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I. On the relations of Greece with Persia.

I 1. Panegyrikos.

1. Panegyrikos [Or. IV.]—The date of the speech is determined by § 126. It is there said that the Spartans are besieging Olynthos and Phlius. Olynthos was besieged in 383 B.C., Phlius early in 380; both fell towards the close of 379. The speech cannot, then, have been published before 380 or after 379. Now the year 380 B.C. was the first of the hundredth Olympiad. The title Panegyrikos— given to the speech by Isokrates himself—points only to some great festival, and has been referred by one critic¹ to the Greater Panathenaea. But, taking the other circumstances into account, it seems hardly doubtful that the Panegyrikos was published at the time of the Olympic festival in the autumn ² of 380 B.C.³

The duty of Hellenic unity against the barbarian had already been the theme of Gorgias and of Lysias in speeches delivered at Olympia⁴. It is not likely ⁵ that, like theirs, the oration of Isokrates was recited at the festival by its author. His want of nerve and voice, and much in the contents of the speech itself, would probably have deterred him from such an attempt. The speech may, indeed, have been recited for him; but it is more likely that it was first introduced to the Greek public by copies circulated at Olympia, and sent to cities in which Isokrates had friends among the leading men⁶ .

His appeal to Panhellenic patriotism was made ⁷ at a time when such patriotism was sorely needed. By the Peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C. Artaxerxes II. had become master of the Asiatic Greeks, and ultimate arbiter in the affairs of western Hellas; the Aegean, no longer protected by an Athenian fleet, was infested by pirates; the party strife which the dekarchies had exasperated was everywhere filling the smaller cities with bloodshed; and Sparta, regardless of the autonomy which the Peace had guaranteed to every state, was using these troubles for her own ends. In 385 the Spartans had destroyed Mantineia; in 383, besieged Olynthos; in 382, seized the Kadmeia; in 380, besieged Phlius.

The Panegyrikos falls into two main divisions. ⁸ In the first (§§ 1—132) Isokrates urges that Athens and Sparta, laying aside their jealousies, should assume the joint leadership of Greece. He argues that, if Sparta at present holds the first place, Athens has the better historical claim to it; and that, therefore, a compromise might well be made. In the second part (§§ 133—189) he shows the direction in which the forces of Greece, once consolidated, ought to be turned — namely against Persia.

I. ‘It is strange that the founders of the great Festivals should have kept all their rewards for a physical prowess which serves only the athlete himself, and should have assigned no honour to the mental toil from which flow benefits to all. Content, however, with the hope of simple approbation, I am here to offer counsels of unity among Greeks and ⁹ war against the barbarian (§§ 1—3). If the theme is not new, it admits of better treatment than it has received (§§ 4 —5). The crisis is not yet past,—nor, therefore, the season for advice (§§ 3—5); and it is of the essence of oratory that it seeks to put familiar facts in a more impressive way (§§ 7—10). There are some who dislike all elaborate speaking, and who cannot distinguish between occasions for safe plainness and for a loftier effort. I address myself to those who expect speakers on a great theme to rise above the common level; and I crave no indulgence if I fail to do so (§§ 11—14).

‘That the various cities of Greece should renounce their ¹⁰ feuds and turn together against the barbarian, has often been urged; but the point from which such unity must begin has been missed. Hellas is divided, for the most part, between oligarchies dependent on Sparta and democracies dependent on Athens. Before the lesser States can be in harmony, the leaders must be reconciled, and must consent to share the headship ( τὰς ἡγεμονίας διελέσθαι, § 17). Sparta is the obstacle. She fancies that she has an ancestral right to sovereignty. If it can be shown that this right belongs rather to Athens, Sparta will either yield something, or, if she does not, will be clearly in the wrong (§§ 15—20).

‘Maritime Empire belongs of right to Athens, whether ¹¹ the test be ( a) naval efficiency, ( b) antiquity, or ( c) services done to Greece. Her services have been of two kinds, (1) civil, and (2) military (§§ 21—27).

(1.) ‘The first things which human life needs came to ¹² Hellas through Athens. Demeter, visiting Attica in her search for Persephone, gave to its inhabitants two gifts,—the corn-crop, and the rite of the Mysteries. Athens did not keep these blessings to herself, but freely shared them with all. If the tradition be questioned because it is lost in antiquity, on the other hand this antiquity implies wide acceptance. It is accredited by the fact that most Greek cities pay to Athens a yearly tribute of first-fruits. It has also an a priori likelihood. The earliest men, most needing, were most likely to obtain, direct help from the gods; and the people of Attica are confessedly the oldest of races (§§ 28—33).

‘The next great boon which Athens bestowed on early ¹³ Greece, was the enlargement of the area covered by Greeks. Seeing the barbarians widely spread and the Hellenes straitened for space, she provided the cities with leaders under whom they conquered from the alien new homes both in Europe and in Asia; peopled islands in every sea; and, in opening a career to colonists, saved the mother country (§§ 34—37).

‘These primary benefits were followed by others. Athens ¹⁴ was not content with having given the Hellenes the necessaries of life; she gave them civilisation. Hers were the earliest laws, hers was the earliest Constitutional Polity. With her originated the arts which minister to men's needs or pleasures. The central emporium of Hellas, the Peiraeus, was established by her. All the advantages, all the charms of those great gatherings at which Greeks of every city forget their differences in a sense of common worship and of common blood, are supplied in an unequalled measure by the ¹⁵ festivals of Athens; nay, she herself is for all visitors a perpetual festival. Practical philosophy, the deviser and organiser of all these things—rational eloquence, the permanent distinction of high natures—are honoured by her as by no other city. So pre-eminently is she the seat of national culture that a man is not considered in the fullest sense a Hellene merely because he is of Hellenic blood, unless, further, he bears the stamp of the Athenian mind (§§ 38—50).

(2.) ‘Such are the services which Athens has rendered ¹⁶ to the civil life of Hellas. Her military services have been equally great, both in wars between Greeks, and in wars of Greek against barbarian.

‘In Greece she has always shown herself the unselfish ¹⁷ champion of the oppressed. Thus she successfully aided Adrastos against the Thebans and the Herakleidae against Eurystheus. The greatness of Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese—a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring, or claiming to rule, Athens. Argos, Thebes, Sparta, were in early times, as they are now, the foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was greater than them all—the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded Sparta (§§ 51—65).

‘Against the barbarians Athens has waged more wars ¹⁸ than could fitly be told here: a few of the chief only shall be named. In the infancy of Hellas, Attica was invaded by the Thracians under Eumolpos, son of Poseidon, and, later, by the Scythians leagued with the Amazons, daughters of Ares. The Thracians were so crushed that they withdrew from their old seats on the Attic frontier to a more distant abode. Of the Amazons, not one who came hither returned; and those who had stayed behind were driven from their realm on account of the disaster (§§ 66—70).

‘Similar in spirit and in result were the wars against ¹⁹ Dareios and Xerxes. In these, Athens won a double victory; she drove back the apparently irresistible hordes of the enemy, and took the prize for valour from allies whose bravery it seemed impossible to surpass. Lacedaemon, indeed, did brilliant service; the greater the glory for Athens of having outshone such a rival. The Persian Wars claim special mention here, illustrating, as they do at once the heroism of our ancestors and the hostility of Greek to barbarian. The subject has been well-nigh exhausted by the speakers of Funeral Orations²⁰; but, as it relates to my present purpose, I must not shrink from touching upon it (§§ 71—74).

‘Praise is due, first of all, to those earlier generations of ²¹ Athenian and Spartan statesmen who sowed the seed of the valour which afterwards saved Hellas. They were characterised in all things by unselfish public spirit. They were thrifty of the resources of the state; they were sensitively loyal to its honour and to its interest in their personal conduct and in their legislation. Political parties, political clubs then vied only in benefits to the city. Thus were formed the men who, surpassing the captors of Troy, vanquished Asia; men whose merit transcends all that has been said or sung of them. Surely some god must have ordained that struggle in order to bring into full light natures worthy of the demigods of old (§§ 75—84).

‘The rivalry between Athens and Sparta was never so noble as in the Persian wars. When the army of Dareios invaded Greece, the Athenians, without waiting for the allies, met it at Marathon; the Lacedaemonians, on hearing of the ²² peril, had no thought but to hasten to the rescue. When, later, Xerxes came with his host, marching over the Hellespont and sailing through Athos, Sparta won glory at ²³ Thermopylae, Athens at Artemision. Then began the last period of the war: and in this the Athenians distanced all competitors. Scorning the overtures of an enemy who actually held their city, and true to allies who had forsaken them, they made ready to fight alone at Salamis. Shame brought the ²⁴ Peloponnesians to their side; but, of the Greek ships engaged, Athens furnished more than all the other States together.

‘If there is now to be an expedition against the barbarians, who ought to lead it? Who but the foremost fighters, the most unselfish sufferers, in the former war; the founders, in ancient days, of cities to which, later, they became saviours? Would it not be hard if, having borne most evil, we did not receive most honour; if, having once been chosen to lead, we should now be forced to follow? (§§ 85—99.)

‘Everyone must allow that, up to the close of the Persian ²⁵ wars, Athens had deserved the supremacy. But it is objected that, after her attainment of maritime empire, she did much evil to Greece; notably in the cases of Melos and of Skione²⁶. Now, these were towns which had made war upon her; they were treated simply with a rigour usual in war. The true test of Imperial Athens is to be found in the condition of her ²⁷ loyal subjects. These, during seventy years, enjoyed exemption from tyrants, from barbarians, from the strife of factions, from enmity in any quarter. The settlement of Athenian citizens upon the lands of conquered rebels has been quoted in evidence of her rapacity. But such settlements ²⁸ were meant merely as defensive garrisons, not as outposts of aggression. If Athens is indeed so acquisitive, why has she never seized Euboea? (§§ 100—109.)

‘Though we have given such proofs of moderation, we ²⁹ are actually accused of selfishness and harshness by those partisans of Sparta who supported the dekarchies in the various cities;—who inflicted on their own countries a fate worse than that of Melos;—who enslaved themselves to a Helot³⁰, and honoured the assassins of their fellow-citizens more than their own parents;—who brought such misery to every hearth that no man had time to grieve for his neighbour. These presume to criticise the tribunals of Imperial Athens,—although they, in three months, put to death untried a greater number of persons than Athens put on trial during the whole period of her empire. A single decree might have cancelled the ‘severities’ of our rule; the bloodshed and lawlessness of theirs are irreparable (§§ 110—114).

‘Sparta has, indeed, given nominal peace³¹ and nominal ³² independence to the Greek cities. But the state of Hellas is very different from what it was in the days of Athenian ascendancy. Pirates on the sea, marauders on land render life insecure. The ‘independent’ towns, if not desolate, are subject to despots, to harmosts, or to Persia. Formerly, when the Great King invaded our territory, Athens made him tremble for his own: she even forbade him to launch a warship west of Phaselis³³. Now, he has landed troops in Laconia, taken Cythera, ravaged the Peloponnesos. The treaty made with Persia under our empire was a notable contrast to that which has just been concluded. Sparta went to war for the purpose of freeing the Greeks, and has ended by giving up a large proportion of them to Persia. The Ionians are not merely tributaries to the barbarian, they do not merely see his garrisons in their citadels: they suffer worse bodily usage than our bought slaves. Sparta is answerable for this. She has become the ally of absolutism against constitutional freedom. She has devastated Mantineia, seized the Kadmeia, besieged Olynthos and Phlius; she is in league with Amyntas of Macedon³⁴, with Dionysios of Syracuse, and with the master ³⁵ of Asia. Is it not monstrous that the city which claims to lead the Hellenes should have formed against them a perpetual alliance with the barbarians?

‘I have spoken harshly of Sparta; but not as an enemy who would denounce,—rather as a friend who would admonish. Instead of making her neighbours helots to herself, ³⁶ let her make the barbarians dependents of Greece. Instead of crushing the Aegean islands with taxation, let her seek wealth on the continent of Asia (§§ 115—132).

II. ‘To lookers-on our conduct would seem madness. While we quarrel among ourselves, the king of Persia profits by our divisions. We suffer him to blockade one Greek ³⁷ armament [that of Evagoras] in Cyprus³⁸; while another—the Ionian contingent with Teiribazos³⁹—fights his battles. If, instead of disputing about the Kyklades⁴⁰, we united in marching on Asia, these very Ionians would be with us. As it is, Artaxerxes holds such a position as no Persian king ever reached before. He is king of all Asia and master of the Asiatic Greeks (§§ 133—137).

‘Some stand in awe of his strength. Were he indeed ⁴¹ strong, that would be but another reason for attacking him before he is stronger. But he is not strong. His importance has been due to our dissensions. Even Chios⁴² has ere now made a difference by throwing itself into one or other of two trembling scales. Egypt resisted for three years⁴³, and finally discomfited, the three best generals of the great king— ⁴⁴ Abrokomas, Tithraustes and Pharnabazos. Evagoras has kept him at bay for six years. In the war around Rhodes⁴⁵ Artaxerxes allowed the whole fleet,—led by the ablest living commander, Konon, and favoured by the sympathy of Sparta's oppressed subjects—to be held in check⁴⁶ for three years by 100 Lacedaemonian triremes. It was only the formation of the league⁴⁷ of which Corinth was the centre which at last drove him to fight—and conquer. I pass over the successes, against Persia, of Derkyllidas, of Drakon, of Thimbron⁴⁸, of Agesilaos. Nor is the mettle of Persian troops better than the quality of Persian generalship. This was well seen in the case of the Greeks who accompanied Cyrus. After the loss of their leader, surrounded by difficulties of every kind, ⁴⁹ they effected their retreat as smoothly as if the Persian force which sought to harass it had been a guard of honour. Chastised when he invaded Europe—defeated on the seaboards of Asia—the Persian king has actually been mocked under the walls of his own palaces⁵⁰. (§§ 138—149.)

‘This weakness naturally results from the political and ⁵¹ social system of Persia. The country cannot have good soldiers while the mass of the people is an unruly, nerveless, slavish mob. It cannot have good generals while the men of the upper classes are insolent and abject by turns, with pampered bodies and craven spirits, grovelling before their human master, and scorning the gods. The satraps who come down to the coast of Asia do not belie their home training. Faithless and arrogant to friends, they quail and cringe before enemies. Thus they lavished gifts on the army of Agesilaos, but maltreated the Greeks who helped them against Cyprus. Konon, who led them to victory, was seized that he might be put to death⁵²: Themistokles, who defeated them, was enriched. (§§ 150—154.)

‘They merit our hatred; and they are hateful also to our ⁵³ gods, whose shrines they have desecrated. The Ionians did well when they swore that every temple burnt by the Persians should remain in ruins, a perpetual record of the impiety which had destroyed it. Nor has Athens been less constant in its enmity. The business of our Ekklesia and of our Senate is always prefaced by an anathema upon any citizen who shall make overtures to Persia. We delight most in those legends which immortalise the disasters of Asia. Nay, we find a special charm in the poetry of Homer, because it embodies our hereditary loathing of the barbarians. (§§ 155 —159.)

‘We have every motive, then, for attacking Persia. The ⁵⁴ moment is favourable. Egypt and Cyprus⁵⁵ are in revolt; Phoenicia and Syria⁵⁶ are desolate; Tyre has been stormed; the greater part of Cilicia is with us. The prince of Karia, Hekatomnos⁵⁷, has virtually, if not openly, rebelled. From Knidos to Sinope the Greeks are impatient to rise. If we delay, Rhodes, Samos and Chios may incline to the enemy; but, if we preoccupy them, Lydia, Phrygia and the up-country generally will probably come into our power. Our fathers, having allowed Persia to be beforehand with them and to get Ionia, were forced to stand a death-struggle at home. Let us take warning. Let us go in time to Asia. There is a further reason for making war now. The present generation has a claim to be indemnified for long sufferings and privations. There never was in Hellas a greater mass of individual distress; though, indeed, the troubles of individuals seem ⁵⁸ almost trivial at a time when whole countries are afflicted— as Italy⁵⁹ has been devastated and Sicily⁶⁰ enslaved by Dionysios. (§§ 160—169.)

‘Since the leading statesmen of the various cities are apathetic or timid, it is the more incumbent on men outside the political sphere to press this grave question. Before we can have firm peace, we must have common war against Asia. Before we can shake off our poverty, we must cease to prey upon each other, and must unite in gathering spoils elsewhere.

‘The Treaty of Antalkidas is no real obstacle. Its more ⁶¹ creditable articles—those guaranteeing the autonomy of the Greek cities in Europe—have been violated already. Only its shameful articles—those which surrender our allies to Persia—have been observed. These must forthwith be annulled: they were never compacts—they were dictates. The negociators of the Treaty are much to blame. One of three courses ought to have been taken by them. They ought to ⁶² have stipulated that each Greek State should hold (1) simply its own original territory; or (2) all that it had ever acquired by conquest; or (3) as much as it actually held at the time of the treaty.—As it was, the terms of peace were left to be settled arbitrarily by the Great King. As if he were parcelling out the world between himself and Zeus, he has taken one-half of it⁶³; and this stands recorded in our public temples. If, for Helen's sake, our fathers rallied against Troy, ⁶⁴ ought not an insult to Hellas to kindle a war now—a war which will move forward, not liable to repulse, but with the stately progress of a sacred embassy⁶⁵? (§§ 170—182.) ⁶⁶

‘From every point of view this is the right course. Those who look to nothing but abstract justice cannot refuse to punish our malignant foes. Those whom the sight of unmerited prosperity provokes, indeed, yet leaves prudent, may safely resent a grandeur almost superhuman which is, at the same time, divorced from merit. Those who wish to consult both justice and expediency see before them evil-doers who are rich and helpless. The cities will gladly bear the burden of the campaign; and its fame will surpass that of the war against Troy. (§§ 183—186.)

‘At the outset I had hopes of doing some justice to my subject; now, at the close, I feel how inadequately I have handled it. Try, then, to imagine for yourselves what an ⁶⁷ achievement it would be to transfer to Europe the prosperity of Asia. And let aspirants to oratorical distinction, instead of engaging in petty rivalries, vie in the treatment of this great theme. So shall they benefit themselves, and be regarded as benefactors by others.’ (§§ 187—189.)⁶⁸

The Panegyrikos is the greatest work of Isokrates. The renown which it enjoyed in antiquity is attested by Dionysios⁶⁹ and Philostratos⁷⁰; and the tradition, found in several writers⁷¹, that it employed Isokrates for ten or more years, whether literally true or not, at least shows that the speech was recognised as a masterpiece of careful work. It is, indeed, artistic in a double relation, in regard to expression and in regard to structure. ⁷² The expression has not only a finished and uniform— almost too uniform—brilliancy; it has also in some places a wonderful felicity, a deep poetical suggestiveness; as when it is said that the expedition to Asia will be less a march through an enemy's country than such a solemn and secure procession as, at the seasons of the great Festivals, goes forth from each city to the welcoming shrine of the Delphian Apollo or the Olympian Zeus (§ 182); and that Sparta, instead of making Greeks helots to herself, ought to make the barbarians dependents of Greece ( περίοικοι, § 131). It is, however, in the structure of the ⁷³ entire work that the highest power of the master is seen. The central idea is simple:—‘To give counsel about war against the barbarian and unity among Greeks’ (§ 3). But in the development of this idea a vast range of topics must be surveyed;— the historical claims of Athens and of Sparta to lead Greece; the recent history and actual state of Persia, with all the multitude of particulars which group themselves round each of these large questions. As the speech goes on, the mass of facts with which it has to deal is ever growing. Yet so thorough is the writer's grasp that each thought leads to the next without violence and without confusion. As the circle of ideas gradually widens, the central point is still kept clearly in view; and the details, even where most complex, are seen to belong to an organic whole.

Foremost among its author's works in merits of ⁷⁴ execution, the Panegyrikos stands first also in the interest of its subject-matter. Its value as a political pamphlet has been considered in a former chapter⁷⁵; and on this head, one remark only need be added here. Isokrates emphatically claims (§§ 15—17) to be not only more philosophical, but more practical, than previous speakers on the same subject; alluding, no doubt, to Gorgias and Lysias among the rest. As regards Gorgias, this claim cannot now be decided. As regards Lysias, it is questionable: at least the large fragment of his Olympiakos offers advice not less definite or less sensible than that in the Panegyrikos⁷⁶. But whatever was, at the time, the political worth of the Panegyrikos, its permanent historical worth can hardly be overrated. To the history of Greece it contributes a vivid picture of the whole Hellenic world, and of the barbarian world⁷⁷ in contact with Hellas, at a critical moment. To the history of Athens it contributes a striking sketch of the growth and influence in Greece of the specially Athenian ideas, religious, political and social⁷⁸. For the personal history of Isokrates it is of surpassing interest; it is the earliest⁷⁹ and most complete⁸⁰ expression of the ruling thought of his life; the thought which he afterwards urged upon Dionysios, upon Archidamos,—at last upon Philip.

I. 2 Philippos.

2. Philippos [Or. v.]—Philip had taken Amphipolis in 358 B. C. and Potidaea in 356. The hostilities between him and Athens, carried on intermittently from 356⁸¹, were closed in March, 346, by the socalled Peace of Philokrates. Before that event Isokrates had been composing a letter to Philip ‘On Amphipolis,’ urging peace on the ground that Amphipolis, the chief cause of the war, was not a desirable possession either for Athens or for the king of Macedon (§§ 1, 3).

This letter had not been sent when peace was concluded (§ 7). Isokrates now writes on another ⁸² and a larger subject. He sees in Philip, at length reconciled to Athens, the man who can lead the united Hellenes against Persia. Ever since the failure of the Panegyrikos to bring about such an expedition under the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta, he had been looking for an individual powerful enough to execute his favourite plan (§§ 84, 128, 129). He had already applied to Dionysios I.— probably about 368 B. C. ( Ep. I. § 8)—and in 356 to Archidamos III. ( Ep. IX. § 16). This oration was addressed to Philip soon after the peace (§§ 8, 56), but before the conclusion of the Sacred War (§§ 54, ⁸³ 74); that is, between March and July⁸⁴, 346 B. C.

‘Do not be surprised, Philip, if before entering upon the ⁸⁵ immediate subject of this address I say a few words upon another. The war between Athens and you, which arose out of your acquisition of Amphipolis, has just been closed by a Peace (§ 7). Before this Peace was concluded, I was preparing to write to you in reference to Amphipolis. It was my purpose to show that it was not your interest to hold that town, since, if you surrendered it to Athens, you would still be virtual master of it, and enjoy our goodwill besides; nor yet the interest of Athens to receive it from you, since she would, in return, have been obliged to consult your designs in that quarter—paying you the same kind of homage which the elder Amadokos⁸⁶ formerly received for protecting our colonists in the Chersonese. This argument for peace has become unnecessary; but the desire that the Peace itself should be permanent leads me to offer you counsel on another subject. (§§ 1—9.) This subject is a noble one—too great, perhaps, for my failing powers. I am going to urge you to place yourself at the head of a united Hellas, and to make ⁸⁷ war upon the barbarian. (§§ 10—16.) Friends at first dissuaded me from the presumptuous design of offering advice to the statesman who has brought Thessaly to acquiesce in obeying, instead of ruling, Macedonia—to the general who has subdued the Magnetes, the Perrhaebi, the Paeonians, all Illyria save the seaboard of the Adriatic; and who has given to Thrace what masters he pleased. But when my dissuaders heard what I had to say, their opposition was changed into encouragement. (§§ 17—23.) Advice on great and pressing questions is more effective when it is given orally. Mine will not have that advantage; nor is it set off with rhetorical ornament. It is a plain statement of facts; but these facts are so supremely important to you that I hope for your attention. (§§ 24—29.)

‘I say, then, that you ought, as their common friend, to ⁸⁸ bring into amity the four great cities of Hellas—Argos, Sparta, Thebes, Athens.

‘This obligation is laid upon you by your descent. Argos ⁸⁹ was the native city of your ancestors⁹⁰. Thebes honours above other deities Herakles, the founder of your line. Sparta has long been ruled by the Herakleidae: and Athens was their friend at need. No quarrel should ever have divided these cities from you or from each other. There have been faults on all parts. But now you have a glorious opportunity of benefiting them and yourself too,—when harassed by war, each of them resembles rather a single combatant, following a blind, vindictive impulse, than a State with a government and a policy. (§§ 30—38.)

‘The attempt which I propose to you can be shown to be feasible:—and first, on general grounds. The difficulty which would have been presented by the great predominance of any one State, as of Athens and Sparta, has vanished; changes of fortune have placed all the cities of Greece upon one level. Your position, on the other hand, is supreme. Experience ⁹¹ proves that no enmities are too bitter to be overcome. Greece was reconciled to Xerxes; Athens has been the ally successively of Sparta and of Thebes. The interest of the moment is, in fact, the sovereign controller of political combinations. (§§ 39—45.)

‘The practicability of the attempt may be shown, further, on particular grounds. It is favoured by the respective conditions of the several States concerned.

‘Sparta wishes for peace, because, deprived of her empire ⁹² Leuktra, she is now harassed by her neighbours and by her own serfs—distrusted and disliked throughout Hellas—and in daily dread of the Thebans making up their quarrel with the Phocians and turning upon her.

‘Argos desires peace, because her distress resembles, but ⁹³ exceeds, that of Sparta. She, too, is constantly harassed by her neighbours—with this difference, that they are stronger than herself. And in the intervals of war she is a prey to fierce democratic risings.

‘Thebes wishes for peace, because, through abusing the ⁹⁴ results of her great victory, she is now worse off than if it had been a defeat. No sooner had she won Leuktra than she began to interfere in the Peloponnese; enslaved Thessaly; threatened Megara; encroached upon Athens; ravaged Euboea; sent a fleet to Byzantium. Lastly she has made war upon Phokis,—a war which she thought to finish rapidly and to pay for out of the treasures of Delphi; but which, in the event, has brought her to the brink of despair.

‘Athens is no longer yearning for peace; she has had the ⁹⁵ good sense to embrace it already. (§§ 46—56.)

‘The possibility of reconciling Hellas may be seen from ⁹⁶ these considerations. The ease, for you, of the attempt may be judged from the cases of other men, who, though less favoured by circumstances, have changed the destinies of whole countries. Alkibiades, exiled from Athens and resolved to force his way back, effected it by first throwing all Greece into a tumult. Konon, disgraced through no fault of his own, not only retrieved the disgrace by his own unaided energy, but lived to restore the glory of Athens. Dionysios, an ordinary Syracusan, made himself master of Sicily. The elder Cyrus, whom, in his infancy, his mother left to perish at the roadside, became sovereign of Asia. Shall not the achievements of these men be equalled by one who is, from the outset the descendant of Herakles, the king of Macedonia, the lord of such great multitudes? (§§ 57—67.)

‘The enterprise is one which may well rouse your ambition. What nobler position can be imagined than that of president of Greece—acknowledged arbiter of her destinies? It is also an enterprise which would silence certain calumnies now current against you. Some ill-disposed persons pretend ⁹⁷ that your avowed purpose of helping the Messenians merely veils a scheme for subjugating the Peloponnesos, as a step to subjugating all Greece. These slanders are heard gladly by three classes of people—by those who, like the slanderers, secretly desirc such an event; by those who, themselves indifferent to the public safety, are grateful to those who affect to care for it;—and by men who, admiring you, fancy that imputations such as these are fitted to raise your importance in the eyes of Greece;—not seeing that a project, which, if imputed to the king of Persia, would increase his reputation for courage, would be infamy for a Greek—for a Heraklid. Having a perfectly good conscience, you perhaps think it beneath you to notice such calumniators. Still you ought not to underrate the importance of being cordially trusted by all Greece,—trusted as your own friends trust you, or as Sparta trusts her Heraklid kings. (§§ 68—80.)

‘The counsel which I offer to you—as I offered it to Dionysios after he became master of Syracuse⁹⁸—does not come from a General, from a public speaker, from a person of influence in any way—but merely from one who lays claim to common sense and to education. (§§ 81, 82.)

‘Your duty towards Greece has been spoken of; it ⁹⁹ remains to speak of the expedition against Asia. The Panegyrikos has left me little that is new to say upon this topic —but I will attempt to trace its outlines with additional clearness.

‘The first condition of a successful attack upon Persia is ¹⁰⁰ this—that you should have all the Greeks either as helpers or at least as favouring spectators. It was here that Agesilaos failed. He tried to do two things at once—to make war ¹⁰¹ upon the Great King, and to restore his friends¹⁰² to power in their respective cities. The feuds engendered by the latter purpose defeated the former. (§§ 83—88.)

‘All would admit that the sympathy, active or passive, of Hellas is a primary requisite. But most people, if they wished to encourage you by example, would quote wars in which Greece triumphed over Asia. I prefer to cite an expedition in which we were considered to have been worsted ¹⁰³ —that which was led by the younger Cyrus and Klearchos. The Greeks, victorious at Kynaxa, missed the rewards of victory by the death of Cyrus. Yet, though they were left forlorn and in danger by his loss, the Great King did not dare to attack them openly. He resorted to treachery in order to seize their leaders.—The example has been used by me before¹⁰⁴; but fact, not literary novelty, is important here.

‘Next, consider how far more favourable circumstances ¹⁰⁵ will be for you than they were for Cyrus. First, as regards facility of raising troops. The Asiatic Greeks looked coldly on his expedition, thinking that its success would probably aggravate the Spartan tyranny under which they groaned:— they will favour your expedition; and the great multitudes of homeless exiles and wanderers, ready to serve as mercenaries, will make it easy to raise a large army. Secondly, as regards the character of the former, and the actual, king of Persia. The father¹⁰⁶ of the present king proved too strong both for ¹⁰⁷ Athens and for Sparta; the reigning king¹⁰⁸ is unable even to hold the towns given up to him by the treaty of Antalkidas. Thirdly, as regards the position of Persia. Then, as now, ¹⁰⁹ Egypt was in revolt¹¹⁰; but then Egypt dreaded an attack of the Great King; now, the attack has been made—and has failed. Cyprus, Phoenicia, Cilicia, were then¹¹¹ arsenals of the Persian navy: now, Cyprus and Cilicia have revolted, Phoenicia is desolate. Idrieus¹¹², the wealthiest prince in Asia Minor, is bitter against Persia. Not he alone, but some of the satraps also will come over to you if you make heard throughout ¹¹³ Asia that word— Liberty—which in Hellas has been the spell before which our empire, and the Spartan empire, vanished. (§§ 89—104.)

‘If I went on to offer you advice as to the conduct of the war, I might be reproached with want of military experience. But as to the object of the war, and as regards the general ¹¹⁴ spirit of my counsels, I feel sure that the voices of your ancestors, if they could be heard, would be with me. The voice of your father¹¹⁵—for he was ever friendly to the cities which I urge you to befriend. The voice of the founder¹¹⁶ of the Macedonian kingdom—for, while establishing his own power securely, he abstained from every attempt to impose it upon Greece; and thus, alone of all Greeks, came safely through the perils of monarchy. The voice of Herakles, author of your line—for, after composing a distracted Hellas, he made war upon Troy—after conquering it, he slew all the kings of barbarian tribes¹¹⁷ on the shore of either continent,— and then set up the pillars which bear his name as memorials of his victory over the barbarians, and as boundaries of the Hellenic territory. If you cannot rival him in all things, you can emulate the spirit of his dealing with Greece. You have only to look to the examples in your own family to learn with whom, and against whom, an Heraklid should fight. (§§ 105—115.)—You may think that I am saying too much on ‘gentleness’ and ‘kindliness.’ Yet are not the kindly and gentle gods called ‘Olympian,’ and honoured with shrines and temples, while expiatory rites express our horror of an omnipotence which is cruel? (§§ 116—118.)

‘The popularity which a Persian war would command in Greece may be estimated from the case of Jason of Pherae. ¹¹⁸ He rose to greatness through his profession—never fulfilled —of an intention to attack Persia¹¹⁹. What will your reputation be, if you put such a scheme into act?

‘Three different degrees of success—the lowest of which is glorious—are possible. You may conquer the Persian empire. ¹²⁰ Or you may detach from it the portion of Asia Minor west of a line drawn from Cilicia to Sinôpê, and found, in this, new cities for the homeless Greeks who now are roving mercenaries. Or, at the worst, you cannot fail to free from Persia the existing Greek cities of Asia. We should be mad if, instead of wasting our strength on quarrels at home, we did not turn it upon our certain prey, the effeminate Asiatics. (§§ 119—127.)

‘It may be made a reproach to me that I call upon you, and not upon my own city, to lead the enterprise. I have ¹²¹ already appealed to Athens; but she gives less heed to me than to the brawlers of the platform. The greater credit is mine for constancy in asserting my principle, and for seeking everywhere the agents who seem most capable of putting it into practice. (§§ 128—131.)

‘Shame should forbid us to see, unmoved, Asia more prosperous than Europe,—the descendants of Cyrus more prosperous than the descendants of Herakles. It is not power or wealth—you have more than enough of both already—it is glory that ought to be your motive. Hear, in this counsel of mine—would that it were more complete!—the suggestion of your forefathers,—of the heroes,—of the present opportunity. Do not believe that the despotism built up by a ¹²² rude barbarian can defy a Greek champion of freedom. If, in a single city, the man who combines statesmanship and generalship is honoured, what honour will be yours, when the field of your statesmanship is Hellas,—of your strategy, Asia? No successor will surpass your fame; your have already outdone all your predecessors.

‘Beneficence, not brilliancy, is the ultimate test of ¹²³ exploits, not only for the olden time, but in our own. Tantalos, Pelops, Eurystheus yield in popular repute to Herakles, Theseus and the captors of Troy. Athens took her highest glory, not from her empire or her wealth, but from Marathon and Salamis: Sparta owed more renown to the defeat at Thermopylae than to any of her victories. (§§ 132—148.)

‘If my words seem, in themselves, weak and poor, set it ¹²⁴ down to old age; but receive the thoughts which they have strived to utter as a message from the gods. The gods do not benefit men directly, but through human agents. They have prompted me to speak for them—they have chosen you to act. Your triumphs hitherto have been given to prepare you for this crowning effort. It is no disparagement, but the best praise, to say that what you have already done falls short of what you are worthy to do. (§§ 149—153.)

‘This, then, is the sum:—“Be the benefactor of Greece; ¹²⁵ the king (not the despot) of Macedonia; the governor, in a free Hellenic spirit, of Asia.”’ (§§ 154, 155.)

Dionysios extols the Philippos as an appeal to ¹²⁶ a powerful man to use his power for the noblest ends¹²⁷. That generous earnestness which the Discourse certainly breathes is not for us, however, its most striking feature¹²⁸. The leading characteristic of the whole is emphatic recognition of Philip as the first of Hellenes and the natural champion of Hellas¹²⁹. It is an accident that his subjects are aliens; the Heraklid spirit is still as true in him as it was in the Argive founder of his dynasty. This was the sincere belief of Isokrates. For Demosthenes, Philip was no Hellene who chanced to rule barbarians; he was in his own person the representative barbarian¹³⁰—the head and front of the antihellenic interest.

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Sir Richard C. Jebb. London. 1876.

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Funding provided by National Endowment for the Humanities.

Current edition Perseus

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos (English) (The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos. Jebb, Richard Claverhouse, author. London: Macmillan, 1876.)

Notes on the current edition

The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos

1. Preller, Demeter and Persephone, p. 71 n., who refers to § 62, εἰς τὴν χώραν ταύτην: but ταύτην merely answers to ἐξ ἧς—( that land, from which). The Greater Panathenaea fell in the third year of each Olympiad. The celebrations nearest to 380 B.C. would therefore have been those of 382 and 378; and the Lesser Panathenaea can scarcely be thought of.

2. Date.

3. An ingenious, but to my mind improbable view, has lately been suggested by W. Engel (Rauchenstein, Introd. to Panegyr. p. 21). Engel thinks that the whole speech — except §§ 125—132—was written and published as early as 385 B. C. He observes that (1) in §§ 125—132 the Spartans are spoken of with a bitterness which is in contrast with the conciliatory tone used towards them in the rest of the oration: (2) in § 141 the defeat of Evagoras by the Persians (placed by Diod. in 386 B. C.) is alluded to; but Isokrates seems to know nothing of the capitulation of Evagoras in 385 (acc. to Diodoros XV. 4). Engel thinks that the war between Evagoras and Persia began in 394 B. C. It lasted 10 years, and ended in 385 B C. (Diod. XV. 9). The six years of § 141 are then, 391—385.Now argument (1) from the tone of §§ 125—132 appears to me wholly untenable; since in §§ 129 —132 Isokrates expressly and elaborately apologises for whatever may seem harsh in the tone of §§ 125—128. As regards argument (2), it is valid only if the chronology of Diodoros is accepted. Clinton, F. H. vol II. p. 279 (Appendix c. 12, on the Cyprian War), thinks that Diodoros is clearly wrong. He believes that the war began in 385 and ended in 376. Grote, too, rejeets the authority of Diodoros, and places the war in 390—380 B.C.: c. 76, vol. x. p. 30 n.

4. See above, on the Olympiakos of Lysias.

5. Mode of publication.

6. Sandys, Introd to Paneg. p. xli.

7. State of the Greek world in 380 B.C.

8. Analysis.

9. A summons to unity.

10. Obstacle to Greek concord— Sparta.

11. Claims of Athens to Empire.

12. Gifts of Athens to primitive Greece.

13. Athens the mother of Colonisation.

14. Athens the founder of civil life.

15. The Athenian Festivals.

16. Athens the military champion,

17. (1) of oppressed Greeks:

18. (2) of Greeks against barbarians.

19. The Persian Wars.

20. Cf. the note of Mr Sandys on Paneg. § 74, where he enumerates the known early ἐπιτάφιοι, viz. (1) that of Perikles in honour of those who fell at Samos in 440 B C.: (2) the speech of Perikles in 431 B.C.: (3) the ἐπιτάφιος of Gorgias. (4) the ἐπιτάφιος commonly ascribed to Lysias: (5) the Menexenos of Plato: (6) the ἐπιτάφιος ascribed to Demosthenes and purporting to have been spoken after Chacroneia: (7) the ἐπιτάφιος of Hypereides.

21. Public spirit of old.

22. Marathon.

23. Thermopylae. Arlemision.

24. Salamis.

25. Charges against Athens.

26. § 100, τὸν Μηλίων ἀνδραποδισμὸν καὶ τον Σκιωναίων ὅλεθρον. The fate of the Melians in 416 B. C. (Thuc. V. 84—116) and of the Skioneans in 423 B.C. (Thuc. V. 37) was the same;—the men of military age were put to death, the women and children sold as slaves. If any real antithesis is meant between ἀνδραποδισμός and ὄλεθρος, it must refer to the fact that the very name of Skione was effaced. The territory was given to the Plataean refugees: Thuc. v. 32.

27. Test of Imperial Athens.

28. The kleruchiae.

29. Imperial Sparta.

30. Lysander was a μόθων,—i.e. the son of a Helot, brought up as fosterbrother of a Spartan, and afterwards freed: see Lidd. and Scott s. v.

31. § 115, the Peace of Antalkidas.

32. Present condition of Greece.

33. § 118, ἐπὶ τάδε Φασήλιδος. The so called Peace of Kimon has usually been placed in 450 B.C.: Clinton F. H. The tradition was founded on the fact of an Athenian embassy to Persia headed by Kallias: Her. VIII. 151. Grote and Curtius take different views of this. Grote thinks that Kallias really negotiated a treaty—in 449 B. C.; c. xlix. vol. v. pp. 455—464. Curtius thinks that the embassy of Kallias failed; no treaty was formally concluded, but the terms of the legendary treaty represent truly the relative positions of Persia and Hellas at the time. ( Hist. Gr. vol. II. p. 412 tr. Ward.) Note that (as Mr Sandys observes) the cessation of Persia from hostilities is described in § 118 as a simple result of Athenian victories; in § 120, as the result of a definite convention. This well illustrates the view of Thirlwall, Curtius and others, that the belief in a definite treaty grew out of the vague boasts of orators who were seeking a contrast to the treaty of Antalkidas.

34. § 126. Amyntas II. began to reign in 394 B C. In 393 the Illyrians invaded Macedonia. Amyntas, compelled to evacuate Pella, made over to the Olynthian Confederacy the towns and territory on the Thermaic gulf, and withdrew to Thessaly. In 383 he succeeded in recovering the greater part of his kingdom. But the Olynthians refused to restore that part of it which he had given into their keeping. Hereupon, in 383, Amyntas sent envoys to Sparta asking for help against Olynthos (Diod. XV. 19). Envoys from Akanthos and Apollonia came on the same errand about the same time: Xen. Hellen. v. 2. 11. Throughout the Olynthian war(383—379) Sparta was actively aided by Amyntas: Diod. XV. 19—23.

35. The Spartan alliances

36. Appeal to Sparta.

37. The position of Persia.

38. § 134. The war between Evagoras and Persia lasted ten years (Isokr. Evag., Or. IX. § 64: Diod. XV. 8, 9). In the course of it, Evagoras got together 200 triremes and attacked the Persian fleet at Citium, but was utterly defeated; was blockaded soon afterwards in Salamis; and, after a brave resistance, capitulated.Diodoros assigns the war to 394 —385 (XV. 8, 9); the seafight to 386 (XV. 2, 3); the capitulation ( ib. 8) to 385. Isokrates alludes in § 141 to the seafight, and here (§ 134) speaks of the blockade as existing. He says, moreover, that the king of Persia has now wasted six years in the war; which naturally means, and has always been taken to mean, that it is six years since the war began.I. Engel reconciles Diodoros with Isokrates by supposing that, with the exception of §§ 125—132 which allude to 380 B.C., the Panegyrikos was published in 385, just before Evagoras capitulated. The ‘six years’ of Isokrates are, then, 391—385, during which the war was actively prosecuted,—394—391 having been years chiefly of preparation. (See Rauchonstein, Introd. to Panegyr. p. 21 and note above.)II. Clinton, holding the natural view that the entire Panegyrikos was first published in 380, sets aside the chronology of Diodoros. He believes that the war began in 385, in which year Evagoras suffered his defeat at sea, and ended in 376. The ‘six years’ of Isokr. are, then, 385—380. The blockade of Salamis must have followed soon upon the defeat; and we have, then, to suppose a resistance of some nine years on the part of Evagoras, if, as Diodoros says, the blockade was terminated only by his surrender.III. Grote also places the Panegyrikos in 380. But he assigns the war to 390—380 or 379. Xenophon ( Hellen. IV viii. 24) mentions that an Athenian fleet was sent to the aid of Evagoras in 390 B. C. Grote relies on this fact as showing that the war between Evagoras and Persia had begun in 390. Clinton, on the other hand, thinks that this Athenian expedition, and a subsequent one in 388, related to hostilities which preceded formal war. Grote does not define the ‘six years’ of Isokr.; but suggests that they may be taken either from the Peace of Antalkidas (from which, however, 380 was the eighth year) or from the defeat of Evagoras in 385.It seems impossible—in the absence of better data—to arrive at a certain or satisfactory conclusion. For my own part, I incline to prefer, with Clinton, the authority of Isokrates to that of Diodoros; to suppose that the Athenian expeditions of 390 and 388 preceded any formal declaration of war; that the actual war began in 385; that the naval defeat of Evagoras also fell in 385, and was soon followed by the blockade; but that Evagoras held out (whether able to take the sea again or not) till 376.

39. § 134. The Persian fleet (at this time blockading Salamis) was commanded by Gaos; the Persian land-forces by Orontes and the satrap Teiribazos. With Teiribazos served a contingent of Ionian Greeks: οἱ μετὰ Τειριβάζου στρατευόμενοι, § 135.

40. § 136. The particular dispute —if any such is referred to—is unknown. Isokrates perhaps means merely that Athens and Sparta contended for the hegemony, and for that privilege of levying contributions on the Aegaean islands which belonged to the head of a naval confederacy. Cf. § 132, χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν. Rauchenstein remarks: ‘Das nahere uber diesen Hader ist nicht bekannt, aber Athen konnte den Verlust der Kykladen in Folge des Friedens (§ 115) nicht verschmerzen.’

41. The real weakness of Persia.

42. § 139. Alluding to the revolt of Chios from Athens at a critical time in 412 B. C.: Thuc. VIII. 7.

43. § 140. This revolt of Egypt is not known from other sources; but is again alluded to in the Philippos, § 101. As Mr Sandys observes, it must at any rate have been over before the active hostilities of Persia against Evagoras began, and may be placed about 392—390, or 390—388.

44. Persian repulses.

45. § 142. By ὁ πόλεμος ὁ περὶ Ρόδον is meant the naval war which the Persian fleet, under Konon and Pharnabazos, waged with the Lacedaemonian fleet under Pharax and Peisandros, beginning nearly at the same time as the first campaign of Agesilaos in Asia, and ending with the battle of Knidos: 396—394 B. C.

46. § 142. The Greek words answering to ‘ held in check for three years’ are τρία ἔτη πολιορκούμενον. But by πολιορκούμενον, as Schneider on § 142 points out, is meant not merely the literal blockade of Konon by Pharax in Kaunos (Diod XIV. 83) in 395;—that, of course, did not last three years;— but the fact that, during 396—394, even after the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta, Konon kept his fleet in harbours, avoiding engagements on the open sea, until just before Knidos.

47. The alliance against Sparta of Athens, Thebes, Argos, Euboea and Corinth in 394 B.C., the first year of the Corinthian war: ‘Corinth was the συνέδριον of the allies (Xen. Hellen. IV. 4. 1. and Diod. XIV. 82)’: Mr Sandys ad loc.

48. § 144. Thimbron commanded in Asia in 400: Derkyllidas in 399—397: Agesilaos in 396—395. Derkyllidas having taken Atarneus in Mysia in 398 placed Drakon there as harmost: Xen. Hellen. II. 11.

49. The ‘Ten Thousand.’

50. § 149. Cf. Xen. Anab. II. 4. 4. (in allusion to the victory at Kynaxa): ἐνικῶμεν τὸν βασιλέα ἐπ ταῖς θύραις αὐτοῦ καὶ καταγελάσαντες ἀπήλθομεν.

51. Causes of Persian weakness.

52. § 154 ἐπὶ θανάτῳ. Konon was seized by order of Teiribazos in 390. How he actually perished was never known. According to Deinon, an historian of the 4th century, quoted by Cornelius Nepos, Con. § 3 , Konon escaped from the Persians.

53. Greek hatred of Barbarians.

54. Reasons for a War on Persia.

55. § 161. See notes above on §§ 134, 140.

56. § 161. Evagoras had ‘ravaged Phoenicia, stormed Tyre, made Cilicia revolt from the king’: Isokr. Evag. (Or. IX.) § 62.

57. § 162. Hekatomnos, Greek prince of Karia, had been appointed by Artaxerxes admiral of the Persian fleet at the beginning of the war with Evagoras (Theopomp. frag. 111, ed. Müller, quoted by Mr Sandys on § 134); but had afterwards become disaffected, and had secretly supplied Evagoras with money (Diod. XIV. 98).

58. Suffering in Greece.

59. § 169. In 389—387 B C. Dionysios I. had reduced successively Kaulon, Hipponium and Rhegium in Magna Graecia: Diod. XIV. 106 ff.

60. § 169. Dionysios had surrendered some Sicilian towns—as Akragas, Himera, Selinos—to Carthage; and brought others—as Naxos, Leontini, Messene—under his own power: see Diod. XIII. 114.

61. Peace of Antalkidas.

62. Its terms criticised.

63. § 179. The meaning seems to be:—‘Zeus is absolute lord of the whole earth. But Artaxerxes claims to be absolute lord of half the earth, i. e. of the continent of Asia. Europe—the other of the δισσαὶ ἤπειροι—is all that he leaves for Zeus.’

64. The invasion will be a theoria.

65. I have ventured to paraphrase the meaning of the image—so deeply suggestive to a Greek— contained in the words θεωρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ στρατείᾳ προσεοικώς (§ 182).

66. Summary.

67. Asia shall pour its wealth into Europe.

68. Fame of the Panegyrikos.

69. Dionys. de Isocr. c. 14 ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ, τῷ περιβοήτῳ λόγῳ.

70. Philostr. Vit. Soph. I. 17.—Isokrates himself, in the Philippos (Or. V.) § 11, notices the prestige of the Panegyrikos.

71. Quint. Inst. X. 4: Plut. Mor. p. 350 E (‘almost three Olympiads’): [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt.: Phot. Cod. 260.

72. Merits of expression.

73. Merits of structure.

74. Historical interest.

75. Above, p. 20.

76. See vol. I. p. 206.

77. See esp. §§ 133—159.

78. §§ 28—50.

79. See the Philippos (Or. v.) §§ 128, 129.

80. In the Philippos, § 84, he speaks of the difficulty of putting his conceptions in a new way— the Panegyrikos has beggared him; he can only say over again what he has said there: ὁ λόγος ὁ πανηγυρικός, ὃ τοὺς ἄλλους...εὐπορωτέρους ποιήσας, ἐμοὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρέσχηκεν .

81. Cf. Grote, c. 86, vol. XI. p. 332.

82. Motive of the Discourse.

83. Date.

84. Cf. Clinton, F. H. sub ann. 346.

85. Analysis.

86. § 7. Ἀμάδοκος, or Μήδοκος, king of the Thracian Odrysae, is called here ὁ παλαιός to distinguish him from the Amadokos who inherited, in 358 B. C., part of the dominions of Kotys, and who was perhaps his son: see O. Schneid. ad loc. The elder Amadokos is first heard of in 405 B.C.: Diod. XIII. 105. Xen. Hellen. IV. 8 says that in 390 B.C. Thrasybulos, then commanding an Athenian fleet, reconciled Amadokos to Seuthes, ruler of Lower Thrace ( ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἄρχοντα), and received both of them into friendship and alliance with Athens:— νομίζων καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ Θράκῃ οἰκούσας πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας φίλων ὄντων τούτων μᾶλλον προσέχειν ἂν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸν νοῦν. Isokrates speaks here as if the object of the favour shown to Amadokos had been rather to restrain him from interfering with the Athenian colonies in Thrace than to impress the Greeks in that region with the influence of Athens over the Thracian princes. Cf, Dem. in Aristocr. p. 623.

87. Philip must lead Greece against Asia.

88. His first duty.

89. His hereditary position.

90. § 32. According to Herodotos VIII. 137—8 , Perdikkas I., founder of the dynasty of Edessa, was an Argive of the house of Têmenos. Another tradition—which cannot, however, be traced above Theopompos—made Karanos, also an Argive and a Têmenid, the founder of the monarchy: see Grote, c. 25, vol. IV. p. 21. Cf. Liv. 27. 30

Macedonum reges ex ea civitate ( Argis) oriundos se referunt.

91. It is possible for him to reconcile the Greeks.

92. Sparta.

93. Argos.

94. Thebes.

95. Athens.

96. The task is even easy.

97. What illnatured people say of Philip.

98. § 81, πρὸς Διονύσιον την τυραννίδα κτησάμενον. Dionysios I. became master of Syracuse in 406 B.C.: but Isokrates certainly did not write to him till after 380 B.C.: cf. Philipp. §§ 128, 129: Ep. I. § 8. The words τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον do not, however, imply that the application of Isokrates immediately followed the acquisition of the tyrannis by Dionysios. Benseler and O. Schneider read τὸν τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον. The meaning would then be:—‘Dionysios I., founder of the despotism,’ as opposed to Dionysios II. who succeeded him in 367.

99. Invasion of Asia.

100. First condition of success.

101. Why Agesilaos failed.

102. § 87, τοὺς ἑταίρους—oligarchs who had been driven by political troubles from the towns of Asia Minor: see Ep. IX. § 13.

103. A precedent.

104. § 93. Cf. Panegyr. § 91.

105. Comparative advantages of Cyrus the younger and Philip.

106. § 99. Artaxerxes II. (Mnemon), king of Persia, 405—359 B.C.: Clinton, F. H. vol. II. Append. c. 18.

107. Their respective opponents.

108. Artaxerxes III. (Ochos): 359 —339 B.C.

109. Position of Persia.

110. As regards the earlier revolt mentioned here, see Panegyr. § 140 note. The chronology of the later revolt, spoken of here as not yet subdued, is uncertain. Schäfer ( Demosth. u. seine Zeit, vol. I. pp. 436 f.) thinks that Ochos made three expeditions against Egypt: (1) On the occasion noticed, but without date, by Diod. XVI. 40. (2) In the winter of 351—350 B.C., when Nectanebos II. was assisted by Diophantos and Lamios: Diod. XVI. 48: cf. Isokr. Ep. VIII. § 8. This would be the expedition, alluded to here, in which Ochos was ignominiously repulsed. (3) In 340 B.C., when Egypt was reconquered—Ochos again commanding in person. See Thirlwall, c. 48, vol. VI. p. 187 n.: Clinton, F. H. vol. II. Append c. 18.

111. § 102. ‘ Then’—i. e. at the time of the earlier Egyptian revolt, which was probably earlier than 385 B.C.: see note on Panegyr. § 161.

112. § 103. Idrieus, second son of Hekatom nos, succeeded Artemisia, widow of his brother Mausôlos, as dynast of Karia in 351 B.C., and reigned till 344. On the chronology of the princes of Karia, see Clinton, F. H. vol. II. Append. c. 14.

113. The true spell for Asia.

114. These counsels are in the spirit of Philip's ancestry.

115. § 106. Amyntas II., who began to reign in 394 B.C. and died in 370.

116. § 106. Perdikkas I.: see note on § 32.

117. § 112, τοὺς βασιλέας τῶν ἐθνῶν τῶν ἐφ’ ἑκατέρας τῆς ἠπείρου.—ἐθνῶν here can mean only βαρβάρων.

‘Man hat also für Europa nicht mit Benseler auch an griechische Fürsten, Neleus in Pylos, Hippokoon in Lacedämon, sondern nur an Barbaren wie an den Thrakerfürsten Diomedes (Apollodor 2, 5, 8) zu denken; für Asien (und Afrika) ist an Mygdon, die Hippolyte, Sarpedon (über Alle Apollodor 4, 5, 9), Busiris (obwohl Is. über diesen 11, 36 seq. anders urtheilt), Antaeus u. s. w. zu denken.’

O. Schneid. ad § 112.

118. Jason of Pherae.

119. § 119. In regard to this intention, see the conversation which Polydamas of Pharsalos reported at Sparta as having passed between himself and Jason of Pherae: Xen. Hellen. VI. 1. 12.

120. Results possible for Philip.

121. Athens.

122. Asia cannot resist Greece.

123. Beneficence is the test of achievement.

124. A message from the gods.

125. Summary.

126. Remarks.

127. Dionys. de Isocr. c. 6.

128. See Thirlwall's remarks on §§ 73—80 of the Philippos: c. 44: vol. V. p. 480.

129. See esp. §§ 32—38: 76—80: 108.

130. Demosth. Philipp. III. p. 118, § 31, directly calls Philip βάρβαρος—with political, if not with technical truth. Cf. Grote, c. 90, vol. XI. p. 604.

Sir Richard C. Jebb The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos 2.16.1