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II. On the internal affairs of Greece.

II. 1. Plataikos.

1. Plataikos [Or. XIV.]—The revolution of 379 B. C. at Thebes had been a blow to Spartan influence throughout Hellas, and especially in Boeotia. Agesilaos in 378 and 377, Kleombrotos in 378 and 376, ¹ had invaded Boeotia without gaining any advantage. By the end of 376 the oligarchies supported by Sparta had been abolished in all the Boeotian towns except Orchomenos²; and the Boeotian Confederacy, with Thebes at its head, had been reconstituted.

After its destruction in 427 Plataea had been ³ non-existent till 386, when it was rebuilt by Sparta as a stronghold against Thebes. Cut off from Spartan support, Plataea had been brought, in 377 or 376, into the revived Boeotian Confederacy; but, like Thespiae and Tanagra (§ 9), had joined it unwillingly. The relief felt by most other towns at riddance from the philo-Spartan oligarchies was more than balanced, in the case of Thespiae, Tanagra and Plataea, by hatred of Thebes. Diodoros⁴ states that the Plataeans secretly offered their town to Athens. At any rate the alarm felt at Plataea was so great that it was only on the days of public assemblies at Thebes that the men ventured to go into the fields, leaving their wives and children within the walls⁵. On one of these days a Theban force under the ⁶ Boeotarch Neokles surprised Plataea, in the latter half of 373 B. C.⁷. The town was destroyed and the territory was again annexed to Thebes. The inhabitants, with such property as they could carry, sought refuge, like their ancestors in 427, at Athens. Their case was discussed there, not merely in the ekklesia, but in the congress of the allies ( συνέδριον § 21); Kallistratos being the foremost advocate of Plataea, as Epameinondas of Thebes⁸. It was not till 338, after Chaeroneia, that Plataea was restored; this time through the enmity of Philip, as formerly through the enmity of Sparta, towards Thebes⁹.

The speech of Isokrates is supposed to be spoken by a Plataean before the ekklesia; and there is nothing in the matter or form of the speech itself to make it improbable that it was actually so delivered¹⁰. The date is 373 B. C.¹¹

‘We know, Athenians, that it is your custom to help the ¹² wronged and to remember those who have done you good. We have come, therefore, to beg that you will not allow ¹³ Plataea to be devastated, in time of peace¹⁴, by Thebes. No people have ever been more injured than we are; no people are more closely bound to you. We have to contend, not only against the Thebans, but against those Athenian advocates whose aid they have procured with our property. It will be necessary for us, then, to speak at some length. To describe our wrongs adequately would be difficult; enough that you know our town to have been razed and our lands seized. We will try to expose the arguments by which the Thebans hope to mislead you (§§ 1—7).

‘It is sometimes their pretence that they have thus dealt ¹⁵ with us because we refused to be enrolled as dependents of Thebes. Judge if this is a sufficient warranty for such usage, or if it became Plataea to accept upon compulsion such a dependence. Thespiae¹⁶ and Tanagra also refused it; but they were not treated as Plataea has been treated; they were not destroyed, but simply compelled to obey. It is difficult to see what is the claim of Thebes to such obedience. Historically speaking, Orchomenos is the head of Boeotia. Or if the peace of Antalkidas is to be recognised, then all cities, great or small, are independent (§§ 8—10).

‘Perhaps, however, the Thebans will take a different ¹⁷ ground. They may say that we were leagued with Sparta against them, and that they have acted in the interest of their entire Confederacy. In any case the treaty ought to have protected us. But, moreover, we were the allies of Sparta perforce. A harmost and a garrison being in our town, while our army was at Thespiae, we had no choice. Many other Greek States are in the same plight. By allowing us to be punished, you will alienate them (§§ 11—16).

‘Remember that the war which you suddenly undertook, ¹⁸ with Thebes, against Sparta, was not for liberty—you and your allies had liberty already—but for the independence of those whose rights, conferred by the Peace of Antalkidas, were being violated. Will you allow cities which you wished to vindicate from slavery to Sparta to be destroyed by Thebes? The Thebans complain of the Lacedaemonian seizure of the Kadmeia; but they themselves raze the walls of their neighbours. They were jealous of Oropos¹⁹ having voluntarily given itself to Athens; yet they themselves usurp territory by force (§§ 17—20).

‘They pretend that they have acted in the common ²⁰ interest of their allies. But, before the act, Athens ought to have been consulted. While the war lasted, Thebes spoke much of the common cause; now that she is secured by peace, she thinks only of her own advantage (§§ 21—25).

‘They cannot plead that there is danger lest, if we get ²¹ back our territory, we should go over to Lacedaemon. Plataea has been twice besieged and twice taken²² on account of its loyalty to Athens. The Thebans, on the other hand, have been repeatedly false to you. Having caused the Corinthian war, and having been brought safely through it by you, on the conclusion of peace they forsook your alliance for that of Sparta; while Chios, Mytilene and Byzantium remained true. They were punished by the Spartan seizure of the Kadmeia,—when they found a refuge at Athens. But no sooner had they been restored to their city, than they made new overtures to Sparta, which were frustrated only by the severity of her terms. Yet these Thebans taunt others with ‘Laconism,’—they, who have been the slaves of Spartan ambition. Did they ever fail to take part in an invasion of Attica? Were they not your worst foes in the war of Dekeleia? Did they not, finally, give their solitary vote²³ for the enslavement of your population and the conversion of your country into sheep-pastures like those of Krisa? (§§ 26—32).

‘It may be said that Boeotia is the bulwark of Attica; ²⁴ and that, if you break off your friendship with the Thebans, they will join Sparta. They will not be so mad. It would be the ruin of the democratic party at Thebes,—watched, as it is, at once by the oligarchical exiles and by the malcontents in the Boeotian towns. Treat them as you did when they blustered about your acquisition of Oropos. When you excluded them from the peace²⁵, they became humble; and they will become so now, if treated with like firmness (§§ 33—38).

‘Even supposing, however, that they were likely to act ²⁶ differently, it does not become Athens to regard their friendship more than the treaty to which she has sworn. Experience shows, moreover, the value in war of being able to appeal to a just cause. It was thus that Sparta roused Hellas against Athens; it was thus that Athens reft the empire from Sparta. Show your readiness to espouse the cause of right, and, in any future war, all Hellas will be with you. If, on the contrary, you allow Thebes to break her oaths, who, hereafter, will help you to make Sparta keep hers? Would it not be monstrous if you upheld the constant allies of Sparta against those who, in a single instance, were forced to side with her? (§§ 39—45).

‘Who could be found more wretched than we are? Our ²⁷ city, our land, our fortunes have been taken from us in a single day. With whom shall we take refuge? If with fellow-sufferers, we shall share their troubles; if with happier men, we shall be reminded of our own. Parents comfortless in their old age—children threatened with slavery on account of some paltry debt²⁸—wives separated from husbands, daughters from mothers—are the miseries which we mourn daily. Have care for us; we are near to you in friendship,—many of us, in blood; for, through the right of intermarriage given to us, many of us are sons of Athenian mothers. Athens helped Adrastos to get from the Thebans burial for his dead; let her help us to save those who yet live (§§ 46—55).

‘We ask you to give us back our land and town. Alone ²⁹ of all the Greeks, you owe us this charity. It is said that when, in the Persian Wars, your fathers were driven from their homes, our fathers, alone of all the dwellers outside the Peloponnesos, shared their perils. At least, if you do not care for our lives, defend our land—in which are the trophies of the victory won by Hellas from all Asia. Think of the ³⁰ gods and heroes who hold the place; think of your fathers, and of the feeling which would be theirs, if they could know that their graves were unvisited by offerings because the traitors who fought against them had swept their comrades from the soil. You used to make it the greatest reproach against the Spartans that Plataea had been destroyed to please Thebes; do not let that reproach fall upon you. Much must be left unsaid. But remember your oaths and the treaty; remember our friendship and their enmity; and give righteous judgment in our cause’ (§§ 56—63).

The Plataikos shows great power of a certain ³¹ kind: it is a glowing denunciation of a cruelty; and the peroration especially has true and noble pathos (§§ 56—62). But if the reasoning is examined it will appear that the pleas urged are liable to some abatement; and that, on grounds of general policy, there was something to be said for the Thebans. When the Plataean speaker appeals to the peace of Antalkidas³², he forgets that Plataea could derive no right from that treaty, since Plataea did not exist when the treaty was made³³. And, though the character of the town since 386 as a Spartan outpost may have been imposed upon it by force³⁴, it was still natural that that character should make Plataea obnoxious to the head of an anti-Spartan Confederacy. Thebes might urge with plausibility that the measures taken against Plataea, however severe, were necessary in the interest of the allies³⁵. This view—as we learn from the speech itself—was taken by several Athenian debaters³⁶; and it was the view which prevailed, ³⁷ for no attempt was at this time made to restore Plataea.

II. 2. On the Peace.

2. On the Peace [Or. VIII.]. Like the Areopagitikos, this political pamphlet has the form of a deliberative speech, purporting to be spoken in the ekklesia (§§ 1, 15). But the fiction is not so well kept up as in the case of the Areopagitikos, which concludes with an appeal to the assembly. Here the conclusion is more suitable to an essay than to a speech in debate, as if the writer had forgotten the supposition with which he set out (§ 145). In 357 B.C. Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium revolted from Athens. The Social War was concluded about midsummer, 355, by a treaty which declared the revolted states to be independent, and no longer members of the Athenian Confederacy. The Speech On the Peace³⁸ was probably written while negotiations for peace were pending, i.e. in the first half of 355 B. C.³⁹. The ambassadors whose ‘offers’ are spoken of in § 25 must be envoys sent by the allies⁴⁰. But the first overtures of peace had come from Athens, under pressure of Persian threats; and it is rather singular that no allusion to Persian hostility occurs in the speech⁴¹.

‘It is the custom of everyone who addresses this assembly ⁴² to premise that the subject on which he is about to speak is the greatest and the gravest that could be discussed. In this instance, if in any, such a preface would be fitting. We are here to consider the question of peace or war.

‘You are wont to drive from the platform all speakers but those whose advice meets your wishes; for, though in private life you hate flattery, you tolerate it in the counsels of the State. On the present occasion the advocates of war are ⁴³ naturally your favourites. They promise you the recovery of wealth and power. The supporters of peace have no such inducements to offer; they can only represent that it is best to remain quiet and not to seek dishonest gains. They preach that most difficult of virtues,—contentment. I fear for their success; for I observe that some are as eager for war as if it had been revealed to them by a god that we must conquer. If, however, the future is not indeed so certain, you ought not only to hear both sides, but to hear with especial attention that side to which your first inclinations do not lean.

‘The older among you ought to recollect, the younger must have heard, that advocates of war have ere now brought us into trouble,—but advocates of peace, never. Yet we are ⁴⁴ always ready to plunge into war in anyone's quarrel, even when we cannot promote our own advantage. The reason is that, whereas in our private affairs we pick our advisers carefully, in public concerns we listen to drunkards rather than to sober men, to folly rather than to prudence.

‘It is up-hill work to oppose your prejudices; we have a democracy, but freedom of speech is enjoyed only by the most foolish members of this Assembly and by the comic poets in the theatre. As, however, I am not here to court your votes, I shall say what I think; first, about the special business which the presidents have brought before us; then, about the affairs of Athens generally (§§ 1—15).

‘I say, then, that we ought to make peace, not only with ⁴⁵ Chios and Rhodes, and Byzantium but with all the world;— that we ought to adopt, not any special treaty drawn up for this occasion, but that broad treaty, arranged between Sparta and Persia, which guaranteed the independence of every Hellenic city.

‘It will be asked why, if Thebes is to keep Plataea and Thespiae, Athens should needlessly resign what she holds. I hope to show on general grounds that all unjust acquisition is impolitic; but I will first endeavour to show what would be the results of this particular peace.

‘Security—prosperity—the esteem of Greece:—should ⁴⁶ we be satisfied if we obtained these things? What more we can desire, I know not. Well, all these things have been taken from us by the war, and will be restored by the peace. The war has given us peril—poverty—unpopularity. If we renounced it, we could obtain by diplomacy all that we are vainly fighting for. Philip⁴⁷ would not contest Amphipolis with us;—Kersobleptes⁴⁸ would not contest the Chersonese,— if they were once convinced that we were safe neighbours and that our policy was not aggressive. They would even resign to us something of their own, in order to have us as guarantors of their own power. We could get a slice of Thrace large enough for ourselves and for some of the distressed Greeks too. Athenodoros⁴⁹, a private man, and Kallistratos⁵⁰, an exile, have planted towns there; much more could we. And such enterprises would become our rank in Hellas better than wars waged by mercenary troops (§§ 16—24).

‘This is enough to show that the offer of the envoys is advantageous. But I wish you to go away, not merely ⁵¹ persuaded to accept this peace, but convinced that, universally, it is better to be quiet than to meddle. We fancy that nothing can go well with us unless we hold the sea with a large fleet and force the other cities to pay rates to us and to send deputies to Athens. It would not be difficult to show that honesty is the best national pohcy; and that a State which is tempted to become aggressive is like an animal which a bait draws into a trap. But, after proving this in theory, it is less easy to enforce it in practice. Athens has long been corrupted by a class of bribed impostors who presume to bid us imitate our ancestors. What ancestors? Those who won Marathon, or those who brought on the disaster in Sicily? If the former, then ⁵² the contrast between their policy and that recommended to us is such as nothing but a sense of our desperate state could give me the courage to bring before you. Those ancestors fought for the Greeks against Asia. We bring Asiatic mercenaries against Greece. They exposed their lives for the safety of Hellas. We will not risk ours even to gratify our greed. Out of our penury, we pay mercenaries whose crimes we screen, but who would join a higher bidder against us. Not only when Athens was popular, but when she was most hated, her citizens fought her battles themselves, although the treasury was overflowing. Then, the aliens and slaves rowed the triremes and the citizens fought. Now, ⁵³ Athens is like Persia—an employer of hireling troops; and, in her fleet, the needy citizens are forced to row, while foreigners carry arms. When we make a descent on a hostile coast, the alien comes ashore with shield and spear,—the citizen—with a cushion (§§ 25—48).

‘Our prospects abroad, however, would not be hopeless if ⁵⁴ it was well with our domestic affairs. But these are in a state which calls for indignation. We, who are so proud of ⁵⁵ being children of the soil, have lavished our franchise on aliens with as little care for the purity of our blood as if we were Triballi or Leukani. The penalty for bribing is death; and yet the largest bribers of the ekklesia become our generals. ⁵⁶ We cherish the Constitution as the very life of the State; yet we reproach the advocates of peace with desiring an oligarchy, and court war, though by war the democracy has twice been overthrown. We are practised in debate and administration; yet we do not know our own minds for a day. We consider ourselves the most intelligent of the Greeks—and listen to the most contemptible advisers, making the worst citizens guardians of the city. Our ancestors judged that the ablest counsellors made the best generals. Our ⁵⁷ counsellors are not trusted to lead; we send out as generals, with plenary powers, our most incapable men (§§ 49—56).

‘Some one to whom these remarks apply may be stung into asking—‘How is it that, if our policy is so bad, we are still on a level with any city in Greece?’ ‘Because,’ I ⁵⁸ answer, ‘our competitors are as weak as ourselves. We save the Thebans, and they save us. It would be worth the while of either to provide pay for the ekklesiasts of the other. The oftener either holds assemblies, the better for its rival.’ If some more thoughtful questioner, admitting that the evils exist, were to ask me what remedy I propose, I should be more at a loss for an answer; not for a satisfactory answer, but for one which would find favour with you (§§ 57—62).

‘True national prosperity depends on a religious respect ⁵⁹ for the rights of one's neighbours. How is the character which respects those rights most readily to be produced among us? By the surrender of our maritime Empire. Bear with me if I tell you that that empire is unjust, untenable, unprofitable. Unjust, because one city cannot claim to rule Hellas—a principle which we ourselves proclaimed in the case of Sparta; untenable, because wealth failed to hold it, and we are poor; unprofitable for both these reasons, and for others of which I will speak, if you will hear me as the admonisher, not denouncer, of Athens (§§ 63—73).

‘Let us compare the period before, and the period after, ⁶⁰ the city's acquisition of maritime empire. The difference between them is the difference between Aristeides, Themistokles, Miltiades on the one hand, and Hyperbolos, Kleophon, the demagogues of to-day, on the other. Athens had formerly commanded the admiration and the confidence of the Greeks for whom she had fought. Empire demoralised and abased her; her citizens dared not go outside their walls to meet the enemy; her fleet, manned by all the scoundrels in Greece, was its scourge; nothing but the moderation of Sparta saved her from political annihilation. The men of Imperial ⁶¹ Athens had reduced the art of unpopularity to a science. In the theatre, at the Dionysia, they used to display the balance of the money levied on their allies,—bringing in, at the same time, the children of those who had fallen in the war; thus reminding the allies of the extortion practised upon them, and the other Greeks present of the misery wrought by means of this plunder. It was the men of the empire who formed designs against Sicily, Italy, Carthage, at a moment when enemies held the suburbs⁶² of Athens. Under their ⁶³ rule more disasters happened than in all the earlier or later history of the city—disasters in Egypt⁶⁴, at Cyprus⁶⁵, at Daton⁶⁶, in Sicily, in the Hellespont; until the public tombs were filled with citizens and the public registers with aliens. The happiest people is that by whom the old families are cherished; the best statesmen are those who deserve, but do not grasp, power. Such was the Athens, such were the Athenians of the time of the Persian Wars; and therefore they did not lead the lives of pirates. Their successors, instead of ruling for the good of their subjects, wished to tyrannise for their own; and they met with the fate of tyrants. No person not reckless alike of the past and of the future could wish to imitate them. The earlier and the later experiences of Athens prove, in fact, two things; that Attica produces good men, and that empire spoils them (§§ 74—94).

‘The effect of naval supremacy may be further seen in ⁶⁷ the case of Sparta. Her polity, unaltered and unshaken through seven centuries⁶⁸, was all but overthrown when she became imperial. Her sins against Greece were thus far worse than ours, that faction and bloodshed, entailing perpetual feuds, were rife in her subject cities. She was ⁶⁹ ungrateful, also, to all her benefactors in turn—to Thebes, to Chios, to Persia. She established despots in Italy and Sicily; and in the Peloponnesos outraged Elis, Corinth, Mantineia, Phlius, Argos. In fact she never ceased doing violence until she had prepared for herself the calamity of ⁷⁰ Leuktra,—which was not the beginning of her misfortunes but the result of her folly. She was ruined by the arrogance of Empire—Empire, which allures and betrays like a false mistress. Ought not the traitress to be detested who has brought both Athens and Sparta to misery? It is no marvel that, nevertheless, all woo Empire. No men know their own real ⁷¹ interests. We, by meddling, prepared the Spartan ascendancy, and they, by insolence, brought about a reaction in our favour. The demagogues led up to the Thirty Tyrants, and these, in turn, made all of us ultra-democrats. The case is the same in regard to monarchy. Absolute power is universally coveted, though all know that an absolute ruler has an anxious life and usually a violent death. You admit this, and are yet unwilling to apply the same reasoning to the case of an Imperial State. You even allow that the despotism of Thebes wrongs Boeotia; but will not admit that your own government injures your allies. If, then, you listen to me, you will consider through what causes Athens and Sparta rose to rule Hellas, and then came into peril of enslavement; through what causes the Thessalians have lost their hereditary wealth, while the Megarians, placed among enemies and originally ⁷² poor, have become the richest of the Greeks. It is moderation that has brought the blessing, intemperance that has brought the curse,—a curse which sometimes tarries, which an individual sometimes eludes by death, but from which there is no escape for the immortality of a State (§§ 95—120).

‘Remembering this, you must not be led by demagogues ⁷³ who, in their words and in their deeds, resemble those who brought Athens to ruin. It was not such men as these who made, and kept, the city great; or who brought back from exile the victims of the Peisistratidae or of the Thirty. While Athens acquires a name for rapacity throughout Greece, these men enrich themselves at our cost. Perikles, one of ⁷⁴ the earliest demagogues⁷⁵, at least did not fill his own purse, though he left 8,000 talents in the akropolis. Now, we hear nothing but the lamentations of those who are absolutely starving, or of those who, though not destitute, are crushed by public imposts. Unprincipled speakers and demagogues are our worst enemies. They do not merely compromise our national name; it is their interest that each one of us should be in actual want, and so at their mercy. They delight, therefore, in impeachments, indictments, and all that machinery of calumny by which we can be brought to the beggary which makes their wealth (§§ 121—131).

‘To sum up—the conditions of restoring Athens to ⁷⁶ prosperity are three:—that we should cease to assume that every informer is a true democrat, and every honourable man an oligarch;—that we should treat allies as friends, not as slaves;—that we should value above all things the esteem of Greece.

‘If you do this—and if, at the same time, you show yourselves warlike in preparation, but peaceful in the justice. of your policy—Greece will be tranquillised, seeing your power ready to step in to the support of the injured. In any event, however, Athens will gain reputation. If wars cease, the credit will be ours. If they do not, we shall be the recognised champions of the weak. The infirmities of age do not suffer me to express all that I foresee as in store for us. But, in one word, let us be the deliverers, not the despoilers of Greece.

‘The position among the Hellenes at which Athens ought to aim is like that which the kings of Sparta held among the Lacedaemonians. These kings are not despots, but leaders ⁷⁷ who command a devoted loyalty; the Spartan who shrank from dying for them would be more disgraced than if he cast away his shield.

‘Two things warn me to cease—the length of this speech, and the number of my years. Let younger men strive, by speaking and writing, to give an honest direction to the politics of Greece. They may remember that, when Greece prospers, her most thoughtful men prosper too’ (§§ 132—145).

The Speech On the Peace excels in one respect ⁷⁸ almost all the other compositions of Isokrates. The elaborate evenness of his usual style is here broken by a sincere indignation; the disasters, moral and material, brought on Athens by the war rouse him to direct and vigorous utterance. Chares and Aristophon, the leaders of the War Party, are the men at whom his attack is specially levelled⁷⁹. It is this definite significance which gives their sting to his invectives against the corrupt generals⁸⁰ and the corrupt statesmen⁸¹.

Dionysios admires the Speech as an exhortation to a just and upright policy⁸²; Isokrates himself quotes it in the Antidosis⁸³ as an example of practical advice on contemporary affairs. The tenor of the advice is this:—Let Athens resign empire ( ἀρχή), and be content with hegemony,—the headship of a Confederacy of which all the members shall be free —such a Confederacy as she presided over just after the Persian Wars. Abstinence from aggression, and the manifestation of a just temper, of a resolution to protect the weak against the strong, will suffice to place and to keep Athens at the head of such a league. Isokrates fails to remark that the Athenian hegemony of 478, and the revived hegemony of 378, had passed into empire by the same inevitable process. He has an ideal of a free confederacy which experience has not taught him to be impossible; and for the attainment of this ideal he believes nothing to be needful but that Athens should become and appear virtuous. In the Areopagitikos he propounds a simple return to old constitutional forms as the remedy for the internal disorders of Athens; in the speech he maintains that her ⁸⁴ foreign policy may be amended and made triumphant by a return to the spirit of Aristeides⁸⁵. The counsel is in itself good and noble, but is thoroughly unpractical; it estimates in a manner infinitely too flattering what Athens was capable of doing and what Hellas was ready to accept.

II. 3. Archidamos

Archidamos [Or. VI.]. At the beginning of 366 B. C. Sparta, Athens, Corinth and the smaller states dependent on Corinth, as Epidauros and Phlius, were allied, and were at war with Thebes and her allies, of whom the chief was Argos. But in that year the treacherous attempt of Athens to seize Corinth gave the Corinthians a sense of insecurity and a desire for peace. They⁸⁶ accordingly sent envoys to Thebes, asking on what terms peace would be granted to the allies. The Thebans prescribed, as one condition of peace, the recognition of the independence of Messene, the new state founded by Epameinondas in 370⁸⁷. A congress met at Sparta. The Spartans refused to recognise the independence of Messene; and accordingly remained, with Athens, at war against Thebes. The Corinthians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, and probably some other small states⁸⁸, accepted the condition, and made peace on their own account, B.C. 366: see § 91.

The Archidamos is in the form of a deliberative speech. It purports to be spoken, in 366 B. C., by ⁸⁹ Archidamos III., son of the king Agesilaos, during a debate⁹⁰ at Sparta on the Theban proposal. There seems no reason to doubt that the speech was written in 366 B.C., either just before or soon after the actual decision of the question⁹¹. It may have been composed in the first instance as an exercise⁹²; yet, as discussing a question of contemporary politics from the point of view which a large party at Sparta must really have taken, it claims to be considered as something more. Isokrates probably sent it to Archidamos,—not, of course, for delivery, but as a proof of sympathy with the Spartan policy⁹³.

‘Perhaps some of you will be surprised that I, who have always been loyal to the customs of Sparta, should, in spite of my youth⁹⁴, come forward to advise. Had my elders given counsel worthy of Sparta, I should have been silent. As it is, some of them have supported the demand of the enemy; others have but faintly opposed it. I must not, through regard for what becomes me individually, allow the State to pass a resolution which would dishonour it.

‘The royal house of Sparta is responsible for the conduct of war; surely it ought to have a voice in the debates on which war depends. The present crisis is the gravest in which Sparta has ever been placed. The question is not ⁹⁵ whether we shall rule others, but whether we shall obey the dictates of an enemy. As a descendant of Herakles, as son of a king of Sparta and heir of his dignity, I cannot look on in silence while the country left to us by our ancestors is made over to our slaves. Such a surrender would be for Thebes a triumph greater than Leuktra; a victory over that which they failed to conquer when they broke our ranks— the Spartan spirit (§§ 1—10).

‘Our allies urge us to resign Messenia and to make ⁹⁶ peace. Worse traitors than those who revolted from us formerly and ruined only themselves, these seek to rob us of the glory which our ancestors were seven hundred years⁹⁷ in winning. We have often fought for our allies; they refuse to fight for us, and threaten, if we hold out, to make peace on their own account. Let them: a struggle without them will bring us the more honour (§§ 11—14).

‘I am no lover of words; but it will be useful at this moment to trace the historical claims of Sparta to Messene (§§ 15—16).

‘When Herakles had passed from earth to the gods, his ⁹⁸ children were long vexed by Eurystheus; then, after their enemy's death, they settled among the Dorians. Their descendants in the third generation had occasion to consult the oracle at Delphi. It told them nothing as to the special object of their visit; but bade them go to their fatherland. Reflecting, they found that Argos belonged to them by hereditary right—since the offspring of Herakles were now the only representatives of Perseus: Lacedaemon, by gift—for Heracles had bestowed it upon Herakles who had restored him from exile: Messene, by conquest—for Herakles, wronged by Neleus and his sons, had slain them and taken their town.

‘Deeming that the oracle spoke of all these places, the ⁹⁹ Herakleidae rallied your ancestors around them, promising to divide the territory among their followers, but reserving the royalty to themselves. It need not be told how they conquered the Peloponnesos and divided it into three chief kingdoms. You have kept to this day the compact which your ancestors made with mine. But the Dorian invaders of Messenia had scarcely been settled in it when they slew their own leader and founder, the Heraklid Kresphontes. His sons fled to Sparta, imploring vengeance for their father, and offering Messenia to us. Encouraged by an oracle, we made war and conquered the country. Our right to it thus ¹⁰⁰ rests on the same grounds as our right to Lacedaemon; that is,—on the gift of the Herakleidae; on an oracle; and on conquest (§§ 17—25).

‘All titles to possession are made stronger by length of occupancy. We acquired Messene before the Persians were masters of Asia, and before some of the Greek cities had been founded. Yet the Thebans, while recognising, in the ¹⁰¹ case of Persia, a right less than two hundred years¹⁰² old, deny, in ours, a right of more than twice that age. Only the other day¹⁰³ they devastated Thespiae and Plataea; after an interval of four hundred years¹⁰⁴ they restore Messene—in each instance breaking oaths and treaties. Were they only bringing back genuine Messenians, it would be unjust; but in fact they are planting Helots on our frontier.

‘Further, our claim to Messene has been indirectly allowed by our enemies. We have had ere now to make a humiliating peace; but neither Persia nor Athens has ever asked us for Messene. Our claim was also recognised by the oracle at Delphi,—the most august in Greece. It advised ¹⁰⁵ us to accept the offer of the sons of Kresphontes, and showed us how to succeed in the war; but was silent to our enemies. In brief—we received Messene from its former owners—established our own right of conquest—drove out the impious foe of the Heraklidae—and have had our title confirmed by time, by the verdict of enemies, by the voice of the gods (§§ 26—33).

‘We are urged to make our decision on grounds of expediency, not of abstract justice. This is wrong in principle, and not easy in practice; for what is expediency? It is not clear that, supposing we obeyed Thebes, we should obtain a firm peace. Concessions of this kind always invite new attacks (§§ 34—39).

‘There are plenty of instances in which disasters as great ¹⁰⁶ as ours have been retrieved. Athens, to say nothing of her perils in remote times, came safely through the Persian war, and gained empire, because, when her position seemed desperate, she refused to listen to the dictates of the enemy. Dionysios¹⁰⁷ was on the point of abandoning Syracuse to the Carthaginians, when a friend reminded him that “royalty is a good winding-sheet”:—he remained, and triumphed. Amyntas¹⁰⁸ of Macedon, defeated by his neighbours and temporarily robbed of his whole realm, rallied, with a like result, from a like despair. Thebes is great now because she had patience to endure our attacks steadfastly. In short, good government and military skill are the two things needful to repair national misfortunes. No one will deny that in both these things we stand unrivalled (§§ 40—48).

‘Some advocate peace because war is a bad thing in itself. But that depends on circumstances. Peace is for the prosperous: war is certainly the best hope of the unfortunate. Those who would be free must make peace, not when the enemy bids them, but when they have become stronger than, or equal to, him (§§ 49—51).

‘We ought not to be less spirited in defending ourselves ¹⁰⁹ than we have always been in succouring others. Formerly, if a single Lacedaemonian went to the aid of a city allied with us, its deliverance was always ascribed to him. Pedaritos¹¹⁰ saved Chios, Brasidas saved Amphipolis, Gylippos saved Syracuse. What one Spartan could do for others, shall not the whole Lacedaemonian people be able to do for themselves? Asia and Europe are full of the trophies of our victories in the causes of others; in the cause of Sparta shall not one blow be struck? We can afford to keep numbers of horses at a great cost; and shall we make peace as if we were beggars? We have the name of being the most laborious of the Hellenes; and shall we accept the terms of the enemy after one defeat¹¹¹, one invasion¹¹²—resigning so quickly the country for which the Messenians themselves stood a siege of twenty years¹¹³, and forgetting the dangers by which our ancestors won it? (§§ 52—57).

‘Some, reckless of our honour, advise peace because ¹¹⁴ Sparta is weak and Thebes strong. But we have at least the strength of a good government, of temperate habits, of a brave spirit. Nor shall we lack external aid. Athens, though she is not with us in all things, will not see us destroyed. Dionysios of Syracuse; the king of Egypt; the various dynasts of Asia; the richest and most distinguished individuals in Hellas, whose political sympathies are with us—will help. Nay, even the democrats of the Peloponnese will soon begin to long once more for our protecting care, now that they have tasted the fruits of anarchy (§§ 58—69).

‘Even, however, if we were utterly forsaken, I should be ashamed to give up Messene, and to admit, either that our ancestral title to it was bad, or that we had relinquished a right. Probably the tide will turn soon. But, if the worst ¹¹⁵ comes, we must send away our women and children and old men to Sicily, Italy, Cyrene, Asia; we must quit Sparta; seize some strong position; and, from it, harass the enemy by land and sea. No city in the Peloponnese would long be able to bear what an army of desperadoes, unfettered by any polity, and able to plant themselves where they pleased, could inflict. Or if several towns combined, and brought their ill-disciplined levies to meet us in our fastnesses, what could serve us better? The essence of Sparta's strength lies in the resemblance of her civic system to an orderly and disciplined camp. If this resemblance becomes identity, what ¹¹⁶ can resist us? The Athenians, in the cause of Hellenic freedom, once left their homes; the Phokaeans removed to Massalia rather than submit to the Persian king. It would be strange if we did not choose to quit Sparta for a time rather than to obey the dictates of our former subjects. But our thoughts ought not to dwell on the possible necessity of leaving Sparta,—they ought to anticipate our triumphant return to it. I have not spoken of what must happen; rather of what ought to happen before we surrender Messene. No lasting peace could be gained by such a compromise. If the Helots were once established at our side, endless annoyance and danger would be our portion (§§ 70—87).

‘There could be no nobler cause in which to die than the present, when the prestige, when the very existence of Sparta is threatened. Epidauros, Corinth, Phlius¹¹⁷ may ¹¹⁸ without reproach prefer safety to honour; Sparta cannot. The reputation of the city ought to be as dear to each Spartan as his own: he ought not to suffer it to desert the post at which our fathers placed it. How could we ever show our faces at Olympia¹¹⁹ or at any Hellenic gathering, if we were to find our own slaves outshining us there by means of wealth taken from us? Dipaea¹²⁰, where a single line of Spartans routed many myriads of Arcadians; Thyrea, where three hundred Spartans defeated all the Argives; Thermopylae, where a thousand Spartans held their ground against the seventy myriads of Persia—ought to teach us selfreliance now. Nothing is hopeless in war. It was by war, not peace, that Athens and Thebes grew. And in this struggle we should be stimulated by remembering that all Hellas is watching us (§§ 88—106).

‘The true view of this crisis may be shortly given. By ¹²¹ staking our lives on this good cause we shall save them; cowardice would be not only base but fatal. Let us imagine children and parents pleading with us—these, for Sparta's future name; those, for her past. No king of our house has ever led you to defeat. Listen, then, as prudent men listen, to the advice of those who in practice have been found trusty guides’ (§§ 107—111).

The Archidamos has a real historical interest: it ¹²² may be taken as an expression, highly coloured but in the main faithful, of the feeling excited in a majority of Spartans by the reestablishment of Messenia at their side. The damage thus inflicted on Sparta did not consist merely in the reanimation of a hostile State which had long been in decay. It consisted in the creation anew of a hostile State which for three centuries had been dead; and in the subtraction, for that purpose, from Sparta of what had been for three centuries the fairest portion of her territory—of all the country from the Neda to C. Akritas and from the Western slopes of Taygetos to the sea¹²³. Archidamos denounces the allies who consented to such a measure as worse enemies to Sparta than helots and Messenians¹²⁴. He proposes that, if need be, the Spartans should send away the old and helpless— abandon Sparta—and pour themselves upon Messenia as homeless and desperate invaders¹²⁵. If the matter-of-fact narrative of Xenophon¹²⁶ gives no hint of any feeling so passionate as that which is expressed by the second Tyrtaeos, it vouches at least for a resolution no less firm; a resolution which, four years later, again decided Sparta against accepting a peace¹²⁷.

II. 4 Areopagitikos.

Areopagitikos [Or. VII.]—In this speech Isokrates contrasts the Athenian democracy as it existed in the middle of the 4th century B.C. with the democracy of Solon and of Kleisthenes (§ 16). He dwells chiefly on two features of the elder democracy:— 1. the preference of election ( αἵρεσις) to ballot ( κλήρωσις) in the appointment of state officers, §§ 22 ff.; 2. the supervision of public morals exercised by the Council of the Areiopagos: §§ 36—55. It is owing to the prominence of the latter topic that the speech has been called Ἀρεοπαγιτικός. It is cast in a ¹²⁸ deliberative form. Isokrates supposes himself to have given notice in writing to the prytanes of an intention to speak ‘On the Safety of Athens’ ( περὶ σωτηρίας πρόσοδον ἀπογράψασθαι, §§ 1, 15); and to be now urging in the ekklesia, as absolutely necessary to the welfare of the city, the restoration of censorial power to the Areiopagos (cf. § 84). Like the De Pace (Or. VIII.), this speech was not delivered, or meant for delivery, in the assembly. The deliberative form was adopted merely for the sake of giving greater life and impressiveness to the pleading.

The date is to be inferred from five indications:— ¹²⁹ (1) There was now peace on the frontiers of Attica ( τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν), and a confident sense of security at Athens, §§ 1—3: (2) The Athenians had ‘lost all the cities in Thrace’, (§ 9): (3) had spent more than 1000 talents on mercenaries, ib.: (4) had got a bad name in Hellas and incurred the enmity of Persia, § 10: (5) had been forced ‘to save the friends of the Thebans’ and to lose their own allies, ib.

These notices point to one of two dates; to 346 B.C., in which peace was concluded between Athens and Philip; or to 355, in which the Social War, begun in 357, was closed by a peace between Athens and her allies.

The year 346 best suits (2), since it was only in ¹³⁰ 347 that Philip became master of Olynthos and its confederate towns. On the other hand, a general sense of security (1) could not be said to have existed at Athens in 346. The war with Philip had been thoroughly disheartening; and the deep dismay at Athens when Philip occupied Phokis a few days¹³¹ after the final ratification of the peace, has been described by Demosthenes¹³². Further, if the speech belonged to 346, we should have expected in §§ 6, 7 some mention of Olynthos, the latest and most striking instance of sudden disaster to a confident city; and in §§ 8, 81 some mention of Macedonia as a quarter from which danger was supposed to threaten Athens; for, though Isokrates did not himself admit any such danger, he could not ignore the large party who in 346 apprehended it, and to whom he refers when he writes in that very year to Philip: Or. V. §§ 73—80.

The year 355 evidently fits (1), (2) and (4) of ¹³³ the conditions mentioned above. Though the necessity of recognising the autonomy of Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium had been humiliating for Athens, the number of smaller States which still paid the syntaxis was large enough to inspire the Athenians with pride and confidence, in the absence of any danger so formidable as that which presently began to threaten them from Macedonia. The troops of Chares had been almost wholly mercenaries, and it had been felt as a relief at Athens when Artabazos helped to pay them. Artaxerxes III., incensed by the aid given to his rebellious satrap, had sent (probably in 355) an embassy to Athens, threatening to help the Chians with 300 ships; and this threat had hastened the peace¹³⁴. As regards (2), it must be allowed that, if 355 is the true date, the ἁπάσας of § 9 is a rhetorical exaggeration. According to common usage, αἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πόλεις mean not only the towns of the Chalkidic peninsula, but often also the Greek colonies all along the southern coasts of Thrace¹³⁵. Philip had not yet got Olynthos or the 32 towns of its confederacy. He had, however, alienated the entire Olynthian confederacy from the Athenian interest; and had taken, in 358—356, Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaea. As to (5), the words in § 10, τοὺς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων φίλους σώζειν ἠναγκασμένοι τοὺς δ’ ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, have been explained in two different ways. Schäfer¹³⁶ refers them to the circumstance that during the Phokian war the Messenians, Argives and Megalopolitans had been threatened by Sparta, and on applying to Sparta had received a qualified promise of support. Rauchenstein¹³⁷ finds a better clue in the fact that Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium had been, since 364, friendly with Thebes¹³⁸. In allowing these important allies to be severed from her confederacy, and in guaranteeing their autonomy, Athens was therefore giving a deliverance to ‘friends of the Thebans.’ The sense thus put on σώζειν is somewhat strange; but, on the whole, the explanation seems tenable. The latter half of 355¹³⁹ B.C. may be taken as the date of the Areopagitikos.

‘It will be asked why I come forward to speak on the “safety” of Athens at a time when she has a fleet of more than two hundred triremes; peace on her frontiers; the command of the sea; numerous allies. It is, in truth, this very persuasion of security which alarms me. The rise and the fall, first of Athens, then of Sparta, prove that anxious watchfulness leads to success,—arrogance, to ruin. Our ¹⁴⁰ present prosperity is hollow. We have lost the cities in Thrace, spent great sums on mercenaries,—become unpopular in Greece,—revived our enmity with Persia,—saved the friends of Thebes and lost our own. Yet we have twice¹⁴¹ held a public thanksgiving; and in the ekklesia we are taking affairs as easily as if their position was absolutely satisfactory. The reason of this apathy lies deep. The whole political constitution of Athens is vitiated. When the victories, first of Konon, then of Timotheos, had given Athens the control of Hellas, she could not keep it for a moment. Her polity, her very soul, is distempered; and yet we do not attempt to minister to its disease. Chatting in the workshops, we admit that never under a democracy was there worse government; but in practice we are content to have it so. It is on this account that I have given notice of an intention to speak on the “safety” of Athens. Year by year her course becomes more perilous; and the only hope which I can see for her is in a return to the old paths. I wish to put before you the characteristics of that elder democracy which Solon founded and which Kleisthenes reconstituted. You can then choose between it and the present (§§ 1—19).

‘Under that democracy, licence was not confounded with freedom. Political “equality” has been understood in two ¹⁴² senses—as meaning either that all are to share absolutely alike, or that every man is to receive his due. Our ancestors preferred that “equality” which does not efface the distinction between merit and worthlessness. They did not take officials ¹⁴³ at random from the crowd, but picked the fittest for each task¹⁴⁴. They held, also, that appointment to office by lot was less truly democratic than selection. In the one case, chance prevails—in the other, the desire of choosing genuine friends of popular government. This system satisfied the people generally, because, in those days, everyone had his own business to attend to. Office was not yet looked upon as an easier source of income than private industry. The people collectively reigned; the rich men, who had leisure, served it as a duty (§§ 20—27).

‘Such was their political system. From it followed their ¹⁴⁵ relations to the gods and to each other. Their zeal in the services of religion was not spasmodic, but equable as the blessings for which it expressed their gratitude—regular as the sequence of seed-time and harvest. Their private intercourse was embittered by no class-feeling; the poor were proud of the great houses, and the rich helped all the enterprises of the needy. In a word, it was safe to have money, and easy to borrow it (§§ 28—35).

‘If it is inquired to what causes such results may be ¹⁴⁶ traced, the principal cause will be found to be this—that the education of the citizen did not end with his boyhood. The Court of the Areiopagos was the recognised guardian of public decorum. Its influence at that time upon the whole community may be judged from its influence at this day upon its own members. We see how the worst men, when raised to it, cease to obey their own natures and become loyal to its traditions. It was the principle of this Court that deterrent laws, however strict, are useless without positive moral discipline; that the happiness of citizens depends, not on ¹⁴⁷ having the walls of their porticoes covered with laws, but on having justice in their hearts. The Areiopagos aimed, not at punishing merely, but at preventing crime. It was especially watchful over young men. For the poorer youths, work was found in agriculture and commerce; for the richer, in vigorous exercises of mind and body. This watch was maintained over the daily life even of adults, and was aided by the division of the town into wards, of the country into demes. The Supreme Court knew well that two things chiefly restrain crime; probability of detection and certainty of punishment. Thus controlled, the young men of that time did not spend their days in the haunts popular now; nay, if they had to cross the marketplace, they did so with downcast eyes. Disrespect to elders, dissipation, buffoonery, were not then in fashion.

‘I do not mean to be hard upon youthful follies. My censure is meant for those statesmen who, a little before our own time¹⁴⁸, abolished the controlling power of the Areiopagos. While that power lasted, Attica was so secure from invasion ¹⁴⁹ and from faction that the houses in the country were handsomer than those within the walls; many citizens never came to town even for the festivals. The contrasts of a thoroughly vulgar policy were not to be seen then. There were no citizens casting lots for their daily bread¹⁵⁰ outside the lawcourts, while they paid strangers liberally to fight their battles: no choregi, blazing in golden robes, who were doomed to shiver through the winter in rags. The Areiopagos, while it had power, found employment for the poor and restrained the excesses of the wealthy (§§ 36—55).

‘Some who have heard this account of our ancestors’ life, while admiring it, have thought that my advice was unpractical—long habit cannot be broken through,—and also dangerous to myself. I shall be suspected, they say, of desiring an oligarchy. Now if I were praising some new ¹⁵¹ scheme of government, and urging the appointment of a special commission to carry it out, I might incur suspicion. As it is, I have only been urging a return to that old system under which, as everyone knows, Athens was greatest. On all other occasions, too, I have censured dynasty and supported democracy—not a reckless democracy, but one tempered like that of Sparta, in which the principle of equality is most truly expressed. If we go through the chief cities of Hellas, a democratical, not an oligarchical, form of government will be found to have been most frequently prosperous.

‘Even our corrupt democracy would seem god-made by the side of the government of the Thirty Tyrants. It was ¹⁵² their doing that the walls of Athens were levelled; that the dockyards, which had cost 1,000 talents, were destroyed by contract for three; that 1,500 citizens were put to death untried, and more than 5,000 banished. When the exiles were restored, the ekklesia generously voted the payment of a debt contracted by the adherents of the Thirty in making war upon the Peiraeus; Athens resumed, on the proposal of Sparta herself, the empire of the sea, and, later, was besought for help by the Power which, under the Thirty, had constantly dictated to her. I say this to show, first, that I am no friend of oligarchies: next, that even a bad democracy is a less evil than an oligarchy.

‘You may ask why, then, I am dissatisfied with this ¹⁵³ democracy, seeing that it has been productive of so much good? I answer that it is not enough to excel the Tyrants; we must strive to reach the standard of our ancestors. No race ought to be better than the Athenians. As other countries have their special products, Attica has her breed of men; we are of that breed, but at this moment we dishonour it. Enough of this: I return to my immediate subject (§§ 56—77).

‘If our general system of government remains unaltered, all its particular phenomena must continue the same—our conduct of war, our conduct of debate, the spirit of our private life. If we go back to the old system we shall get the old results. Then the Greeks trusted us; then the ¹⁵⁴ Persians launched no war-ship west of Phaselis; moved no camp beyond the Halys¹⁵⁵. The generals can tell you how the Greeks hate us now; the mind of the Persian king may be seen in his letters. Then, the citizens were so educated as to be a terror to invaders and to live comfortably with each other; now, not a man will fight but for pay, and there are more citizens destitute than solvent. If we imitate our ancestors we shall get rid of our own troubles and save Hellas. Believing this, I have come forward to urge it; reflect, and vote as you think best for Athens’ (§§ 78—84).

The purpose of the Areopagitikos involves a contrast between old times and new; it has therefore a double interest, as a picture of the past and of the present. As a picture of the older democracy it supplements the Panegyrikos. The Panegyrikos describes the external relations of Athens at the time of her most splendid activity¹⁵⁶; the Areopagitikos portrays the inner life by which that activity was created and nourished. As a picture of the new democracy, this speech may be compared with another spoken four¹⁵⁷ years later—with the First Philippic of Demosthenes. The First Philippic sets forth vividly the utter indifference of the Athenian public to the foreign concerns of Athens, their halfheartedness in all things, their habitual indolence broken by spasmodic efforts which always came too late: the Areopagitikos exposes in detail that civil and domestic life of which such a foreign policy was the counterpart. Demosthenes saw the true remedy in a more earnest attention to the actual crisis. Isokrates, who saw the inner decay but believed in no urgent danger from without, found the remedy in a simple return to old forms and manners¹⁵⁸.

The powers exercised by the Areiopagos before the reforms of Ephialtes were of two kinds, definite and indefinite. The definite powers were:—1. A limited criminal jurisdiction: 2. the supreme direction of religious worship, especially of the cultus of the Eumenides. The indefinite powers were:—1. A general supervision of all magistrates and law-courts: 2. a general guardianship of the laws, with the right of protest (though not of veto) when proposed new laws conflicted with old: 3. a general control of the education of the young: 4. a general censorship of public morals: 5. competence to assume, in emergencies of the State, a dictatorial authority¹⁵⁹.

The definite powers of the Areiopagos were never at any time taken from it¹⁶⁰. But Ephialtes abolished almost¹⁶¹ wholly the indefinite powers. It is for the revival of these—especially of (3) and (4)—that Isokrates is anxious. While it possessed these, the Areiopagos had been the strongest influence, though mainly a negative influence, in the State; it had been able to impress a conservative character upon the whole civic body¹⁶². Deprived of these, it was merely a criminal court of narrow competence. Its connection with what was most venerable in the old religion, and the high standing of its individual members, still secured to it, indeed, a large measure of respect. Isokrates speaks of the influences which, even in his own day, changed bad men when they became members of the college¹⁶³. But politically the Areiopagos was now powerless. The plea of Isokrates for a restoration of its strength is strikingly illustrated by the protest of Aeschylos against its enfeeblement. It is not on any welldefined function, but rather on those prerogatives which, being vague, were boundless, that orator and poet alike insist:—

Here, on the Hill of Ares,

Once seat and camp of Amazons who came

In anger against Theseus, and defied

From their new ramparts his acropolis,

And poured blood unto Ares, where is now

The hill, the rock of Ares—in this place

Awe kin to dread shall hold the citizens

From sinning in the darkness or the light,

While their own voices do not change the laws.

This Court, majestic, incorruptible,

Instant in anger, over those who sleep

The sleepless watcher of my land I set.

( Eum. 660 ff.)

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Sir Richard C. Jebb. London. 1876.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos (English) (The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Jebb, Richard Claverhouse, author. London: Macmillan, 1876.)

Notes on the current edition

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos

1. The Theban Revolution.

2. Grote, c. 77, vol. X. p. 217, n. 1.

3. Plataea.

4. Diodor. XV. 46.

5. Paus. IX. 1. 6.

6. Occasion of this Speech.

7. Pausanias (IX. 1. 8) defines the time as the third year before Leuktra, when Asteios was Archon (i. e. midsummer 373—midsummer 372). Schäfer ( Dem. I. 61), whom I follow, takes the last half of 373: Grote (c. 77, vol. X. p. 219) the first half of 372. Clinton, F. H. 374 B.C.

8. Diod. XV. 38: Grote c. 77, X. 221.

9. Paus. IX. 1. 8.

10. Cf. Grote, c. 77, X. 220.

11. Date.

12. Analysis.

13. Object of the Appeal.

14. § 1. εἰρηνης οὔσης. This is understood by Grote (c. 77, vol. X. p. 217 n.) as meaning simply that Plataea and Thebes were at peace —the autonomy of Plataea, subjcet to the Boeotian confederacy, having been guaranteed by Thebes when she reconstituted that confederacy in 377—376. Thirlwall, on the other hand (vol. V. pp. 70—73), understands the peace of 374 between Athens and Sparta, to which, he thinks, Thebes was a party, and under which the Spartan garrisons had been withdrawn from Boeotia. The words ἢν πάλιν γένηται πόλεμος (§ 43) must, as the context shows, refer to a prospective war between Athens and Sparta; and imply that, when the Plataikos was written, those States were at peace. But the peace of 374 was of very short duration; and, if the reference is to it, the Plataikos would appear to belong to the year 37 4/3. Diodoros does, indeed, place the surprise of Plataea in that year (XV. 41, 46), and Clinton agrees with him. On the other hand, the clear and precise specification of the year 37 3/2 by Pausanias (IX. 1. 3—8) as that in which Plataea was seized, can scarcely be set aside. Schäfer, placing the Plataikos in the latter half of 373, thinks that the peace of 374 was still formally in force, but that Athens was on the point of resuming hostilities against Sparta; cf. § 38 (Schäf. Demosth. I. p. 61 n.).

15. Pretexts of Thebes: (1) that Plataea rejected dependence:

16. § 9. The walls of Thespiac had been razed soon after the destruction of Plataea (Diod. XV. 46), but the inhabitants had not, like the Plataeans, been driven from their territory. Pausanias speaks of the Thespians as retreating from their town to Kerèssos, a neighbouring stronghold, after Leuktra (IX. 14. 2). The praycr to the Athenians, which Xenophon puts into their month— μὴ σφᾶς περιϊδεῖν ἀπόλιδας γενομένους—is snfficiently explained by the destruction of their walls—to which the τῶν μὲν τὰ τείχη κατεσκάφασι of § 35 may (as Mr Grote suggests) refer. Cf. Schäf. Dem. I. p. 62, n 1.

17. (2) that Plataea was leagued with Sparta.

18. Athens must defend the autonomy of the cities.

19. § 20. In 412 B C. Oropos had been treacherously seized by the Boeotians (Thuc. VIII. 60), and in 402 it was still in their power (Diod. XIV. 17). But at some time between 402 and 374 Oropos had placed itself under the protection of Athens. At the congress of 374 at Sparta—resulting in the brief peace between Sparta and Athens —Thebes probably laid claim to Oropos, but without success: cf. § 37 and see Schäf. Dem. I. 47. In 366 Oropos was seized by a party of exiles and placed in the hands of the Thebans (Xen. H. VII. 4. 1). It was not until, in 338, Philip gave the town to the Athenians that their possession of it became secure: see Paus. I. 34. 1.

20. The Theban policy.

21. Plataea and Thebes— their deeds towards Athens contrasted.

22. i.e. in 427 and in 373 B.C.

23. In the debate held at Sparta, after Aegospotami, on the terms which should be granted to Athens (405 B.C.). But Isokrates exaggerates. Not the Thebans alone, but the Corinthians and many others of the Peloponnesian allies, voted for the extermination of Athens. It was by Sparta alone that Athens was saved.—Xen. Hellen. II. ii. 19; Grote, c. 65, vol. VIII. p. 311.

24. No danger from Thebes.

25. § 37. The Thebans were excluded from the peace of 374 B.C. between Athens and Sparta—as afterwards from the general peace of 371—because they insisted on the formal recognition of Thebes as head of the Panbocotic confederacy: Schäf. Dem. I. 47.

26. The Peace of Antalkidas must be upheld.

27. Miseries of the Plataeans.

28. § 48, μικρῶν ἕνεκα συμβολαίων δουλεύοντας. Isokrates has borrowed this touch from Lysias Against Eratosthenes (Or. XII.) § 98, μικρῶν ἂν ἕνεκα συμβολαίων ἐδούλευον.

29. Appeal to gratitude:

30. and to the sacredness of the Plataean land.

31. Remarks.

32. § 18.

33. Cf. Grote, c. 77, vol. x. p. 220.

34. §§ 11—16.

35. §§ 21—25.

36. § 3.

37. The result.

38. Date.

39. Clinton says ‘before the conclusion of the peace—perhaps in the beginning of 355.’ Thirlwall— ‘while the negotiation with the allics was pending, or soon after the peace’; but, Isokrates would hardly have delayed the publication till the question which he discussed had been aetually settled. Schäfer puts the speech in 355; so, too, Benseler (1854). Oncken ( Isokrates und Athen, Appendix) argues for 357 B.C.— just after the attack of Chares on Chios.

40. Cf. Schäf. Dem. I. 169.

41. Thirl. v. p. 325, ch. 42.

42. Analysis.

43. Popularity of the WarParty.

44. Athens too ready to espouse quarrels.

45. True basis for peace— the Treaty of Antalkidas

46. Advantages of peace for Athens.

47. § 22. Philip had now been for two years (since 357 B.C.) in actual possession of Amphipolis.

48. Ib. By a treaty concluded in 357 between Chares and Kersobleptes, the Thracian Chersonese, with the exception of Kardia, was formally recognised as belonging to Athens. But the treaty was not at once fully executed,—Sestos, among other places, still remaining in the hands of Kersobleptes; and hence Isokrates can still, in 355, speak of that prince as disputing the claim of Athens. See Schäf. Demosth. I. pp. 144, 380.

49. § 24. Athenodoros of Imbros, by birth an Athenian citizen (Dem. in Aristocr. § 12), had served with distinction as a captain of mercenaries in the army of Artaxerxes Ochos during the war (360 B. C.) between the king and his satrap Orontes, who was supported by an Athenian force under Chares, Charidemos and Phokion. In that contest for the throne of Thrace which ensued on the death of Kotys in 359, Berisades was supported by Athenodoros, as Kersobleptes by Charidemos, and Amadokos by Simon and Bianor. The position of Athenodoros at that time (359— 357) would have been one of sufficient influence to enable him to become founder (oekist) of a new town, though he was merely an ἰδιώτης, i.e. neither a prince nor the official representative of a city. Schäf. Dem. I. pp. 137—144.

50. Ib. Kallistratos of Aphidna, the orator, was condemned to death, and withdrew into exile, in 361 B. C. It was in 360 (Schäf. Dem. I. 120), that he induced the Thasians to recolonise the decayed town of Daton or Datos on the coast of Thrace, N.W. of Thasos. The excellence of the site, and its neighbourhood to the gold mines of Pangaeos, gave rise to the proverb Δάτος ἀγαθῶν (Zenob. prov. Graec. Cent. 3. 11). The young colony was destroyed four years later, when, in 356, Philip founded Philippi in its near neighbourhood. Daton was probably on the site of Neapolis, the port of Philippi (Scylax, p. 27 § 67). Schäfer places the return of Kallistratos to Athens (immediatcly followed by his death) in 355, before the end of the Social War, and observes that there is nothing in this passage to warrant the inference that he was alive when it was written. But the perfect γεγόνασιν (§ 24) surely implies that Kallistratos, as well as Athcnodoros, still lived. The return of Kallistratos may perhaps be placed in 354, the year after this speech, when Aristophon and Chares brought Iphikrates, Menestheus and Timotheos to trial. Kallistratos, sympathising strongly with the accused, would have been tempted to come back to Athens at any risk for the sake of standing by them at such a time.

51. Aggressive ambition is a snare.

52. The men of Marathon.

53. Citizens no longer fight.

54. Home affairs.

55. Alien intruders.

56. Corruption.

57. The statesmen are no longer the generals.

58. Thebes is as bad as Athens.

59. The remedy —to resign the Empire of the sea

60. Athens before and after she was Imperial

61. The men of the Empire.

62. § 85. Dekeleia—here called a προαστεῖον of Athens—was 14 miles N. of it, and as many from the Boeotian frontier. It was occupied by the Pcloponncsians in the spring of 413 B.C.; and the Sicilian disaster came in September of the same year. It is of this passage that Dionysios is probably thinking when he speaks of Isokrates as censuring, in the De Pace, τοὺς πρὸ τῶν Δεκελεικῶν γενομένους ( de Isocr. c. 8). As to the large schemes of conquest—embracing Italy and Libya—entertained at Athens in 415, see Curtius Hist. Gr. bk. IV. C. IV. VOL. III. p. 303 tr. Ward.

63. What they brought about.

64. § 86. Alluding to the destruction, in 455 B C., of the Athenian armament sent to aid Inaros.

65. Ib. In 449 B.C. Kimon laid siege to Citium in Cyprus. After his death, hissuccessor Anaxikrates was compelled by famine to raise the siege; but the fleet was soon afterwards victorious near Salamis (Thuc. I. 112). Either Isokrates is here inisrepresenting the unsuccessful siege as the destruction ( διεφθάρησαν, § 86) of an Athenian armament; or he may refer to the earlier expedition in 460 B.C. of the Athenians and their allies, with 200 ships, to Cyprus, which Thucydides mentions (I. 104), but of which he gives no particulars, except that it was ultimately abandoned for the purpose of helping Inaros in Egypt.

66. § 86. ἐν Δάτῳ δὲ μυρίους ὁπλίτας αὑτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἀπώλεσαν. As to the site of Daton see note above. Herodotos mentions—but without closer definition of the time than that it was after 378 B. C.—an incident to which Isokrates is perhaps referring:—

αὐτὸν δὲ Σωφάνεα χρόνῳ ὕστερον τούτων κατέλαβε ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενόμενον Ἀθηναίων στρατηγέοντα ἅμα Λεάγρῳ τῷ Γλαύκωνος ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ Ἠδώνων ἐν Δάτῳ περὶ τῶν μετάλλων τῶν χρυσέων μαχεόμενον,

IX. 75 . But the μυρἱους looks as if Isokrates was thinking also of the destruction, by the Thracians, of 10,000 Athenians at Drabëskos near Ennea Hodoi in 465 B.C.: Thuc. I. 100.

67. Imperial Sparta,

68. § 95. The beginning of the ‘seven centuries’ is taken from 1104 B C.—the legendary epoch of the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesos. Cf. Isokr. Archid. § 12 δόξαν ἣν οἱ πρόγονοι...ἐν ἑπτακοσίοις ἔτεσι κτησάμενοι κατέλιπον; and Panathen. § 204.

69. her insolence;

70. her fall.

71. Dangers of Empire.

72. Why Megara is rich.

73. The demagogues.

74. Perikles.

75. § 126. Περικλῆς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τοιούτων δημαγωγὸς καταστάς. Cf. Panathen. § 148, where Peisistratos also is described as a δημαγωγός.

76. Three conditions of welfare.

77. The Spartan Kings.

78. Remarks.

79. Cf. Schäf. Dem. I. p. 168. Arist. Rhet. III. 17.

80. §§ 45—56.

81. §§ 121—131.

82. Dionys. de Isocr. c. 8.

83. Antid. §§ 62 ff.

84. On the Peace.

85. Cf. § 75.

86. And not the Spartans, as the author of the ὑπόθεσις wrongly says: cf. Grote, c. 79, vol. x p. 309 n.

87. Grote and Schäfer place the first invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas, and the commencement of the new town of Messene, at the close of 370 B.C.; Clinton, at the beginning of 369 B.C. Xenophon speaks of the restoration as complete in 368: Hellen. VII. 1. 27.

88. As Troezen and Hermione: Grote, c. 79, x. p. 400.

89. Date and occasion.

90. It may be questioned whether the scene of the debate was (1) the Gerousia, or (2) the Assembly of Spartan citizens above thirty. ( ἄπελλα, Plut. Lys. 35), or (3) that more select assembly of citizens— probably limited to the ὅμοιοι— which is heard of as being convened in special emergencies: Xen. Hellen. III. 3. 18. But, except the kings and the ephors, no citizen under 60 years of age could be a member of the Gerousia. On the other hand it is certain that the Public Assembly ( ἡ ἐκκλησία τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Thuc. I. 87) was sometimes the scene of a real debate, (and not merely of passive voting)—as of the debate in which the Peloponnesian War was decided upon: Thuc. I. 79—87. The king Archidamos and the ephor Stenelaidas are, indeed, the only speakers named on that occasion: and probably a private citizen could speak only by permission. Archidamos, though a Heraklid and next heir to the throne, apologises for presuming to speak: but mainly on account of his youth: §§ 1—2.

91. Referring to the opinion of Niebuhr that the Archidamos was written after the battle of Mantineia, Thirlwall says—‘We must however remember the speech which Cleon made for Lysander, and that Xenophon ( H. VII. 4. 9) gives us reason to believe that the spirit prevailing at Sparta was just that which breathes through the Archidamus’: V. p. 178, c. 40.

92. The Μεσσηνιακός of Alkidamas of Elaea (Ar. Rhet. I. 13. II. 23) may, as Spengel thinks ( συναγ. τεχν. XXIV), have been composed in rivalry of the Archidamos.

93. Spengel says of the Archidamos ( συν. τεχν. XXIV) ‘non est ut Philippus oratio Archidamo missa, sed declamatio.’ It is not easy to see why the fact of the speech being a declamation should exclude the hypothesis of its having been sent to Archidamos.—The speaker's apology for the length of his remarks (§§ 15, 16) may be noticed as an attempt to give the composition something of a Spartan air. But Spartan brevity was now no longer so severe as formerly: cf. Plut. Apophth. 16 (quoted by Thirlwall V. 179), where Epameinondas replies to a Spartan's invective—‘At least the Thebans have taught you to make longer speeches.’

94. § 1. νεώτερος ὤν. Archidamos is mentioned as a young man in 378 B.C.: Xen. H. V. 4, §§ 25—33: and as commanding Spartan armies in 371 ( H. VI. 4, §§ 17—26) and 367 ( H. VII. 1, § 28). He may now have been about thirty-five years of age.

95. The issue.

96. The allies.

97. § 12. Cf. note on De Pace, § 95.

98. Sparta's title to Messene.

99. Return of the Herakleidae.

100. Sparta's threefold claim.

101. The Thebans.

102. § 27. Dating from the accession of Cyrus to the empire, 559 B.C.

103. § 27. In 373 B.C.: cf. introd. to the Plataikos.

104. § 27. ‘Three hundred’ would have been more accurate. The Second Messenian War ended, and the conquest of the country was completed, in 668 B.C.

105. Delphic oracle.

106. Examples of recovery from disaster.

107. § 44. i.e. Dionysius I. in 394 B.C.: cf. Grote, c. 82, vol. X. p. 695.

108. § 46. See note on Panegyr. § 126.

109. Spartans for Sparta.

110. § 53. When Chios revolted from Athens in 412 B.C. Pedaritos was posted there as Lacedaemonian governor: Thuc. VIII. 28. Soon afterwards the Athenians set about fortifying Delphinion, a promontory on the east coast of the island: ib. 38. Pedaritos having refused to help Astyochos in supporting the revolt of Lesbos, Astyochos refused to support Pedaritos at Chios. The Athenian fort was at length eompleted. Pedaritos then sent an urgent message to the Spartan fleet at Rhodes, representing that, unless help came speedily, Chios must be lost. In the mean time he made an attack on Delphinion with such forces as he had, but was defeated and slain: Thuc. VIII. 55. The words of Isokrates— εἰς Χίον εἰσπλεύσας τὴν πόλιν διέσωσε—are calculated, therefore, to convey an inaceurate imprcssion. Pedaritos did, indeed, hold out in Chios for a year; but his command ended disastrously.

111. § 56. i.e. Leuktra, § 10.

112. § 56. At this time Epameinondas had thrice invaded Peloponnesos—in 370, 369, 367. But he had invaded Lakonia only once, in 370. The next invasion of Lakonia occurred shortly before Mantineia in 362.

113. § 57. Referring to the siege of Ithome in the first Messenian War, 743—723 B.C.

114. Hopes from without.

115. The last resort.

116. Sparta a camp.

117. § 91. See introductory remarks.

118. Appeal to reputation.

119. § 95. As Mr Grote observes (c. 78, vol. X. p. 314, n. 2), no free Messenian theoria could have visited Olympia since 723 B.C.

120. § 99. According to Herod. IX. 36 the five ἀγῶνες in which Tisamenos of Elis was victorious in company with the Spartans were— 1. Plataea, 479 B.C.: 2. a battle at Tegea against the Tegeatans and Argives: 3. a battle at Dipaea— a town of Maenalia in Arcadia— ‘against all the Argives except the Mantineans’: 4. the third Messenian War, 464—355: 5. Tanagra, 457. From this it may be inferred that the battle at Dipaea was fought between 479 and 464 B.C.

121. Summary.

122. Remarks.

123. Cf. Grote, c. 78, vol. X. p. 313.

124. §§ 11—14.

125. §§ 70—87.

126. Xen. H. VII. 4, §§ 8—11. ἀκούσαντες δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς τε Κορινθίοις συνεβούλευον τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς μὴ βουλομένοις σὺν έαυτοῖς πολεμεῖν ἀναπαύσασθαι· αὐτοὶ δὲ ἔφασαν, κ.τ.λ.

127. After Mantineia: Diod. XV. 89: Plut. Ages. 35.

128. Form.

129. Date.

130. Arguments for 346 B.C.

131. Dem. de F. L. § 125.

132. Id. de Cor. § 169.

133. Arguments for 355 B.C.

134. Diod. XVI. 22.

135. Rauchenstein, Introd. to the Areopag. p. 107.

136. Schäfer, Demosth. u. s. Zeit, vol. I. p. 462 n.: Paus. IV. 28. 1, 2.

137. Introd. p 108: Diod. XV. 79.

138. Peace was concluded about midsummer 355: Clinton, F. H. Rauchenstein places the Areopagitikos in 354, following Böhnecke, who assigns the embassy from Artaxerxes III. to that year. But according to Diod. XVI. 22 the embassy preeeded and hastened the peace; and the peace certainly belongs to 355.Clinton refers the Areopagitikos to 353, the year (probably) of the Antidosis, which he thinks must have been published before it. But on this point no inference ean be drawn from the fact that the Areopag. is not mentioned in the Antidosis. In the Antidosis Isokrates quotes from several, but by no means from all, of his important works; and, in such an apology for his life and teaching, it can be easily understood why he avoided reference to the Areopagitikos, which may have been represented as hostile to the democracy—a calumny which he himself antieipates, Areop. §§ 57, 70. Sehäfer, Dem. u. s. Z. III. 329, also puts the Areopagitikos in 355.

139. Oncken (p. 79) seems to refer the Areop. to 358 B C.

140. Dangers of confidence.

141. One of these two oceasions was probably when Chares, aided by Artabazos, had defeated the Persian army under Tithraustes in 356 B.C.: see Grote, c. 86, vol. XI. p. 324. What the other occasion was is more doubtful. Schneider refers to the vietory gained by Chares over Adaeus, one of Philip's generals, at Cypsela on the Hebrus but this was in 353 B.C. (see Schäf Dem. I. 399) and no one, except Clinton, places the Areopagiticos later than 354: Schneider himself (p. 71) places it ‘soon after’ the end of the war in 355.

142. The old democracy.

143. Its ‘equality.’

144. It is difficult to say how much Isokrates meant by this vague assertion. He states that the public officials generally ( οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες) were selected aecording to merit ( προκρίνειν). It is now pretty well ascertained:— 1. That, in the election of the nine archons, Kleisthenes substituted the democratic ballot ( κλήρωσις) for election ( αἵρεσις). 2. That at least the ten Strategi, and the Tamias or Steward of the Public Treasury, were at all periods, as a rule, αἱρετοί, not κληρωτοί. 3. That, as regards most other offices, lot was substituted for election about 478 B.C.—Isokrates probably believed that, in the case of archous, αἵρεσις continued to be the rule longer than it really did. It is possible, again, that in his time Strategi were sometimes appointed by ballot; and also that the proportion of inferior officials so appointed was larger than in former times.See Curtius, App. to bk. II. e. 2, vol. I. p. 478 tr. Ward: Rauehenstein Introd. to Areop. p. 112: C. F. Herm. Antt. § 112. 7.

145. Its general tone.

146. The Areiopagos:

147. guardian of the unwritten law.

148. § 50. The law of Ephialtes is usually placed in Ol. LXXX. 2, 459 B.C.: by Curtius in 460 ( Hist. Gr. II. 381 trans.).

149. Sense of security.

150. § 54: i.e. for employment as dikasts: cf. de Pac. (Or. VIII.) § 130 τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστηρίων ζῶντας.

151. This is no plea for oligarchy.

152. The Thirty Tyrants.

153. The present Democracy.

154. A contrast.

155. Demosthenes de Fals. Legat. § 311 says that the conditions were — ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας πεζῆ μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν βασιλέα, ἐντὸς δὲ Χελιδονίων (the Swallow Islands, opposite the frontier of Lykia and Pamphylia, and S.W.E. of Cape Phaselis) καὶ Κυανέων πλοίῳ μακρῷ μὴ πλεῖν. As Mr Grote observes (c. 45, v. 456), even the ‘one day's course for a horse’ is probably more than the truth. But the statement of Isokrates—if, indeed, he recollected where the Halys was—is a strange exaggeration. As to this legendary treaty, see note on Panegyr. § 115.

156. See esp. Panegyr. §§ 51—99.

157. For I follow Schäfer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, II. 66 ff., in placing the First Philippic in 351, and not, as it is usually placed, in 352.

158. Dionys. Isokr. 8 characterises the Areopag. as an exhortation to εὐκοσμία—the decorum of the old school.

159. Such as, e.g., it assumed in the year of Salamis. Niebuhr compares this to the power conferred on Roman consuls by the formula ‘videant ne quid detrimenti, &c.’ Vortrage ub. alte Gesch. II. 29.

160. It has, indeed, been supposed that the jurisdiction of the Areiopagos was temporarily taken away by the Thirty Tyrants. It is in this sense that Mr Grote (c. 46, v. 498) understands Lys. de caede Eratosth. § 32:— ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζειν—the passage mainly relied on by those who, like Meier, Boeckh and O. Müller, think that Ephialtes abolished the criminal jurisdiction of the Areiopagos. But there I think with Hermann that the meaning is simply:—‘(that court) of which it is the ancestral right, and to which it has been assigned in your own time also, to try causes of homicide.’ The antithesis is between πάτριον and ἐφ’ ὑμῶν. ἀποδέδοται means, not ‘ restored,’ but ‘ rendered, assigned as a province.’ The idea might have been expressed thus— ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν ὑπάρχει. The statement of Demosthenes is precise and emphatic ( in Aristocr. § 66) — τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δικαστήριον οὐχὶ τύραννος οὐκ ὀλιγαρχία οὐ δημοκρατία τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἀφελέσθαι τετόλμηκεν.

161. The Areiopagos retained the power, shared by the Senate of Five Hundred and by all magistrates, of inflicting small fines: cf. Grote, c. 46, v. 498. And on at least one occasion subsequent to the reform of Ephialtes—namely in 405 B.C., after Aegospotami— the Areiopagos is found acting in a dictatorial capacity: Lys. in Eratosth. (Or. XII.) § 69, πραττούσης τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆς σωτήρια.

162. Cf. Curtius, Hist. Gr. bk. III, c. II., vol. II., p. 378 tr. Ward.

163. § 38. It is at least credible that democrats, on becoming members of an ancient and dignified official body, grew more conservative. On the esprit de corps of the Areiopagos Niebuhr says:— Der Areopag est ein merkwürdiges Beispiel von dem was man esprit de corps nennt in seiner schönsten Bedeutung, wie vor der französischen Revolution der pariser Parlament eine Gravität und Unabhängigkeit hatte, die sich allen Mitgliedern mittheilten und das ganze Leben und Weise übergingen.’ Vorträge üb. alte Gesch. II. p. 31.

Sir Richard C. Jebb The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos 2.16.2