Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 42.47

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[1] When Marcius and Atilius had arrived in Rome, in the Capitol they reported about their embassy, emphasizing nothing as a greater achievement than the deception of the king by the truce and the hope of peace.

[2] For he had been, they said, so equipped with apparatus for war, while the Romans had made no preparations, that all the commanding places might have been seized by him before an army could be sent over to Greece.

[3] However, with the time consumed by the truce, the war would be waged on even terms; he would be in no way better prepared, and the Romans would start the war better equipped in everything. Also they had subtly disrupted the Boeotian League, they said, so that the Boeotians could no longer be joined by any common action to the Macedonians.

[4] These actions a large part of the senate approved as having been done with great wisdom; the older men and those mindful of ancient custom said they did not recognize in this embassy the ways of Rome.¹

[5]

Not by ambushes and battles by night,

they thought, "nor by pretended flight and unexpected return to an enemy off his guard, nor in such a way as to boast of cunning rather than real bravery, did our ancestors wage war; they were accustomed to declare war before they waged it, and even at times to announce a battle and specify the place in which they were going to fight.²

[6] With the same³ straightforwardness the information was given to King Pyrrhus that his physician was plotting against his life;

[7] in the same way the betrayer of their children was delivered bound to the Faliscans;⁴ these are the acts of Roman scrupulousness, not of Carthaginian artfulness⁵ nor of Greek slyness, since among these peoples it has been more praiseworthy to deceive an enemy than to conquer by force.

[8] Occasionally a greater advantage is gained for the time being by trickery than by courage, but final and lasting conquest of the spirit overtakes one from whom the admission has been extorted that he has been conquered, not by craft or accident, but by the⁶ hand-tohand clash of force in a proper and righteous war."

[9] Thus the older men, who were less well pleased by the new and over-sly wisdom; however, that part of the senate to whom the pursuit of advantage was more important than that of honour, prevailed to the effect that the previous embassy of Marcius should be approved, and he should be sent back again to Greece with . . .⁷ quinqueremes and instructed to conduct further affairs as might seem best to serve the state.

[10] Aulus Atilius, too, they sent to hold Larisa in Thessaly, fearing that if the time of the truce should expire, Perseus might send a garrison there and have in his power the capital of Thessaly.

[11] Atilius was instructed to call on Gnaeus Sicinius for two thousand soldiers to accomplish this mission. Publius Lentulus too —he had returned from Achaea —was

[12] given three hundred soldiers of Italian stock in order that he should do what he could at Thebes to keep Boeotia under Roman control.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 42.47 focus

[1] Marcius et Atilius Romam cum venissent, legationem in Capitolio ita renuntiarunt, ut nulla re magis gloriarentur quam decepto per indutias et spem pacis rege.

[2] adeo enim apparatibus belli fuisse instructum, ipsis nulla parata re, ut omnia opportuna loca praeoccupari ante ab eo potuerint, quam exercitus in Graeciam traiceretur.

[3] spatio autem indutiarum sumpto aecum bellum futurum: illum nihilo paratiorem, Romanos omnibus instructiores rebus coepturos bellum. Boeotorum quoque se concilium arte distraxisse, ne coniungi amplius ullo consensu Macedonibus possent.

[4] haec ut summa ratione acta magna pars senatus adprobabat; veteres et moris antiqui memores negabant se in ea legatione Romanas agnoscere artes.

[5] non per insidias et nocturna proelia, nec simulatam fugam inprovisosque ad incautum hostem reditus, nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur, bella maiores gessisse: indicere prius quam gerere solitos bella, denuntiare etiam interdum pugnam et locum finire, in quo dimicaturi essent.

[6] eadem fide indicatum Pyrrho regi medicum vitae eius insidiantem; eadem Faliscis vinctum traditum proditorem liberorum;

[7] religionis haec Romanae esse, non versutiarum Punicarum neque calliditatis Graecae, apud quos fallere hostem quam vi superare gloriosius fuerit.

[8] interdum in praesens tempus plus profici dolo quam virtute; sed eius demum animum in perpetuum vinci, cui confessio expressa sit se neque arte neque casu, sed collatis comminus viribus iusto ac pio esse bello superatum.

[9] haec seniores, quibus nova ac nimis callida minus placebat sapientia; vicit tamen ea pars senatus, cui potior utilis quam honesti cura erat, ut conprobaretur prior legatio Marci, et eodem rursus in Graeciam cum * quinqueremibus remitteretur iubereturque cetera, uti e re publica maxime visum esset, agere.

[10] A. quoque Atilium miserunt ad occupandam Larisam in Thessaliam timentes, ne, si indutiarum dies exisset, Perseus praesidio eo misso caput Thessaliae in potestate haberet.

[11] duo milia peditum Atilius ab Cn. Sicinio accersere ad eam rem agendam iussus.

[12] et P. Lentulo, qui ex Achaia redierat, trecenti milites Italici generis dati, ut Thebis daret operam, ut in potestate Boeotia esset.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 43.23 focus

[1]

Rex cum non ¹ minore vexatione iumentorum hominumque quam venerat in Macedoniam rediit; Appium tamen ab obsidione Phanotes fama ducentis ad Stratum Persei summovit.

[2] Cleuas cum praesidio impigrorum iuvenum insecutus sub radicibus prope inviis montium ² ad mille hominum ex agmine impedito occidit, ad ducentos cepit.

[3] Appius superatis angustiis in campo quem Meleona vocant stativa dierum paucorum habuit. interim Cleuas assumpto Philostrato, qui quingentos ex ³ Epirotarum gente habebat, in agrum Antigonensem transcendit. ⁴ Macedones ad depopulationem profecti;

[4] Philostratus⁵ cum cohorte sua in insidiis loco ⁶ obscuro consedit. in palatos populatores cum erupissent ab Antigonea armati, ⁷ fugientes eos persequentes effusius in vallem insessam ab hostibus praecipitant.

[5] ibi ad mille ⁸ occisis, centum ferme captis, et ubique prospere gesta re prope stativa Appi castra movent, ne qua vis sociis suis ab Romano exercitu inferri possit.

[6] Appius nequiquam in his locis terens tempus, dimissis Chaonum Thesprotorumque ⁹ et si qui alii Epirotae erant praesidiis, cum Italicis militibus in Illyricum regressus, per Parthinorum ¹⁰ socias urbes in hiberna militibus divisis, ¹¹ ipse Romam sacrificii causa redit.

[7] Perseus ex Penestarum gente mille pedites, ducentos equites revocatos Cassandream, praesidio ut essent, misit.

[8] Ab Gentio eadem adferentes redierunt. nec deinde alios atque alios mittendo temptare eum destitit, cum appareret, quantum in eo praesidii esset, nec tamen impetrare ab animo posset, ut impensam in rem maximi ad omnia momenti faceret.

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 42.47 focus

[1]

Marcius et Atilius Romam cum venissent, legationem in Capitolio ita renuntiarunt, ut nulla re magis gloriarentur quam ¹ decepto per indutias et spem pacis rege.

[2] adeo enim apparatibus belli fuisse instructum, ipsis nulla parata re, ut omnia opportuna loca praeoccupari ante ab eo potuerint, quam exercitus in Graeciam traiceretur.

[3] spatio autem indutiarum sumpto aecum venturum; illum nihilo paratiorem, Romanos omnibus instructiores rebus coepturos bellum. Boeotorum quoque se concilium arte distraxisse, ne coniungi amplius ullo consensu Macedonibus possent.

[4] haec ut summa ratione acta magna pars senatus adprobabat; veteres et moris antiqui memores negabant se in ea legatione Romanas agnoscere artes:

[5] non per insidias et nocturna proelia nec simulatam fugam inprovisosque ad incautum hostem reditus nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur, bella maiores gessisse; indicere prius quam gerere solitos bella, denuntiare etiam interdum finire, in quo dimicaturi essent.

[6] eadem fide ² indicatum Pyrrho regi medicum vitae eius insidiantem, eadem Faliscis vinctum traditum proditorem liberorum.

[7] vere haec Romana esse, non versutiarum Punicarum neque calliditatis Graecae, apud quos fallere hostem quam vi superare gloriosius fuerit.

[8] interdum in praesens tempus plus profici dolo quam virtute; sed eius demum animum in perpetuum vinci, cui confessio expressa sit se neque arte neque casu, sed conlatis comminus viribus, iusto ac pio esse bello superatum.

[9] haec seniores, quibus nova haec minus placebat sapientia; vicit tamen ea pars senatus, cui potior utilis quam honesti cura erat, ut conprobaretur prior legatio Marci et eodem rursus in Graeciam cum quinqueremibus remitteretur iubereturque cetera, uti e re publica maxime visum esset, agere.

[10] A. quoque Atilium miserunt ad occupandam Larisam in Thessalia timentes, ne, si indutiarum dies exisset, Perseus praesidio eo misso caput Thessaliae in potestate haberet.

[11] duo milia peditum Atilius ab Cn. Sicinio accersere ad eam rem agendam iussus.

[12] et P. Lentulo , qui ex Achaia redierat, trecenti ³ milites Italici generis dati, ut Thebis daret operam, ut in potestate Boeotia esset.

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 42.47 focus

[1]

When Marcius and Atilius returned to Rome, they reported in the Capitol the result of their embassy, in such a manner that they assumed no greater merit for any one matter, than for having overreached the king by the suspension of arms, and the hope of peace given him;

[2] for

he was so fully provided,

they said,

with every requisite for the immediate commencement of war, while on their side no one thing was in readiness, that all the convenient posts might have been pre-occupied by him before an army could be transported into Greece;

[3]

but, by gaining so much time by the truce, the Romans would begin the war better provided with every thing; whereas he would come into the field in no respect better prepared.

[4] They mentioned, also, that

they had so effectually disunited by stratagem the members of the Bœotian council, that they could never again, with any degree of unanimity, connect themselves with the Macedonians.

A great part of the senate approved of these proceedings, as conducted with consummate wisdom; but the older members, and those who retained the ancient simplicity of manners, declared, that

in the conduct of that embassy, they could discover nothing of the Roman genius.

[5]

Their ancestors waged war not by stratagems and attacks in the night, nor by counterfeiting flight and returning unexpectedly on an unguarded foe, nor in such a manner as to glory in cunning more than in real valour. That they were accustomed to proclaim war before they waged it, that they sometimes appointed the day of battle and marked out the ground on which they were to fight.

[6]

That with the same honourable feeling information was given to king Pyrrhus of his physician plotting against his life;

[7]

and, from the same motive, they delivered bound, to the Faliscians, the betrayer of their children.

[8]

These were the acts of the Roman law, not resulting from the craft of Carthaginians or the subtlety of Greeks, among whom it is reckoned more glorious to deceive an enemy than to overcome him by force. Sometimes greater present advantages may be acquired by artifice than by bravery. But an adversary's spirit is finally subdued for ever, when the confession has been extorted from him, that he was vanquished, not by artifice, nor by chance, but in a just and open war, in a fair trial of strength hand to hand.

[9] Such were the sentiments of the elder members, to whom this modern kind of wisdom was displeasing. But that part of the senate who paid more regard to utility than to honour, prevailed, and passed a vote approving of Marcius' conduct in his former embassy; at the same time ordering that he should be sent again into Greece with some ships, and with authority to act in other matters as he should judge most conducive to the public good.

[10] They also sent Aulus Atilius to keep possession of Larissa in Thessaly; fearing lest, on the expiration of the armistice, Perseus might send troops and secure to himself that metropolis.

[11] For the execution of this, Atilius was ordered to receive from Cneius Sicinius two thousand infantry. And three hundred soldiers of the Italian race were given to Publius Lentulus, who

[12] had returned from Achaia, that he should fix his quarters at Thebes, in order that Bœotia might be kept in obedience.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 42.47 focus

[1]

On their return to Rome, Marcius and Atilius reported the results of their mission to the senate in the Capitol. The thing for which they took most credit to themselves was the way in which they had hoodwinked the king by holding out hopes of peace.

[2] He was so fully provided with all the means of war, whilst they themselves had nothing ready, that all the strategic positions could have been occupied by him before their armies had landed in Greece.

[3] The interval of the armistice, however, would place them on equal terms, he would no longer have the advantage of preparation, the Romans would begin the war better equipped in every way. They had also succeeded by a clever stroke in breaking up the national council of Boeotia, they could never again be united in support of the Macedonians.

[4] A good many of the senators approved of these proceedings as showing very skilful management.

[5] The elder senators, however, and others who had not forgotten the moral standards of earlier days, said that they failed to recognise anything of the Roman character in these negotiations. "Our ancestors," they said, "did not conduct their wars by lurking in ambush and making attacks at night, nor by feigning flight and then turning back upon the enemy when he was off his guard.

[6] They did not pride themselves on cunning more than on true courage, it was their custom to declare war before commencing it, sometimes even to give the enemy notice of the time and place where they would fight. This sense of honour made them warn Pyrrhus against his physician, who was

[7] plotting against his life, it made them hand over to the Faliscans as a prisoner the betrayer of their children.

[8] This is the true Roman spirit, there is nothing here of the cunning of the Carthaginians or the cleverness of the Greeks, who pride themselves more in deceiving an enemy than in overcoming him in fair fight. Occasionally more can be gained for the time being by craft than by courage, but it is only when you have forced your enemy to confess that he has been overcome not by cleverness nor by accident, but after a fair trial of strength where the rules of war are properly observed-it is only then that his spirit is broken and his defeat a lasting one."

[9] Such were the views of the older senators, who regarded the new policy with disfavour, but the majority preferred expediency to honour and signified their approval of what Marcius had done.

[10] It was decided that he should be sent back to Greece with the fifty quinqueremes, and should be at full liberty to act as he thought best in the interest of the republic. A. Atilius was also sent to occupy Larisa in Thessaly, as there was the danger of Perseus sending a garrison there on the expiration of the armistice, and so keeping the capital of Thessaly under his power.

[11] Atilius sent for 2000 infantry from the army of Cnaeus Sicinius to hold the city.

[12] P. Lentulus, who had returned from Achaia, was supplied with 300 Italian troops to look after Thebes and overawe Boeotia.

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. Livy's central theme is the old Roman character and its decline and fall (Preface, 9); his patriotism does not blind him to certain lapses from the traditional standard, cf. e.g. IX. xi; cf. also Diodorus XXX. 7.

2. Polybius XIII. 3 tells the same story of Roman warfare, citing it as the one remaining example of the practice formerly adhered to by the Greeks.

The ancients, as we know, were far removed from such malpractices (as treacherous dealings). For so far were they from plotting mischief against their friends, with the purpose of aggrandizing their own power, that they would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand-to-hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. Hence they preceded war by a declaration and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed and array their army. But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war. Some slight traces, however, of the ancient principles of warfare survive among the Romans. For they make declaration of war, they very seldom use ambuscades, and they fight hand-to-hand at close quarters

(tr. Paton, L.C.L.). Tacitus, Germania, 6. 6 notes that the Germans regarded strategic retreat as honourable. For the early Roman declaration of war, cf. I. xxxii. 5-14, which suggests that the view of Livy's contemporaries that Romans had from the first been warriors is a myth due to the later successes in war. Rome's early expansion was caused by a desire for peace, and an inability to accept border raiding as a sport. Cf. also XXXI. viii. 3 and the note, XXXVI. iii. 12 and the note.

3. B.C. 172

4. Livy's account of the senate's warning to Pyrrhus occurred in the missing book, XIII, cf. the Summary of that book, also Aulus Gellius, III. viii, quoting Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius; for the story of the treacherous tutor of Falerii, cf. V. xxvii; an allusion to both in XXIV. xlv. 3.

5. Cf. XXI. iv. 9, XXII. vi. 12, xxii. 15. Cf. Diodorus XXX. 7, o(/ti diasafou/ntwn tw=n (Pwmai/wn w(s Perse/a katestrath/ghsan a)/neu o(/plwn e)pexei/rhsa/n tines tw=n e)k th=s boulh=s e)painei=n au)tou/s. ou) mh\n toi=s presbuta/tois h)/reske to\ gegenhme/non a)ll' e)/legon mh\ pre/pein (Pwmai/ois mimei=sqai Foi/nikas, w(/ste di' a)pa/ths a)ll' ou) di' a)reth=s tw=n polemi/wn perigi/nesqai.

When the Romans announced that they had got the better of Perseus without recourse to arms, some of the senators tried to praise them. But what had happened did not please the eldest, but they said that it was not fitting that Romans should imitate Phoenicians, in such a way as to surpass their enemies through deceit and not through valour.

6. B.C. 172

7. The number is missing.

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 42.47

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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