Titus Livius (Livy), Ab urbe condita, Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor), 35.12

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[1] But neither the Boii nor the Spaniards, with whom war was carried on that year, were so hostile and so dangerous to the Romans as the people of the Aetolians.¹

[2] After the evacuation of Greece by the armies they had at first been in hopes that Antiochus would come to occupy masterless Europe² and that neither Philip³ nor Nabis⁴ would remain quiet.

[3] When they saw that no movement was being made, thinking that some agitation and confusion should be caused, lest their scheming should become feeble from lack of exercise, they called a council at Naupactus.⁵

[4] There Thoas, their chief magistrate, complained of the injuries inflicted by the Romans and of the condition of Aetolia, because of all the states and cities of Greece they were the

[5] least honoured, after that victory for which they themselves had been the chief cause, and proposed that⁶ ambassadors should be sent around to the kings, who should not only sound out their sentiments but should rouse each, by proper inducements, to a Roman war.

[6] Damocritus was dispatched to Nabis, Nicander⁷ to Philip, Dicaearchus, the praetor's brother, to Antiochus.

[7] To the Spartan tyrant Damocritus pointed out the weakening of the tyranny from the loss of the coast towns;⁸ thence he had drawn soldiers, thence ships and naval allies; shut up, almost, within his own walls, he saw the Achaeans lording it in the Peloponnesus;

[8] he would never have a chance to recover his own if he let pass the one which then existed; there was, moreover, no Roman army in Greece; Gytheum and the other Spartan towns on the coast would not be considered by the Romans an adequate reason why they should again transport their legions to Greece.

[9] This was said to rouse the zeal of the tyrant, that, when Antiochus had crossed to Greece, the consciousness that the Roman friendship had been violated by the injuries done their allies might unite him with Antiochus.

[10] As to Philip, Nicander tried to provoke him by a somewhat similar argument; there was also more material for his persuasiveness, in proportion to the greater height from which the king had fallen, in comparison with the tyrant, and in proportion to the heavier losses he had suffered.

[11] In addition, he spoke of the ancient renown of the kings of Macedonia and the victorious progress of that race throughout the earth.

[12] He said, moreover, that the advice which he offered was safe, whether in the beginning or at the end: for he would not counsel Philip to move before Antiochus with his army should cross to Greece, and

[13] when he, who⁹ without Antiochus had so long sustained the war against the Romans and the Aetolians, was joined by Antiochus and had as allies the Aetolians, who had been at that time more dangerous foes than the Romans, with what strength, pray, could the Romans withstand him?

[14] He spoke further of the general Hannibal, born an enemy to the Romans, who had destroyed both their commanders and their soldiers in greater numbers than now remained.

[15] Such was Nicander's message to Philip; Dicaearchus approached Antiochus in another fashion, and first of all he said that the booty from Philip had become the Romans', the victory was the Aetolians'; none other than the Aetolians had given the Romans ingress to Greece and furnished them with the strength to conquer.

[16] Finally, he told Antiochus how great forces, infantry and cavalry, they would furnish him for the war, what stations for his land forces, what harbours for his navies.

[17] Then he employed a gratuitous lie regarding Philip and Nabis: each was ready to rebel and would seize the earliest opportunity to regain what he had lost in war. Thus throughout the whole world at once the Aetolians were arousing war against the Romans.

Ab urbe condita. Titus Livius (Livy). Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor). Medford, MA. .

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

History of Rome (English) (Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Sage, Evan T.; Schlesinger, Alfred C., translators. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959. (Loeb Classical Library))

Editions (3)

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Pars I-IV, Libri I-XL. Editio Stereotypica. Weissenborn, Wilhelm; Mueller, Moritz, editors. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884-1911.) — 35.12 focus

[1] sed neque Boi neque Hispani, cum quibus eo anno bellatum erat, tam inimice infesti erant Romanis quam Aetolorum gens.

[2] ii post deportatos ex Graecia exercitus primo in spe fuerant et Antiochum in vacuam Europae possessionem venturum, nec Philippum aut Nabim quieturos.

[3] ubi nihil usquam moveri viderunt, agitandum aliquid miscendumque rati, ne cunctando senescerent consilia, concilium Naupactum indixerunt.

[4] ibi Thoas praetor eorum conquestus iniurias Romanorum statumque Aetoliae, quod omnium Graeciae gentium civitatiumque inhonoratissimi post earn eam victoriam essent,

[5] cuius causa ipsi fuissent, legatos censuit circa reges mittendos, qui non solum temptarent animos eorum, sed suis quemque stimulis moverent ad Romanum bellum.

[6] Damocritus ad Nabim, Nicander ad Philippum, Dicaearchus, frater praetoris, ad Antiochum est missus.

[7] tyranno Lacedaemonio Damocritus ademptis maritimis civitatibus enervatam tyrannidem dicere; inde militem, inde naves navalesque socios habuisse; inclusum suis prope muris Achaeos videre dominantis in Peloponneso;

[8] numquam habiturum reciperandi sua occasionem, si earn eam, quae tur tum esset, praetermisisset; et nullum exercitum Romanum in Graecia esse, nec propter Gytheum aut maritimos alios Laconas dignam causam existimaturos Romanos, cur legiones rursus in Graeciam transmittant.

[9] haec ad incitandum animum tyranni dicebantur, ut, cum Antiochus in Graeciam traiecisset, conscientia violatae per sociorum iniurias Romanae amicitiae coniungeret se cum Antiocho.

[10] et Philippum Nicander haud dissimili oratione incitabat; erat etiam maior orationis materia, quo ex altiore fastigio rex quam tyrannus detractus erat, quoque plures ademptae res.

[11] ad hoc vetusta regum Macedoniae fama peragratusque orbis terrarum victoriis eius gentis referebatur. et tutum vel incepto vel eventu se consilium adferre:

[12] nam neque, ut ante se moveat Philippus, quam Antiochus cum exercitu transient in Graeciam,

[13] suadere, et, qui sine Antiocho adversus Romanos Aetolosque tam diu sustinuerit bellum, ei adiuncto Antiocho, sociis Aetolis, qui tur tum graviores hostes quam Romani fuerint, quibus tandem viribus resistere Romanos posse?

[14] adiciebat de duce Hannibale, nato adversus Romanos hoste, qui plures et duces et milites eorum occidisset, quam quot superessent. haec Philippo Nicander;

[15] alia Dicaearchus Antiocho; et omnium primum praedam de Philippo Romanorum esse dicere, victoriam Aetolorum; et aditum in Graeciam Romanis nullos alios quam Aetolos dedisse, et ad vincendum vires eosdem praebuisse.

[16] deinde quantas peditum equitumque copias praebituri Antiocho ad bellum essent, quae loca terrestribus copiis, quos portus maritimis.

[17] tur tum de Philippo et Nabide libero mendacio abutebatur: paratum utrumque ad rebellandum esse, et primam quamque occasionem reciperandi ea, quae bello amisissent, arrepturos.

[18] ita per totum simul orbem terrarum Aetoli Romanis concitabant bellum.

Ab urbe condita Perseus (Livy in Fourteen Volumes. Foster, Benjamin Oliver; Moore, Frank Gardener; Schlesinger, Alfred C., editors. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919-1959 (printing).) — 30.12 focus

[1]

Ibi Syphax, dum obequitat hostium turmis, si pudore,

[2] si periculo suo fugam sistere posset, equo graviter icto effusus opprimitur capiturque et vivus, laetum ante omnes Masinissae praebiturus spectaculum, ad Laelium pertrahitur. ¹

[3] caedes² in eo proelio minor quam victoria fuit, quia equestri tantummodo proelio certatum fuerat.

[4] non plus quinque milia occisa, minus dimidium eius hominum captum est impetu in castro facto, quo perculsa rege amisso multitudo se contulerat.

[5] Cirta caput regni Syphacis erat, eoque se ³ ingens ⁴ hominum ex fuga ⁵ contulit vis. ⁶

[6] Masinissa sibi quidem dicere nihil esse in praesentia pulchrius quam victorem recuperatum tanto post intervallo patrium invisere regnum; sed tam secundis quam adversis rebus non dari spatium ad cessandum.

[7] si se Laelius cum equitatu vinctoque ⁷ Syphace Cirtam praecedere sinat, trepida omnia metu se oppressurum; Laelium cum peditibus subsequi modicis itineribus posse.

[8] adsentiente Laelio praegressus Cirtam evocari ad conloquium principes Cirtensium iubet. Sed apud ignaros regis casus nec quae acta essent promendo nec minis nec suadendo ante valuit quam rex vinctus in conspectum datus est. ⁸

[9] tum ad spectaculum tam foedum comploratio orta, et partim pavore moenia sunt deserta, partim repentino consensu gratiam apud victorem quaerentium patefactae portae.

[10] et Masinissa praesidio circa portas opportunaque moenium dimisso, ne cui fugae pateret exitus, ad regiam occupandam citato vadit equo.

[11] intranti vestibulum in ipso limine Sophoniba, ⁹ uxor Syphacis, filia Hasdrubalis Poeni, occurrit; et cum in medio agmine armatorum Masinissam ¹⁰ insignem cum armis tum cetero habitu conspexisset, regem esse, id quod erat, rata, genibus advoluta eius

[12]

omnia quidem ut posses

¹¹ inquit

in nobis ¹² di dederunt virtusque et felicitas tua; sed si captivae apud dominum vitae necisque suae vocem supplicem mittere licet, si genua, si victricem attingere dextram, precor quaesoque per maiestatem regiam,

[13]

in qua paulo ante nos quoque fuimus, per gentis Numidarum nomen, quod tibi cum Syphace commune fuit, per huiusce regiae deos, qui te melioribus ominibus accipiant quam Syphacem hinc miserunt,

[14]

hanc veniam supplici des ut ipse quodcumque fert ¹³ animus de captiva tua ¹⁴ statuas neque me in cuiusquam Romani superbum et crudele arbitrium venire sinas.

[15]

si nihil aliud quam Syphacis uxor fuissem, tamen Numidae atque in eadem mecum Africa geniti quam alienigenae et externi fidem experiri mallem;

[16]

quid Carthaginiensi ab Romano, quid filiae Hasdrubalis timendum sit vides. si nulla re alia potes, morte me ut vindices ab Romanorum arbitrio oro obtestorque.

[17] forma erat insignis et florentissima aetas. itaque cum modo genua modo ¹⁵ dextram amplectens in id ne cui Romano traderetur fidem exposceret, propiusque blanditias iam ¹⁶ oratio esset

[18] quam preces, non in misericordiam modo prolapsus est animus victoris, sed, ut est genus Numidarum in ¹⁷ Venerem praeceps, amore captivae victor captus. data dextra in id quod petebatur obligandae fidei in regiam concedit.

[19] institit deinde reputare ¹⁸ secum ipse quem ad modum promissi fidem praestaret. quod cum expedire non posset, ab amore temerarium atque impudens mutuatur consilium;

[20] nuptias in eum ipsum diem parari repente iubet, ne quid relinqueret integri ¹⁹ aut Laelio aut ipsi Scipioni consulendi velut in captivam quae Masinissae iam nupta foret.

[21] factis nuptiis supervenit Laelius, et adeo non dissimulavit improbare se factum ut primo etiam cum Syphace et ceteris captivis detractam eam lecto ²⁰ geniali mittere ad Scipionem conatus sit.

[22] victus deinde precibus Masinissae orantis ut arbitrium -utrius regum duorum fortunae accessio Sophoniba- esset ad Scipionem reiceret, misso Syphace et captivis ceteras urbes Numidiae quae praesidiis regiis tenebantur adiuvante Masinissa recipit. ²¹

Ab urbe condita libri, erklärt von M. Weissenborn Perseus (Weissenborn, W.; Müller, H. J., editors. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1873-1883.) — 35.12 focus

[1]

sed neque Boi neque Hispani, cum quibus eo anno bellatum erat, tam inimice infesti erant Romanis quam Aetolorum gens.

[2] ii post deportatos ex Graecia exercitus primo in spe fuerant et Antiochum in vacuam Europae possessionem venturum, nec Philippum aut Nabim quieturos.

[3] ubi nihil usquam moveri viderunt, agitandum aliquid miscendumque rati, ne cunctando senescerent consilia, concilium Naupactum indixerunt.

[4] ibi Thoas praetor eorum conquestus iniurias Romanorum statumque Aetoliae, quod omnium Graeciae gentium civitatiumque inhonoratissimi post eam victoriam essent,

[5] cuius causa ipsi fuissent, legatos censuit circa reges mittendos, qui non solum temptarent animos eorum, sed suis quemque stimulis moverent ad Romanum bellum.

[6] Damocritus ad Nabim, Nicander ad Philippum, Dicaearchus, frater praetoris, ad Antiochum est missus.

[8] numquam habiturum reciperandi sua occasionem si eam, quae tum esset, praetermisisset; [et] nullum exercitum Romanum in Graecia esse, nec [propter] Gytheum aut maritimos alios Laconas dignam causam existimaturos Romanos, cur legiones rursus in Graeciam transmittant.

[9] haec ad incitandum animum tyranni dicebantur, ut, cum Antiochus in Graeciam traiecisset, conscientia violatae per sociorum iniurias Romanae amicitiae coniungeret se cum Antiocho.

[10] et Philippum Nicander haud dissimili oratione incitabat; erat etiam maior orationis materia, quo ex altiore fastigio rex quam tyrannus detractus erat, quoque plures ademptae res.

[11] ad hoc vetusta regum Macedoniae fama peragratusque orbis terrarum victoriis eius gentis referebatur. et tutum vel incepto vel eventu se consilium adferre:

[12] nam neque, ut ante se moveat Philippus, quam Antiochus cum exercitu transierit in Graeciam,

[13] suadere, et, qui sine Antiocho adversus Romanos Aetolosque tam diu sustinuerit bellum, ei adiuncto Antiocho, ² sociis Aetolis, qui tum graviores hostes quam Romani fuerint, quibus tandem viribus resistere Romanos posse?

[14] adiciebat de duce Hannibale, nato adversus Romanos hoste, qui plures et duces et milites eorum occidisset, quam quot superessent, haec Philippo Nicander;

[16] deinde quantas peditum equitumque copias praebituri Antiocho ad bellum essent, quae loca terrestribus copiis, quos portus maritimis.

[17] tum de Philippo et Nabide libero mendacio abutebatur: paratum utrumque ad rebellandum esse, et primam quamque occasionem reciperandi ea, quae bello amisissent, arrepturos.

[18] ita per totum simul orbem terrarum Aetoli Romanis concitabant bellum. et reges tamen aut non moti aut tardius moti sunt;

Translations (2)

History of Rome Perseus (Spillan, D.; Edmonds, Cyrus; McDevitte, William A., translators. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1849-1868. (Bohn's Classical Library)) — 35.12 focus

[1]

But neither the Boians nor the Spaniards, with whom they had been at war during that year, were such bitter and inveterate foes to the Romans as the nation of the Aetolians.

[2] These, after the departure of the Roman armies from Greece, had, for some time, entertained hopes that Antiochus would come and take possession of Europe, without opposition; and that neither Philip nor Nabis would continue quiet.

[3] But, seeing no active measures begun, in any quarter, they resolved, lest their designs might be damped by delay, to create some agitation and disturbance; and, with this view, they summoned a general assembly at Naupactum.

[4] Here Thoas, their praetor, after complaining of the injurious behaviour of the Romans, and the present state of Aetolia, and asserting, that

of all the nations and states of Greece, they had been most unhonoured, after the victory which they themselves had been the means of obtaining,

moved, that ambassadors should be sent to each of the kings;

[5] not only to sound their dispositions, but, by such incentives as suited the temper of each, to urge them to a war with Rome.

[6] Damocritus was sent to Nabis, Nicander to Philip, and Dicaearchus, the praetor's brother, to Antiochus.

[7] To the Lacedaemonian tyrant Damocritus represented, that,

by the maritime cities being taken from him, his government was left enervated; for from them he had drawn his soldiers, as well as his ships and seamen. He was now pent up almost within the walls of his capital, while he saw the Achaeans domineering over the whole Peloponnesus.

[8]

Never would he have another opportunity of recovering his rights, if he suffered the one that now offered to pass by. There was no Roman army in Greece, nor would the Romans deem Gythium, or the other towns on the coast of Laconia, sufficient cause for transporting their legions a second time into that country.

These arguments were used for the purpose of provoking the passions of Nabis; in order that when Antiochus should come into Greece.

[9] the other, conscious of having infringed the treaty of amity with Rome, by injuries offered to its allies, might unite himself with him.

[10] Nicander excited Philip, by arguments somewhat similar; and he had more copious matter for discourse, as the king had been degraded from a more elevated state than the tyrant, and more possessions also had been taken from him. In addition to this, he introduced the ancient renown of the Macedonian kings, and the whole world pervaded by the victorious marches of that nation.

[11]

The plan which he proposed,

he said,

was free from any danger, either in the commencement or in the issue. For he did not advise that Philip should stir until Antiochus should have come into Greece with an army;

[12]

and, considering that, without the aid of Antiochus, he had maintained a war so long against the combined forces of the Romans and Aetolians, with what possible force could the Romans withstand him, when joined by Antiochus, and supported by the aid of the Aetolians, who, on the former occasion, were more dangerous enemies than the Romans?

[13] He added the circumstance of Hannibal being general;

a man born a foe to the Romans, who had slain greater numbers, both of their commanders and soldiers, than were left surviving.

[14] Such were the representations of Nicander to Philip. Dicaearchus addressed other arguments to Antiochus. In the first place, he told him, that

the spoils of Philip belonged to the Romans, but the victory over him to the Aetolians; that none other than the Aetolians had afforded to the Romans admittance into Greece, and that the same people supplied them with the strength which enabled them to conquer.

[15] He next set forth the numerous forces, both horse and foot, which they were willing to furnish to Antiochus, for the purpose of the war; what quarters they would assign to his land armament, what harbours for his naval forces.

[16] He then asserted whatever falsehoods he pleased, respecting Philip and Nabis; that

both were ready to recommence hostilities, and would greedily lay hold on the first opportunity of recovering what they had lost in war.

[17] Thus did the Aetolians labour, in every part of the world, to stir up war against the Romans.

[18] The kings, however, either took no steps in it or took them too late.

History of Rome Perseus (Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.) — 35.12 focus

[1]

Neither the Boii nor the Spaniards, however, with whom Rome had been warring that year, were such bitter enemies as the Aetolians.

[2] After the Roman armies had evacuated Greece they expected that Antiochus would take possession of that part of Europe vacated, and that neither Philip nor Nabis would remain inactive.

[3] When they saw no movement anywhere they decided that to prevent their designs from being thwarted by delay they must do something to produce agitation and confusion, and accordingly a council was convened at Naupactus.

[4] Here Thoas, their chief magistrate, complained of their unjust treatment by the Romans and the position in which the Aetolians were placed, for after a victory which was won through them, they, of all the States and cities in Greece, had been shown the least consideration.

[5] He advised that envoys should be sent to each of the three kings to find out their intentions and to urge such arguments on each as would goad them into a war with Rome.

[6] Democritus was sent to Nabis, Nicander to Philip, and Dicaearchus, the brother of Thoas, to Antiochus. Democritus pointed out to the tyrant that by the loss of his maritime cities the very sinews of his power were cut;

[7] it was from them that he drew his soldiers, his ships and his crews.

[8] Little more than a prisoner within his own walls, he saw the Achaeans fording it over the Peloponnese; he would never have another opportunity of winning back his dominion if he let this one go by; there was no Roman army in Greece, and they would never think it worth their while to send their legions back again for the sake of Gytheum and the other Laconian cities on the coast.

[9] Such were the arguments used to influence the tyrant, so that when Antiochus landed in Greece the consciousness of having broken his amity with Rome through his ill-treatment of her allies might force him to join arms with the Syrian monarch.

Nicander took much the same line in his interview with Philip.

[10] He spoke with all the greater force because the king had been brought down from a loftier position than the tyrant and had lost more of his power. He reminded the king of the former prestige of Macedonia and the world-wide victories of his nation.

[11] Nicander assured him that the policy recommended was a safe one both in its initiation and its execution. On the one hand he was not asking Philip to take any action before Antiochus was in Greece with his army, on the other there was every prospect of final success.

[12] With what possible force could the Romans hold their own against him when leagued

[13] with Antiochus and the Aetolians after he had, without the help of Antiochus, maintained such a protracted struggle against the Romans and against the Aetolians, who were at the time a more formidable enemy than the Romans? He also spoke about Hannibal as a foe to Rome from his birth, who had slain more of her generals and soldiers than still survived.

[14] Such were the arguments employed with Philip. Those advanced by Dicaearchus in his interview with Antiochus were different.

[15] The spoils of war, he said, won from Philip belonged to the Romans, but the victory over him to the Aetolians; they and they alone had granted the Romans an entrance into Greece and provided them with the strength which secured victory.

[16] He went on to enumerate the amount of infantry and cavalry which they were prepared to furnish to Antiochus, the localities which would be available for his land army and the harbours which could receive his fleet. Then, as Philip and Nabis were not present to check him, he falsely

[17] represented them as prepared for immediate hostilities and ready to seize the very first opportunity of recovering what they had lost in war. In this way the Aetolians tried to stir up war against Rome throughout the world.

Notes on the current edition

Ab Urbe Condita With An English Translation, books 1-10, 21-45, with periochae 11-20

1. Livy here turns to the Roman campaigns in the east, and for his annalistic sources he substitutes Polybius. A settlement in Greece had been effected by Flamininus after the defeat of Philip in 197 B.C., but the Aetolians had been from the first dissatisfied with the arrangements (cf. XXXIV. xxiii. 5 ff., etc.), and grasped every opportunity to unsettle the minds of their neighbours. Their activity and its consequences are described in the following chapters.

2. Livy here employs a legal phrase ( in vacuam possessionem intrare), used to express the act of taking possession of property which had no real or apparent owner ( dominus). Greece had been

liberated

by the Romans.

3. Philip was represented by the Aetolians as resentful at his defeat.

4. Nabis was tyrant or king, according to the point of view, of Sparta.

5. This council was held late in the fall of 194 B.C. or during the following winter, and Livy is gathering up and summarizing earlier events, preparatory to continuing the narrative.

6. B.C. 193

7. Polybius (XXI. xxxi) gives his name as Mnestas.

8. In XXXIV. xxxv, Livy gives the terms of peace between Rome and Nabis in 195 B.C. There the loss of the coast towns is implied rather than expressly stated.

9. B.C. 193

Titus Livius (Livy) Ab urbe condita 35.12

Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D. (Editor), Frank Gardener Moore (Editor), Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. (Editor), Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D. (Editor)

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