, iam velut ad commune restinguendum incendium concurrent.

[12] quid porro, si satis confisi Carthaginienses consensu Africae, fide sociorum regum, moenibus suis, cum tuo exercitusque tui praesidio nudatam Italiam viderint, ultro ipsi novum exercitum in Italiam aut ex Africa miserint,

[13] aut Magonem, quem a Baliaribus classe transmissa iam praeter oram Ligurum Alpinorum vectari constat, Hannibali se coniungere iusserint?

[14] nempe in eodem terrore erimus, in quo nuper fuimus, cum Hasdrubal in Italiam transcendit, quem tu, qui non solun solum Carthaginem sed omnem Africam exercitu tuo es clausurus, e manibus tuis in Italiam emisisti.

[15] victum a te dices: eo quidem minus vellem, et id tua, non rei publicae solum causa, iter datum victo in Italiam esse. patere nos omnia, quae prospera tibi ac populi Romani imperio evenere, tuo consilio adsignare, adversa casibus incertis belli et fortunae delegare:

[16] quo melior fortiorque es, eo magis talem praesidem sibi patria atque universa Italia retinet. non potes ne ipse quidem dissimulare, ubi Hannibal sit, ibi caput atque arcem huius belli esse, quippe qui prae te feras eam tibi causam traiciendi in Africam esse, ut Hannibalem eo trahas:

[17] sive hic igitur sive illic, cum Hannibale est tibi futura res. utrum tandem ergo firmior eris in Africa solus an hic tuo conlegaeque tui exercitu coniuncto? ne Claudius quidem et Livius consules tam recenti exemplo, quantum id intersit, documento sunt?

[18] quid? Hannibalem utrum tandem extremus angulus agri Bruttii, frustra iam diu poscentem ab domo auxilia, an propinqua Carthago et tota socia Africa potentiorem armis virisque faciet?

[19] quod istud consilium est, ibi malle decernere, ubi tuae dimidio minores copiae sint, hostium multo maiores, quam ubi duobus exercitibus adversus unum tot proeliis et tam diuturna ac gravi militia fessum pugnandum sit?

[20] quam compar consilium tuum parentis tui consilio sit, reputa. ille consul profectus in Hispaniam, ut Hannibali ab Alpibus descendenti occurreret, in Italiam ex provincia rediit: tu, cum Hannibal in Italia sit, relinquere Italiam paras,

[21] non quia rei publicae id utile, sed quia tibi amplum et gloriosum censes esse, sicut cum provincia et exercitu relicto sine lege, sine senatus consulto duabus navibus populi Romani imperator fortunam publicam et maiestatem imperii, quae tum in tuo capite periclitabantur, commisisti.

[22] ego P. Cornelium publicae nobisque, non sibi ipsi privatim creatum consulem existimo, exercitusque ad custodiam urbis atque Italiae scriptos esse, non quos regio more per superbiam consules, quo terrarum velint, traiciant.”

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Conway, Robert Seymour; Walters, Charles Flamstead; Johnson, Stephen Keymer, editors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914-1935. (Oxford Classical Texts)) — 28.42 focus

[1]

'externa et nimis antiqua repeto. Africa eadem ista et M. Atilius , insigne utriusque fortunae exemplum, nobis documento sint.

[2] ne tibi, P. Corneli , cum ex alto Africam conspexeris, ludus et iocus fuisse Hispaniae tuae uidebuntur. quid enim simile?

[3] pacato mari praeter oram Italiae Galliaeque uectus Emporias in urbem sociorum classem adpulisti; expositos milites per tutissima omnia ad socios et amicos populi Romani Tarraconem duxisti;

[4] ab Tarracone deinde iter per praesidia Romana; circa Hiberum exercitus patris patruique tui post amissos imperatores ferociores calamitate ipsa facti,

[5] et dux tumultuarius quidem ille L. Marcius et militari suffragio ad tempus lectus, ceterum si nobilitas ac iusti honores adornarent, claris imperatoribus qualibet arte belli par; oppugnata per summum otium Carthago nullo trium Punicorum exercituum socios defendente;

[6] cetera—neque ea eleuo—nullo tamen modo Africo bello comparanda, ubi non portus ullus classi nostrae apertus, non ager pacatus, non ciuitas socia, non rex amicus, non consistendi usquam locus, non procedendi;

[7] quacumque circumspexeris hostilia omnia atque infesta. 'an Syphaci Numidisque credis? satis sit semel creditum; non semper temeritas est felix, et fraus fidem in paruis sibi praestruit ut, cum operae pretium sit, cum mercede magna fallat.

[8] non hostis patrem patruumque tuum armis prius quam Celtiberi socii fraude circumuenerunt; nec tibi ipsi a Magone et Hasdrubale hostium ducibus quantum ab Indibili et Mandonio in fidem acceptis periculi fuit.

[9] Numidis tu credere potes, defectionem militum tuorum expertus? et Syphax et Masinissa se quam Carthaginienses malunt potentissimos in Africa esse, Carthaginienses quam quemquam alium.

[10] nunc illos aemulatio inter sese et omnes causae certaminum acuunt quia procul externus metus est: ostende Romana arma et exercitum alienigenam; iam uelut ad commune restinguendum incendium concurrent.

[11] aliter iidem illi Carthaginienses Hispaniam defenderunt, aliter moenia patriae, templa deum, aras et focos defendent cum euntes in proelium pauida prosequetur coniunx et parui liberi occursabunt.

[12] 'quid porro, si satis confisi Carthaginienses consensu Africae, fide sociorum regum, moenibus suis, cum tuo exercitusque tui praesidio nudatam Italiam uiderint, ultro ipsi nouum exercitum in Italiam aut ex Africa miserint, aut Magonem,

[13] quem a Baliaribus classe transmissa iam praeter oram Ligurum Alpinorum uectari constat, Hannibali se coniungere iusserint?

[14] nempe in eodem terrore erimus in quo nuper fuimus cum Hasdrubal in Italiam transcendit, quem tu, qui non solum Carthaginem sed omnem Africam exercitu tuo es clausurus, e manibus tuis in Italiam emisisti. uictum a te dices;

[15] eo quidem minus uellem—et id tua non rei publicae solum causa—iter datum uicto in Italiam esse. patere nos omnia quae prospera tibi ac populi Romani imperio euenere tuo consilio adsignare, aduersa casibus incertis belli et fortunae relegare:

[16] quo melior fortiorque es, eo magis talem praesidem sibi patria tua atque uniuersa Italia retinet. non potes ne ipse quidem dissimulare, ubi Hannibal sit, ibi caput atque arcem huius belli esse, quippe qui prae te feras eam tibi causam traiciendi in Africam esse ut Hannibalem eo trahas.

[17] siue igitur hic siue illic, cum Hannibale est tibi futura res. 'utrum tandem ergo firmior eris in Africa solus an hic tuo collegaeque exercitu coniuncto? ne Claudius quidem et Liuius consules tam recenti exemplo quantum id intersit documento sunt?

[18] quid? Hannibalem utrum tandem extremus angulus agri Bruttii, frustra iam diu poscentem ab domo auxilia, an propinqua Carthago et tota socia Africa potentiorem armis uirisque faciet?

[19] quod istud consilium est, ibi malle decernere ubi tuae dimidio minores copiae sint, hostium multo maiores, quam ubi duobus exercitibus aduersus unum tot proeliis et tam diuturna ac graui militia fessum pugnandum sit?

[20] quam compar consilium tuum parentis tui consilio sit reputa. ille consul profectus in Hispaniam, ut Hannibali ab Alpibus descendenti occurreret in Italiam ex prouincia rediit: tu cum Hannibal in Italia sit relinquere Italiam paras, non quia rei publicae utile sed

[21] quia tibi id amplum et gloriosum censes esse—sicut cum prouincia et exercitu relicto sine lege sine senatus consulto duabus nauibus populi Romani imperator fortunam publicam et maiestatem imperii, quae tum in tuo capite periclitabantur, commisisti.

[22] ego, patres conscripti, P. Cornelium rei publicae nobisque, non sibi ipsi priuatim creatum consulem existimo, exercitusque ad custodiam urbis atque Italiae scriptos esse, non quos regio more per superbiam consules quo terrarum uelint traiciant.'

Translations (3)

History of Rome Perseus (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library)) — 28.42 focus

[1]

"Foreign examples are these that I am recalling and too ancient. Let that same Africa of yours and Marcus Atilius, ¹ a striking example of good fortune and bad, be a lesson to

[2] us. Verily, Publius Cornelius, when you sight Africa from the sea your Spanish provinces will seem to you to have been mere ² child's

[3] play. For what is there that is comparable? Over an unmolested sea you sailed along the coast of Italy and Gaul, ³ and put in with your fleet at Emporiae, a city of our

[4] allies. Landing your troops you led them through country everywhere perfectly safe and reached allies and friends of the Roman people at Tarraco. From Tarraco it was then a march from one Roman post to

[5] another. Along the Hiberus were the armies of your father and uncle, which after losing their generals had gained more spirit even from disaster. Their commander also was the well-known Lucius Marcius, ⁴ irregularly appointed, to be sure, being chosen for an emergency by vote of the soldiers, but if nobility and the normal magistracies added their distinction, equal to famous generals in all the arts of

[6] war. (New) Carthage was taken without any interference, since none of the three Punic armies came to the defence of their allies. The rest of your campaign —and I do not belittle it

[7] —cannot, however, be compared in any way with a war in Africa, where there is no harbour open to our fleet, no subjugated territory, no allied city, no friendly king, no place anywhere to hold your ground, no place to advance, while wherever you look, the country all about you will be hostile and dangerous.

"Can it be that you trust Syphax and the Numidians? Let it suffice to have trusted them

[8] once. Not always is rashness successful, and treachery seeks in small matters to ensure trustfulness, so that when it becomes worth while, it may deceive with great profit. The enemy did not overpower your father and uncle by force of arms until the Celtiberian allies had done so by

[9] treachery. Nor in your own case was there as much danger from Mago and Hasdrubal, ⁵ generals of the enemy, as from Indibilis and Mandonius, who had come under your protection. Can you trust the Numidians after experiencing a mutiny of your own

[10] soldiers? Both Syphax and Masinissa prefer that they themselves rather than the Carthaginians should be supreme in Africa, and the Carthaginians rather than anyone else. At present rivalry between them and all possible reasons for contention spur them on because the foreigners whom they fear are far

[11] away. Show them Roman arms and a foreign-born army, and now they will rush, as it were, to put out a fire that concerns them

[12] all. In one fashion those same Carthaginians have defended Spain; in quite another fashion will they defend the walls of their native city, the temples of the gods, their altars and hearths, when as they go out to battle a frightened wife will escort them and little children will throw themselves in their way.

[13] "Furthermore, what if the Carthaginians, confidently relying upon the united spirit of Africa, the loyalty of the allied kings, and their own walls, shall take the initiative themselves when they have seen Italy stripped of protection from yourself and your

[14] army? What if they either send a new army into Italy from Africa, or order Mago —and it is known that he has crossed from the Balearic Islands on his fleet and is already sailing along the coast held by the Alpine Ligurians —to unite with

[15] Hannibal? Surely we shall be in the same panic as we were recently when Hasdrubal crossed into Italy —the man whom you, who are about to invest not merely Carthage but all Africa by your army, allowed to slip out of your hands into Italy. He had been defeated by you, you will say; all the more do I regret —and this for ⁶ your own sake, not merely for that of the state — that a passage into. Italy was allowed to the

[16] defeated. Permit us to attribute to your strategy all that resulted favourably for you and the empire of the Roman people, to ascribe the unfavourable to the uncertainties of war and to fortune. The better and braver man you are the more do your native city and all Italy keep their hold upon so capable a

[17] defender. You are unable even yourself to conceal the fact that where Hannibal is, there is the centre and stronghold of this war, since you declare that your reason for crossing over to Africa is in order to draw Hannibal thither. Therefore, be it here, be it there, you will have Hannibal to deal with.

Will you, therefore, be stronger, pray, -in Africa when alone, or here, uniting your army with that of your colleague? Do not Claudius also and Livius, the consuls, by a very recent instance prove how great a difference that

[18]

makes? And tell me, pray, will the remote and secluded Bruttian territory make Hannibal stronger in arms and men, when he: has long been begging in vain for auxiliaries from home, or rather Carthage near at hand and all Africa her

[19]

ally? What is that plan of yours, to prefer to decide the issue just where your forces are reduced by one-half, the forces of the enemy greatly increased, rather than where two armies have to fight against one exhausted by so many battles and a service so long and so

[20]

hard? Reflect how different is your plan from that of your father. He as consul had set out for Spain, but he returned to Italy from his province in order to meet ⁷ Hannibal as he came down from the

[21]

Alps. ⁸ You, although Hannibal is in Italy, are preparing to leave Italy, not because you think it to the advantage of the state, but because you hold it great and glorious for yourself. It was thus that leaving province and army, unauthorized by any law or decree of the senate, you, a commanding general of the Roman people, entrusted to two ships the fortune of the state and majesty of the empire, which were at that time endangered in your

[22]

person. My opinion is that Publius Cornelius was elected consul for the republic and for us, not for himself and his personal ends, and that armies were enlisted for the defence of the city and Italy, not that consuls in the arrogant manner of tyrants may transport them to whatever lands they choose.

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 28.42 focus

[1]

But I am adducing foreign and too remote examples. That same Africa, and Marcus Atilius, who was a signal example of both extremes of fortune, may form a warning to us.

[2]

Without doubt, Publius Cornelius, when you shall have a view of Africa from the sea, the reduction of your province of Spain will appear to you to have been a mere matter of sport and pastime.

[3]

For what similarity is there between them? After sailing along the coast of Italy and Gaul to Emporiae without any enemy to oppose you, you brought your fleet to land at a city of our allies.

[4]

There landing your soldiers, you marched them through countries entirely secure from danger to Tarraco, to join the allies and friends of the Roman people. After that, from Tarraco you marched through places garrisoned by Roman troops.

[5]

On the banks of the Iberus were the armies of your father and your uncle, rendered. still more furious after the loss of their generals, even by the very calamity they had suffered. The general, indeed, Lucius Marcius, had been irregularly constituted and chosen for the time by the suffrages of the soldiers; but had he been adorned with noble birth and the regular gradations of preferment, he would have been equal to the most distinguished generals, from his skill in every art of war.

[6]

You then laid siege to Carthage, quite at your leisure, not one of the three Punic armies coming to the defence of their allies.

[7]

The rest of your achievements, nor do I wish to disparage them, are by no means to be compared with what you will have to do in a war in Africa, where there is not a single harbour open to receive our fleet, no part of the country at peace with us, no state in alliance, no king in friendship with us, no room in any part either to take up a position or to advance.

[8]

Whichever way you turn your eyes, all is hostility and danger. Do you trust in the Numidians and Syphax? Let it suffice to have trusted in them once. Temerity is not always successful, and the fraudulent usually pave the way to confidence in small matters, that when an advantageous opportunity occurs, they may deceive with great gain.

[9]

Your father and uncle were not cut off by the arms of their enemies till they were duped by the treachery of their Celtiberian allies; nor were you yourself exposed to so much danger from Mago and Hasdrubal, the generals of your enemies, as from Indibilis and Mandonius, whom you had received into friendship.

[10]

Can you place any confidence in Numidians after having experienced a defection in your own soldiers? Syphax and Masinissa would rather that they themselves should have the rule in Africa than the Carthaginians, but that the Carthaginians should rather than any other state.

[11]

At present, emulation and the various causes of dispute existing be- tween them incite them against each other, because the fear of any foreign enemy is remote. But show them the Roman arms and a body of troops, natives of another country, and they will run together as if to extinguish a common conflagration.

[12]

These same Carthaginians defended Spain in a different manner from that in which they will defend the walls of their capital, the temples of their gods, their altars, and their hearths; when their terrified wives will attend them on the way to the battle, and their little children will run to them.

[13]

What, moreover, if the Carthaginians, feeling sufficiently secure in the harmony subsisting in Africa, in the attachment of the sovereigns in alliance with them, and their own fortifications, should, when they see Italy

[14]

deprived of the support of yourself and your army, themselves assuming an offensive attitude, either send a fresh army out of Africa into Italy, or order Mago, who, it is certain, having passed over from the Baleares, is now sailing along the coast of Liguria and the Alps, to form a junction with Hannibal.

[15]

Without doubt, we should be thrown into the same state of alarm as we were lately, when Hasdrubal passed over into Italy; that Hasdrubal, whom you, who are about to blockade, not Carthage only, but all Africa with your army, allowed to slip out of your hands into Italy. You will say that he was conquered by you. For that very reason I should be less willing, not on account of the commonwealth only, but of yourself, that, after having been defeated, he should be allowed to march into Italy.

[16]

Suffer us to ascribe to your prudence all the successful events which have happened to you and the empire of the Roman people, and to impute all those of an adverse nature to the uncertain chances of war and to fortune. The more meritorious and brave you are, so much the more do your country and all Italy desire to retain you as their protector.

[17]

You cannot even yourself pretend to deny, that where Hannibal is, there is the head and principal stress of the war, for you profess, that your motive in crossing over into Africa is to draw Hannibal thither. Whether, therefore, here or there, it is with Hannibal that you will have to contend. Will you then, I pray, have more power in Africa and alone, or here, with your own and your colleague's army united?

[18]

Is not the great difference which this makes proved to you even by the recent precedent of Claudius and Livius, the consuls? What! will Hannibal, who has now for a long time been unavailingly soliciting succours from home, be rendered more powerful in men and arms when occupying the remotest corner of the Bruttian territory, or when near to Carthage and supported by all Africa?

[19]

What sort of policy is that of yours, to prefer fighting where your own forces will be diminished by one half, and the enemy's greatly augmented, to encountering the enemy when you will have two armies against one, and that wearied with so many battles, and so protracted and laborious a service?

[20]

Consider how far this policy of yours corresponds with that of your parent. He, setting out in his consulship for Spain, returned from his province into Italy, that he might meet Hannibal on his descent from the Alps; while you are going to leave Italy when Hannibal is there, not because you consider such a course beneficial to the state, but because you think it will redound to your own honour and glory;

[21]

acting in the same manner as you did when leaving your province and your army without the sanction of a law, without a decree of the senate, you, a general of the Roman people, intrusted to two ships the fortune of the commonwealth and the majesty of the empire, which were then hazarded in your person.

[22]

In my estimation, conscript fathers, Publius Cornelius was elected consul for the service of the state and of us, and not to forward his own individual interest; and the armies were enlisted for the protection of the city and of Italy, and not for the consuls, like kings, to carry into whatever part of the world they please from motives of vanity.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 28.42 focus

[1]

"I will not take instances from distant lands and remote times. This very Africa we are speaking about and the fate of Atilius Regulus form a conspicuous example of the fickleness of fortune. "When you, Scipio, have a view of Africa from the sea will not your conquest of Spain seem mere child's play?

[2] What resemblance is there between them? You began by coasting along the shores of Italy and Gaul over a sea free from any hostile fleet, and you brought up at Emporiae, a friendly city. After disembarking your troops you led them through a perfectly safe country to Tarraco, to the friends and allies of Rome, and from Tarraco your route led through the midst of Roman garrisons.

[3] Round the Ebro lay the armies of your father and your uncle, whose courage had been raised by defeat and who were burning to avenge the loss of their commanders. Their leader was, it is true, irregularly chosen by the vote of the soldiery to meet the emergency, but had he belonged to an ennobled family and been duly appointed he would have rivalled distinguished generals in his mastery of the art of war.

[4] Then you were able to attack New Carthage without the slightest interruption; not one out of the three Carthaginian armies attempted to defend their allies. The rest of your operations, though I am far from depreciating them, are not to be compared with a war in Africa.

[5] There no harbour is open to our fleet, no district which will receive us peaceably, no city in alliance with us, no king friendly to us, no spot which we can use as a base of operations. Wherever you turn your eyes, you see hostility and menace.

"Do you put your trust in Syphax and his Numidians? Be satisfied with having trusted them once.

[6] Rashness does not always succeed and duplicity prepares the way for confidence through trifles, so that when the occasion calls for it, it may succeed in securing some great advantage. Your father and your uncle were not defeated until the treachery of their Celtiberian auxiliaries left them victims to the enemy.

[7] You yourself were not exposed to anything like the danger from the Carthaginian commanders, Mago and Hasdrubal, that you were from Indibilis and Mandonius after you had accepted their alliance. Can you trust the Numidians after the experience you have had of the disloyalty of your own troops? Syphax and Masinissa would both prefer that they rather than the Carthaginians should be the leading powers in Africa, but failing that, they would rather have the Carthaginians than any one else.

[8] At this moment mutual rivalry and numberless grounds of complaint are embittering them against one another, because external dangers are far distant; but once let them see the arms of Rome and a foreign army, and they will hasten side by side to extinguish, as it were, a conflagration which threatens them both. Those Carthaginians defended Spain in a very different way from that in which they would defend their country's walls, the temples of their gods, their hearths and homes, when their trembling wives will follow them and their little children cling to them as they march out to battle.

[9] What, moreover, if, feeling quite assured of the united support of Africa, the fidelity of their royal allies and the strength of their walls, and seeing that you and your army are no longer here to protect Italy, the Carthaginians should send over a fresh army from Africa, or order Mago, who, we understand, has left the Balearic Isles and is sailing along the Ligurian coast, to form a junction with Hannibal?

[10] Surely we should be in the same state of alarm as we were at the appearance in Italy of Hasdrubal, after you had allowed him to slip through your hands-you, who are going to blockade not Carthage only but the whole of Africa with your army!

[11] You will say that you defeated him. Then I regret all the more, both on your account and on behalf of the republic, that you allowed him after his defeat to invade Italy.

"Allow us to ascribe all that has gone happily for you and for the dominion of Rome to your wise counsels, and all misfortunes to the uncertain chances of war-the more talent and courage you claim for yourself the more will your native country and all Italy desire to keep such a doughty defender at home.

[12] Even you cannot disguise the fact that where Hannibal is, there is the centre and mainstay of the war, for you are giving out that the one reason for your going to Africa is to draw Hannibal there. Whether there then or here, you still have Hannibal to deal with. And will you, I should like to know, be in a stronger position in Africa, single-handed, than here with your own army and your colleague's acting together?

[13] What a difference that makes is shown by the recent instance of the consuls Claudius and Livius. Where, pray, is Hannibal more likely to be supplied with men and arms?

[14] In the most remote corner of Bruttium where he has so long been vainly asking for reinforcements from home, or in the country round Carthage and on the soil of Africa which is entirely occupied by his allies?

[15] What an extraordinary idea that is of yours to fight where your forces are reduced by one-half and those of the enemy largely augmented, rather than in a country where with two armies you would engage only one, and that, too, exhausted by so many battles, and such long and burdensome service.

[16] Just think how different your plan is from your father's. On his election as consul he proceeded to Spain, then left his province and returned to Italy in order to meet Hannibal on his descent from the Alps; you are preparing to leave Italy while Hannibal is actually here, not in the interest of the republic but because you think it a grand and glorious thing to do. Just in the same way you, a general of the Roman people, left your province and your army without any legal authority, without any instructions from the senate, and entrusted to a couple of ships the fortunes of the State and the majesty of the empire which were for the time bound up with your own safety.

[17] I hold the view that P. Cornelius Scipio was elected consul not for his own private ends, but for us and the commonwealth, and that armies are raised to guard this city and the soil of Italy, and not for consuls to transport to any part of the world they please in the arrogant style of kings and despots."

Notes on the current edition

Ab urbe condita

1. A.U.C. 549

2. praeter x Aldus, Froben, Eds.: per P (1) NJK.

3. consistendi usquam locus, non A3 N3 JK Eds.: om. P (1) N.

4. A.U.C. 549

5. potentis ( or -es) P (1) n Aldus, Eds.: -tissimos A3 JK Froben 2, Conway .

6. se P (1) N: sese A3 N3 JK Aldus, Froben.

7. iam A3 N3 JK Aldus, Froben: om. P (1) N.

8. A.U.C. 549

9. delegare Gronovius , Eds. ( cf. XXI. xlvi. 10): legare P (1) n Aldus, Froben: relegare Sp A3 JK Conway.

10. patria, after this A3N3JK Conway have tua.

11. traiciendi in Africam A3N3JK Aldus, Froben, Eds.: om. P (1) N, one line.

12. hic igitur P 1 d Eds.: igitur P (3): igitur hic cl ? M3 ANJK Luchs, Conway.

13. tui CM 4 DAVN 6 Aldus, Eds.: tut P ( with obscure correction ) and R : tute MBAN: om. Sp ?N3 JK Froben 2, Conway .

14. A.U.C. 549

15. id P (1) NJK Eds.: om. Conway .

16. tibi P (1) n Aldus, Eds.: tibi id A3 N3 JK Conway.

17. Ego, after this A3 JK have p.c. or patres conscripti ( retained by Alschefski, Conway ); and so after P. Cornelium Aldus .

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 28.42

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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