Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 36.7

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[1] Since the whole debate centred practically on this one question, Hannibal, appealed to by name for his opinion, turned the king and all who were present to the consideration of the war as a¹ whole, by a speech of the following character:²

[2]

If I had been invited to the council from the time we crossed to Greece, when the question concerned Euboea or the Achaeans or Boeotia, I should have expressed the same opinion as to-day when we are discussing the Thessalians.

[3]

Before anything else, I vote that Philip and the Macedonians be drawn, in any possible way, into a military alliance.

[4]

For as to Euboea and the Boeotians and the Thessalians, who doubts that they, possessing no strength of their own, are ever fawning upon those who are close at hand, and will use the same fearfulness which they display in the council as a means of winning pardon, and that,

[5]

as soon as they see the Roman army in Greece, they will turn back to their accustomed masters and that they will suffer no harm because, when the Romans were far away, they were unwilling to test, face to face, the strength of you and your army?

[6]

How much greater priority and preference should we give to allying ourselves with Philip rather than with them? He, if once he joins our cause, will have no choice left,³ and he can contribute that strength which will be not merely an additional resource for the Roman war, but one which by itself alone was able recently to withstand the Romans.

[7]

With this reinforcement —may I say so without offence⁴ —how can I doubt the result when I see that those very men with whose assistance the Romans prevailed over Philip will⁵ now be overwhelming the Romans themselves?

[8]

The Aetolians who, as all agree, defeated Philip, will fight with Philip against the Romans; Amynander and the nation of the Athamanes, whose services in

[9]

that war were the greatest after those of the Aetolians, will stand with us; Philip then, when you were inactive, bore the whole burden of the war;

[10]

now you, the two mightiest kings of Asia and Europe, will wage war against one people which, not to speak of my own twofold experience, in the time of our fathers at least could not contend even against one king of Epirus —and how could he be compared with you? What cause, then, convinces me that Philip can be allied with us?

[11]

First, the common profit, which is the firmest bond in an alliance; second, the assurances of you Aetolians. For your representative, Thoas here, among other reasons which he was wont to use to attract Antiochus to

[12]

Greece, continually made this assertion before all else, that Philip was enraged and that he found it hard to bear the laws of slavery imposed upon him under the guise of peace. Indeed in his speech he likened the king in his wrath to a wild beast chained or shut up and trying to break his bonds.⁶

[13]

If such is his temper, let us break his chains and tear away his bars, that he may let loose his long-restrained passion upon the common enemy. But if our embassy to him does not move him, let us at least, since we cannot unite him with ourselves, see to it that he does not make common cause with our foes.

[14]

Your son Seleucus is at Lysimachia; if with that army which he has with him he shall begin to move through Thrace and devastate the adjacent portions of Macedonia, he will easily turn Philip from sending aid to the Romans⁷ to the more important task of defending his own possessions.

[15]

As to Philip you have my views; even from the first you have not been ignorant of my opinion as to the strategy of the war as a whole.

[16]

If I had been listened to then, the Romans would not now be hearing that Chalcis in Euboea was captured and a fort on the Euripus, but that Etruria and the coasts of Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul were aflame with war and —this is what they dread beyond everything else —that Hannibal is in Italy. Now too I vote that you summon all your forces on land and sea; — let cargo-boats follow-with supplies, for, as we are few here for the tasks of war, so we are too many in proportion to our shortage of supplies.

[17]

When you have assembled all your strength, you will divide your fleet, keeping part on guard near Corcyra, that free and safe passage may not be open

[18]

to the Romans, and sending part across to the coast of Italy which faces Sardinia and Africa;

[19]

you yourself will go ahead with all your armies to the territory of Bullis;⁸ thence you will stand guard over Greece and offer to the Romans the appearance of being about to cross, and, if the situation shall demand it, will actually cross.

[20]

This is the advice I give, I who, though I am not well versed in every kind of war, with the Romans at least have learned to fight from my own successes and failures. For this same programme which I have advised I promise aid neither faithless nor reluctant.

[21]

May the gods approve that proposal which shall have seemed to you the best.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 36.7 focus

[1] cum circa hanc fere consultationem disceptatio omnis verteretur, Hannibal nominatim interrogatus sententiam in universi belli cogitationem regem atque eos, qui aderant, tali oratione avertit.

[2] “si, ex quo traiecimus in Graeciam, adhibitus essem in consilium, cum de Euboea deque Achaeis et de Boeotia agebatur, eandem sententiam dixissem, quam hodie, cum de Thessalis agitur, dicam.

[3] ante omnia Philippum et Macedonas in societatem belli quacumque ratione censeo deducendos esse.

[4] nam quod ad Euboeam Boeotosque et Thessalos attinet, cui dubium est, quin, ut quibus nullae suae vires sint, praesentibus adulando semper, quem metum in consilio habeant, eodem ad impetrandam veniam utantur,

[5] simul ac Romanum exercitum in Graecia viderint, ad consuetum imperium se avertant, nec iis noxiae futurum sit, quod, cum Romani procul abessent, vim tuam praesentis exercitusque tui experiri noluerint?

[6] quanto igitur prius potiusque est Philippum nobis coniungere quam hos? cui, si semel in causam descenderit, nihil integri futurum sit, quique eas vires adferat, quae non accessio tantum ad Romanum esse bellum, sed per se ipsae nuper sustinere potuerint Romanos.

[7] hoc ego adiuncto — absit verbo invidia — qui dubitare de eventu possim, cum, quibus adversus Philippum valuerint Romani, iis nunc fore videam, ut ipsi oppugnentur?

[8] Aetoli, qui Philippum, quod inter omnes constat, vicerunt, cum Philippo adversus Romanos pugnabunt;

[9] Amynander atque Athamanum gens, quorum secundum Aetdlos Aetolos plurima fuit opera in eo bello, nobiscum stabunt;

[10] Philippus tum te quieto totam molem sustinebat belli; nunc duo maximi reges Asiae Europaeque viribus adversus unum populum, ut meam utramque fortunam taceam, patrum certe aetate ne uni quidem Epirotarum regi parem — qui quid tandem erat vobiscum comparatus? — geretis bellum.

[11] quae igitur res mihi fiduciam praebet coniungi nobis Philippum posse? una, communis utilitas, quae societatis maximum vinculum est; altera,

[12] auctores vos Aetoli. vester enim legatus hic Thoas inter cetera, quae ad exciendum in Graeciam Antiochum dicere est solitus, ante omnia hoc semper adfirmavit, fremere Philippum et aegre pati sub specie pacis leges servitutis sibi impositas.

[13] ille quidem ferae bestiae vinctae aut clausae et refringere claustra cupienti regis iram verbis aequabat. cuius si talis animus est, solvamus nos eius vincula et claustra refringamus, ut erumpere diu coercitam iram in hostes communes possit.

[14] quod si nihil eum legatio nostra moverit, at nos, quoniam nobis eum adiungere non possums, possumus, ne hostibus nostris ille adiungi possit, caveamus.

[15] Seleucus filius tuus Lysimachiae est; qui si eo exercitu, quem secum habet, per Thraciam proxima Macedoniae coeperit depopulari, facile ab auxilio ferendo Romanis Philippum ad sua potissimum tuenda avertet.

[16] de Philippo meam sententiam habes; de ratione universi belli quid sentirem, iam ab initio non ignorasti. quod si tur tum auditus forem, non in Euboea Chalcidem captam et castellum Euripi expugnatum Romani, sed Etruriam Ligurumque et Galliae Cisalpinae oram bello ardere, et, qui maximus iis terror est, Hannibalem in Italia esse audirent.

[17] nunc quoque accersas censeo omnis navalis terrestrisque copias; sequantur classem onerariae cum commeatibus; nam hic sicut ad belli munera pauci sumus, sic nimis multi pro inopia commeatuum. commeatum.

[18] cum omnis tuas contraxeris vires, divisa classe partem Corcyrae in statione habebis,

[19] ne transitus Romanis liber ac tutus pateat, partem ad litus Italiae, quod Sardiniam Africamque spectat, traicies; ipse cum omnibus terrestribus copiis in Bullinum agrum procedes;

[20] inde Graeciae praesidebis, et speciem Romanis traiecturum te praebens et, si res poposcerit, traiecturus. haec suadeo, qui ut non omnis peritissimus sim belli, cum Romanis certe bellare bonis malisque meis didici.

[21] in quae consilium dedi, in eadem nec infidelem nec segnem operam polliceor. dii approbent ear eam sententiam, quae tibi optima visa fuerit.”

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 30.7 focus

[1]

Hasdrubal ex fuga cum paucis Afrorum urbem proximam petierat, eoque omnes qui supererant vestigia ducis sequentes se contulerant; metu deinde ne dederetur Scipioni urbe excessit.

[2] mox eodem patentibus portis Romani accepti, nec quicquam hostile, quia voluntate concesserant in dicionem, factum. duae subinde urbes captae direptaeque. ea praeda et quae castris incensis ex igne rapta erat militi concessa est.

[3] Syphax octo milium ferme inde spatio ¹ loco munito ² consedit; Hasdrubal Carthaginem contendit, ne quid per metum ex recenti clade mollius consuleretur.

[4] quo tantus primo terror est adlatus ut omissa Utica Carthaginem crederent extemplo Scipionem obsessurum. ³

[5] senatum itaque sufetes, quod velut consulare imperium apud eos erat, vocaverunt.

[6] Ibi tribus sententiis certatum ⁴ ; una de pace legatos ad Scipionem decernebat, altera Hannibalem ad tuendam ab exitiabili bello patriam revocabat, tertia Romanae in adversis rebus constantiae erat;

[7] reparandum exercitum Syphacemque hortandum ne bello absisteret censebat. haec sententia, quia Hasdrubal praesens Barcinaeque omnes factionis bellum malebant, vicit.

[8] inde dilectus in urbe agrisque haberi coeptus, et ad Syphacem legati missi, summa ope et ipsum reparantem bellum, cum uxor non iam ut ante blanditiis, satis potentibus ad animum amantis,

[9] sed precibus et misericordia valuisset, plena lacrimarum obtestans ne patrem suum patriamque proderet isdemque flammis Carthaginem quibus castra conflagrassent absumi sineret.

[10] spem quoque opportune oblatam adferebant legati: quattuor milia Celtiberorum circa urbem nomine Obbam, ab conquisitoribus suis ⁵ conducta in Hispania, egregiae iuventutis, sibi occurrisse; et Hasdrubalem propediem adfore cum manu haudquaquam contemnenda.

[11] igitur non benigne modo legatis respondit, sed ostendit etiam ⁶ multitudinem agrestium Numidarum, quibus per eosdem ⁷ dies arma equosque dedisset, et omnem iuventutem adfirmat ex regno exciturum;

[12] scire incendio, non proelio cladem acceptam; eum bello inferiorem esse qui armis vincatur.

[13] haec legatis responsa, et post dies paucos rursus Hasdrubal et Syphax copias iunxerunt. is omnis exercitus fuit triginta ferme milium ⁸ armatorum.

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 36.7 focus

[1]

cum circa hanc fere consultationem disceptatio omnis verteretur, Hannibal nominatim interrogatus sententiam in universi belli cogitationem regem atque eos, qui aderant, tali oratione avertit.

[2] “si, ex quo traiecimus in Graeciam, adhibitus essem in consilium, cum de Euboea deque Achaeis et de Boeotia agebatur, eandem sententiam dixissem, quam hodie, cum de Thessalis agitur, dicam.

[3] ante omnia Philippum et Macedonas in societatem belli quacumque ratione censeo deducendos esse.

[6] quanto igitur prius potiusque est Philippum nobis coniungere quam hos? cui, si ¹ semel in causam descenderit, nihil integri futurum sit, quique eas vires adferat, quae non accessio tantum ad Romanum esse bellum, sed per se ipsae nuper sustinere potuerint Romanos.

[7] hoc ego adiuncto—absit verbo invidia—qui dubitare de eventu possim, cum, quibus adversus Philippum valuerint Romani, iis nunc fore videam, ut ipsi oppugnentur?

[8] Aetoli, qui Philippum, quod inter omnes constat, vicerunt, cum Philippo adversus Romanos pugnabunt;

[9] Amynander atque Athamanum gens, quorum secundum Aetolos plurima fuit opera in eo bello, nobiscum stabunt;

[11] —geretis bellum. quae igitur res mihi fiduciam praebet coniungi nobis Philippum posse? una, communis utilitas, quae societatis maximum vinculum est; altera, auctores vos Aetoli.

[12] vester enim legatus hic Thoas inter cetera, quae ad exciendum in Graeciam Antiochum dicere est solitus, ² ante omnia hoc semper adfirmavit, fremere Philippum et aegre pati sub specie pacis leges servitutis sibi impositas.

[14] quod si nihil eum legatio nostra moverit, at nos, quoniam nobis eum adiungere non possumus, ne hostibus nostris ille adiungi possit, caveamus.

[16] de Philippo meam sententiam habes: de ratione universi belli quid sentirem, iam ab initio non ignorasti. quod si tum auditus forem, non in Euboea Chalcidem captam et castellum Euripi expugnatum Romani, sed Etruriam Ligurumque et Galliae Cisalpinae oram bello ardere, et, qui maximus iis terror est, Hannibalem in Italia esse audirent.

[17] nunc quoque accersas censeo omnis navalis terrestrisque copias; sequantur classem onerariae cum commeatibus: nam hic sicut ad belli munera pauci sumus, sic nimis multi pro inopia commeatum.

[18] cum omnis tuas contraxeris vires divisa classe partem Corcyrae in statione ³ habebis,

[19] ne transitus Romanis liber ac tutus pateat, partem ad litus Italiae, quod Sardiniam Africamque spectat, traicies; ipse cum omnibus terrestribus copiis in Bullinum agrum procedes;

[21] in quae consilium dedi, in eadem nec infidelem nec segnem operam polliceor. dii approbent eam sententiam, quae tibi optima visa fuerit.”

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 36.7 focus

[1]

Although the present debate turned chiefly on these points, Hannibal, being called on by name to give his opinion, led the king, and those who were present, into the consideration of the general conduct of the war, by a speech to this effect:

[2] —

If I had been employed in your councils since we came first into Greece, when you were consulting about Eubœa, the Achaeans, and Bœotians, I would have offered the same advice which I shall offer you this day, when your thoughts are employed about the Thessalians.

[3]

My opinion is, that, above all things, Philip and the Macedonians should by some means or other be brought into a participation in this war.

[4]

For, as to Eubœa, as well as the Bœotians and Thessalians, who can doubt that, having no strength of their own, they will ever court the power that is present; and will make use of the same fear, which governs their councils, as an argument for obtaining pardon?

[5]

That, as soon as they shall see a Roman army in Greece, they will turn away to that government to which they have been accustomed? Nor are they to blame, if, when the Romans were at so great a distance, they did not choose to try your force, and that of your army, who were on the spot.

[6]

How much more advisable, therefore, and more advantageous would it be, to unite Philip to us, than these; as, if he once embarks in the cause, he will have no room for retreat, and as he will bring with him such a force, as will not only be an accession to a power at war with Rome, but was able, lately, of itself, to withstand the Romans!

[7]

With such an ally, (I wish to speak without offence,) how could I harbour a doubt about the issue; when I should see the very persons through whom the Romans prevailed against Philip, now ready to act against them? The Aetolians, who, as all agree, conquered Philip, will fight in conjunction with Philip against the Romans.

[8]

Amynander and the Athamanian nation, who, next to the Aetolians, performed the greatest services in that war, will stand on our side.

[9]

Philip, at the time when you remained inactive, sustained the whole burden of the war.

[10]

Now, you and he, two of the greatest kings, will, with the force of Asia and Europe, wage war against one state; which, to say nothing of my own fortune with them, either prosperous or adverse, was certainly, in the memory of our fathers, unequal to a dispute with a single king of Epirus; what then, I say, must it be in competition with you two? But it may be asked, What circumstances induce me to believe that Philip may be brought to a union with us?

[11]

First, common utility, which is the strongest cement of union; and next, you, Aetolians, are yourselves my informants.

[12]

For Thoas, your ambassador, among the other arguments which he used to urge, for the purpose of drawing Antiochus into Greece, always above all things insisted upon this, —that Philip expressed extreme indignation that the conditions of servitude had been imposed on him under the appearance of conditions of peace: comparing the king's anger to that of a wild beast chained, or shut up, and wishing to break the bars that confined it.

[13]

Now, if his temper of mind is such, let us loose his chains; let us break these bars, that he may vent, upon the common foe, this anger so long pent up. But should our embassy fail of producing any effect on him, let us then take care, that if we cannot unite him to ourselves, he may not be united to our enemies.

[14]

Your son, Seleucus, is at Lysimachia; and if, with the army which he has there, he shall pass through Thrace, and once begin to make depredations on the nearest parts of Macedonia, he will effectually divert Philip from carrying aid to the Romans, to the protection, in the first place, of his own dominions.

[15]

Such is my opinion respecting Philip. With regard to the general plan of the war, you have, from the beginning, been acquainted with my sentiments:

[16]

and if my advice had been listened to, the Romans would not now hear that Chalcis in Eubœa was taken, and a fort on the Euripus reduced, but that Etruria, and the whole coast of Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul, were in a blaze of war; and, what is to them the greatest cause of alarm, that Hannibal was in Italy. Even as matters stand at present, I recommend it to you, to call home all your land and sea forces; let storeships with provisions follow the fleet; for, as we are here too few for the exigencies of the war, so are we too many for the scanty supplies of necessaries.

[17]

When you shall have collected together the whole of your force, you will divide the fleet, and keep one division stationed at Corcyra, that the Romans may not have a clear and safe passage;

[18]

and the other you will send to that part of the coast of Italy which is opposite Sardinia and Africa; while you yourselves, with all the land forces, will proceed to the territory of Bullium.

[19]

In this position you will hold the command of all Greece; you will give the Romans reason to think, that you intend to sail over to Italy; and you will be in readiness so to do, if occasion require.

[20]

This is my advice; and though I may not be the most skilful in every kind of warfare, yet surely I must have learned, in a long series of both good and bad fortune, how to wage war against the Romans. For the execution of the measures which I have advised, I promise you my most faithful and zealous endeavours.

[21]

Whatever plan you shall consider the best, may the gods grant it their approbation.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 36.7 focus

[1]

Whilst the debate was revolving entirely round these details Hannibal was asked for his opinion, and in what he said he turned the thoughts of the king and of all present to the consideration of the war as a whole.

[2] He spoke as follows: "If I had been taken into your counsels after we landed in Greece and you were deliberating about Euboea and the Achaeans and Boeotia, I should have expressed the same view which I am expressing now with regard to the Thessalians.

[3] I consider that it is of the first importance that we should use every possible means to bring Philip and the Macedonians into an armed alliance with us.

[4] As to Euboea and the Boeotians and the Thessalians, who can doubt that these people who have no strength of their own and always cringe before a power which is present to their eyes will display the same craven spirit which marks the proceedings of their councils in suing for pardon, and as soon as they see a Roman army in Greece will turn to their accustomed obedience?

[5] Nor will they be blamed for refusing to try conclusions with your strength when you and your army are amongst them and the Romans are far away.

[6] How much sooner ought we-how much better would it be-to secure the adhesion of Philip than of these people! For if he once takes up the cause he will have everything at stake, and he will contribute an amount of strength which will not only be an accession to us in a war with Rome, but was not long ago sufficient of itself to withstand the Romans.

[7] I trust I shall not give offence in saying that with him as our ally I cannot feel doubtful as to the issue, for I see that those through whose assistance the Romans prevailed against Philip will now be the men by whom the Romans themselves are opposed.

[8] The Aetolians, who as is universally admitted defeated Philip, will now be fighting in company with him against the Romans.

[9] Amynander and the Athamanians, who next to the Aetolians rendered the greatest service in the war, will be on our side.

[10] While you, Antiochus, had not yet moved, Philip sustained the whole weight of the war; now you and he, the mightiest monarchs in Asia and Europe, will direct your united strength against a single people who-to say nothing of my own fortunes, good or bad-were at all events in the days of our fathers no match for even one king of Epirus, and how can he possibly be compared with you?

[11] "What considerations then give me ground for believing that Philip can be made our ally? One is the identity of interests, which is the surest bond of alliance. The other is your own assurance, Aetolians.

[12] For amongst the reasons which your envoy Thoas gave for inducing Antiochus to come to Greece, the strongest was his constant asseveration that Philip was complaining and chafing under the servile conditions imposed upon him in the guise of peace. He used to compare the king's rage to that of some animal chained or shut up and longing to burst his prison bars.

[13] If that is his state of mind, let us loose his chains and burst the bars that hold him in so that he can vent his long-restrained rage on our common foe. But if our delegates are unable to influence him, let us at all events see to it that if we cannot get him on our side the enemy does not get him on his side.

[14] Your son Seleucus is at Lysimachia; if with the army he has with him he traverses Thrace and begins to lay waste the adjacent parts of Macedonia, he will easily turn Philip aside from actively assisting the Romans to the defence of his own dominions.

[15] "You are in possession of my opinions about Philip. As regards the general strategy of the war, you have known from the outset what my views are.

[16] Had I been listened to then, it would not have been the capture of Chalcis or the storming of a fort on the Euripus that the Romans would have heard about; they would have learnt that Etruria and Liguria and the coastal districts of Cisalpine Gaul were wrapped in the flames of war and, what would have alarmed them most of all, that Hannibal was in Italy. I am of opinion that even now you ought to bring up the whole of your military and naval forces and let a fleet of transports accompany them laden with supplies.

[17] We here are too few for the requirements of war and too many for our scanty commissariat. When you have concentrated your entire strength, Antiochus, you might divide your fleet and keep one division cruising off Corcyra, that there may be no safe and easy passage for the Romans, the other you would

[18] send across to the coast of Italy opposite Sardinia and Africa.

[19] You yourself would advance with all your land forces into the country round Byllis; from there you would protect Greece and give the Romans the impression that you are going to sail to Italy, and should circumstances render it necessary you will be in readiness to do so.

[20] This is what I advise you to do, and though I may not be profoundly versed in every phase of war, how to war with the Romans at all events I have learnt through success and failure alike. In the measures which I have advised you to take I promise to co-operate most loyally and energetically.

[21] I trust that whatever course, Antiochus, seems best to you may receive the approval of the gods."

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. B.C. 191

2. The speech of Hannibal is also reported by Appian ( Syr. 14), and both versions are probably derived from Polybius.

3. A causa integra was one which left the person concerned free to choose his course of action. An alliance between Philip and Antiochus would at once commit Philip to war with Rome, and so leave nihil integri to him.

4. The term invidia always suggests

casting the evil eye upon

the person or act involved. Here proud words were held to provoke the jealousy of the powers above, and Hannibal is deprecating this invidia.

5. B.C. 191

6. In XXXV. xviii. 6 this figure is attributed to Alexander the Acarnanian.

7. B.C. 191

8. Bullis (Byllis) was a town on the Illyrian coast not far from Apollonia.

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 36.7

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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